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PHILOSOPHY  OF  T 


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V 


DUGALD  STEWART,  Esq.  F.R.  SS.  Lond.  &  Edin. 

Honorary  Member  of  the  Imperial  Academy  of   Sciences  at  St.    Petersburgh  ; 
Member  of  the  Royal  Academy  of  Berlin  ;  and  of  the  American  Philoso- 
phical Society  held  at  Philadelphia  ;  formerly  Professor  of  Moral 
Philosophy  in  the  University  of  Edinburgh. 


VOLUME  SECOND. 
FROM  THE  LATEST  EDINBURGH  EDITION. 


J\'EfV-TOHK: 

PUBLISHED  BY  JAMES  EASTBURN  &  CO. 

At  the  Literary  Rooms,  Broadway. 
E.  &f  E.  Hosford,  Printers,  Albany. 

1818. 


I.'.-*; 


3s  v 


*  s 

-  --■ — • 


ADVERTISEMENT. 


AFTER  an  interval  of  more  than  twenty  years^ 
I  venture  to  present  to  the  public  a  Second  Vo- 
lume on  the  Philosophy  of  the  Human  Mind. 

When  the  preceding  Part  was  sent  to  the  press, 
I  expected  that  a  few  short  chapters  would  compre- 
hend all  that  I  had  further  to  offer  concerning  the 
Intellectual  Powers ;  and  that  I  should  be  able  to 
employ  the  greater  part  of  this  Volume  in  examin- 
ing those  principles  of  our  constitution,  which  are 
immediately  connected  with  the  Theory  of  Morals. 
On  proceeding,  however,  to  attempt  an  analysis  of 
Reason,  in  the  more  strict  acceptation  of  that  term, 
I  found  so  many  doubts  crowding  on  me  with  re- 
spect to  the  logical  doctrines  then  generally  receiv- 
ed, that  I  was  forced  to  abandon  the  comparatively 
limited  plan  according  to  which  I  had  originally 
intended  to  treat  of  the  Understanding,  and,  in  the 
mean  time,  to  suspend  the  continuation  of  my  work, 
till  a  more  unbroken  leisure  should  allow  me  to  re- 
sume it  with  a  less  divided  attention. 


IV  ADVERTISEMENT. 

Of  the  accidents  which  have  since  occurred  to 
retard  my  progress,  it  is  unnecessary  to  take  any 
notice  here.  I  allude  to  them,  merely  as  an  apology 
for  those  defects  of  method,  which  are  the  natural, 
and  perhaps  the  unavoidable,  consequences  of  the 
frequent  interruptions  by  which  the  train  of  my 
thoughts  has  been  diverted  to  other  pursuits.  Such 
of  my  readers  as  are  able  to  judge  how  very  large 
a  proportion  of  my  materials  has  been  the  fruit  of 
my  own  meditations  ;  and  who  are  aware  of  the 
fugitive  nature  of  our  reasonings  concerning  pheno- 
mena so  far  removed  from  the  perceptions  of  Sense, 
|#iU  easily  conceive  the  difficulty  I  must  occasion- 
ally have  experienced,  in  deciphering  the  short  and 
sjight  hints  on  these  topics,  which  I  had  committed 
to  writing  at  remote  periods  of  my  life ;  and  still 
more,  in  recovering  the  thread  which  had  at  first 
connected  them  together  in  the  order  of  my  re- 
searches. 

I  have  repeatedly  had  occasion  to  regret  the 
tendency  of  this  intermitted  and  irregular  mode  of 
composition,  to  deprive  my  speculations  of  those 
advantages,  in  point  of  continuity,  which,  to  the 
utmost  of  my  power,  I  have  endeavoured  to  give 
them.  But  I  would  willingly  indulge  the  hope, 
that  this  is  a  blemish  more  likely  to  meet  the 
eye  of  the  author  than  of  the  reader  ;  and  I  am 


ADVERTISEMENT.  V 

confident,  that  the  critic  who  shall  honour  me  with 
a  sufficient  degree  of  attention,  to  detect  it  where 
it  may  occur,  will  not  be  inclined  to  treat  it  with 
an  undue  severity. 

A  Third  Volume  (of  which  the  chief  materials 
are  already  prepared)  will  comprehend  all  that  I 
mean  to  publish  under  the  title  of  the  Philosophy 
of  the  Human  Mind.  The  principal  subjects  allot- 
ted for  it  are  Language  ;  Imitation ;  the  Varieties 
of  Intellectual  Character  ;  and  the  Faculties  by 
which  Man  is  distinguished  from  the  lower  animals. 
The  two  first  of  these  articles  belong,  in  strict  pro- 
priety, to  this  second  part  of  my  work ;  but  the 
size  of  the  volume  has  prevented  me  from  entering 
on  the  consideration  of  them  at  present. 

The  circumstances  which  have  so  long  delayed 
the  publication  of  these  volumes  on  the  Intellec- 
tual Powers,  have  not  operated,  in  an  equal  degree, 
to  prevent  the  prosecution  of  my  inquiries  into  those 
principles  of  Human  Nature,  to  which  my  attention 
was,  for  many  years,  statedly  and  forcibly  called 
by  my  official  duty.  Much,  indeed,  still  remains 
to  be  done  in  maturing,  digesting,  and  arranging 
many  of  the  doctrines  which  I  was  accustomed  to 
introduce  into  my  lectures;  but  if  I  shall  be  bless- 
ed, for  a  hw  years  longer,  with  a  moderate  share 


VI  ADVERTISEMENT. 

of  health  and  of  mental  vigour,  I  do  not  altogether 
despair  of  jet  contributing  something,  in  the  form 
of  Essays >j  to  fill  up  the  outline  which  the  sanguine 
imagination  of  youth  encouraged  me  to  conceive, 
before  I  had  duly  measured  the  magnitude  of  my 
undertaking  with  the  time  or  with  the  abilities 
which  I  could  devote  to  the  execution. 

The  volume  which  I  now  publish  is  more  parti- 
cularly intended  for  the  use  of  Academical  Stu- 
dents ;  and  is  offered  to  them  as  a  guide  or  assist- 
ant, at  that  important  stage  of  their  progress  when, 
the  usual  course  of  discipline  being  completed,  an 
inquisitive  mind  is  naturally  led  to  review  its  past 
attainments,  and  to  form  plans  for  its  future  im- 
provement. In  the  prosecution  of  this  design,  I 
have  not  aimed  at  the  establishment  of  new  theo- 
ries ;  far  less  have  I  aspired  to  the  invention  of  any 
new  organ  for  the  discovery  of  truth.  My  princi- 
pal object  is  to  aid  my  readers  in  unlearning  the 
scholastic  errors  which,  in  a  greater  or  less  degree, 
still  maintain  their  ground  in  our  most  celebrated 
seats  of  learning ;  and  by  subjecting  to  free,  but  I 
trust,  not  sceptical  discussion,  the  more  enlightened 
though  discordant  systems  of  modern  Logicians,  to 
accustom  the  understanding  to  the  unfettered  exer- 
cise of  its  native  capacities.  That  several  of  the 
views  opened  in  the  following  pages  appear  to  my- 


ADVERTISEMENT.  VU 

self  original,  and  of  some  importance,  1  will  not 
deny  ;  but  the  reception  these  may  meet  with,  I 
shall  regard  as  a  matter  of  comparative  indiffer- 
ence, if  my  labours  be  found  useful  in  training  the 
mind  to  those  habits  of  reflection  on  its  own  opera- 
tions, which  may  enable  it  to  superadd  to  the  in- 
structions of  the  schools,  that  higher  education 
which  no  schools  can  bestow. 

Kinneil-Hoitse,  22d  November,  1813 


CONTENTS. 


Page. 
of  Reason,  or  the  understanding,  properly  so  called  ;  and  the 
various  faculties  and  operations  more  immediately  connected 

"WITH    IT, I 

Preliminary  Observations  on  the  Vagueness  and  Ambiguity  of  the  common 
Philosophical  Language  relative  to  this  part  of  our  Constitution  — Reason 
and  Reasoning, — Understanding, — Intellect, — Judgment,  Sic.  .  .        ib. 

CHAPTER  1.— Of  the  Fundamental  Laws  of  Human  Belief ;  or  the  Prima- 
ry Elements  of  Human  Reason,    ....  .19 
Section  I. — Of  Mathematical  Axioms,        .         .        .         .     .    .        .        ib. 

1 20 

II.  Continuation  of  the  same  Subject,        ....       32 
Section  II. — Of  certain  Laws  of  Belief,  inseparably  connected  with  the 
exercise  of  Consciousness,  Memory,  Perception,  aud  Rea- 
soning,        •     ....       36 

Section  III. — Continuation  of  the  Subject. — Critical  remarks  on  some 
late  Controversies  to  which  it  has  given  rise. — Of  the  Ap- 
peals which  Dr.  Reid  and  some  other  Modern  Writers 
have  made,  in  their  Philosophical  Discussions,  to  Common 

Sense,  as  a  Criterion  of  Truth, 47 

CHAPTER  II.— Of  Reasoning  and  of  Deductive  Evidence,          ...       66 
Section  I ib, 

I.  Doubts  with  respect  to  Locke's  Distinction  between  the 
Powers  of  Intuition  and  of  Reasoning,  ib. 

II.  Conclusions  obtained  by  a  process  of  Deduction  often 
mistaken  for  Intuitive  Judgments,  ....        72 

Section  II. — Of  General  Reasoning, 77 

I.  Illustrations  of  some  Remarks  formerly  stated  in  treating 

of  Abstraction, ib. 

II.  Continuation  of  the  Subject. — Of  Language  considered 

as  an  Instrument  of  Thought,  94 

Vol..  ii.  B 


X  CONTENTS. 

Page, 

III.  Continuation  of  the  Subject. — Visionary  Theories  of 
some  Logicians,  occasioned  by  their  inattention  to  the 
Essential  Distinction  between  Mathematics  and  other 
Sciences, 101 

IV.  Continuation  of  the  Subject. — Peculiar  and  superemi- 
nent  Advantages  possessed  by  Mathematicians,  in  conse- 
quence of  their  definite  Phraseology,         ....      108 

Sect.  III. — Of  Mathematical  Demonstration, 110 

I.  Of  the  Circumstance  on  which  Demonstrative  Evidence 
essentially  depends, .        ib 

II.  Continuation  of  the  Subject. — How  far  it  is  true  that  all 
Mathematical  Evidence  is  resolvable  into  Identical  Pro- 
positions,  121 

III.  Continuation  of  the  Subject. — Evidence  of  the  Mecha- 
nical Philosophy,  not  to  be  confounded  with  that  which  is 
properly  called  Demonstrative  or  Mathematical. — Oppo- 
site Error  of  some  late  Writers, 131 

Section  IV. — Of  our  Reasonings  concerning  Probable  or  Contingent 

Tr  ths, 150 

I.  Narrow  Field  of  Demonstrative  Evidence. — Of  Demon- 
strative Evidence,  when  combined  with  that  of  Sense,  as 
in  Practical  Geometry  ;  and  with  those  of  Sense  and  of 
Induction,  as  in  the  Mechanical  Philosophy. — Remarks 
on  a  Fundamental  Law  of  Belief,  involved  in  all  our  Rea- 
sonings concerning  Contingent  Truths,    ....        ib, 

II.  Continuation  of  the  Subject. — Of  that  Permanence  or 
Stability  in  the  Order  of  Nature,  which  is  presupposed  in 

our  Reasonings  concerning  Contingent  Truths,        .        .      155 

III.  Continuation  of  the  Subject. — General  Remarks  on  the 
Difference  between  the  Evidence  of  Experience,  and  that 

of  Analogy, 169 

IV.  Continuation  of  the  Subject. — Evidence  of  Testimony 
tacitly  recognized  as  a  ground  of  Belief,  in  our  most  cer- 
tain Conclusions  concerning  Contingent  Trnths. — Differ- 
ence between  the  logical  and  the  popular  meanings  of  the 
word  Probability, 178 

CHAPTER  III.— Of  the  Aristotelian  Logic, 182 

Section  I. — Of  the  Demonstrations  of  the  Syllogistic  Rules  given  by 

Aristotle  and  his  Commentators, ib 

Section  II. — General  Reflections  on  the  Aim  of  the  Aristotelian  Logic, 
and  on  the  Intellectual  Habits  which  the  study  of  it  has  a 


CONTENES.  XI 

Page, 
tendency  to  form. — That  the  improvement  of  the  power  of 
Reasoning  ought  to  be  regarded  as  only  a  secondary  Ob- 
ject in  the  Culture  of  Understanding,        ....      201 

Section  III. — In  what  respects  the  study  of  the  Aristotelian  Logic  may 
be  useful  to  Disputants. — A  general  acquaintance  with  it 
justly  regarded  as  an  essential  accomplishment  to  those 
who  are  liberally  educated. — Doubts  suggested  by  some 
late  Writers,  concerning  Aristotle's  claims  to  the  inven- 
tion of  the  Syllogistic  Theory,  216 

CHAPTER  IV.— Of  the  Method  of  Inquiry  pointed  out  in  the  Experimental 

or  Inductive  Logic,  230 

Section  I. — Mistakes  of  the  Ancients  concerning  the  proper  object  of 
Philosophy. — Ideas  of  Bacon  on  the  same  Subject. — In- 
ductive Reasoning. — Analysis  and  Synthesis. — Essential 
difference  between  Legitimate  and  Hypothetical  Theo- 
ries,   ib- 

Section  II. — Continuation  of  the  Subject. — The  Induction  of  Aristotle 

compared  with  that  of  Bacon, 253 

Section  III. — Of  the  Import  of  the  words  Analysis  and  Synthesis  in  the 

Language  of  Modern  Philosophy,     .....      264 

I.  Preliminary  Observations  on  the  Analysis  and  Synthesis 

of  the  Greek  Geometricians, ib. 

II.  Critical  Remarks  on  the  vague  Use,  among  Modern 
Writers,  of  the  Terms  Analysis  and  Synthesis,        .        .      273 

Section  IV. — The  Consideration  of  the  Inductive  Logic  resumed,  .      286' 

I.  Additional  Remarks  on  the  distinction  between  Expe- 
rience and  Analogy. — Of  the  grounds  afforded  by  the  lat- 
ter for  Scientific  Inference  and  Conjecture,       .  ib. 

II.  Use  and  Abuse  of  Hypotheses  in  Philosophical  Inqui- 
ries.— Difference  between  Gratuitous  Hypotheses,  and 
those  which  are  supported  by  presumptions  suggested  by 
Analogy. — Indirect  Evidence  which  a  Hypothesis  may 
derive  from  its  agreement  with  the  Phenomena. — Cau- 
tions against  extending  some  of  these  conclusions  to  the 
Philosophy  of  the  Human  Mind, 301 

III.  Supplemental  Observations  on  the  words  Induction  and 
Analogy,  as  used  in  Mathematics, 319 

•Section  V. — Of  certain  misapplications  of  the  words  Experience  and 
Induction  in  the  phraseology  of  Modern  Science. — Illus- 
trations from  Medicine  and  from  Political  Economy,        .      325 


Xll  CONTENTS. 

Page. 
Section  VI. — Of  tke  Speculation  concerning  Final  Causes,  .        .     338 

I.  Opinion  of  Lord  Bacon  on  the  Subject. — Final  Causes 
rejected  by  Des  Cartes,  and  by  the  majority  of  French 
Philosophers. — Recognized  as  legitimate  Objects  of  re- 
search by  Newton. — Tacitly  acknowledged  by  all  as  a 
useful  Logical  Guide,  even  in  Sciences  which  have  no 
immediate  relation  to  Theology, ib. 

II.  Danger  of  confounding  Final  with  PIrysical  Causes  in 

the  Philosophy  of  the  Human  Mind,         ....      353 
Conclusion  of  Part  Second, 362 

Notes  and  Illustrations, ,  371 

Appendix, 413 


ELEMENTS 


OF    THE 


PHILOSOPHY  OF  THE  HUMAN  MIND. 


PART  SECOND. 

&F  REASON,  OR  THE  UNDERSTANDING  PROPERLY  SO  CALLED; 
AND  THE  VARIOUS  FACULTIES  AND  OPERATIONS  MORE  IMME- 
DIATELY   CONNECTED    WITH    IT. 


PRELIMINARY  OBSERVATIONS  ON  THE  VAGUENESS  AND  AMBIGUITY  OP 
THE  COMMON  PHILOSOPHICAL  LANGUAGE  RELATIVE  TO  THIS  PART 
OF  OUR  CONSTITUTION. — REASON  AND  REASONING, — UNDERSTAND- 
ING,— INTELLECT, — JUDGMENT,  &C. 

1  HE  power  of  Reason,  of  which  I  am  now  to  treat,  is  un- 
questionably the  most  important  by  far,  of  those  which  are 
comprehended  under  the  general  title  of  Intellectual.  It  is 
on  the  right  use  of  this  power,  that  our  success  in  the  pur- 
suit both  of  knowledge  and  of  happiness  depends ;  and  it  is 
by  the  exclusive  possession  of  it  that  Man  is  distinguished, 
in  the  most  essential  respects,  from  the  lower  animals.  It  is, 
indeed,  from  their  subserviency  to  its  operations,  that  the  other 
faculties,  which  have  been  hitherto  under  our  consideration, 
derive  their  chief  value. 

In  proportion  to  the  peculiar  importance  of  this  subject 
are  its  extent  and  its  difficulty  ; — both  of  them  such  as  to  lay 
me  under  a  necessity,  now  that  I  am  to  enter  on  the  discus- 
sion, to  contract,  in  various  instances,  those  designs  in  which 
I  was  accustomed  to  indulge  mvself.  when  I  looked  forward 

VOL.    II.  I 


2  ELEMENTS    OF    THE    PHILOSOPHY 

to  it  from  a  distance.  The  execution  of  them  at  present 
even  if  I  were  more  competent  to  the  task,  appears  to  me, 
on  a  closer  examination,  to  be  altogether  incompatible  with 
the  comprehensiveness  of  the  general  plan  which  was  sketch- 
ed out  in  the  advertisement  prefixed  to  the  former  volume  ; 
and  to  the  accomplishment  of  which  I  am  anxious,  in  the 
first  instance,  to  direct  my  efforts.  If  that  undertaking  should 
ever  be  completed,  I  may  perhaps  be  able  afterwards  to  of- 
fer additional  illustrations  of  certain  articles,  which  the 
limits  of  this  part  of  my  work  prevent  me  from  considering 
with  the  attention  which  they  deserve.  I  should  wish  in 
particular,  to  contribute  something  more  than  I  can  here  in- 
troduce, towards  a  rational  and  practical  system  of  Logic, 
adapted  to  the  present  state  of  human  knowledge,  and  to  the 
real  business  of  human  life. 

"  What  subject,1'  says  Burke,  "  does  not  branch  out  to  in- 
"  finity  !  It  is  the  nature  of  our  particular  scheme,  and  the  sin- 
"  gle  point  of  view  in  which  we  consider  it,  which  ought  to 
"  put  a  stop  to  our  researches."*  How  forcibly  does  the  re- 
mark apply  to  all  those  speculations  which  relate  to  the  prin- 
ciples of  the  Human  Mind  ! 

I  have  frequently  had  occasion,  in  the  course  of  the  fore- 
going disquisitions,  to  regret  the  obscurity  in  which  this  de- 
partment of  philosophy  is  involved,  by  the  vagueness  and 
ambiguity  of  words  ;  and  I  have  mentioned,  at  the  same  time, 
my  unwillingness  to  attempt  verbal  innovations,  wherever  I 
could  possibly  avoid  them,  without  essential  injury  to  my  ar- 
gument. The  rule  which  I  have  adopted  in  my  own  prac- 
tice is,  to  give  to  every  faculty  and  operation  of  the  mind  its 
own  appropriate  name  ;  following,  in  the  selection  of  this 
name,  the  prevalent  use  of  our  best  writers  ;  and  endeavour- 
ing afterwards,  as  far  as  I  have  been  able,  to  employ  each 
word  exclusively,  in  that  acceptation  in  which  it  has  hitherto 
been  used  most  generally.  In  the  judgments  which  I  have 
formed  on  points  of  this  sort,  it  is  more  than  probable  that  I 
may  sometimes  have  been  mistaken  :  but  the  mistake  is  of  lit- 
tle consequence,  if  I  myselfhave  invariably  annexed  the  same 
*  Conclusion  of  the  Inquiry  fate  the  Sublime  and  the  Beautiful. 


OP    THE    HUMAN    MIND.  .5 

meaning  to  the  same  phrase  ; — an  accuracy  which  I  am  not 
so  presumptuous  as  to  imagine  that  I  have  uniformly  attained, 
but  which  I  am  conscious  of  having,  at  least,  uniformly  at- 
tempted. How  far  I  have  succeeded,  they  alone  who  have 
followed  my  reasonings  with  a  very  critical  attention  are 
qualified  to  determine  :  for  it  is  not  by  the  statement  of  for' 
mal  definitions,  but  by  the  habitual  use  of  precise  and  ap- 
propriate language,  that  I  have  endeavoured  to  fix  in  my 
reader's  mind  the  exact  import  of  my  expressions. 

In  appropriating,  however,  particular  words  to  particu- 
lar ideas,  I  do  not  mean  to  censure  the  practice  of  those 
who  may  have  understood  them  in  a  sense  different  from 
that  which  I  annex  to  them  ;  but  I  found  that,  without  such 
an  appropriation,  I  could  not  explain  my  notions  respecting 
the  human  mind,  with  any  tolerable  degree  of  distinctness. 
This  scrupulous  appropriation  of  terms,  if  it  can  be  called 
an  innovation,  is  the  only  one  which  I  have  attempted  to  in- 
troduce ;  for  in  no  instance  have  I  presumed  to  annex  a  phi- 
losophical meaning  to  a  technical  word  belonging  to  this 
branch  of  science,  without  having  previously  shewn,  that  it 
has  been  used  in  the  same  sense  by  good  writers,  in  some  pas- 
sages of  their  works.  After  doing  this,  I  hope  I  shall  not  be 
accused  of  affectation,  when  I  decline  to  use  it  in  any  of  the 
other  acceptations  in  which,  from  carelessness  or  from  want 
of  precision,  they  may  have  been  led  occasionally  to  em- 
ploy it. 

Some  remarkable  instances  of  vagueness  and  ambiguity  in 
the  employment  of  words,  occur  in  that  branch  of  my  sub- 
ject of  which  I  am  now  to  treat.  The  word  Reason  itself 
is  far  from  being  precise  in  its  meaning.  In  common  and 
popular  discourse,  it  denotes  that  power  by  which  we  distin- 
guish truth  from  falsehood,  and  right  from  wrong  ;  and  by 
which  we  are  enabled  to  combine  means  for  the  attainment 
of  particular  ends.  Whether  these  different  capacities  are, 
with  strict  logical  propriety,  referred  to  the  same  power,  is 
a  question  which  I  shall  examine  in  another  part  of  my 
work  5  but  that  they  are  all  included  in  the  idea  which  is 
generally   annexed   to   the  word  reason,    there   can  be  no 


4  ELEMENTS    OP    THE    PHILOSOPHY 

doubt  ;  and  the  case,  so  far  as  I  know,  is  the  same  with 
the  corresponding  term  in  all  languages  whatever.  The  fact 
probably  is,  that  this  word  was  first  employed  to  compre- 
hend the  principles,  whatever  they  are,  by  which  man  is 
distinguished  from  the  brutes  ;  and  afterwards  came  to  be 
somewhat  limited  in  its  meaning,  by  the  more  obvious  con- 
clusions concerning  the  nature  of  that  distinction,  which  pre- 
sent themselves  to  the  common  sense  of  mankind.  It  is  in 
this  enlarged  meaning  that  it  is  opposed  to  instinct  by  Pope  : 

"  And  Reason  raise  o'er  Instinct  as  you  can; 
"  In  this  'lis  God  directs,  in  that  'tis  Man." 

It  was  thus,  too,  that  Milton  plainly  understood  the  term, 
when  he  remarked,  that  smiles  imply  the  exercise  of  reason  : 

" Smiles  from  Reason  flow, 

"  To  brutes  denied,  :" 

And   still   more    explicitly  in  these   noble   lines  ; 

"  There  wanted  yet  the   master-work,  the  end 
"  Of  all  yet  done  ;  a  creature  who,  not  prone 
"  And  brute  as   other  creatures,  but  endued 
*'  With  sanctity  of  Reason,  might  eret:t 
"  His  stature,  and  upright  with   front  serene 
"  Govern  the  rest,  self-knowing  ;  and  from  thence, 
"  Magnanimous,  to  correspond  with  heaven  ; 
"  But,  grateful  to  acknowledge   whence  his  good 
"  Descends,  thither  with  heart,  and  voice,  and  eyes 
et  Directed  in   devotion,  to  adore 
"  And  worship  God  Supreme,  who  made  him  chid 
«  Of  all  his  works." 

Among  the  various  characteristics  of  humanity,  the  power 
of  devising  means  to  accomplish  ends,  together  with  the 
power  of  distinguishing  truth  from  falsehood,  and  right  from 
"wrong,  are  obviously  the  most  conspicuous  and  important ; 
and  accordingly  it  is  to  these  that  the  word  reason,  even  in 
its  most  comprehensive  acceptation,  is  now  exclusively  re- 
stricted.* 

*  This,  I  think,  is  the  meaning  which  most  naturally  presents  itself  to  com- 
mon readers,  when  the  word  reason  occurs  in  authors  not  affecting  to  aim  at 
any  nice  logical  distinctions  ;  and  it  is  certainly  the  meaning  which  must  be 
annexed  to  it,  in  some  of  the  most  serious  and  important  arguments  in  which 
it  has  ever  been  emplo\7ed.  In  the  following  passage,  for  example,  where 
Mr.  Locke  contrasts  the  light  of  Reason  with  that  of  Revelation,  he  plainly 
proceeds    on  the  supposition,  that  it    is  competent  to  appeal   to   the  former,    as 


OP    THE    HUMAN    MIND.  D 

By  some  philosophers,  the  meaning  of  the  word  has  been, 
of  late,  restricted  still  farther;  to  the  power  by  which  we 
distinguish  truth  from  falsehood,  and  combine  means  for  the 
accomplishment  of  our  purposes  ; — the  capacity  of  distin- 
guishing right  from  wrong,  being  referred  to  a  separaie  prin- 
ciple or  faculty,  to  which  different  names  have  been  assigned 
in  different  ethical  theories.  The  following  passage  from 
Mr.  Hume  contains  one  of  the  most  explicit  statements  of 
this  limitation  which  I  can  recollect  :  "  Thus,  the  distinct 
"  boundaries  and  offices  of  reason  and  of  taste  are  easily 
"  ascertained.  The  former  conveys  the  knowledge  of  truth 
"  and  falsehood  ;  the  latter  gives  the  sentiment  of  beauty 
"  and  deformity, — vice  and  virtue.  Reason,  being  cool  and 
"  disengaged,  is  no  motive  to  action,  and  directs  only  the 
"  impulse  received  from  appetite  or  inclination,  by  shewing 
is  us  the  means  of  attaining  happiness  or  avoiding  misery. 
"  Taste,  as  it  gives  pleasure  or  pain,  and  thereby  constitutes 
"  happiness  or  misery,  becomes  a  motive  to  action,  and  is 
"  the  first  spring  or  impulse  to  desire  and  volition."* 

affording  a  standard  of  right  and  wrong,  not  less  than  of  speculative  truth  and 
falsehood  ;  nor  can  there  be  a  doubt  that,  when  he  speaks  of  truth  as  the  ob- 
ject of  natural  reason,  it  was  principally,  if  not  wholly,  moral  truth,  which  he 
had  in  his  view  : — "  Reason  is  natural  revelation,  whereby  the  eternal  Father 
ct  of  Light,  and  fountain  of  all  knowledge,  communicates  to  mankind  that  por- 
"  tion  of  truth  which  he  has  laid  within  the  reach  of  their  natural  faculties.  Ke- 
"  velation  is  natural  reason,  enlarged  by  a  new  set  of  discoveries,  communi- 
"  cated  by  God  immediately,  which  reason  vouches  the  truth  of,  by  the  lestimo- 
"  ny  and  proofs  it  gives  that  they  come  from  God.  So  that  he  who  takes  away 
"  reason  to  make  way  for  revelation,  puts  out  the  light  of  both,  and  does  much 
"  the  same,  as  if  he  would  persuade  a  man  to  put  out  his  eyes,  the  better  to 
"  receive  the  remote  light  of  an  invisible  star  by  a  telescope." — Lode's  Essay, 
B.  iv.  c.  19. 

A  passage  still  more  explicit  for  my  present  purpose,  occurs  in  the  pleasing 
and  philosophical  conjectures  of  Huyghens,  concerning  the  planetary  worlds. 
"  Positis  vero  ejusmodi  planetarum  incolis  raiione  ntentibus,  qua?ri  adhuc  potest, 
"  nnne  idem  illic,  atque  apud  nos,  sit  hoc  quod  ralioncm  vocamus.  Q'iod  quidetn 
"  ita  esse  omnino  dicendum  videtur,  neque  alitor  fieri  posse  ;  sive  usum  rationis 
"  in  his  consideremus  quce  ad  mores  et  aequitatem  pertinent,  sive  in  iis  quiip 
"  spectant  ad  principia  et  fundamenta  scienliarum.  Etenim  ratio  apud  nos  cm, 
i!  qua;  sensum  justitise,  honesti,  laudis,  dementia?,  gratitudinis  ingenci  at.  mala  ac 
''bona  in  universum  discernere  docet :  quaKjue  ad  ha?c  anirauin?disciplinn?,  mnl- 
"  torumque  inventorum  capacem  reddit,"  k.c.  &zc. — Hugenii  Ojiera  I'aria,  Vol.  LI. 
p.  663.     Lugd    Batav.  1724 

;  Essays  and  Treatises,  &c.  Appendix,   concerning  Moral   Sentiment. 


6  ELEMENTS    OP    THE    PHILOSOPHY 

On  the  justness  of  this  statement  of  Mr.  Hume,  I  have  no 
remarks  to  offer  here  ;  as  my  sole  object  in  quoting  it  was  to 
illustrate  the  different  meanings  annexed  to  the  word  reason 
by  different  writers.  It  will  appear  afterwards,  that,  in  con- 
sequence of  this  circumstance,  some  controversies,  which 
have  been  keenly  agitated  about  the  principles  of  morals, 
resolve  entirely  into  verbal  disputes  ;  or,  at  most,  into  ques- 
tions of  arrangement  and  classification,  of  little  comparative 
moment  to  the  points  at  issue.* 

Another  ambiguity  in  the  word  reason  it  is  of  still  greater 
consequence  to  point  out  at  present ;  an  ambiguity  which 
leads  us  to  confound  our  rational  powers  in  general,  with  that 
particular  branch  of  them,  known  among  logicians  by  the 
name  of  the  Discursive  faculty.  The  affinity  between  the 
words  reason  and  reasoning  sufficiently  accounts  for  this  inac- 
curacy in  common  and  popular  language  ;  although  it  cannot 
fail  to  appear  obvious,  on  the  slightest  reflection,  that  in 
strict  propriety,  reasoning  only  expresses  one  of  the  various 
functions  or  operations  of  reason  ;  and  that  an  extraordinary 
capacity  for  the  former  by  no  means  affords  a  test  by  which 
the  other  constituent  elements  of  the  latter  may  be  measured.! 
]STor  is  it  to  common  and  popular  language  that  this  inaccu- 
rac}'  is  confined.  It  has  extended  itself  to  the  systems  of 
some  of  our  most  acute  philosophers,  and  has,  in  various  in- 

*In  confirmation  of  this  remark,  I  shall  only  quote  at  present  a  few  sentences 
from  an  excellent  discourse,  by  Dr.  Adams  of  Oxford,  on  the  nature  and  obliga- 
tions of  virtue.  "  Nothing;  can  bring  us  under  an  obligation  to  do  what  appears 
to  our  moral  judgment  wrong.  It  may  be  supposed  our  interest  to  do  this ;  but 
it  cannot  be  supposed  our  duty. — Power  may  compel,  interest  may  bribe,  plea- 
sure may  persuade  ;  but  reason  only  can  oblige.  This  is  the  only  authority 
which  rational    beings  can  own,  and  to  which  they  owe  obedience. 

It  must  appear  perfectly  obvious  to  every  reader,  that  the  apparent  difference 
of  opinion  between  this  writer  and  Mr.  Hume,  turns  chiefly  on  the  different 
degrees  of  latitude  with  which  they  have  used  the  word  reason.  Of  the  two, 
there  cannot  be  a  doubt  that  Dr.  Adams  has  adhered  by  far  the  most  faith- 
fully, not  only  to  its  acceptation  in  the  works  of  our  best  English  authors,  but 
to  the  acceptation  of  the  corresponding  term  in  the  ancient  languages.  "  Est 
'■'  quidem  vera  lex,  recta  ratio — quae  vocet  ad  officium,  jubendo  ;  vetando,  a  fraude 
"  deterreat,"  Sic.  &.c. 

t  The  two  most  different  things  in  the  world  (says  Locke)  are,  a  logical  chicaner, 
and  a  man  of  reason.". — Conduct  of  the  Understanding.  §  3. 


OF    THE    HUMAN    MIND.  7 

stances  produced  an  apparent  diversity  of  opinion  where  there 
was  little  or  none  in  reality. 

"  No  hypothesis  (says  Dr.  Campbell)  hitherto  invented, 
"  hath  shewn  that,  by  means  of  the  discursive  faculty,  with- 
"  out  the  aid  of  any  other  mental  power,  we  could  ever  obtain 
"  a  notion  of  either  the  beautiful  or  the  good.'1*  The  remark 
is  undoubtedly  true,  and  may  be  applied  to  all  those  systems 
which  ascribe  to  reason  the  origin  of  our  moral  ideas,  if  the 
expressions  reason  and  discursive  faculty  be  used  as  synony- 
mous. But  it  was  assuredly  not  in  this  restricted  acceptation, 
that  the  word  reason  was  understood  by  those  ethical  writers 
at  whose  doctrines  this  criticism  seems  to  have  been  pointed 
by  the  ingenious  author.  That  the  discursive  faculty  alone 
is  sufficient  to  account  for  the  origin  of  our  moral  ideas. 
I  do  not  know  that  any  theorist,  ancient  or  modern,  has  yet 
ventured  to  assert. 

Various  other  philosophical  disputes  might  be  mentioned, 
which  would  be  at  once  brought  to  a  conclusion,  if  this  dis- 
tinction between  reason  and  the  power  of  reasoning  were 
steadily  kept  in  vievv.t 

*  Philosophy  of  Rhetoric,  Vol.  I.  p.  204. 

t  It  is  curious,  that  Dr.  Johnson  has  assigned  to  this  very  limited,  and  (according 
to  present  usage)  very  doubtful  interpretation  of  the  word  reason,  the  first  place  in  his 
enumeration  of  its  various  meanings,  as  if  he  had  thought  it  the  sense  in  which  it  is 
most  properly  and  correctly  emploj'ed.  "  Reason"  he  tells  us  "  is  the  power  by  which 
"  man  deduces  one  proposition  from  another,  or  proceeds  from  premises  to  consequen- 
"  ces."  The  authority  which  he  has  quoted  for  this  definition  is  still  more  curious, 
being  manifestly  altogether  inapplicable  to  his  purpose.  "  Reason  is  the  director  of 
"  man's  will,  discovering  in  action  what  is  good  ;  for  the  laws  of  well-doing  are  the 
"  dictates  of  right  reason."' — Hooker. 

In  the  sixth  article  of  the  same  enumeration,  he  states  as  a  distinct  meaning  of  the 
same  word,  ratiocination,  discursive  power .  What  possible  difference  could  he  con- 
ceive between  this  signification  and  that  above  quoted  ?  The  authority,  however,  which 
he  produces  for  this  last  explanation,  is  worth  transcribing.  It  is  a  passage  from  Sir 
John  Davis,  where  that  fanciful  writer  states  a  distinction  between  reason  and  under- 
standing: to  which  he  seems  to  have  been  led  by  a  conceit  founded  on  their  respec- 
tive etymologies 

<(  When  she  rates  things,  and  moves  from  ground  to  ground, 

"  The  name  of  Keason  she  obtains  by  this  ; 

"  But  when  by  Reason  she  the  truth  hulh  found, 

"  And  standeth  fixt,  she  Understanding  is." 

The  adjective  reasonable,  as  employed  in  our  language,  is  not  liable  to  the  same  am- 
biguity with  the  substantive  from  which  it  is  derived.  It  denotes  a character  in  which 
reason  (taking  that  word  in  its  largest  acceptation)  prsscsses  a  decided  ascendnnt  ove 


8  ELEMENTS    OP    THE    PHILOSOPHY 

In  the  use  which  I  mike  of  the  word  reason,  in  the  title  of 
the  following  disquisitions,  I  employ  it  in  a  manner  to  which 
no  philosopher  can  object — to  denote  merely  the  power  by 
which  we  distinguish  truth  from  falsehood,  and  combine 
means  for  the  attainment  of  our  ends  :  omitting  for  the  pre- 
sent all  consideration  of  that  function  which  many  have  as- 
cribed to  it,  of  distinguishing  right  from  wrong  :  without, 
however,  presuming  to  call  in  question  the  accuracy  of  those 
by  whom  the  term  has  been  thus  explained.  Under  the  title 
of  Reason,  I  shall  consider  also  whatever  faculties  and  opera- 
tions appear  to  be.  more  immediately  and  essentially  con- 
nected with  the  discovery  of  truth,  or  the  attainment  of  the 
objects  of  our  pursuit,  more  particularly  the  Power  of  Rea- 
soning or  Deduction  ;  but  distinguishing,  as  carefully  as  I 
can,  our  capacity  of  carrying  on  this  logical  process,  from 
those  more  comprehensive  powers  which  Reason  is  under- 
stood to  imply. 

The  latitude  with  which  this  word  has  been  so  universally 
used,  seemed  to  recommend  it  as  a  convenient  one  for  a 
general  title,  of  which  the  object  is  rather  comprehension 
than  precision.  In  the  discussion  of  particular  questions,  I 
shall  avoid  the  employment  of  it  as  far  as  1  am  able  ;  and 
shall  endeavour  to  select  other  modes  of  speaking,  more  ex- 
clusively significant  of  the  ideas  which  I  wish  to  convey.* 

the  temper  and  the  passions ;  and  implies  no  particular  propensity  to  a  display  of  the 
discursive  power,  if,  indeed,  it  docs  not  exclude  the  idea  of  such  a  propensity.  In  the 
following  stanza,  Pope  certainly  had  no  view  to  the  logical  talents  of  the  lady  whom, 
he  celebrates : 

"  1  know  a  thing  that's  most  uncommon, 

"  (Envy  be  silent  and  attend) 
"  I  know  a  reasonable  woman, 

"  Handsome  and  witty,  yet  a  fiiend." 
Of  this  reasonable  woman,  we  may  venture  to  conjecture,  with  some  confidence,  1 1. 
she  did  not  belong  to  the  class  of  ihose  f em mes  raismineuses,  so  happily  described 
by  Molicre : 

"  Raisonner  est  l'emploi  de  toute  ma  maison 
"  Et  le  raisonnement  en  bannitla  raison." 

*  Mr.  Locke  too  has  prefixed  the  same  title,  Of  Reason,  to  the  17th  chapter  of  his 
Fourth  Book,  using  the  word  in  a  sense  nearly  coinciding  >v;th  that  very  extensive 
one  which  I  wish  my  readers  to  annex  to  it  here. 

After  observing,  that  by  reason  he  means  "  that  faculty  whereby  man  is  supposed 
::  to  be  distinguished  from  brutes,  rind  wherein  it  i?  evident  he  much  surpasses  them  ;:' 


OP   THE    HUMAN    MIND.  9 

Another  instance  of  the  vagueness  and  indistinctness  of 
the  common  language  of  logicians,  in  treating  of  this  part  of 
the  Philosophy  of  the  Human  Mind,  occurs  in  the  word 
Understanding.  In  its  popular  sense  it  seems  to  be  very 
nearly  synonymous  with  reason,  when  that  word  is  used  most 
comprehensively  ;  and  is  seldom  or  never  applied  to  any  of 
our  faculties,  but  such  as  are  immediately  subservient  to  the 
investigation  of  truth,  or  to  the  regulation  of  our  conduct. 
In  this  sense,  it  is  so  far  from  being  understood  to  compre- 
hend the  powers  of  Imagination,  Fancy,  and  Wit,  that  it  is 
often  stated  in  direct  opposition  to  them  ;  as  in  the  common 
maxim,  that  a  sound  understanding  and  a  warm  imagination 
are  seldom  united  in  the  same  person.  But  philosophers, 
without  rejecting  this  use  of  the  word,  very  generally  employ 
it,  with  far  greater  latitude,  to  comprehend  all  the  powers 
which  I  have  enumerated  under  the  title  of  intellectual  ;  re- 
ferring to  it  Imagination,  Memory,  and  Perception,  as  well 
as  the  faculties  to  which  it  is  appropriated  in  popular  dis- 
course, and  which  it  seems  indeed  most  properly  to  denote. 
It  is  in  this  manner  that  it  is  used  by  Mr.  Locke  in  his  cele- 
brated Essay  :  and  by  all  the  logicians  who  follow  the  com- 

he  adds,  that.  "  we  may  in  reason  consider  these  four  degrees  ; — the  first  and  highest 
11  is  the  discovering  and  finding  out  of  proofs  ;  the  second,  the  regular  and  methodi- 
"  cal  disposition  of  them,  and  laying  them  in  a  clear  and  fit  order,  to  make  their 
"  connexion  and  force  be  plainly  and  easily  perceived  ;  the  third  is  the  perceiving 
"  their  connexion  ;  and  the  fourth  is  making  a  right  conclusion." 

Dr.  Reid's  authority  for  this  use  of  the  word  is  equally  explicit  :  "  The  power  of 
''reasoning  is  very  nearly  allied  to  that  of  judging.    We  include  both  under  the 
''  name  of  reason. — Intellect.  Powers,  p.  671.  4to.  edit. 
Another  authority  to  the  same  purpose  is  furnished  by  Milton  : 

i "  Whence  the  soul 

"  Reason  receives  ;  and  Reason  is  her  being, 
"  Discursive  or  intuitive." 

Par.  Lost,  B.  V.  1.  48R. 
I  presume  that  Milton,  who  was  a  logician  as  well  as  a  poet,  means  by  the  words 
her  being,  her  essential  or  characterislical  endowment. 

To  these  quotations  I  shall  only  add  a  sentence  from  a  very  judicious  French 
writer  ;  which  I  am  tempted  to  introduce  here,  less  on  account  of  the  sanction  which 
it  gives  to  my  own  phraseology,  than  of  the  importance  ol  the  truth  which  it  conveys. 
"  Reason  is  commonly  employed  as  an  instrument  to  acquire  the  sciences ;  where- 
"  as,  on  the  contrary,  the  sciences  ought  to  be  made  use  of  as  an  instrument  to  give 
'  reason  its  perfection." — VArl  de  Penser,  translated  by  Ozell,  p.  2.  London,  1717. 
VOL.  H.  2 


10  ELEMENTS    OF    THE    PHILOSOPHY 

mon  division  of  our  mental  powers  into  those  of  the  Under- 
standing and  those  of  the  Will. 

In  mentioning  this  ambiguity,  I  do  not  mean  to  cavil  at 
the  phraseology  of  the  writers  from  whom  it  has  derived  its 
origin,  but  only  to  point  it  out  as  a  circumstance  which  may 
deserve  attention  in  some  of  our  future  disquisitions.  The 
division  of  our  powers  which  has  led  to  so  extraordinary  an 
extension  of  the  usual  meaning  of  language,  has  an  obvious 
foundation  in  the  constitution  of  our  nature,  and  furnishes  an 
arrangement  which  seems  indispensable  for  an  accurate  ex- 
amination of  the  subject  :  nor  was  it  unnatural  to  bestow  on 
those  faculties,  which  are  all  subservient  in  one  way  or  an- 
other to  the  right  exercise  of  the  Understanding,  the  name  of 
that  power,  from  their  relation  to  which  their  chief  value 
arises. 

As  the  word  understanding,  however,  is  one  of  (hose  which 
occur  very  frequently  in  philosophical  arguments,  it  may 
be  of  some  use  to  disengage  it  from  the  ambiguity  just  re- 
marked ;  and  it  is  on  this  account  that  I  have  followed  the 
example  of  some  late  writers,  in  distinguishing  the  two 
classes  of  powers  which  were  formerly  referred  to  the  Un- 
derstanding and  to  the  Will,  by  calling  the  former  intellectual, 
and  the  latter  active.  The  terms  cognitive  and  motive  were 
long  ago  proposed  for  the  same  purpose  by  Hobbes  ;  but 
they  never  appear  to  have  come  into  general  use,  and  are 
indeed  liable  to  obvious  objections. 

It  has  probably  been  owing  to  the  very  comprehensive 
meaning  annexed  in  philosophical  treatises  to  the  word  Un- 
derstanding, that  the  use  of  it  has  so  frequently  been  supplied 
of  late  by  Intellect.  The  two  words,  as  they  are  commonly 
employed,  seem  to  be  very  nearly,  if  not  exactly,  synony- 
mous :  and  the  latter  possesses  the  advantage  of  being  quite 
unequivocal,  having  never  acquired  that  latitude  of  applica- 
tion of  which  the  former  admits.  The  adjective  intellectual, 
indeed,  has  had  its  meaning  extended  as  far  as  the  substan- 
tive understanding  ;  but,  as  it  can  be  easily  dispensed  with 
in  our  particular  arguments,  it  may,  without  inconvenience, 
be  adopted  as  a  distinctive  epithet,  where  nothing  is  aimed 


OP   THE    HUMAN   MIND.  11 

at  but  to  mark,  in  simple  and  concise  language,  a  very  gene- 
ral and  obvious  classification.  The  word  intellect  can  be  of 
no  essential  use  whatever,  if  the  ambiguity  in  the  significa- 
tion of  the  good  old  English  word  understanding  be  avoided ; 
and  as  to  intellection,  which  a  late  very  acute  writer*  has  at- 
tempted to  introduce,  I  can  see  no  advantage  attending  it, 
which  at  all  compensates  for  the  addition  of  a  new  and  un- 
couth term  to  a  phraseology  which,  even  in  its  most  simple 
and  unaffected  form,  is  so  apt  to  revolt  the  generality  of 
readers. 

The  only  other  indefinite  word  which  I  shall  take  notice 
of  in  these  introductory  remarks,  is  judgment  ;  and,  in  do- 
ing so,  I  shall  confine  myself  to  such  of  its  ambiguities  as 
are  more  peculiarly  connected  with  our  present  subject.  In 
some  cases,  its  meaning  seems  to  approach  to  that  of  under- 
standing /  as  in  the  nearly  synonymous  phrases,  a  sound 
understanding,  and  a  sound  judgment.  If  there  be  any  dif- 
ference between  these  two  modes  of  expression,  it  appears 
to  me  to  consist  chiefly  in  this,  that  the  former  implies  a 
greater  degree  of  positive  ability  than  the  latter  ;  which  in- 
dicates rather  an  exemption  from  those  bia«ses  which  lead 
the  mind  astray,  than  the  possession  of  any  uncommon  reach 
of  capacity.  To  understanding  we  apply  the  epithets  strong, 
vigorous,  comprehensive,  profound  :  To  judgment,  those  of 
correct,  cool,  unprejudiced,  impartial,  solid.  It  was  in  this 
.sense  that  the  word  seems  to  have  been  understood  by  Pope 
in  the  following  couplet  : 

"  Tis  with  our  judgments  as  our  watches  ;  none 
"  Go  just  alike,  yet  each  believes  his  own." 

For  this  meaning  of  the  word,  its  primitive  and  literal  ap- 
plication to  the  judicial  decision  of  a  tribunal  accounts  suffi- 
ciently. 

Agreeably  to  the  same  fundamental  idea,  the  name  of 
judgment  is  given,  with  peculiar  propriety,  to  those  acquired 
powers  of  discernment  which  characterize  a  skilful  critic  in 
f'he  fine  arts  ;  powers  which  depend,  in  a  very  great  degree. 

*  Dr.  Campbell,     See  his  Philosophy  ofRhctoiic,  Vol.  I.  p.  10:1  ht.  edit. 


12  ELEMENTS    OP   THE    PHILOSOPHY 

on  a  temper  of  mind  free  from  the  undue  influenee  of  authori- 
ty and  of  casual  associations.  The  power  of  Taste  itself  is 
frequently  denoted  by  the  appellation  of  judgment  ;  and  a 
person  who  possesses  a  more  than  ordinary  share  of  it  is 
said  to  be  a  judge  in  those  matters  which  fall  under  its  cog- 
nizance. 

The  meaning  annexed  to  the  word  by  logical  writers  is 
considerably  different  from  this  5  denoting  one  of  the  simplest 
acts  or  operations  of  which  we  are  conscious,  in  the  exercise 
of  our  rational  powers.  In  this  acceptation,  it  does  not  ad- 
mit of  definition  any  more  than  sensation,  will,  or  belief.  All 
that  can  be  done,  in  such  cases,  is  to  describe  the  occasions 
on  which  the  operation  takes  place,  so  as  to  direct  the  atten- 
tion of  others  to  their  own  thoughts.  With  this  view,  it  may 
be  observed,  in  the  present  instance,  that  when  we  give  our 
assent  to  a  mathematical  axiom  ;  or  when,  after  perusing  the 
demonstration  of  a  theorem,  we  assent  to  the  conclusion  ;  or, 
in  general,  when  we  pronounce  concerning  the  truth  or  falsi- 
ty of  any  proposition,  or  the  probability  or  improbability  of 
any  event,  the  power  by  which  we  are  enabled  to  perceive 
what  is  true  or  false,  probable  or  improbable,  is  called  by 
logicians  the  faculty  of  judgment.  The  same  word,  too,  is 
frequently  used  to  express  the  particular  acts  of  this  power, 
as  when  the  decision  of  the  understanding  on  any  question  is 
called  a  judgment  of  the  mind. 

In  treatises  of  logic,  judgment  is  commonly  defined  to  be 
an  act  of  the  mind,  by  which  one  thing  is  affirmed  or  deni- 
ed of  another  ;  a  definition  which,  though  not  unexceptiona- 
ble, is  perhaps  less  so  than  most  that  have  been  given  on 
similar  occasions.  Its  defect  (as  Dr.  Reid  has  remarked) 
consists  in  this, — that,  although  it  be  by  affirmation  or  denial 
that  we  express  our  judgments  to  others,  yet  judgment  is  a 
solitary  act  of  the  mind,  to  which  this  affirmation  or  denial  is 
not  essential  ;  and.  therefore,  if  the  definition  be  admitted,  it 
must  be  understood  of  mental  affirmation  or  denial  only;  in 
which  case,  we  do  no  more  than  substitute,  instead  of  the 
thing  defined,  another  mode  of  speaking  perfectly  synony- 
mous.    The  definition  has,  however,  notwithstanding  this 


OP    THE    HUMAN   MIND.  13 

imperfection,  the  merit  of  a  conciseness  and  perspicuity,  not 
often  to  be  found  in  the  attempts  of  logicians  to  explain  our 
intellectual  operations. 

Mr.  Locke  seems  disposed  to  restrict  the  word  judgment 
to  that  faculty  which  pronounces  concerning  the  verisimilitude 
of  doubtful  propositions  ;  employing  the  word  knowledge  to 
express  the  faculty  which  perceives  the  truth  of  propositions, 
either  intuitively  or  demonstratively  certain.  "  The  faculty 
"  which  God  has  given  man  to  supply  the  want  of  clear  and 
"  certain  knowledge  in  cases  where  that  cannot  be  had,  is 
"judgment;  whereby  the  mind  takes  its  ideas  to  agree  or 
"  disagree  ;  or,  which  is  the  same  thing,  any  proposition  to 
"  be  true  or  false,  without  perceiving  a  demonstrative  evi- 
"  dence  in  the  proofs. 

"  Thus,  the  mind  has  two  faculties,  conversant  about  truth 
"  and  falsehood. 

"  First,  knowledge,  whereby  it  certainly  perceives,  and  is 
rt  undoubtedly  satisfied  of  the  agreement  or  disagreement  of 
:i  any  ideas. 

"  Secondly,  judgment,  which  is  the  putting  ideas  together, 
"  or  separating  them  from  one  another  in  the  mind,  when 
"  their  agreement  or  disagreement  is  not  perceived,  but  pre- 
"  sumed  to  be  so ;  which  is,  as  the  word  imports,  taken  to 
"  be  so,  before  it  certainly  appears.  And  if  it  so  unites,  or 
"  separates  them,  as  in  reality  things  are,  it  is  right  judg- 
"  ment."* 

For  this  limitation  in  the  definition  of  judgment,  some  pre- 
tence is  afforded  bv  the  literal  signification  of  the  word,  when 
applied  to  the  decision  of  a  tribunal ;  and  also,  by  its  meta- 
phorical application  to  the  decisions  of  the  mind,  on  those 
critical  questions  which  fall  under  the  province  of  Taste.  But, 
considered  as  a  technical  or  scientific  term  of  Logic,  the 
practice  of  our  purest  and  most  correct  writers,  sufficiently 
sanctions  the  more  enlarged  sense  in  which  I  have  explained 
it ;  and,  if  I  do  not  much  deceive  myself,  this  use  of  it  will  be 
found  more  favourable  to  philosophical  distinctness  than  Mr. 

"  Tssny  on  the  Human  Undorstandinir.  Book  iv.  Chan.  14, 


14  ELEMENTS    OP    THE    PHILOSOPHY 

Locke's  language,  which  leads  to  an  unnecessary  multipli- 
cation of  our  intellectual  powers.  What  good  reason  can  be 
given  for  assigning  one  name  to  the  faculty  which  perceives 
truths  that  are  certain,  and  another  name  to  the  faculty  which 
perceives  truths  that  are  probable  ?  Would  it  not  be  equally 
proper  to  distinguish,  by  different  names,  the  power  by 
which  we  perceive  one  proposition  to  be  true,  and  another  to 
he  false  ? 

As  to  knowledge,  I  do  not  think  that  it  can,  with  propriety, 
be  contrasted  with  judgment ;  nor  do  I  apprehend  that  it  is 
at  all  agreeable,  either  to  common  use  or  to  philosophical  ac- 
curacy, to  speak  of  knowledge  as  a  faculty.  To  me  it  seems 
rather  to  denote  the  possession  of  those  truths  about  which  our 
faculties  have  been  previously  employed,  than  any  separate 
power  of  the  understanding  by  which  truth  is  perceived.* 

*  In  attempting  thus  to  fix  the  logical  import  of  various  words  in  our  language, 
which  are  apt  to  be  confounded,  in  popular  speech,  with  reason,  and  also  with  reason- 
ing, some  of  my  readers  may  be  surprised,  that  I  have  said  nothing  about  the  word 
wisdom.  The  truth  is,  that  the  notion  expressed  by  this  term,  as  it  is  employed  by 
our  best  writers,  seems  to  presuppose  the  influence  of  some  principles,  the  considera- 
tion of  which  belongs  to  a  different  part  of  my  work.  In  confirmation  of  this,  it  may 
be  remarked,  that  whereas  the  province  of  our  reasoning  powers  (in  their  application 
to  the  business  of  life)  is  limited  to  the  choice  of  means,  wisdom  denotes  a  power  of  a 
more  comprehensive  nature,  and  of  a  higher  order  ;  a  power  which  implies  a  judi- 
cious selection  both  of means  and  of  ends.  It  is  very  precisely  defined  by  Sir  William 
Temple  to  be  "  that  which  makes  men  judge  what  are  the  best  ends,  and  what  the 
"  best  means  to  attain  them." 

Of  these  two  modifications  of  wisdom,  the  one  denotes  a  power  of  the  mind  which 
obviously  falls  under  the  view  of  the  logician  ;  the  examination  of  the  other,  as  obvi- 
ously, belongs  to  ethics. 

A  distinction  similar  to  this  was  plainly  in  the  mind  of  Cudworth,  when  he  wrote 
the  following  passage,  which,  although  drawn  from  the  purest  sources  of  ancient 
philosophy,  will,  I  doubt  not,  from  the  nncouthness  of  the  phraseology,  have  the  ap- 
pearance of  extravagance,  to  many  in  the  present  times.  To  myself  it  appears  to 
point  at  a  fact  of  the  highest  importance  in  the  moral  constitution  of  man. 

"  We  have  all  of  us  by  nature  ftccvTevfix  rt  (as  both  Plato  and  Aristotle  call  it, 
t:  a  certain  divination,  -presage,  and  parturient,  vaticination  in  our  minds,  of  some 
L-  higher  good  and  perfection,  than  either  power  or  knowledge.  Knowledge  is  plainly 
•'  to  be  preferred  before  power,  as  being  that  which  guides  and  directs  its  blind  force 
'"'  and  impetus ;  but  Aristotle  himself  declares,  that  there  is  Myy  t<  Kpetrrot, 
"  which  is  Aey  a  ctf/CV  j  something  better  than  reason  and  knowledge,  which  is  the 
"  principle  and  original  of  it.  For  (saith  he)  hoyX  &p%ii  a  Xvyos,  «AA«  T< 
"'  y.petTTov .  The  principle  of  reason  is  'not  reason.  hut  something  better " — Tnfc''- 
lectualStietem.p.  %03 


OP    THE   HUMAN   MIND'.  15 

Before  concluding  these  preliminary  remarks,  I  cannot  help 
expressing  my  regret,  that  the  subject  on  which  I  am  about 
to  enter  will  so  frequently  lay  me  under  the  necessity  of  cri- 
ticising the  language,  and  of  disputing  the  opinions  of  my 
predecessors.     In  doing  so,  I  am  not  conscious  of  being  at  all 
influenced  by  a  wish  to  indulge  myself  in  the  captiousness  of 
controversy ;  nor  am  I  much  afraid  of  this  imputation  from 
any  of  my  readers  who  shall  honour  these  speculations  with 
an  attentive  perusal.     My  real  aim  is,  in  the  Jirst  place,  to 
explain  the  grounds  of  my  own  deviations  from  the  track 
which  has  been  commonly  pursued,  and,  secondly,  to  facilitate 
the  progress  of  such  as  may  follow  me  in  the  same  path,  by 
directing  their  attention  to  those  points  of  divergency  in  the 
way,  which  may  suggest  matter  for  doubt  or  hesitation.     I 
know,  at  the  same  time,  that,  in  the  opinion  of  many,  the  best 
mode  of  unfolding  the  principles  of  a  science  is  to  stale  them 
systematically  and  concisely,  without  any  historical  retros- 
pects whatever;  and  I  believe  the  opinion  is  well-founded, 
in  those  departments  of  knowledge,  where  the  difficulty  arises 
less  from  vague  ideas  and  indefinite  terms,  than  irom  the 
length  of  the  logical  chain  which  the  student  has  to  trace. 
But,  in  such  disquisitions  as  we  are  now  engaged  in,  it  is 
chiefly  from  the  gradual  correction  of  verbal  ambiguities,  and 
the  gradual  detection  of  unsuspected  prejudices,  that  a  pro- 
gressive, though  slow  approximation  to  truth  is  to  be  expect- 
ed.    It  is  indeed  a  slow  approximation,  at  best,  that  we  can 
hope  to  accomplish  at  present,  in  the  examination  of  a  sub- 
ject where  so  many  powerful  causes  (particularly  those  con- 
nected with  the  imperfections  of  language)  conspire  to  lead 
us  astray.     But  the  study  of  the  human  mind  is  not,  on  that 
account,  to  be  abandoned.     Whoever  compares  its  actual 
state  with  that  in  which  Bacon,  Des  Cartes,  and  Locke,  found 
it,  must  be  sensible  how  amply  their  efforts  for  its  improve- 

Lord  Shaftesbury  has  expressed  the  same  truth  more  simply  and  perspicuously  in 
that  beautiful  sentence  which  occurs  more  than  once  in  bis  writings  :  <;  True  wisdom 
"comes  more  from  the  heart  than  from  the  head." — Numberless  illustrations  of  this 
protuund  maxim  must  immediately  crowd  on  the  memory  of  all  who  are  conversant 
with  the  most  enlightened  works  on  the  theory  of  legislation  ;  more  particularly,  wifh 
♦  hose  which  appeared,  daring  the  eighteenth  century,  en  the  science  of  r>olitica'l 
eeonomv. 


lp"  ELEMENTS    OF    THE    PHILOSOPHY 

ment  have  been  repaid,  both  by  their  own  attainments,  and 
by  those  of  others  who  have  since  profited  by  their  example. 
I  am  willing  to  hope,  that  some  useful  hints  for  its  farther  ad- 
vancement, may  be  derived  even  from  my  own  researches ; 
and,  distant  as  the  prospect  may  be  of  raising  it  to  a  level 
with  the  physical  science  of  the  Newtonian  school,  by  uniting 
the  opinions  of  speculative  men  about  fundamental  princi- 
ples, my  ambition  as  an  author  will  be  fully  gratified,  if,  by 
the  few  who  are  competent  to  judge,  I  shall  be  allowed  to  have 
contributed  my  share,  however  small,  towards  the  attainment 
of  so  great  an  object. 

In  the  discussions  which  immediately  follow,  no  argu- 
ment will,  1  trust,  occur  beyond  the  reach  of  those  who 
shall  read  them  with  the  attention  which  every  inquiry  into 
the  human  mind  indispensably  requires.  I  have  certainly 
endeavoured,  to  the  utmost  of  my  abilities,  to  render  every 
sentence  which  I  have  written,  not  only  intelligible  but  per- 
spicuous ;  and,  where  I  have  failed  in  the  attempt,  the  ob- 
scurity will,  I  hope,  be  imputed,  not  to  an  affectation  of 
mystery,  but  to  some  error  of  judgment.  I  can,  without 
much  vanity,  say,  that  with  less  expense  of  thought,  I  could 
have  rivalled  the  obscurity  of  Kant  ;  and  that  the  invention 
of  a  new  technical  language,  such  as  that  which  he  has  in- 
troduced, would  have  been  an  easier  task,  than  the  commu- 
nication of  clear  and  precise  notions,  (if  I  have  been  so  for- 
tunate as  to  succeed  in  this  communication,)  without  depart- 
ing from  the  established  modes  of  expression. 

To  the  following  observations  of  D'Alembert  (with  some 
trifling  verbal  exceptions)  I  give  my  most  cordial  assent  ; 
and,  mortifying  as  they  may  appear  to  the  pretensions  of 
bolder  theorists,  I  should  be  happy  to  see  them  generally  re- 
cognized as  canons  of  philosophical  criticism  :  Truth  in 
metaphysics  resembles  truth  in  matters  of  taste.  In  both 
cases,  the  seeds  of  it  exist  in  every  mind  ;  though  few  think 
of  attending  to  this  latent  treasure,  till  it  be  pointed  out  to 
them  by  more  curious  inquirers.  It  should  seem  that  every 
thing  we  learn  from  a  good  metaphysical  book  is  only  a  sort 
of  reminiscence  of  what  the  mind   previously  knew.     The 


OF   THE    HUMAN  MIND.  17 

obscurity,  of  which  we  are  apt  to  complain  in  this  science, 
may  be  always  justly  ascribed  to  the  author  ;  because  the 
information  which  he  professes  to  communicate  requires  no 
technical  language  appropriated  to  itself.  Accordingly,  we 
may  apply  to  good  metaphysical  authors  what  has  been  said 
of  those  who  excel  in  the  art  of  writing,  that,  in  reading 
them,  every  body  is  apt  to  imagine,  that  he  himself  could 
have  written  in  the  same  manner. 

"  But,  in  this  sort  of  speculation,  if  all  are  qualified  to  un- 
"  derstand,  all  are  not  fitted  to  teach.  The  merit  of  accom- 
"  modating  easily  to  the  apprehension  of  others,  notions 
"  which  are  at  once  simple  and  just,  appears,  from  its  extreme 
"  rarity^  to  be  much  greater  than  is  commonly  imagined. 
"  Sound  metaphysical  principles  are  truths  which  every  one  is 
"  ready  to  seize,  but  which  few  men  have  the  talent  of  unfold- 
"  ing ;  so -difficult  is  it  in  this,  as  well  as  in  other  instances, 
"  to  appropriate  to  one's  self  what  seems  to  be  the  common 
"  inheritance  of  the  human  race."* 

I  am,  at  the  same  time,  fully  aware,  that  whoever,  in 
treating  of  the  human  mind,  aims  to  be  understood,  must 
lay  his  account  with  forfeiting,  in  the  opinion  of  a  very 
large  proportion  of  readers,  all  pretensions  to  depth,  to 
subtlety,  or  to  invention.  The  acquisition  of  a  new  nomencla- 

*  "  Lc  vrai  en  metaphysique  ressemble  au  vrai  en  matifere  de  gout  5  c*est; 
u  un  vrai  clont  tons  les  esprits  ont  le  geime  en  eux-memes,  auquei  la  plupart  ne 
'.'  font  point  d'attenlion,  muis  qu'ils  reconnoissenl  des  qu'on  le  leur  montre.  II 
'<  semble  que  tout  ce  qu'on  apprend  dans  un  bonlivre  de  metaphysique,  ne  soit 
"  qu'une  espfice  de  reminiscence  de  ce  que  notre  ame  a  deja  su  ;  Tobscurite, 
"  quand  il  y  en  a,  vient  lotijours  de  la  fetrte  de  I'auteur,  parce  que  la  science 
**  qui]  se  propose  d'enseigner  n'a  point  d'uutre  langue  que  la  langue  commune. 
"  Anssi  peulon  fcppliquer  aux  bons  auteurs  de  metaphysique  ce  qu'on  a  dit  des 
,!  bons  ecrivains,  qu'il  n'y  a  personne  qui  en  les  lisant,  ne  croie  pouvoir  en 
"  dire  autant  qu'enx. 

"  Mais  si  dans  ce  genre  tons  sont  faits  pour  entendre,  tous  ne  sont  pas  faits 
"  pour  instruire.  Le  merile  de  faire  entrer  avec  facilite  dans  les  esprits  des 
"notions  \7a1Vs  <n  simples,  est  beaucoup  plus  grand  qu'on  ne  pense,  puisqur 
11  rexperience  nous  pronve  combien  il  est  rare  ;  les  saines  idees  mStaphysiques 
*'  sont  des  verites  communes  que  ehacun  saisit,  mais  que  peu  d'hommes  ont 
"  le  talent  de  devplopper;  tanl  il  est  difficile,  dans  quelqne  sujet  que  ce  puissc 
"  etre,  de  sc  rendre  prt»ffo8  ce  qui  appartient  a  tout  If  monde  " — Flrwm  <(* 
Philosophie. 

VOL.   IT.  & 


18  ELEMENTS    OP    THE    PHILOSOPHY 

ture  is,  in  itself,  no  inconsiderable  reward  to  the  industry  of 
those,  who  study  only  from  motives  of  literary  vanity  ;  and, 
if  D'Alembert's  idea  of  this  branch  of  science  be  just,  the 
wider  an  author  deviates  from  truth,  the  more  likely  are  his 
conclusions  to  assume  the  appearance  of  discoveries.  I 
may  add,  that  it  is  chiefly  in  those  discussions  which 
possess  the  best  claims  to  originality,  where  he  may  expect 
to  be  told  by  the  multitude,  that  they  have  learned  from  him 
nothing  but  what  they  knew  before. 

The  latitude  with  which  the  word  metaphysics  is  frequent- 
ly used,  makes  it  necessary  for  me  to  remark,  with  respect 
to  the  foregoing  passage  from  D'Alembert,  that  he  limits  the 
term  entirely  to  an  account  of  the  origin  of  our  ideas.  "  The 
"  generation  of  our  ideas,"  he  tells  us,  "  belongs  to  metaphy- 
"  sics.  It  forms  one  of  the  principal  objects,  and  perhaps 
"  ought  to  form  the  sole  object  of  that  science.'1*  If  the 
meaning  of  the  word  be  extended,  as  it  too  often  is  in  our 
language,  so  as  to  comprehend  all  those  inquiries  which  re- 
late to  the  theory  and  to  the  improvement  of  our  mental 
powers,  some  of  his  observations  must  be  understood  with 
very  important  restrictions.  What  he  has  stated,  however, 
on  the  inseparable  connexion  between  perspicuity  of  style 
and  soundness  of  investigation  in  metaphysical  disquisitions, 
will  be  found  to  hold  equally  in  every  research  to  which  that 
epithet  can,  with  any  colour  of  propriety,  be  applied. 

*  "  La  generation  de  nos    idles  appartient    S.  la  metapliysique ;    c'est    un  de 
11  ses  objets  principaux,  et  peut-etre  devroit  elle  s'y  borner."— 'Ibid, 


SECT.  I.]  OP    THE    HUMAN   MIND.  19 


CHAPTER  FIRST. 

OF  THE  FUNDAMENTAL  LAWS  OF  HUMAN  BELIEF  ;    OR  THE  PRI- 
MARY   ELEMENTS    OF    HUMAN    REASON. 


1  HE  propriety  of  the  title  prefixed  to  this  Chapter  will,  I 
trust,  be  justified  sufficiently  by  the  speculations  which  are 
to  follow.  As  these  differ,  in  some  essential  points,  from  the 
conclusions  of  former  writers,  I  found  myself  under  the  ne- 
cessity of  abandoning,  in  various  instances,  their  phraseolo- 
gy ; — but  my  reasons  for  the  particular  changes  which  I  have 
made,  cannot  possibly  be  judged  of,  or  even  understood,  till 
the  inquiries  by  which  I  was  led  to  adopt  them  be  carefully 
examined. 

I  begin  with  a  review  of  some  of  those  primary  truths,  a 
conviction  of  which  is  necessarily  implied  in  all  our  thoughts 
and  in  all  our  actions  ;  and  which  seem,  on  that  account,  ra- 
ther to  form  constituent  and  essential  elements  of  reason,  than 
objects  with  which  reason  is  conversant.  The  import  of  this 
last  remark  will  appear  more  clearly  afterwards.. 

The  primary  truths  to  which  J  mean  to  confine  my  atten- 
tion at  present  are,  1.  Mathematical  Axioms:  2.  Truths  (or 
more  properly  speaking,  Laws  of  Belief,)  inseparably  con- 
nected with  the  exercise  of  Consciousness,  Perception,  Me- 
mory, and  Reasoning. — Of  some  additional  laws  of  Belief, 
the  truth  of  which  is  tacitly  recognized  in  all  our  reasonings 
concerning  contingent  events,  I  shall  have  occasion  to  take 
notice  under  a  different  article.. 

section  i . 

Of  Mathematical  Axioms. 

I  have  placed  this  class  of  truths  at  the  head  of  the  enu 
nieration,  merely  because  they  seem  likely,  from  the  .placer 


20  ELEMENTS    OP    THE    PHILOSOPHY  [CHAP.  I, 

which  they  hold  in  the  elements  of  geometry,  to  present  to 
my  readers  a  more  interesting,  and  at  the  same  time,  an  easi- 
er subject  of  discussion,  than  some  of  the  more  abstract  and 
latent  elements  of  our  knowledge,  afterwards  to  be  consider- 
ed. In  other  respects,  a  different  arrangement  might  per- 
haps have  possessed  some  advantages,  in  point  of  strict  logi- 
cal method. 

L 

On  the  evidence  of  mathematical  axioms  it  is  unnecessary 
to  enlarge,  as  the  controversies  to  which  they  have  given 
occasion  are  entirely  of  a  speculative,  or  rather  scholastic  de- 
scription ;  and  have  no  tendency  to  affect  the  certainly  of  that 
branch  of  science  to  which  they  are  supposed  to  be  sub- 
servient. 

It  must  at  the  same,  time  be  confessed,  with  respect  to  this 
class  of  propositions  (and  the  same  remark  may  be  extended 
to  axioms  in  general,)  that  some  of  the  logical  questions  con- 
nected with  them  continue  still  to  be  involved  in  much  ob- 
scurity. In  proportion  to  their  extreme  simplicity  is  the  dif- 
ficulty of  illustrating  or  of  describing  their  nature  in  unex- 
ceptionable language  :  or  even  of  ascertaining  a  precise  cri- 
terion by  which  they  may  be  distinguished  from  other  truths 
which  approach  to  them  nearly.  It  is  chiefly  owing  to  this,, 
that,  in  geometry,  there  are  no  theorems  of  which  it  is  so  diffi- 
cult to  give  a  rigorous  demonstration,  as  those,  of  which  per- 
sons, unacquainted  with  the  nature  of  mathematical  evidence, 
are  apt  to  say,  that  they  require  no  proof  whatever.  But 
the  inconveniences  arising  from  these  circumstances  are  of 
trifling  moment ;  occasioning,  at  the  worst,  some  embarrass- 
ment  to  those  mathematical  writers,  who  are  studious  of  the 
most  finished  elegance  in  their  exposition  of  elementary  prin- 
ciples ;  or  to  metaphysicians,  anxious  to  display  their  subtil ty 
upon  points  which  cannot  possibly  lead  to  any  practical  con- 
clusion. 

It  was  long  ago  remarked  by  Locke,  of  the  axioms  ol 
geometry,  as  stated  by  Euclid,  that  although  the  proposition 


SECT.  1.]  OF    THE    HUMAN    MIND.  21 

"be  at  first  enunciated  in  general  terms,  and  afterwards  ap- 
pealed to,  in  its  particular  applications,  as  a  principle  previ- 
ously examined  and  admitted,  yet  that  the  truth  is  not  less 
evident  in  (he  latter  case  than  in  the  former.  He  observes 
farther,  that  it  is  in  some  of  its  particular  applications,  that 
the  truth  of  every  axiom  is  originally  perceived  by  the  mind  ; 
and,  therefore,  that  the  general  proposition,  so  far  from  being 
the  ground  of  our  assent  to  the  truths  which  it  comprehends, 
is  only  a  verbal  generalization  of  what,  in  particular  instan- 
ces, has  been  already  acknowledged  as  true. 

The  same  author  remarks,  that  some  of  these  axioms  "  are 
'*  no  more  than  bare  verbal  propositions,  and  teach  us  nothing 
"  but  the  respect  and  import  of  names  one  to  another.  The 
"  whole  is  equal  to  all  its  parts  :  what  real  truth,  I  beseech 
04  you,  does  it  teach  us  ?  What  more  is  contained  in  that 
"  maxim,  than  what  the  signification  of  the  word  totum,  or 
'"  the  whole,  does  of  itself  import  ?  And  he  that  knows  that 
*'  the  word  whole  stands  for  what  is  made  up  of  all  its  parts, 
^  knows  very  little  less,  than  that  '  the  whole  is  equal  to  all 
"  its  parts.1  And  upon  the  same  ground,  f  think,  that  this 
fl  proposition,  A  hill  is  higher  than  a  valley,  and  several  the 
u  like,  may  also  pass  for  maxims." 

Notwithstanding  these  considerations,  Mr,  Locke  does  not 
ebject  to  the  form  which  Euclid  has  given  to  his  axioms,  or 
to  the  place  which  he  has  assigned  to  them  in  his  Elements. 
On  the  contrary,  he  is  of  opinion,  that  a  collection  of  such 
maxims  is  not  without  reason  prefixed  to  a  mathematical  sys- 
tem ;  in  order  that  learpers,  "  having  in  the  beginning  per- 
!i  fectly  acquainted  their  thoughts  with  these  propositions 
"  made  in  general  terms,  may  have  them  ready  to  apply  to 
"  all  particular  cases  as  formed  rules  and  sayings.  Not  that, 
"if  they  be  equally  weighed,  they  are  more  clear  and  evi- 
"  dent  than  the  instances  they  are  brought  to  confirm  ;  but 
♦•that,  being  more  familiar  to  the  mind,  the  very  naming  of 
"  them  is  enough  to  satisfy  the  understanding."  In  farther 
illustration  of  this,  he  adds  very  justly  and  ingeniously,  that, 
"  although  our  knowledge  begins  in  particulars,  and  so 
M  spreads  itself  by  degrees  to  generals  ;  yet  afterwards,  the 


22  ELEMENTS    OP    THE    PHILOSOPHY  [CHAP.  I. 

"  mind  takes  quite  the  contrary  course,  and  having  drawn  its 
"  knowledge  into  as  general  propositions  as  it  can,  makes 
"  them  familiar  to  its  thoughts,  and  accustoms  itself  to  have 
"  recourse  to  them,  as  to  the  standards  of  truth  and  false- 
"  hood." 

But  although,  in  mathematics,  some  advantage  may  be 
gained,  without  the  risk  of  any  possible  inconvenience,  from 
this  arrangement  of  axioms,  it  is  a  very  dangerous  exam- 
ple to  be  followed  in  other  branches  of  knowledge,  where 
our  notions  are  not  equally  clear  and  precise  ;  and  where 
the  force  of  our  pretended  axioms  (to  use  Mr.  Locke's 
words)  "  reaching  only  to  the  sound,  and  not  to  the  signifi- 
"  cation  of  the  words,  serves  only  to  lead  us  into  confusion. 
';  mistakes,  and  error."  For  the  illustration  of  this  remark,, 
I  must  refer  to  Locke. 

Another  observation  of  this  profound  writer  deserves  our 
attention,  while  examining  the  nature  of  axioms  ; — "  that 
"they  are  not  the  foundations  on  which  any  of  the  sciences 
"  is  built  ;  nor  at  all  useful  in  helping  men  forward  to  the 
"  discovery  of  unknown  truths."*  This  observation  I  in- 
tend to  illustrate  afterwards,  in  treating  of  the  futility  of  the 
syllogistic  art.  At  present  I  shall  only  add,  to  what  Mr. 
Locke  has  so  well  stated,  that,  even  in  mathematics,  it  cannot 
with  any  propriety  be  said,  that  the  axioms  are  the  founda- 
tion on  which  the  science  rests  ;  or  the  first  principles  from 
which  its  more  recondite  (ruths  are  deduced.  Of  this  I  have 
little  doubt  that  Locke  was  perfectly  aware  ;  but  the  mis- 
takes which  some  of  the  most  acute  and  enlightened  of  his 
disciples  have  committed  in  treating  of  the  same  subject, 
convince  me,  that  a  further  elucidation  of  it  is  not  altogether 
superfluous.  With  this  view  I  shall  here  introduce  a  few  re- 
marks on  a  passage  in  Dr.  Campbell's  Philosophy  of  Rheto- 
ric, in  which  he  has  betrayed  some  misapprehensions  on 
this  very  point,  which  a  little  more  attention  to  the  hints 
already  quoted  from  the  Essay  on  Human  Understanding 
might  have  prevented.     These  remarks  will,  I  hope,  con- 

'  Rook  if.  chap.  1.  §  11,-2,  3 


8ECT.  I.]  OP    THE  HUMAN   MINI).  23 

tribute  to  place  the  nature  of  axioms,  more  particularly  of 
mathematical  axioms,  in  a  different  and  clearer  light  than 
that  in  which  they  have  been  commonly  considered. 

"Of  intuitive  evidence  (says  Dr.  Campbell)  that  of  the 
"  following  propositions  may  serve  as  an  illustration  :  One 
"  and  four  make  five.  Things  equal  to  the  same  thing  are 
"  equal  to  one  another.  The  whole  is  greater  than  a  part  5 
"  and,  in  brief,  all  axioms  in  arithmetic  and  geometry.  These 
"  are,  in  effect,  but  so  many  expositions  of  our  own  general 
"  notions,  taken  in  different  views.  Some  of  them  are  no  more 
"  than  definitions,  or  equivalent  to  definitions.  To  say,  one 
"  and  four  make^e,  is  precisely  the  same  thing  as  to  say,  we 
"  give  the  name  of  Jive  to  one  added  to  four.  In  fact,  they  are 
"  all  in  some  respects  reducible  to  this  axiom,  whatever  is,  is. 
"  I  do  not  say  they  are  deduced  from  it,  for  they  have  in  like 
"  manner  that  original  and  intrinsic  evidence,  which  makes 
"  them,  as  soon  as  the  terms  are  understood,  to  be  perceived 
"  intuitively.  And,  if  they  are  not  thus  perceived,  no  deduc- 
"  tion  of  reason  will  ever  confer  on  them  any  additional  evi- 
"  dence.  Nay,  in  point  of  time,  the  discovery  of  the  less 
"  general  truths  has  the  priority,  not  from  their  superior  ev> 
"  dence,  but  solely  from  this  consideration,  that  the  less 
"  general  are  sooner  objects  of  perception  to  us.  But  I  a£- 
"  firm,  that  though  not  deduced  from  that  axiom,  they  may 
"  be  considered  as  particular  exemplifications  of  it,  and  co- 
"  incident  with  it,  inasmuch  as  they  are  all  implied  in  this, 
"  that  the  properties  of  our  clear  and  adequate  ideas  can  be 
"  no  other  than  what  the  mind  clearly  perceives  them  to  be. 

"  But,  in  order  to  prevent  mistakes,  it  will  be  necessary 
"  further  to  illustrate  this  subject.  It  might  be  thought  that, 
"  if  axioms  were  propositions  perfectly  identical,  it  would  be 
"  impossible  10  advance  a  step  by  their  means,  beyond  the 
"  simple  ideas  first  perceived  by  the  mind.  And  it  must  be 
"  owned,  if  the  predicate  of  the  proposition  were  nothing 
"  but  a  repetition  of  the  subject,  under  the  same  aspect,  and 
**  in  the  same  or  synonymous  terms,  no  conceivable  advan- 
"  tage  could  be  made  of  it  for  the  furtherance  of  knowledge. 
"  Of  such  propositions,  for  instance,  as  these — seven  are  se- 


21  ELEMENTS    OF    THE    PHILOSOPHY  [CHAP,  h 

"  ven,  eight  are  eight,  and  ten  added  to  eleven  are  equal  to 
"  ten  added  to  eleven,  it  is  manifest  that  we  could  never 
"  avail  ourselves  for  the  improvement  of  science.  Nor  does 
"  the  change  of  the  term  make  any  alteration  in  point  of 
tt  utility.  The  propositions,  twelve  are  a  dozen,  twenty  are 
"  a  score,  unless  considered  as  explications  of  the  words 
"  dozen  and  score,  are  equally  insignificant  with  the  former. 
"  But  when  the  thing,  though  in  effect  coinciding,  is  consi- 
"  dered  under  a  different  aspect,  when  what  is  single  in  the 
"  subject  is  divided  in  the  predicate,  and  conversely  ;  of 
"  when  what  is  a  whole  in  the  one  is  regarded  as  a  part  of 
"  something  else  in  the  other  ;  such  propositions  lead  to  the 
"  discovery  of  innumerable  and  apparently  remote  relations* 
"  One  added  to  four  may  be  accounted  no  other  than  a  defi- 
"  nition  of  the  word  five,  as  was  remarked  above.  But  when 
"  I  say, '  Two  added  to  three  are  equal  to  five,'  I  advance 
"  a  truth  which,  though  equally  clear,  is  quite  distinct  from 
"  the  preceding.  Thus,  if  one  should  affirm,  '  That  twice 
"  fifteen  make  thirty,'  and  again,  that  '  thirteen  added  to  se- 
■"  venteen  make  thirty,'  nobody  would  pretend  that  he  had 
il  repeated  the  same  proposition  in  other  words.  The  cases 
"  are  entirely  similar.  In  both  cases,  the  same  thing  is  pre- 
"  dicated  of  ideas  which,  taken  severally,  are  different.  From 
"  these  again  result  other  equations,  as  '  one  added  to  four 
"  are  equal  to  two  added  to  three,'  and  '  twice  fifteen  are 
u  equal  to  thirteen  added  to  seventeen.' 

"  Now,  it  is  by  the  aid  of  such  simple  and  elementary 
'"  principles,  that  the  arithmetician  and  algebraist  proceed  t© 
"  the  most  astonishing  discoveries.  Nor  are  the  operations 
"  of  the  geometrician  essentially  different." 

I  have  little  to  object  to  these  observations  of  Dr.  Camp- 
bell, as  far  as  they  relate  to  arithmetic  and  to  algebra  ;  for, 
in  these  sciences,  all  our  investigations  amount  to  nothing 
more  than  to  a  comparison  of  different  expressions  of  the 
same  thing.  Our  common  language,  indeed,  frequently  sup- 
poses the  case  to  be  otherwise  ;  as  when  an  equation  is  de- 
fined to  be,  "  A  proposition  asserting  the  equality  of  two 
quantities."     It  would,  however,  be  much  more  correct  to 


SECT.  I.j  OP  THE   HUMAN  MIND.  23 

define  it,  "  A  proposition  asserting  the  equivalence  of  two 
"  expressions  of  the  same  quantity  ;"  for  algebra  is  merely  a 
universal  arithmetic  ;  and  the  names  of  numbers  are  nothing 
else  than  collectives,  by  which  we  are  enabled  to  express 
ourselves  more  concisely  than  could  be  done  by  enumerating 
all  the  units  that  they  contain.  Of  this  doctrine,  the  passage 
now  quoted  from  Dr.  Campbell  shews,  that  he  entertained  a 
sufficiently  just  and  precise  idea. 

But  if  Dr.  Campbell  perceived  that  arithmetical  equations, 
such  as  "one  and  four  make  five,"  are  no  other  than  defini- 
tions, why  should  he  have  classed  them  with  the  axioms  he 
quotes  from  Euclid,  "  That  the  whole  is  greater  than  a  part," 
and  that  "  Things  equal  to  the  same  thing,  are  equal  to  one 
"another-,"  propositions  which,  however  clearly  their  truth 
be  implied  in  the  meaning  of  the  terms  of  which  they  consist, 
cannot  certainly,  by  any  interpretation  be  considered  in  the 
light  of  definitions  at  all  analogous  to  the  former  ?  The  for- 
mer, indeed,  are  only  explanations  of  the  relative  import  of 
particular  names  ;  the  latter  are  universal  propositions,  appli- 
cable alike  to  an  infinite  variety  of  instances.* 
*  Another  very  obvious  consideration  might  have  satisfied 
Dr.  Campbell,  that  the  simple  arithmetical  equations  which 
he  mentions,  do  not  hold  the  same  place  in  that  science  which 
Euclid's  axioms  hold  in  geometry.  What  I  allude  to  is,  that 
the  greater  part  of  these  axioms  are  equally  essential  to  all 

'■'■  D'Alembcrt  also  has  confounded  these  two  classes  of  propositions*  "  What  do  the 
:£  greater  part  of  those  axioms  on  which  geometry  prides  itself  amount  to,  but  to  an 
'•  expression,  by  means  of  two  different  words  or  signs,  of  the  same  simple  idea  ?  He 
"  who  says  that  two  and  two  make  four,  what  more  does  he  know  than  another  who 

"should  content  himself  with  saying,  that  two  aud  two  make  two  and  two  ?" 

Here    a  simple  arithmetical  equation  (which  is  obviously  a  mere  definilimi)    is 

brought  to  illustrate    a   remark    on    the  nature  of  geometrical  axioms. With 

respect  to  these  last  (I  mean  such  axioms  as  Euclid  has  prefixed  to  his  Elements) 
D'Alembert's  opinion  stems  to  coincide  exactly  with  that  of  Locke,  already 
mentioned.  "I  would  not  be  understood,  nevertheless,  to  condemn  the  use  of 
"  them  altogether  :  I  wish  only  to  remark,  that  their  utility  rises  no  higher  than  this, 
*'  that  they  render  our  simple  ideas  more  familiar  by  means  of  habit,  and  better  adapt- 
"  ed  to  the  different  purposes  to  which  we  may  have  occasion  to  apply  them." — "  Je 
"  ne  pretends  point  cependant  en  condamner  absolument  l'usage  :  je  veux  seulement 
"  faire  observer,  a  quoi  il  se  reduit ;  e'est  a.  nous  i  entire  les  idees  simples  plus  fami- 
"  lieres  par  l'habitude,  et  plus  propres  atix  deferens  usages  auxquels  nous  pouvons 
Mes  nppliquer." — Discours  Prciimiw.ire,  &c.  &c. 
VOL.    II.  4 


26  ELEMENTS    OP    THE    PHILOSOPHY  [CHAP.  I. 

the  different  branches  of  mathematics.  That  "  the  whole  is 
"  greater  than  a  part,"  and  that  "  things  equal  to  the  same 
"  thing  are  equal  to  one  another,"  are  propositions  as  essen- 
tially connected  with  our  arithmetical  computations,  as  with 
our  geometrical  reasonings  ;  and,  therefore,  to  explain  in  what 
manner  the  mind  makes  a  transition,  in  the  case  of  numbers, 
from  the  more  simple  to  the  more  complicated  equations, 
throws  no  light  whatever  on  the  question,  how  the  transition 
is  made,  either  in  arithmetic,  or  in  geometry,  from  what  are 
properly  called  axioms,  to  the  more  remote  conclusions  ia 
these  sciences. 

The  very  fruitless  attempt  thus  made  by  this  acute  writer 
to  illustrate  the  importance  of  axioms  as  the  basis  of  mathe- 
matical truth,  was  probably  suggested  to  him  by  a  doctrine 
which  has  been  repeatedly  inculcated  of  late,  concerning  the 
grounds  of  that  peculiar  evidence  which  is  allowed  to  accom- 
pany mathematical  demonstration.  "  All  the  sciences  (it 
"  has  been  said)  rest  ultimately  on  first  principles,  which  we 
"must  take  for  granted  without  proof;  and  whose  evidence 
"  determines,  both  in  kind  and  degree,  the  evidence  which  it 
"  is  possible  to  attain  in  our  conclusions.  In  some  of  the  sci- 
"  ences,  our  first  principles  are  intuitively  certain  ;  in  others, 
"they  are  intuitively  probable;  and  such  as  the  evidence 
"  of  these  principles  is,  such  must  that  of  our  conclusions  be. 
"  If  our  first  principles  are  intuitively  certain,  and  if  we  rea- 
"  son  from  them  consequentially,  our  conclusions  will  be  de- 
"  monstratively  certain:  but  if  our  principles  be  only  intui- 
"  tively  probable,  our  conclusions  will  be  only  demonstrative- 
"ly  probable.  In  mathematics,  the  first  principles  from 
"  which  we  reason  are  a  set  of  axioms  which  are  not  only  in- 
"  tuitively  certain,  but  of  which  we  find  it  impossible  to  con- 
"  ceive  the  contraries  to  be  true  :  And  hence  the  peculiar 
"  evidence  which  belongs  to  all  the  conclusions  that  follow 
"  from  these  principles  as  necessary  consequences." 

To  this  view  of  the  subject  Dr.  Reid  has  repeatedly 
given  his  sanction,  at  least  in  the  most  essential  points  ; 
more  particularly,  in  controverting  an  assertion  of  Locke's, 
that  "  no  science  is,  or  hath  been  built  on  maxims." — "  Surf 


SECT.  I.]  OF    THE    HUMAN   MIND.  27 

"  ly  (says  Dr.  Reid)  Mr.  Locke  was  not  ignorant  of  ge- 
"  ometry,  which  hath  been  built  upon  maxims  prefixed  to 
"  the  Elements,  as  far  back  as  we  are  able  to  trace  it.  But 
"  though  they  had  not  been  prefixed,  which  was  a  matter  of 
f{  utility  rather  than  necessity,  yet  it  must  be  granted,  that 
"  every  demonstration  in  geometry  is  grounded,  either  upon 
"  propositions  formerly  demonstrated,  or  upon  self-evident 
"  principles."* 

On  another  occasion,  he  expresses  himself  thus  :  "  I  take 
"  it  to  be  certain,  that  whatever  can,  by  just  reasoning,  be 
"  inferred  from  a  principle  that  is  necessary,  must  be  a 
if  a  necessary  truth.  Thus,  as  the  axioms  in  mathematics 
"  are  all  necessary  truths,  so  are  all  the  conclusions  drawn 
"  from  them  ;  that  is,  the  whole  body  of  that  science."! 

That  there  is  something  fundamentally  erroneous  in  these 
very  strong  statements  with  respect  to  the  relation  which 
Euclid's  axioms  bear  to  the  geometrical  theorems  which  fol- 
low, appears  sufficiently  from  a  consideration  which  was  long 
ago  mentioned  by  Locke,- — that  from  these  axioms  it  is  not 
possible  for  human  ingenuity  to  deduce  a  single  inference. 
"  It  was  not  (says  Locke)  the  influence  of  those  maxims 
"which  are  taken  for  principles  in  mathematics,  that  hath 
"  led  the  masters  of  that  science  into  those  wonderful  disco 
"  veries  they  have  made.  Let  a  man  of  good  parts  know  all 
"  the  maxims  generally  made  use  of  in  mathematics  never  so 
"  perfectly,  and  contemplate  their  extent  and  consequences 
"  as  much  as  he  pleases,  he  will,  by  (heir  assistance,  I  sup- 
"  pose,  scarce  ever  come  to  know,  that  '  the  square  of  the 
"  hypothenuse  in  a  right  angled  triangle,  is  equal  to  the 
"  squares  of  the  two  other  sides.'  The  knowledge  that 
rc  '  the  whole  is  equal  to  all  its  parts,'  and,  '  if  you  take 
"  equals  from  equals,  the  remainders  will  be  equal,'  helped 
"  him  not,  I  presume,  to  this  demonstration.  And  a  man 
*c  may,  1  think,  pore  long  enough  on  those  axioms,  without 
"  ever  seeing  one  jot  the  more  of  mathematical  truths."! 

*  Essays  on  lntell.  Powers,  p.  647,  4to  edit. 

f  Ibid.  p.  677.    See  also  p.  560.  561,  606. 

i  Essay  on  Haman   Understanding;,  Book  IV.  chap,  xii,  £  IS 


28  ELEMENTS  OF  THE  PHILOSOPHY  [CHAP.  I, 

But  surely,  if  this  be  granted,  and  if,  at  the  same  time,  by 
the  first  principles  of  a  science  be  meant,  those  fundamental 
propositions  from  which  its  remoter  truths  are  derived,  the 
axioms  cannot,  with  any  consistency,  be  called  the  First 
Principles  of  Mathematics.  They  have  not  (it  will  be  admit- 
ted) the  most  distant  analogy  to  what  are  called  the  first 
principles  ©f  Natural  Philosophy  ; — to  those  general  facts, 
for  example,  of  the  gravity  and  elasticity  of  the  air,  from 
which  may  be  deduced,  as  consequences,  the  suspension  of 
the  mercury  in  the  Torricellian  tube,  and  its  fall  when  car- 
ried up  to  an  eminence.  According  to  this  meaning  of  the 
word,  the  principles  of  mathematical  science  are,  not  the 
axioms  but  the  definitions  /  which  definitions  hold,  in  mathe- 
matics, precisely  the  same  place  that  is  held  in  natural  phi- 
losophy by  such  general  facts  as  have  now  been  referred  to.* 
From  what  principle  are  the  various  properties  of  the  cir- 
cle derived,  but  from  the  definition  of  a  circle  ?  From  what 
principle  the  properties  of  the  parabola  or  ellipse,  but  from 
the  definitions  of  these  curves  ?  A  similar  observation  may 
be  extended  to  all  the  other  theorems  which  the  mathemati- 
cian demonstrates  :  And  it  is  this  observation  (which,  obvi- 

*  In  order  to  prevent  cavil,  it  may  be  necessary  for  me  to  remark  here,  that,  when 
I  speak  of  mathematical  axioms,  I  have  in  view  only  such  as  are  of  the  same  descrip- 
tion with  ihefirst  nine  of  those  which  are  prefixed  to  the  Elements  of  Euclid  ;  for: 
in  that  list,  it  is  well  known,  that  there  are  several  which  belong  to  a  class  of  propo- 
sitions altogether  different  from  the  others.  Thar"  all  right  angles  (for  cxample)arr 
¥  equal  to  one  another  ;''  that  "  when  one  straight  line  felling  on  two  other  straight 
"lines  makes  the  two  interior  angles  on  the  same  side  jess  than  two  right  angles. 
"  these  two  straight  lines,  if  produced,  shall  meet  on  the  side,  where  are  the  two  an •• 
ic  gles  less  than  two  right  angles  :"  are  manifestly  principles  which  bear  no  analogy 
to  such  barren  truisms  as  these,  '•'  Things  that  are  equal  to  one  and  the  same  thing 
"  are  equal  to  one  another."  "  If  equals  be  added  to  equals,  (be  wholes  are  equal. : 
"  If  equals  be  taken  from  equals,  the  remainders  are  equal."  Of  these  propositions, 
the  two  former  (the  10th  and  11th  axioms,  to  wit,  in  Euclid's  list)  are  evidently  theo- 
rems which,  in  point  of  strict  logical  accuracy,  ought  to  be  demonstrated  ;  as  may  be 
easily  done,  with  respect  to  the  first,  in  a  single  sentence.  That  the  second  has  no; 
3'et  been  proved  in  a  simple  and  satisfactory  manner,  has  been  long  considered  as  a 
sort  of  reproach  to  mathematicians;  and  1  have  little  doubt  that  this  reproach  will 
continue  to  exist,  till  the  basis  of  the  science  be  somewhat  enlarged,  by  the  introduc- 
tion of  one  or  two  new  definitions,  to  serve  as  additional  principles  of  geometrical 
reasoning. 

For  some  farther  remarks  on  Euclid's  Axioms,  see  note  (A.) 

The  edition  of  Euclid  to  which  I  uniformly  refer,  is  that  of  jDavid  'Gregory.  Qxora 
1713- 


SECT.  I. J  OP    THE   HUMAN    MINI).  29 

ous  as  it  may  seem,  does  not  appear  to  have  occurred,  in  all 
its  force,  either  to  Locke,  to  Reid,  or  to  Campbell)  that 
furnishes,  if  I  mistake  not,  the  true  explanation  of  the  pecu- 
liarity already  remarked  in  mathematical  evidence.* 

The  prosecution  of  this  last  idea  properly  belongs  to  the 
subject  of  mathematical  demonstration,  of  which  I  intend  to 
treat  afterwards.  In  the  mean  time,  I  trust,  that  enough  has 
been  said  to  correct  those  misapprehensions  of  the  nature  of 
axioms,  which  are  countenanced  by  the  speculations,  and 
still  more  by  the  phraseology,  of  some  late  eminent  writers. 
On  this  article,  my  own  opinion  coincides  very  nearly  with 
that  of  Mr.  Locke — both  in  the  view  which  he  has  given  of 
the  nature  and  use  of  axioms  in  geometry,  and  in  what  he 
has  so  forcibly  urged  concerning  the  danger,  in  other  branch- 
es of  knowledge,  of  attempting  a  similar  list  of  maxims, 
without  a  due  regard  to  the  circumstances  by  which  different 
sciences  are  distinguished  from  one  another.  With  Mr. 
Locke,  too,  I  must  beg  leave  to  guard  myself  against  the 
possibility  of  being  misunderstood  in  the  illustrations  which  I 
have  offered  of  some  of  his  ideas  :  And  for  this  purpose,  I 
cannot  do  better  than  borrow  his  words.  "  In  all  that  is 
"  here  suggested  concerning  the  little  use  of  axioms  for  the 
«'  improvement  of  knowledge,  or  dangerous  use  in  undetermin- 
u  ed  ideas,  I  have  been  far  enough  from  saying  or  intending 
H  they  should  be  laid  aside,  as  some  have  been  too  for- 
"  ward  to  charge  me.  I  affirm  them  to  be  truths,  self-evi- 
"  dent  truths  ;  and  so  cannot  be  laid  aside.  As  far  as  their 
"  influence  will  reach,  it  is  in  vain  to  endeavour,  nor  would 
"  I  attempt  to  abridge  it.  But  yet,  without  any  injury  to 
"  truth  or  knowledge,  I  may  have  reason  to  think  their  use 

*D'Alembert,  although  he  sometimes  seems  to  speak  a  different  language,  ap- 
proached nearly  to  this  view  of  the  subject  when  he  wrote  the  following  passage  : 

"  Finally,  it  is  not  without  reason  that  mathematicians  consider  definitions  as  prim- 
l<  ciples  ;  since  it  is  on  clear  and  precise  definitions  that  our  knowledge  rests  in  those 
"  sciences,  where  our  reasoning  powers  have  the  widest  field  opened  for  their  exer- 
"  cise." — "  Au  reste,  ce  n'est  pas  sans  laison  que  les  mathematiciens  regardent  les 
"  definitions  comme  des  principes,  puisque,  dans  les  sciences  on  le  raisonnement  a  la 
"  meil'ure  part,  e'est  sur  des  definitions  netfes  el  exactes  <jne  nos  connoissances  sont 
'  'appuyfces." — Element  ck  Phil,  p,  & 


30  ELEMENTS    OP    THE  PHILOSOPHY  [CHAP.  I, 

"  is  not  answerable  to  the  great  stress  which  seems  to  be 
"  laid  on  them,  and  I  may  warn  men  not  to  make  an  ill  use 
"  of  them,  for  the  confirming  themselves  in  error."* 

After  what  has  been  just  stated,  it  is  scarcely  necessary 
for  me  again  to  repeat,  with  regard  to  mathematical  axioms  ; 
that  although  they  are  not  the  principles  of  our  reasoning, 
either  in  arithmetic  or  in  geometry,  their  truth  is  supposed  or 
implied  in  all  our  reasonings  in  both  ;  and,  if  it  were  called 
in  question,  our  further  progress  would  be  impossible.  In 
both  of  these  respects,  we  shall  find  them  analogous  to  the 
other  classes  of  primary  or  elemental  truths  which  remain  to 
be  considered. 

Nor  let  it  be  imagined,  from  this  concession,  that  the  dis- 
pute turns  merely  on  the  meaning  annexed  to  the  word  prin- 
ciple. It  turns  upon  an  important  question  of  fact ;  Whether 
the  theorems  of  geometry  rest  on  the  axioms,  in  the  same 
sense  in  which  they  rest  on  the  definitions  ?  or  (to  state  the 
question  in  a  manner  still  more  obvious)  Whether  axioms 
hold  a  place  in  geometry  at  all  analogous  to  what  is  occupi- 
ed in  natural  philosophy,  by  those  sensible  phenomena  which 
form  the  basis  of  that  science  ?  Dr.  Reid  compares  them 
sometimes  to  the  one  set  of  propositions  and  sometimes  to 
the  other.!  If  the  foregoing  observations  be  just,  they  bear 
no  analogy  to  either. 

Into  this  indistinctness  of  language  Dr.  Reid  was  proba- 
bly led  in  part  by  Sir  Isaac  Newton,  who,  with  a  very  illo- 
gical latitude  in  the  use  of  words,  gave  the  name  of  axiom? 

*  Locke's  Essay,  Book  IV.  cli.  vii.  §  14. 

j  "  Mathematics,  once  fairly  established  on  the  foundation  of  a  few  axioms  and  </e» 
"finitions,  as  upon  a  rock,  has  grown  from  age  to  age,  so  as  to  become  the  loftiest 
"  and  the  most  solid  fabric  that  human  reason  can  boast." — Essays  on  Int.  Powers, 
p.  561,  4to  edition. 

"  Lord  Bacon  first  delineated  the  only  solid  foundation  on  which  natural  philoso- 
"  phy  can  be  built :  and  Sir  Isaac  iNewton  reduced  the  principles  laid  down  by  Ba- 
rt con  into  three  or  four  axioms,  which  he  calls  regulai  philosophandi.  From  these, 
"  togetJier  with  the  phenomena  observed  by  the  senses,  which  he  likewise  lays  down  a: 
a  first  principles,  he  deduces,  by  strict  reasoning,  the  propositions  contained  in  the 
"third  book  of  his  Principia,  and  ia  his  Optics;  and  by  this  means  has  raised? 
tl  fabric,  which  is  not  liable  to  be  shaken  by  doubtful  disputation,  but  stands  immovex 
"  able  on  the  basis  of  self-evident  principles." — Ibid.     See  also  pp.  617-  CIS 


SECT.  I.]  &F   THE   HUMAN   feflTCfe  31 

to  the  /aw*  of  motion,*  and  also  to  those  general  experimental 
truths  which  form  the  ground-work  of  our  general  reason- 
ings in  catoptrics  and  dioptrics.  For  such  a  misapplication 
of  the  technical  terms  of  mathematics  some  apology  might 
perhaps  be  made,  if  the  author  had  been  treating  on  any  sub- 
ject connected  with  moral  science ;  but  surely,  in  a  work  en- 
titled "  Mathematical  Principles  of  Natural  Philosophy,"  the 
word  axiom  might  reasonably  have  been  expected  to  be  used 
in  a  sense  somewhat  analogous  to  that  which  every  person 
liberally  educated  is  accustomed  to  annex  to  it,  when  he  is 
first  initiated  into  the  elements  of  geometry. 

The  question  to  which  the  preceding  discussion  relates  is 
of  the  greater  consequence,  that  the  prevailing  mistake  with 
respect  to  the  nature  of  mathematical  axioms,  has  contributed 
much  to  the  support  of  a  very  erroneous  theory  concerning 
mathematical  evidence,  which  is,  I  believe,  pretty  generally 
adopted  at  present, — that  it  all  resolves  ultimately  into  the 
perception  oi' identity  ;  and  that  it  is  this  circumstance  which, 
constitutes  the  peculiar  and  characteristical  cogency  of  ma- 
thematical demonstration. 

Of  some  of  the  other  arguments  which  have  been  alleged 
in  favour  of  this  theory,  I  shall  afterwards  have  occasion  to 

*  Axiomala,  sive  leges  Motus.    Vid.  Philosophic  Naturalis  Principiu  Mathematics. 
At  the  beginning,  too,  of  Newton's  Optics,  the  title  of  axioms  is  given  to  the  follow- 
ing propositions : 

Axiom  1. 
"  The  angles  of  reflection  and  refraction  lie  in  one  and  the  same  plane  with  the  any 
«  gle  of  incidence. 

Axiom  II. 
"  The  angle  of  reflection  is  equal  to  the  angle  of  incidence. 

Axiom  III. 
"  If  the  refracted  ray  be  turned  directly  back  to  the  point  of  incidence,  it  shall  be. 
refracted  into  the  line  before  described  by  the  incident  ray. 

Axiom  IV. 
"  Refraction  out  of  the  rarer  medium  into  the  denser,  is  made  towards  the  perpen- 
dicular ;  that  is,  so  that  the  angle  of  refraction  be  less  than  the  angle  of  incidence. 

Axiom  V. 
"  The  sine  of  incidence  is  either  accurately,  or  very  nearly  in  a  given  ratio  to  the 
{t  sine  of  refraction." 

When  the  word  axiom  is  understood  by  one  writer  in  the  sense  annexed  to.  it  by 
Euclid,  and  by  his  antagonist  in  the  sense  here  givfn  to  it  by  Sir  Isaac  Newton,  it  is 
not  surprising  that  there  should  be  apparently  a  wide  diversity  between  their  opinions 
concerning  the  logical  importance  of  this  class  of  propositions. 


32  ELEMENTS    OF    THE    PHILOSOPHY  [CHAP.  I. 

take  notice.  At  present  it  is  sufficient  for  me  to  remark, 
(and  this  I  flatter  myself  I  may  venture  to  do  with  some  con- 
fidence, after  the  foregoing  reasonings,)  that  in  so  far  as  it 
rests  on  the  supposition  that  all  geometrical  truths  are  ulti- 
mately derived  from  Euclid's  axioms,  it  proceeds  on  an  as- 
sumption totally  unfounded  in  fact,  and  indeed  so  obviously 
false,  that  nothing  but  its  antiquity  can  account  for  the  facility 
with  which  it  continues  to  be  admitted  by  the  learned.* 

II. 

Continuation  of  the  same  Subject. 

The  difference  of  opinion  between  Locke  and  Reid,  of 
which  I  took  notice  in  the  foregoing  part  of  this  section,  ap- 
pears greater  than  it  really  is,  in  consequence  of  an  ambigu- 
ity in  the  word  principle,  as  employed  by  the  latter.  In  its 
proper  acceptation,  it  seems  to  me  to  denote  an  assumption 
(whether  resting  on  fact  or  on  hypothesis)  upon  which,  as  a 
datum,  a  train  of  reasoning  proceeds ;  and  for  the  falsity  or 
incorrectness  of  which  no  logical  rigour  in  the  subsequent- 
process  can  compensate.  Thus  the  gravity  and  the  elastici- 
ty of  the  air  are  principles  of  reasoning  in  our  speculations 
about  the  barometer.  The  equality  of  the  angles  of  inci- 
dence and  reflection  ;  the  proportionality  of  the  sines  of  inci- 
dence and  refraction  ;  are  principles  of  reasoning  in  catop- 
trics and  in  dioptrics.  In  a  sense  perfectly  analogous  to  this, 
the  definitions  of  geometry  (all  of  which  are  merely  hypotheti- 

*  A  late  mathematician,  of  considerable  ingenuity  and  learning,  doubtful,  it  should 
seem,  whether  Euclid  had  laid  a  sufficiently  broad  foundation  for  mathematical  sci- 
ence in  the  axioms  prefixed  to  his  Elements,  has  thought  proper  to  introduce  several 
new  ones  oi  his  own  invention.  The  first  of  these  is,  that  "  Every  quantity  is  equal  to 
"  itself;"  to  which  he  adds  afterwards,  that  "  A  quantity  expressed  one  way  is  equal 
"  to  itself  expressed  an}'  other  way." — See  Elements  of  Mathematical  Analysis,  by  Pro- 
fessor Vilant  of  Saint  Andrew's.  We  are  apt  to  smile  at  the  formal  statement  of  these 
propositions  ;  and  yet,  according  to  the  theory  alluded  to  in  the  text,  h  is  in  truths  oi' 
this  very  description  that  the  whole  science  of  mathematics  not  only  begins  but  ends. 
"  Omnes  mathematicorum  propositiones  sunt  identic*,  et  repraesentanturhac  formula, 
"  a  =  a."  This  sentence,  which  I  quote  from  a  dissertation,  published  at  Berlin  about 
fifty  vears  ago,  expresses,  in  a  few  words,  what  seems  to  be  now  the  prevailing  opi 
nion  (more  particularly  on  the  Continent)  concerning  the  nature  of  mathematical  evi- 
dence. The  remarks  which  I  have  to  offer  upon  it,  I  delay  till  some  other  questions 
shall  be  previously  considered. 


SECT.  !.}  OF    THE   MtlMAfr   MIND,  33 

tal)  are  the  first  principles  of  reasoning  in  the  subsequent  de- 
monstrations, and  the  basis  on  which  the  whole  fabric  of  the 
science  rests. 

I  have  called  this  the  proper  acceptation  of  the  word,  be- 
cause it  is  that  in  which  it  is  most  frequently  used  by  the  best 
writers.  It  is  also  most  agreeable  to  the  literal  meaning 
which  its  etymology  suggests^  expressing  the  original  point 
from  which  our  reasoning  sets  out  or  commences. 

Dr.  Reid  often  uses  the  word  in  this  sense,  as,  for  exam- 
ple, in  the  following  sentence,  already  quoted  :  "  From  three 
"  or  four  axioms,  which  he  calls  regulce  philosophandi,  to- 
"  gether  with  the  phenomena  observed  by  the  senses,  which 
w  he  likewise  lays  dvwn  as  first  principles,  Newton  deduces, 
*'  by  strict  reasoning,  the  propositions  contained  in  the  third 
"  book  of  his  PWncipia,  and  in  his  Optics." 

On  other  occasions,  he  uses  the  same  word  to  denote  those 
elemental  truths  (if  I  may  use  the  expression)  which  are  vir- 
tually taken  for  granted  or  assumed,  in  every  step  of  our  rea- 
soning ;  and  without  which,  although  no  consequences  can  be 
directly  inferred  from  them,  a  (rain  of  reasoning  would  be 
impossible.  Of  this  kind  in  mathematics,  are  the  axioms,  or 
(as  Mr.  Locke  and  others  frequently  call  them)  the  maxims; 
in  physics,  a  belief  of  the  continuance  of  the  LavSs  of  Nature  $ 
in  all  our  reasonings,  without  exception,  a  belief  in  our  own 
identity,  and  in  the  evidence  of  memory.  Such  truths  are  the 
last  elements  into  which  reasoning  resolves  itself,  when  sub- 
jected to  a  metaphysical  analysis  ;  and  which  no  person  but 
a  metaphysician  or  a  logician  ever  thinks  of  stating  in  the 
form  of  propositions,  or  even  of  expressing  verbally  to  him- 
self. It  is  to  truths  of  this  description  that  Locke  seems  in 
general  to  apply  the  name  of  maxims  ;  and,  in  this  sense,  it 
is  unquestionably  true,  that  no  science  (not  even  geometry) 
is  founded  on  maxims  as  its  first  principles. 

In  one  sense  of  the  word  principle,  indeed,  maxims  may 
be  calied  principles,  of  reasoning  ;  for  the  words  principles 
and  elements  are  sometimes  used  as  synonymous.  Nor  do  I 
take  upon  me  to  say  that  this  mode  of  speaking  is  exception- 
able.    All  that  I  assert  is,  that  they  cannot  be  called  printi* 

vol.  ti.  5 


34  ELEMENTS    OP    THE    PHILOSOPHY  [CHAP.  I, 

pies  of  reasoning,  in  the  sense  which  has  just  now  been  de- 
fined ;  and  that  accuracy  requires,  that  the  word,  on  which 
the  whole  question  hinges,  should  not  be  used  in  both  senses, 
in  the  course  of  the  same  argument.  It  is  for  this  reason  that 
I  have  employed  the  phrase  principles  of  reasoning  on  the 
one  occasion,  and  elements  of  reasoning  on  the  other,    i 

It  is  difficult  to  find  unexceptionable  language  to  mark  dis- 
tinctions so  completely  foreign  to  the  ordinary  purposes  of 
speech  ;  but,  in  the  present  instance,  the  line  of  separation 
is  strongly  and  clearly  drawn  by  this  criterion, — that  from 
principles  of  reasoning  consequences  may  be  deduced  ;  from 
what  I  have  called  elements  of  reasoning,  none  ever  can. 

A  process  of  logical  reasoning  has  been  often  likened  to  a 
chain  supporting  a  weight.  If  this  similitude  be  adopted, 
the  axioms  or  elemental  truths  now  mentioned,  may  be  com- 
pared to  the  successive  concatenations  which  connect  the 
different  links  immediately  with  each  other;  (he  principles  of 
our  reasoning  resemble  the  hook,  or  rather  the  beam,  from 
which  the  whole  is  suspended. 

The  foregoing  observations,  I  am  inclined  to  think,  coin- 
cide with  what  was,  at  bottom,  Mr.  Locke's  opinion  on  this 
subject.  That  he  has  not  stated  it  with  his  usual  clearness 
and  distinctness,  it  is  impossible  to  deny ;  at  the  same  lime. 
I  cannot  subscribe  to  (he  following  severe  criticism  of  Dr. 
Reid  : 

"  Mr.  Locke  has  observed,  k  That  intuitive  knowledge  is 
"  necessary  to  connect  all  the  steps  of  a  demonstration.' 

u  From  this,  I  think,  it  necessarily  follows,  that  in  every 
"  branch  of  knowledge,  we  must  make  use  of  truths  that  are 
"  intuitively  known,  in  order  to  deduce  from  them  such  as 
"  require  proof. 

kt  But  I  cannot  reconcile  this  with  what  he  says,  (section 
';  8th  of  the  same  chapter  ;  ('  The  necessity  of  this  intuitive 
"  knowledge  in  every  step  of  scientifical  or  demonstrative 
"  reasoning,  gave  occasion,  I  imagine,  to  that  mistaken  ax- 
;;  iom,  that  all  reasoning  was  ex  praicognitis  el  pr&concessis, 
'-'  which  how  far  it  is  mistaken  I  shall  have  occasion  to  shew 


SECT.  I.]  0p   THE    HUMAN    MINI).  33 

"  more  at  large  when  I  come  to  consider  proposiiions,  and 
"  particularly  those  propositions  which  are  called  maxims, 
"  and  to  show  that  it  is  by  a  mistake  that  they  are  supposed 
"  to  be  the  foundation  of  all  our  knowledge  and  reason- 
'"  ings."* 

The  distinction  which  J  have  already  made  between  ele- 
ments of  reasoning,  and  first  principles  of  reasoning,  ap- 
pears to  myself  to  throw  much  light  on  these  apparent  con- 
tradictions. 

That  the  seeming  difference  of  opinion  on  this  point  be- 
tween these  two  profound  writers,  arose  chiefly  from  the  am- 
biguities of  language,  may  be  inferred  from  the  following 
acknowledgement  of  Dr.  R'eid,  which  immediately  follows 
the  last  quotation  : 

■"  I  have  carefully  examined  the  chapter  on  maxims,  which 
x<  Mr.  Locke  here  refers  to,  and  though  one  would  expect, 
"  from  the  quotation  last  made,  that  it  should  run  contrary 
"  to  what  I  have  before  delivered  Concerning  first  princi- 
"  pies,  I  find  only  two  or  three  sentences  in  it,  and  those 
"  chiefly  incidental,  to  which  I  do  not  assent."! 

Before  dismissing  this  subject,  I  must  once  more  repeat, 
that  the  doctrine  which  I  have  been  attempting  to  establish, 
so  far  from  degrading  axioms  from  that  rank  which  Dr.  Reid 
would  assign  them,  tends  to  identify  them  still  more  than  he 
has  done  with  the  exercise  of  our  reasoning  powers  ;  inas- 
much as,  instead  of  comparing  them  with  th,e  data,  on  the 
accuracy  of  which  that  of  our  conclusion  necessarily  depends, 
it  considers  them  as  the  vinculo  which  give  coherence  to  all 
the  particular  links  of  the  chain  ;  or  (to  vary  the  metaphor) 
as  component  elements,  without  which  the  faculty  of  reason- 
ing is  inconceivable  and  impossible.! 

*  Essays  on  Int.  Powers,  p.  613;  4to  edii. 

t  Ibid. 

X  D'Alembert  has  defined  the  word  principle  exactly  in  the  sense  in  which  I  have 
used  it ;  and  has  expressed  himself  (at  least  on  one  occasion)  nearly  as  I  have  done^ 
on  the  subject  of  axioms.  He  seems  however  on  this  as  well  as  on  some  other  logical 
and  metaphysical  questions,  to  have  varied  a  little  in  his  views  (probably  from  mere 
••orgetfulness)  in  different  parts  of  his  writings. 

■:  What  then  are  the  truths  which  are  entitled  to  have  a  place  in  the  elements  c 


36  ELEMENTS    OF    THE    PHILOSOPHY  [CHAP.  {, 


SECTION  II. 

Of  certain  Laws  of  Belief,  inseparably  connected  with  the  exercise  of  Consciousness, 
Memory,  Perception,  and  Reasoning. 

1.  It  is  by  the  immediate  evidence  of  consciousness   that 
we  are  assured  of  the  present  existence  of  our  various  sensa- 

(i  philosophy  ?  The3'  are  of  two  kinds  ;  those  which  form  the  head  of  each  part  of  the 
**  chain,  and  those  which  are  10  be  found  at  the  points  where  different  branches  of  the 
"  chain  unite  together. 

"  Truths  of  the  first  kind  are  distinguished  by  this — that  they  do  not  depend  ou 
11  any  other  truths,  and  that  they  possess  within  themselves  the  whole  grounds  of  their 
"  evidence.  Some  of  my  readers  will  be  apt  to  suppose,  that  I  here  mean  to  speak  of 
w  axioms  :  but  these  are  not  the  truths  which  I  have  at  present  in  view.  With  re- 
ft  spect  to  this  last  class  of  principles,  I  must  refer  to  what  I  have  e'sewheie  said  oi' 
"  them  ;  that,  notwithstanding  their  truth,  they  add  nothing  to  our  information  ;  and 
"  that  the  palpable  evidence  which  accompanies  them,  amounts  to  nothing  more 
"  than  to  an  expression  of  the  same  idea  by  means  of  two  different  terms.  On  such 
"  occasions,  the  mind  only  turns  to  no  purpose  about  its  own  axis,  without  advancing 
'■'•  forward  a  single  step.  Accordingly,  axioms  are  so  far  from  holding  the  highest 
"  rank  in  philosophy,  that  they  scarcely  deserve  the  distinction  of  being  formally 
1(  enunciated." 

"  Or  quelles  sont  les  veriies  qui  doivenl  entrer  d;ins  des  e'emens  de  philosophie  ! 
;t  II  y  en  a  de  deux  sorter  ;  cellas  qui  furment  la  tele  de  chaque  par  tie  de  la  cltaine,  et 
>£  celles  qui  se  trouvent  au  point  de  reunion  cle  plusieurs  branches. 

"  Les  verltes  du  premier  genre  out  pour  caractere  distinctif  cle  ne  dependre 
11  d'aucr.nc  autre,  et  de  n'avoir  'Je  preuves  que  dans  elles-memes.  Plusieurs  lecteurs 
■■'  croiront  que  nous  voulons  parler  des  axioms,  et  ils  se  tromperont  ;  nous  les  renvoj'- 
;:  ons  a  ce  qui  nous  en  avons  clit  ailleurs,  que  ces  sortes  de  principes  ne  nous  appren- 
'■'•  nent  rien  a  force  d'etre  vrais  ;e!  que  leftr  evidence  palpable  et  grossiei  e  se  rcduit  a  ex- 
'■'  primer  la  rneme  idee  par  deux  termes  differens,  1'esprit  ne  fait  alors  autre  chose  que 
:'  tourner  inutilement  snr  lui-raeme  sans  avancer  d'un  seul  pas.  Ainsi  les  axioms,  bieri 
;:  loin  de  tenir  en  philosophie  !e  premier  rang,  n'oht  pas  meuie  hesoin  d"eire  enoncSs.' 
—  EUm.  de  PhiL  pp."i,  25. 

Although,  in  the  foregoing  \  assage,  D'Alomberl,  in  compliance  with  common 
phraseology,  has  bestowed  the  name  of  principles  upon  axioms,  it  appears  clearly, 
from  a  question  which  occurs  afterwards,  that  he  did  not  consider  them  as  well  enti- 
tled to  this  appellation.  "  What  are  then,"  he  asks,  "  in  earh  science,  the  trite prin- 
f*  cipks  from  which  we  ought  to  set  out  ?"  ("  Quels  sont  done  dans  chaque  science  les 
"  vrais  principes  d'ou  Ton  doit  partir  ?")  The  answer  he  gives  to  this  question  agrees 
with  the  doctrine  I  have  staled  in  every  particular,  excepting  in  this,  that  it  repre- 
sents (and  in  my  opinion  very  incorrectly)  the  principles  of  geometrical  science  to  be 
(not  definitions  or  hypotheses,  but)  those  simple  and  acknow!edged/«c<s,  which  our  ■ 
senses  perceive  with  respect  to  the  properties  of  extension.  "  The  true  principles 
ci  from  which  we  ought  to  set  out  in  the  different  sciences,  are  simple  and  acknow- 
-'  ledged  facts,  which  do  not  presuppose  the  existence  of  any  others,  and  which,  of 
c<  course,  it  is  equally  vain  to  attempt  explaining  or  confuting  ;  in  physics,  the  fami- 
"  liar  phenomena  which  daily  experience  presents  to  every  eye  ;  in  geometry,  the 
-'  sensible  properties  of  extension ;  in  mechanics,  the  impenetrability  of  bodies,  upon. 


SECT.  II.]  OP    THE    HUMAN    MIND.  37' 

tions,  whether  pleasant  or  painful ;  of  all  our  affections,  pas- 
sions, hopes,  fears,  desires,  and  volitions.  It  is  thus  too  we 
are  assured  of  the  present  existence  of  those  thoughts  which, 
during  our  waking  hours,  are  continually  passing  through  ihe 
mind,  and  of  all  the  different  effects  which  they  produce  in 
furnishing  employment  to  our  intellectual  faculties. 

According  to  the  common  doctrine  of  our  best  philoso- 
phers,* it  is  by  the  evidence  of  consciousness  we  are  assured 
that  we  ourselves  exist.  The  proposition,  however,  when 
thus  stated,  is  not  accurately  true  ;  for  our  own  existence  (as 
I  have  elsewhere  observed,!)  is  not  a  direct  or  immediate 
object  of  consciousness,  in  the  strict  and  logical  meaning  of 
that  term.  We  are  conscious  of  sensation,  thought,  desire, 
volition  :  but  we  are  not  conscious  of  the  existence  of  mind 
itself;  nor  would  it  be  possible  for  us  to  arrive  at  the  know- 
ledge of  it  (supposing  us  to  be  created  in  the  full  possession 
of  all  the  intellectual  capacities  which  belong  to  human  na- 
ture,) if  no  impression  were  ever  to  be  made  on  our  external 
senses.  The  moment  that,  in  consequence  of  such  an  impres- 
sion, a  sensation  is  excited,  we  learn  two  facts  at  once  ; — the 
existence  of  the  sensation,  and  our  own  existence  as  senti- 
ent beings; — in  other  words,  the  very  first  exercise  of  con- 
sciousness necessarily  implies  a  belief,  not  only  of  the  pre- 
sent existence  of  what  is  felt,  but  of  the  present  existence  of 
that  which  feels  and  thinks  ;  or  (to  employ  plainer  language) 
the  present  existence  of  that  being  which  I  denote  by  the 

':  which  their  mutual  actions  depend  ;  in  metaphysics,  the  results  of  our  sensations  ; 
"  in  morals,  the  original  and  common  affections  of  the  human  race." — "Lesvrais 
';  principes  d'ou  Ton  doit  part ir dans  chaque  science,  sont  des  faits  simples  et  reconnns, 
"  qui  n'en  supposent  point  d'autres,  et  qu'on  ne  pui.sse  par  consequent  ni  exiHquer  ni 
"  contester  ;  en  physique  les  phenomencs  journaliers  que  robservation  deecuvre  a 
"  tous  les  yeux  ;  en  giometrie  les  proprietes  sensibles  de  Vetendue  ;  en  me  chanique, 
"  l'impenelrabiliift  des  corps,  source  de  leur  action  multifile  ;  en  metaphysique,  le  re- 
u  sultat  de  nos  sensations;  en  morale,  les  affections  premieres  ct  communes  a  tous 
«  les  hommes."— pp.  26,  27. 

In  cases  of  this  sort,  whe^e  so  much  depends  on  extreme  precision  and  nicety  in  the 
use  of  words,  it  appears  to  me  to  be  proper  to  verify  the  fideliiy  nf  my,  translations 
by  subjoining  the  original  passages. 

*  See,  in  particular,  Campbell's  Philosophy  of  RhclactC. 

t  Philosophical  Essays,  4to.  edit,  p.  7. 


38  ELEMENTS    OF    THE    PHILOSOPHY         [CHAP.    I. 

words  /  and  myself.  Of  these  facts,  however,  it  is  the  for- 
mer alone  of  which  we  can  properly  be  said  to  be  conscious, 
agreeably  to  the  rigorous  interpretation  of  the  expression. 
A  conviction  of  the  latter,  although  it  seems  to  be  so  insepa- 
rable from  the  exercise  of  consciousness,  that  it  can  scarcely 
be  considered  as  posterior  to  it  in  the  order  of  time,  is  yet  (if 
I  may  be  allowed  to  make  use  of  a  scholastic  distinction)  pos- 
terior to  it  in  the  order  of  nature ;  not  only  as  it  supposes 
consciousness  to  be  already  awakened  by  some  sensation,  or 
some  other  mental  affection  ;  but  as  it  is  evidently  rather  a 
judgment  accompanying  the  exercise  of  that  power,  than  one 
of  its  immediate  intimations  concerning  its  appropriate  class 
of  internal  phenomena.  It  appears  to  me,  therefore,  more 
correct  to  call  the  belief  of  our  own  existence  a  concomitant 
or  accessory  of  the  exercise  of  consciousness,  than  to  say, 
that  our  existence  is  a  fact  falling  under  the  immediate  cog- 
nizance of  consciousness,  like  the  existence  of  the  various 
agreeable  or  painful  sensations  which  external  objects  excite 
in  our  minds. 

2.  That  we  cannot,  without  a  very  blameable  latitude  m 
the  use  of  words,  be  said  to  be  conscious  of  our  personal 
identity,  is  a  proposition  still  more  indisputable  ;  inasmuch 
as  the  very  idea  of  personal  identity  involves  the  idea  of 
time  and  consequently  presupposes  the  exercise  not  only  of 
consciousness  but  of  memory.  The  belief  connected  wilh  this 
idea  is  implied  in  every  thought  and  every  action  of  the  mind, 
and  may  be  justly  regarded  as  one  of  the  simplest  and  most 
essential  elements  of  the  understanding.  Indeed  it  is  impos- 
sible to  conceive  either  an  intellectual  or  an  active  being  to 
exist  without  it.  It  is,  however,  extremely  worthy  of  remark( 
wilh  respect  to  this  belief,  that,  universal  as  it  is  among  our 
species,  nobody  but  a  metaphysician  ever  thinks  of  expres- 
sing it  in  words,  or  of  reducing  into  the  shape  of  a  proposi- 
tion the  truth  to  which  it  relates.  To  the  rest  of  mankind, 
it  forms  not  an  object  of  knowledge  ;  but  a  condition  or  sup- 
position, necessarily  and  unconsciously  involved  in  the  ex- 
ercise of  all  their  facullies.  On  a  part  of  our  constitution, 
which  is  obviously  one  of  the  last  or  primordial  elements  at 


3jE€T.  II.]  OP    THE    HUMAN    MIN1>.  39 

vvhich  it  is  possible  to  arrive  in  analyzing  our  intellectual 
operations,  it  is  plainly  unphilosophical  to  suppose,  that  any 
new  light  can  be  thrown  by  metaphysical  discussion.  All 
that  can  be  done  with  propriety,  in  such  cases,  is  to  state 
the  fact. 

And  here,  I  cannot  help  taking  notice  of  the  absurd  and 
inconsistent  attempts  which  some  ingenious  men  have  made, 
to  explain  the  gradual  process  by  which  they  suppose  the 
mind  to  be  led  to  the  knowledge  of  its  own  existence,  and  of 
that  continued  identity  which  our  constitution  leads  us  to  as- 
cribe to  it.     How  (it  has  been  asked)  does  a  child  come  to 
form  the  very  abstract  and  metaphysical  idea  expressed  by 
the  pronoun  /  or  moi  ?     In  answer  to  this  question,  I  have 
only  to  observe,  that  when  we  set  about  the  explanation  of  a 
phenomenon,  we   must  proceed   on  the  supposition  that  it  is 
possible  to  resolve  it  into  some  more  general  law  or  laws 
with  which  we  are  already  acquainted.     But,  in  the  case  be- 
fore us,  how  can  this  be  expected,  by  those  who  consider 
that  all  our  knowledge  of  mind  is  derived  from  the  exercise 
of  reflection  ;  and  that  every  act  of  this  power  implies  a  con- 
viction of  our  own  existence  as  reflecting  and  intelligent  be- 
ings ?     Every  theory,  therefore,   which  pretends   to  account 
for  this  conviction,    must  necessarily  involve   that   sort   of 
paralogism  which  logicians    call   a   pelltio  principii  ;  inas- 
much as  it  must  resolve  the  thing  to  be  explained  into  some 
law  or  laws,  the  evidence  of  which  rests  ultimately  on  the 
assumption  in  question.     From  this  assumption,  which  is  ne- 
cessarily implied  in  the  joint  exercise  of  consciousness  and 
memory,  the  philosophy  of  the  human  mind,  if  we  mean  to 
study  it  analytically,  must  of  necessity  set  out  ;  and  the  very 
attempt  to  dig  deeper  for  its   foundation,  betrays  a  total  ig- 
norance of  the  logical  rules,  according  to  which  alone  it  can 
ever  be  prosecuted  with  any  hopes  of  success. 

It  was,  I  believe,  first  remarked  by  M.  Prevost  of  Gene- 
va, (and  the  remark,  obvious  as  it  may  appear,  reflects  much 
honour  on  his  acuteness  and  sagacity,)  that  the  inquiries  con- 
cerning the  mind,  founded  on  the  hypothesis  of  the  animated 
statue — inquiries  which  both  Bonnet  and  Condillac  professed 


40  ELEMENTS    OF    THE    PHILOSOPHY  [CHAP,  h 

to  carry  on  analytically, — were  in  truth  altogether  syn- 
thetical. To  this  criticism  it  may  be  added,  that  their  inqui- 
ries, in  so  far  as  they  had  for  their  object  to  explain  the  ori- 
gin of  our  belief  of  our  own  existence,  and  of  our  personal 
identity,  assumed,  as  the  principles  of  their  synthesis,  facts 
at  once  less  certain  and  less  familiar  than  the  problem  which 
they  were  employed  to  resolve. 

Nor  is  it  to  the  metaphysician 'only,  that  the  ideas  of  iden- 
tity and  of  personality  are  familiar.  Where  is  the  individual 
who  has  not  experienced  their  powerful  influence  over  his 
imagination,  while  he  was  employed  in  reflecting  on  the 
train  of  events  which  have  filled  up  the  past  history  of  his 
life  ;  and  on  that  internal  world,  the  phenomena  of  which 
have  been  exposed  to  his  own  inspection  alone  ?  On  such 
an  occasion,  even  the  wonders  of  external  nature  seem  com- 
paratively insignificant  ;  and  one  is  tpmpfed  (with  a  celebra- 
ted French  writer)  in  contemplating  the  spectacle  of  the  uni- 
verse, to  adopt  the  words  of  the  Doge  of  Genoa  when  he  vi- 
sited Versailles — *l  Ce  qui  m'etonne  le  plus  ici,  c'est  de  m'y 
«  voir."* 

3.  The  belief  which  all  men  entertain  of  the  existence  of 
the  material  world,  (I  mean  their  belief  of  its  existence  inde- 
pendently of  that  of  percipient  beings,)  and  their  expectation 
of  the  continued  uniformity  of  the  laws  of  nature,  belong  to 
the  same  class  of  ultimate  or  elemental  laws  of  thought,  with 
those  which  have  been  just  mentioned.  The  truths  which 
form  their  objects  are  of  an  order  so  radically  different  from 
what  are  commonly  called  truths,  in  the  popular  acceptation  of 
that  word,  that  it  might  perhaps  be  useful  for  logicians  to  dis- 
tinguish them  by  some  appropriate  appellation,  such,  for  ex- 
ample, as  that  of  metaphysical  or  transcendental  truths.  They 
are  not  principles  or  data  (as  will  afterwards  appear)  from 
which  any  consequence  can  be  deduced  ;  but  form  a  part  of 
those  original  stamina  of  human  reason,  which  are  equally 
essential  to  all  the  pursuits  of  science,  and  to  all  the  active 
concerns  of  life 

4-.  I  shall  only  take  notice  farther,  under  this  head,  of  the 

-  D'Alembert,  Apologiede  l'Etude, 


SECT.  II.]  OF    THE   HUMAN   MIND.  41 

confidence  which  we  must  necessarily  repose  in  the  evi- 
dence of  memory  (and  I  may  add,  in  the  continuance  of  our 
personal  identity)  when  we  are  employed  in  carrying  on  any 
process  of  deduction  or  argumentation  ;  in  following  out,  for 
instance,  the  steps  of  a  long  mathematical  demonstration. 
In  yielding  our  assent  to  the  conclusion  to  which  such  a  de*- 
monstration  leads,  we  evidently  trust  to  the  fidelity  with 
which  our  memory  has  connected  the  different  links  of  the 
chain  together.  The  reference  which  is  often  made,  in  the 
course  of  a  demonstration,  to  propositions  formerly  proved, 
places  the  same  remark  in  a  light  still  stronger  ;  and  shews 
plainly  that,  in  this  branch  of  knowledge,  which  is  justly  con- 
sidered as  the  most  certain  of  any,  the  authority  of  the  same 
laws  of  belief  which  are  recognized  in  the  ordinary  pursuits 
of  life,  is  tacitly  acknowledged.  Deny  the  evidence  of  me- 
mory as  a  ground  of  certain  knowledge,  and  you  destroy  the 
foundations  of  mathematical  science,  as  completely  as  if  you 
,  were  to  deny  the  truth  of  the  axioms  assumed  by  Euclid. 

The  foregoing  examples  sufficiently  illustrate  the  nature  of 
that  class  of  truths  which  I  have  called  Fundamental  Laws 
of  Human  Belief,  or  Primary  Elements  of  Human  Reason, 
A  variety  of  others,  not  less  important,  might  be  added  to  the 
list  ;*  but  these  I  shall  not  at  present  stop  to  enumerate,  as 
my  chief  object,  in  introducing  the  subject  here,  was  to  ex- 
plain the  common  relation  in  which  they  all  stand  to  deduc- 
tive evidence.  In  this  point  of  view  two  analogies,  or  ra- 
ther coincidences,  between  the  truths  which  we  have  been 
last  considering,  and  the  mathematical  axioms  which  were 
treated  of  formerly,  immediately  present  themselves  to  our 
notice. 

1.  From  neither  of  these  classes  of  truths  can  any  direct 
inference  be  drawn  for  the  farther  enlargement  of  our  know- 
ledge. This  remark  has  been  already  shewn  to  hold  uni- 
versally with  respect  to  the  axioms  of  geometry  ;  and  it  ap- 
plies equally  to  what  I  have  called  Fundamental  Laws  of  Hu- 

*  Such  for  example,  as  our  belief  of  the  existence  of  efficient  causes  ;  our  belief  o£ 
the  exi=tence  of  other  intelligent  beings  besides  ourselves,  &c.  &c. 

vol.  ir.  C 


1%  ELEMENTS    Q$    THE    PHILOSOPHY        [CHAP.  1. 

man  Belief.  From  such  propositions  as  these,  /  exist ;  I  am 
the  same  person  to-day  that  I  was  yesterday ;  the  .material 
world  has  an  existence  independent  of  my  mind  ;  the  general 
laws  of  nature  will  continue  in  future,  to  operate  uniformly  as 
in  time  past,  no  inference  can  be  deduced,  any  more  than 
from  the  intuitive  truths  prefixed  to  the  Elements  of  Euclid. 
Abstracted  from  other  data,  they  are  perfectly  barren  in 
themselves  ;  nor  can  any  possible  combination  of  them  help 
the  mind  forward,  one  single  step,  in  its  progress.  It  is  for 
this  reason,  that,  instead  of  calling  them,  with  some  other 
writers,  first  principles,  I  have  distinguished  them  by  the  title 
of  fundamental  laws  of  belief;  the  former  word  seeming  to 
me  to  denote,  according  to  common  usage,  some  fact,  or 
some  supposition,  from  which  a  series  of  consequences  may 
be  deduced. 

If  the  account  now  given  of  these  laws  of  belief  he  just,  the 
great  argument  which  has  been  commonly  urged  in  support 
of  their  authority,  and  which  manifestly  confounds  them  with 
what  are  properly  called  principles  of  reasoning,*  is  not  at  all 
applicable  to  the  subject ;  or  at  least  does  not  rest  the  point 
in  dispute  upon  its  right  foundation.  If  there  were  no  first 
principles  (it  has  been  said)  or,  in  other  words,  if  a  reason 

*  Aristotle  himself  has  more  than  once  made  this  remark ;  more  particularly,  in  dis- 
cus>ing  the  absurd  question,  Whether  it  be  possible  tor  the  same  thing  to  be  and  not 
to  be?  «|/yc-<  St  x.xt  tsto  ct7roSetx.vvvxt  rivet  St'  X7rxtSeve-txi.  eo-ri 
yx%  XTratSewtx,  to  jk.sj  yive-xrattt  rtvav  Stt  ^ijreiv  XTroStt^tv,  %xt 
rtvav  ov  Sit.  oXuq  ftey  yxg  xttxvtuv  xSvvxrov  a7roSei%iv  etvctt. 
ets  XTetgov  yxg  «v  fixSt^of  'utts  f^'iS'  ovreat  ttvxt  x7roSn%tv* — 
drislot.  Metaphys.  Vol.  II.  p.  873.  Edit.  Du  Val. 

"  But  there  are  some  who,  through  ignorance,  make  an  attempt  to  prove  even  this 
"  principle,  (that  it  is  impossible  for  the  same  thing  to  be  and  not  to  be.)  For  it  is  a 
"  mark  of  ignorance,  not  to  be  able  to  distinguish  those  things  which  ought  to  bede- 
u  monstrated  from  things  of  which  no  demonstration  should  be  attempted.  In 
"  truth,  it  is  allogether  impossible  that  every  thing  should  be  susceptible  of  demon- 
"  stralion  ;  otherwise  the  process  would  extend  to  infinity,  and,  after  all  our  labour, 
"  nothing  would  be  gained."  In  the  sentence  immediately  preceding  this  quotation, 
Aristotle  calls  the  maxim  in  question,  /3 efiott or xfft  t»»  xp%av  irourai,  "  the 
"  most  certain  of  all  principles." 

To  the  same  purpose  Dr.  Reid  has  said  :  "  I  hold  it  to  be  certain  and  even  demon - 
"  strable,  that  all  knowledge  got  by  reasoning  must  be  built  on  first  prnciples.  This' ' 
he  adds,  '-'is  as  certain  as  that  every  house  must  have  a  foundation.  ""-Essays  on  In! 
Powers-,  p.  553.  4to  edit. 


•pECT.  II.]  OP    THE    HUMAN    MIND.  13 

could  be  given  for  every  thing,  no  process  of  deduction 
could  possibly  be  brought  to  a  conclusion.  The  remark  is 
indisputably  true  ;  but  it  only  proves  (what  no  logician  of  the 
present  times  will  venture  to  deny)  that  the  mathematician 
could  not  demonstrate  a  single  theorem,  unless  he  were  first 
allowed  to  lay  down  his  definitions  ;  nor  the  natural  philoso- 
pher explain  or  account  for  a  single  phenomenon,  unless  he 
were  allowed  to  assume,  as  acknowledged  facts,  certain  gene- 
ral laws  of  nature.  What  inference  does  this  afford  in  fa- 
vour of  that  particular  class  of  truths  to  which  the  preceding 
observations  relate,  and  against  which  the  ingenuity  of  mo- 
dern sceptics  has  been  more  particularly  directed  ?  If  1  be 
not  deceived,  these  truths  are  still  more  intimately  connected 
with  the  operations  of  the  reasoning  faculty  than  has  been 
generally  imagined  ;  not  as  the  principles  (etp%ctt)  from  which 
our  reasonings  set  out,  and  on  which  they  ultimately  depend  ; 
but  as  the  necessary  conditions  on  which  every  step  of  the 
deduction  tacitly  proceeds  ;  or  rather  (if  I  may  use  the  ex- 
pression) as  essential  elements  which  enter  into  the  composi- 
tion of  reason  itself. 

2.  In  this  last  remark,  I  have  anticipated,  in  some  mea- 
sure, what  I  had  to  state  with  respect  to  the  second  coinci- 
dence alluded  to,  between  mathematical  axioms,  and  the 
other  propositions  which  I  have  comprehended  under  the 
general  title  of  fundamental  laws  of  human  belief.  As  the 
truth  of  axioms  is  virtually  presupposed  or  implied  in  the 
successive  steps  of  every  demonstration,  so,  in  every  step  of 
our  reasonings  concerning  the  order  of  Nature,  we  proceed 
on  the  supposition,  that  the  lav/s  by  which  it  is  regulated  will 
continue  uniform  as  in  lime  past  ;  and  that  the  material  uni- 
verse has  an  existence  independent  of  our  perceptions.  I 
need  scarcely  add,  that,  in  all  our  reasonings  whatever, 
whether  they  relate  to  necessary  or  to  contingent  truths,  our 
own  personal  identity,  and  the  evidence  of  memory,  are  vir- 
tually taken  for  granted.  These  different  truths  all  agree 
in  this,  that  they  are  essentially  involved  in  the  exercise  of 
our  rational  powers ;  although,  in  themselves,  they  furnish  no 
principles  or  data  by  which  the  sphere  of  our  knowledge  can. 


44  ELEMENTS    OP   THE    PHILOSOPHY  [CHAP.  L 

by  any  ingenuity,  be  enlarged.  They  agree  farther  in  being 
tacitly  acknowledged  by  all  men,  learned  or  ignorant,  with- 
out any  formal  enunciation  in  words,  or  even  any  conscious 
exercise  of  reflection.  It  is  only  at  that  period  of  our  intel- 
lectual progress  when  scientific  arrangements  and  metaphysi- 
cal refinements  begin  to  be  introduced,  that  they  become  ob- 
jects of  attention  to  the  mind,  and  assume  the  form  of  pro- 
positions. 

In  consequence  of  these  two  analogies  or  coincidences,  I 
should  have  been  inclined  to  comprehend,  under  the  general 
title  of  axioms,  all  the  truths  which  have  been  hitherto  under 
our  review,  if  the  common  usage  of  our  language  had  not,  in 
a  great  measure,  appropriated  that  appellation  to  the  axioms 
of  mathematics :  and  if  the  view  of  the  subject  which  I  have 
taken,  did  not  render  it  necessary  for  me  to  direct  the  atten- 
tion of  my  readers  to  the  wide  diversity  between  the  branch- 
es of  knowledge  to  which  they  are  respectively  subservient. 

I  was  anxious  also  to  prevent  these  truths  from  being  all 
identified,  in  point  of  logical  importance,  under  the  same  name. 
The  fact  is,  that  the  one  class,  (in  consequence  of  the  relation  in 
which  they  stand  to  the  demonstrative  conclusions  of  geome- 
try,, are  comparatively  of  so  little  moment,  that  the  forma{ 
enumeration  of  them  was  a  matter  of  choice  rather  than  of 
necessity  ;  whereas  the  other  class  have  unfortunately  been 
raised,  by  the  sceptical  controversies  of  modern  times,  to  a 
conspicuous  rank  in  the  philosophy  of  the  human  mind,  I 
have  thought  it  more  adviseable,  therefore,  to  bestow  on  the 
latter  an  appropriate  title  of  their  own  ;  without,  however,  go- 
ing so  far,  as  to  reject  altogether  the  phraseology  of  those 
who  have  annexed  to  the  word  axiom  a  more  enlarged  mean- 
ing  than  that  which  I  have  usually  given  to  it.  Little  incon- 
venience, indeed,  can  arise  from  this  latitude  in  the  use  of 
the  term;  provided  only  it  be  always  confined  to  those  ulti- 
mate laws  of  belief,  which,  although  they  form  the  first  ele- 
ments of  human  reason,  cannot  with  propriety  be  ranked 
among  the  principles  from  which  any  of  our  scientific  conclu- 
sions are  deduced. 


SECT.  II.]  OF   THE   HUMAN  MIND.  45r 

Corresponding  to  the  extension  which  some  late  writers 
have  given  to  axioms,  is  that  of  the  province  which  they  have 
assigned  to  intuition;  a  terra  which  has  been  applied,  by 
Dr.  Beattie  and  others,  not  only  to  the  power  by  which  we 
perceive  the  truth  of  the  axioms  of  geometry,  but  to  that  by 
which  we  recognize  the  authority  of  the  fundamental  laws  of 
belief,  when  we  hear  them  enunciated  in  language.     My  only 
objection  to  this  use  of  the  word  is,  that  it  is  a  departure  from 
common  practice  ;  according  to  which,  if  I  be  not  mistaken, 
the  proper  objects  of  intuition  are  propositions  analogous  to 
the  axioms  prefixed  to  Euclid's  Elements.     In  some  other  re 
spects,  this  innovation  might  perhaps  be  regarded  as  an  im- 
provement on  the  very  limited  and  imperfect  vocabulary  of 
which  we  are  able  to  avail  ourselves  in  our  present  discus- 
sions.* 

To  the  class  of  truths  which  I  have  here  called  laws  of  be- 
lief, or  elements  of  reason,  the  title  of  principles  of  common 
sense  was  longago  given  by  Father  Buffier,  whose  language  and 
doctrine  concerning  them  bears  a  very  striking  resemblance  to 
those  of  some  of  our  later  Scotish  logicians.  This,  at  least, 
strikes  me  as  the  meaning  which  these  writers  in  general  an- 
nex to  the  phrase  ;  although  all  of  them  have  frequently  em- 
ployed it  with  a  far  greater  degree  of  latitude.  When  thus 
limited  in  its  acceptation,  it  is  obviously  liable,  in  point  of 
scientific  accuracy,  to  two  very  strong  objections,  both  of 
which  have  been  already  sufficiently  illustrated.  The  first 
is,  that  it  applies  the  appellation  of  principles  to  laws  of  be- 
lief from  which  no  inference  can  be  deduced;  the  second, 

*  According  to  Locke,  we  have  the  knowledge  of  our  own  existence  by  intuition  : 
of  the  existence  of  God  by  demonstration  ;  and  of  other  things  by  sensation.  Book  iv- 
Chap.  9.  §  2. 

This  use  of  the  word  intuition  seems  to  be  somewhat  arbitrary.  The  reality  of  our 
ewn  existence  is  a  truth  which  bears  as  little  analogy  to  the  axioms  of  mathematics, 
as  any  other  primary  truth  whatever.  If  the  province  of  intuition,  therefore,  be  ex- 
tended as  far  as  it  has  been  carried  by  Locke  in  the  foregoing  sentence,  it  will  not  be 
easy  to  give  a  good  reason  why  it  should  not  be  enlarged  a  little  farther.  The  words 
intuition  and  demonstration,  it  must  not  be  forgotten,  have,  both  of  them,  an  etymo- 
logical reference  to  the  sense  of  seeing  ;  and  when  wc  wish  to  express,  in  the  strongest 
terms,  the  most  complete  evidence  which  can  be  set  before  the  mind,  we  compare  it 
to  the  light  of  noon-day  ; — in  other  words,  we  compare  it  to  what  Mr.  Locke  heir' 
attempts  *.o  degrade^  by  calling  it  the  eoiderux  qfmtsation.  ■■ 


46  ELEMENTS    OF    TflE    PHILOSOPHY         [CHAP.    I. 

that  it  refers  the  origin  of  these  laws  to  common  sense.* 
Nor  is  this  phraseology  more  agreeable  to  popular  use  than 
to  logical  precision.  If  we  were  to  suppose  an  individual, 
whose  conduct  betrayed  a  disbelief  of  his  own  existence,  or 
of  his  own  identity,  or  of  the  reality  of  surrounding  objects, 
it  would  by  no  means  amount  to  an  adequate  description  of 
his  condition  to  say,  that  he  was  destitute  of  common  sense. 
We  should  at  once  pronounce  him  to  be  destitute  of  reason, 
and  would  no  longer  consider  him  as  a  fit  subject  of  disci- 
pline or  of  punishment.  The  former  expression,  indeed,  would 
only  imply  that  he  was  apt  to  fall  into  absurdities  and  impro- 
prieties in  tbe  common  concerns  of  life.  To  denominate,  there- 
fore, such  laws  of  belief  as  we  have  now  been  considering, 
constituent  elements  of  human  reason,  while  it  seems  quite  un- 
exceptionable in  point  of  technical  distinctness,  cannot  be 
justly  censured  as  the  slightest  deviation  from  our  habitual 
forms  of  speech.  On  the  same  grounds,  it  may  be  fairly 
questioned,  whether  the  word  reason  would  not  on  some  oc- 
casions, be  the  best  substitute  which  our  language  affords  for 
intuition,  in  that  enlarged  acceptation  which  has  been  given 
to  it  of  late.  If  not  quite  so  definite  and  precise  as  might  be 
wished,  it  would  be  at  least  employed  in  one  of  those  signifi- 
cations in  which  it  is  already  familiar  to  every  ear:  whereas 
the  meaning  of  intuition,  when  used  for  the  same  purpose,  is 
stretched  very  far  beyond  its  ordinary  limits.  And  in  cases 
of  this  sort,  where  we  have  to  choose  between  two  terms, 
neither  of  which  is  altogether  unexceptionable,  it  Avill  be 
found  much  safer  to  trust  to  the  context  for  restricting,  in  the 
readers  mind,  what  is  too  general,  than  for  enlarging  what 
use  has  accustomed  us  to  interpret  in  a  sense  too  narrow. 

I  must  add  too,  in  opposition  to  the  high  authorities  of  Dr. 
Johnson  and  Dr.  Beattic,t  that  for  many  years  past,  reason. 

*  See  the  preceding'  part  of  this  section,  with  respect  to  the  word  principle  ;  and 
the  Account  of  Reid's  Life^  for  some  remarks  on  the  proper  meaning  of  the  phrase 
.common  sense. 

t  Dr.  Johnson's  definition  of  Reason  was  before  quoted.  The  following  is  that 
given  by  Dr.  Beattie. 

"  Reason  is  used  by  those  who  are  most  accurate  in  distinguishing,  to  signify  thai 
:i  power  of  the  human  iffind  by  which  we  draw  infe*-ervces;  or  by  which  we  ar-e  cor- 


SECT  III.]  OP    THE    HUMAN   MIND.  47 

has  been  very  seldom  used  by  philosophical  writers,  or,  in- 
deed, by  correct  writers  of  any  description,  as  synonymous 
with  the  power  of  reasoning.  To  appeal  to  the  light  of  hu- 
man reason  from  the  reasonings  of  the  schools,  is  surely  an 
expression  to  which  no  good  objection  can  be  made,  on  the 
score  either  of  vagueness  or  of  novelty.  Nor  has  the  etymo- 
logical affinity  between  these  two  words  the  slightest  tenden- 
cy to  throw  any  obscurity  on  the  foregoing  expression.  On 
the  contrary,  this  affinity  may  be  of  use  in  some  of  our  future 
arguments,  by  keeping  constantly  in  view  the  close  and  in- 
separable connexion  which  will  be  afterwards  shewn  to  ex- 
ist between  the  two  different  intellectual  operations  which  are 
thus  brought  into  immediate  contrast. 

The  remarks  which  I  have  stated  in  the  two  preceding 
sections,  comprehend  every  thing  of  essential  importance 
which  I  have  to  offer  on  this  article  of  logic.  But  the  space 
which  it  has  occupied  for  nearly  half  a  century,  in  some  of 
the  most  noted  philosophical  works  which  have  appeared  in 
Scotland,  lays  me  under  the  necessity,  before  entering  on  a 
new  topic,  of  introducing  in  this  place,  a  few  critical  stric- 
tures on  the  doctrines  of  my  predecessors. 


SECTION  HI. 

Continuation  of  the  Subject. — Critical  Remarks  on  some  late  Controversies  to  which 
it  has  given  rise. — Of  the  Appeals  which  Dr.  Reid  and  some  other  Modern  Writers 
have  made,  in  their  Philosophical  Discussions,  to  Common  Sense,  as  a  Criterion- 
of  Truth. 

I  observed,  in  a  former  part  of  this  work,  that  Dr.  Reid 
acknowledges  the  Berkeleian  system  to  be  a  logical  conse- 
quence of  the  opinions  universally  admitted  by  the  learned  at 
the  time  when  Berkeley  wrote.   In  the  earlier  part  of  his  own 

"  vinced,  that  a  relation  belongs  to  two  ideas,  on  account  of  our  having  found  that 
11  these  ideas  bear  certain  relations  to  other  ideas.  In  a  word,  it  is  that  faculty  which 
;:  enables  us,  from  relations  or  ideas  that  are  known,  to  investigate  such  as  are  un- 
:i  known,  and  without  which  we  never  could  proceed  in  the  discovery  of  truth  a  sin- 
'•'  gle  stop  bevond  first  principles  or  intuitive  axioms," — Essay  on  Truth)  Part  I. 
Chap.  i. 


48  ELEMENTS    OP    THE    PHILOSOPHY  [CHAP  1 

life,  accordingly,  he  informs  us,  that  he  was  actually  a  con- 
vert to  the  scheme  of  immaterialism  ;  a  scheme  which  he 
probably  considered  as  of  a  perfectly  inoffensive  tendency, 
as  long  as  he  conceived  the  existence  of  the  material  world 
to  be  the  only  point  in  dispute.  Finding,  however,  from  Mr. 
Hume's  writings,  that  along  with  this  paradox,  the  ideal 
theory  necessarily  involved  various  other  consequences  of  a 
very  different  nature,  he  was  led  to  a  careful  examina- 
tion of  the  data  on  which  it  rested  ;  when  he  had  the  satis- 
faction to  discover  that  its  only  foundation  was  a  hypothesis, 
unsupported  by  any  evidence  whatever  but  the  authority  of 
the  schools.* 

From  this  important  concession  of  a  most  impartial  and 
competent  judge,  it  may  be  assumed  as  a  fact,  that,  till  the 
refutation  of  the*  ideal  theory  in  his  own  "  Inquiry  into  the 
"  Human  Mind,". the  partisans  of  Berkeley's  system  remain- 
ed complete  masters  of  the  controversial  field  ;  and  yet,  dur- 
ing the  long  period  which  intervened,  it  is  well  known  how 
little  impression  that  system  made  on  the  belief  of  our  sound- 
est philosophers.  Many  answers  to  it  were  attempted,  in 
the  mean  time,  by  various  authors,  both  in  this  country  and 
on  the  Continent ;  and  by  one  or  other  of  these,  the  general- 
ity of  the  learned  professed  themselves  to  be  convinced  of 
its  futility  ; — the  evidence  of  the  conclusion  (as  in  many 
other  cases)  supporting  the  premises,  and  not  the  premises 
the  conclusion.!     A  very  curious  anecdote,  in  illustration  of 

*  It  was  not,  therefore,  (ashas  very  generally  been  imagined  by  the  followers  of  Berke- 
ley,) from  any  apprehension  of  clanger  in  his  argument  against  the  existence  of  mailer, 
that  Reid  was  induced  to  call  in  question  the  ideal  theory  ;  but  because  he  thought 
that  Mr.  Hume  had  clearly  shewn,  by  turning  Berkeley's  weapons  against  himself, 
that  this  theory  was  equally  subversive  of  the  existence  of  mind.  The  ultimate  ob- 
ject of  Berkeley  and  of  Reid  was  precisely  the  same  ;  the  one  asserting  the  existence 
of  matter  from  the  very  same  motive  which  led  the  other  to  deny  it. 

When  I  speak  of  Reid's  asserting  the  existence  of  matter,  1  do  not  allude  to  any  new 
pr<  ofs  which  he  has  produced  of  the  fact.  This  he  rests  on  the  evidence  of  sense,  as 
he  rests  the  existence  of  the  mind  on  the  evidence  of  consciousness.  All  that  he  pro- 
fesses to  have  done  is,  to  shew  the  inconclush  eness  of  Beikeley's  argument  against 
the  former,  and  that  of  Hume  against  the  latter,  by  refuting  the  ideal  hypothesis 
which  is  the  common  foundation  of  both. 

\  The  impotent,  though  ingenious  attempt  of  Berkeley  (not  many  years  after  the  date 
of  bis  metaphysical  publications)  to  shake  the  foundations  of  the  new'y-invented  me- 


SECT.  Ill]  OP    THE    HUMAN   MIND.  49 

this,  is  mentioned  in  the  life  of  Dr.  Berkeley.  After  the  pub- 
lication of  his  book,  it  appears  that  he  had  an  interview 
with  Dr»  Clarke  ;  in  the  course  of  which,  Clarke  (it  is  said) 
discovered  a  manifest  unwillingness  to  enter  into  the  disCUS- 
sion,  and  was  accused  by  Berkeley  of  a  want  of  candour.* 
The  story  (which,  if  I  recollect  right,  rests  on  the  authority 
of  Whiston)  has  every  appearance  of  authenticity  ;  for  as 
Clarke,  in  common  with  his  antagonist,  regarded  the  prin- 
ciples of  the  ideal  theory  as  incontrovertible,  it  was  per- 
fectly impossible  for  him,  with  all  his  acuteness,  to  de- 
tect the  flaw  to  which  Berkeley's  paradox  owed  its  plau- 
sibility. In  such  circumstances,  would  it  haVe  been  un- 
philosophical  in  Clarke  to  have  defended  himself,  by  say- 
ing :  "  Your  conclusion  not  only  contradicts  those  percep- 
"  tions  of  my  senses,  the  evidence  of  which  I  feel  to  be  irre- 
"  sistible  ;  but,  by  annihilating  space  itself  as  an  external  ex- 
"  istence,  bids  defiance  to  a  conviction  inseparable  from  the 
"human  understanding;  and,  therefore}  although  I  cannot 
"  point  out  the  precise  oversight  which  has  led  you  astray, 
u  there  must  necessarily  be  some  error,  either  in  your  origi- 
"  nal  data,  or  in  your  subsequent  reasoning."  Or,  suppos- 
ing Clarke  to  have  perceived,  as  clearly  as  Reid,  that  Berke- 
ley's reasoning  was  perfectly  unexceptionable,  might  he  not- 
have  added  ;  "  The  conclusion  which  it  involves  is  a  demon- 
"  stration  in  the  form  of  a. reductio  ad  absurdum,  oftheunsound- 
"  ness  of  the  ideal  theory,  on  which  the  whole  of  your  argu- 
"  ment  is  built  ?"f 

thod  of  Fluxions,  created,  in  the  public  mind,  a  strong  prejudice  against  him,  as  a 
sophistical  and  paradoxical  disputant  ;  and  operated  as  a  more  powerful  antidote  to 
the  scheme  of  immaterialism,  than  all  the  reasonings  which  his  contemporaries  were 
able  to  oppose  to  it.  This  unfavourable  impression  was  afterwards  not  a  little  con- 
firmed, by  the  ridicule  which  he  incurred  in  consequence  of  his  pamphlet  on  the  vir- 
tues of  Tar-water  ;  a  performance,  howevpr,  of  which  it  is  but  justice  to  add,  that 
it  contains  a  great  deal  more,  both  of  ound  philosophy  and  of  choice  learning,  than 
could  have  been  expected  from  the  subject. 

*  Philosophical  Essays,  Note  F. 

That  Clarke  would  look  upon  the  Berkeleian  theory  with  more  than  common  feel- 
ings of  suspicion  and  alarm,  may  be  easily  conceived,  when  it  is  recollected  that,  by 
denying  the  independent  existence  both  of  space  and  oi'  time,  it  put  an  end  at  once  to 
his  celebi  ated  argument  a  priori,  for  the  existence  of  God. 

t  1  acknowledge,  very  readily,  thai  the  force  of  this  indirect  mode  of  reasoning  is 
essentially  different  in  mathematics,  from  what  it  is  in  the  other  branches  of  know- 
VOL.  II.  7 


50  ELEMENTS    OF    THE    PHILOSOPHY  [CHAP.  I. 

I  am  far  from  supposing  that  Berkeley  would  have  admit- 
ted this  consideration  as  decisive  of  the  point  in  dispute.  On 
the  contrary,  it  appears  from  his  writings,  that  the  scheme  of 
immaterialism  was,  in  his  opinion,  more  agreeable  to  popu- 
lar belief,  than  the  received  theories  of  philosophers  concern- 
ing the  independent  existence  of  the  external  world  ;  nay, 
that  he  considered  it  as  one  of  the  many  advantages  likely  to 
result  from  the  universal  adoption  of  his  system,  that  "  men 
"  would  thereby  be  reduced  from  paradoxes  to  common  sense." 

The  question,  however,  if  not  decided  by  this  discussion, 
would  at  least  have  been  brought  to  a  short  and  simple  is- 
sue ;  for  the  paramount  authority  of  the  common  sense  or 
common  reason  of  mankind,  being  equally  recognized  by 
both  parties,  all  that  remained  for  their  examination  was, 
whether  the  belief  of  the  existence,  or  that  of  the  non-existence 
of  matter,  was  sanctioned  by  this  supreme  tribunal  ?  For  as- 
certaining this  point,  nothing  more  was  necessary,  than  aR 
accurate  analysis  of  the  meaning  annexed  to  the  word  exist- 
ence ;  which  analysis  would  have  at  once  shewn,  not  only 
that  we  are  irresistibly  led  to  ascribe  to  the  material  world 
all  the  independent  reality  which  this  word  expresses,  but 
that  it  is  from  the  material  world  that  our  first  and  most  sa- 
tisfactory notions  of  existence  are  drawn.  The  mathematical 
affections  of  matter  (extension  and  figure)  to  which  the 
constitution  of  the  mind  imperiously  forces  us  to  ascribe  an 
existence,  not  only  independent  of  our  perceptions,  but  ne* 

ledge  ;fl>r  the  object  of  mathematics  (as  will  afterwards  more  fully  appear)  not  being 
truth,  but  systematica]  connection  and  consistency,  whenever  two conlradiclQi-y  propo- 
sitions occur,  embracing  evidently  the  only  possible  suppositions  on  the  point  in  ques- 
tion, if  the  one  can  be  shewn  to  be  incompatible  with  the  definitions  or  h3'potheses  00- 
which  the  science  is  founded,  this  may  be  regarded  as  perfectly  equivalent  to  a  direct 
proof  of  the  legitimacy  of  the  opposite  conclusion.  In  other  sciences,  the  force  of  a  re- 
ductio  ad  absurdum  depends  entirely  on  the  maxim,  "  That  truth  is  always  consistent 
"  with- itself  j"  amaxim  which,  however  certain,  rests  evidently  on  groundsof  a  more 
abstract  and  metaphysical  nature  than  the  indirect  demonstrations  of  geometry.  It 
is  a  maxim,  at  the  same  time,  to  which  the  most  sceptical  writers  have  not  been  able 
to  refuse  their  testimony.  "  Truth,  (says  Mr.  Hume  himself,)  is  one  thing,  but  errors 
"  are  numberless,  and  every  man  has  a  different  one.'' 

The  unity,  or  systematical  consistency  of  truth,  is  a  subject  which  well  deserves  to» 
be  farther  prosecuted.  It  involves  many  important  consequences,  of  which  Mr. 
Hume  does  not,  from  the  general  spirit  of  his  philosophy,  seem  to  have  been  suffi- 
ciently aware. 


SECT.  III."]  OP    THE    HUMAN    MIND.  51 

cessary  and  eternal,  might  more  particularly  have  been  pres- 
sed upon  Berkeley,  as  proofs  how  incompatible  his  notions 
were  with  those  laws  of  belief,  to  which  the  learned  and  the 
unlearned  must  in  common  submit.* 

But  farther,  (in  order  to  prevent  any  cavil  about  the  fore- 
going illustration,)  we  shall  suppose  that  Clarke  had  antici- 
pated Hume  in  perceiving  that  the  ideal  theory  went  to  the 
annihilation  of  mind  as  well  as  of  matter ;  and  that  he 
had  succeeded  in  proving,  to  the  satisfaction  of  Berkeley, 
that  nothing  existed  in  the  universe  but  impressions  and 
ideas.  Is  it  possible  to  imagine,  that  Berkeley  would  not 
immediately  have  seen  and  acknowledged,  that  a  theory 
which  led  to  a  conclusion  directly  contradicted  by  the  evi- 
dence of  consciousness,  ought  not,  out  of  respect  to  ancient 
authority,  to  be  rashly  admitted  ;  and  that,  in  the  present 
instance,  it  was  much  more  philosophical  to  argue  from  the 
conclusion  against  the  hypothesis,  than  to  argue  from  the 
hypothesis  in  proof  of  the  conclusion  ?  No  middle  course, 
it  is  evident,  was  left  him  between  such  an  acknowledg- 
ment, and  an  unqualified  acquiescence  in  those  very  doc- 
trines which  it  was  the  great  aim  of  his  system  to  tear  up  by 
the  roots. 

The  two  chief  objections  which  I  have  heard  urged  against 
this  mode  of  defence,  are  not  perfectly  consistent  with  each 
other.  The  one  represents  it  as  a  presumptuous  and  danger- 
ous innovation  in  the  established  rules  of  philosophical  con- 
troversy, calculated  to  htifle  entirely  a  spirit  of  liberal  inqui- 
ry :  while  the  other  charges  its  authors  with  all  the  meanness 
and  guilt  of  literary  plagiarism.  I  shall  offer  a  few  slight 
remarks  on  each  of  these  accusations. 

1.  That  the  doctrine  in  question  is  not  a  new  one,  nor 
even  the  language  in  which  it  has  been  recently  stated  an 
innovation  in  the  received  phraseology  of  logical  science, 
has  been  shewn  by  Dr.  Reid,  in  a  collection  of  very  inte- 
resting quotations,  which  may  be  found  in  different  parts  of 
his  Essays  on  the  Intellectual  Powers  of  Man.  more  particn- 

*  See  Note  (B.) 


52  ELEMENTS    OF    THE    PHILOSOPHY        [CHAP.  II. 

larly  in  the  second  chapter  of  the  sixth  essay.  Nor  has  this 
doctrine  been  generally  rejected  even  by  those  writers  who, 
in  their  theories,  have  departed  the  farthest  from  the  ordina^ 
ry  opinions  of  the  world,  Berkeley  has  sanctioned  it  in  the 
most  explicit  manner,  in  a  passage  already  quoted  from  his 
works,  in  which  he  not  only  attempts  the  extraordinary  task 
of  reconciling  the  scheme  of  immaterialism  with  the  common 
sense  of  mankind,  but  alleges  the  very  circumstance  of  its 
conformity  to  the  unsophisticated  judgment  of  the  human  race 
as  a  strong  argument  in  its  favour,  when  contrasted  with  the 
paradoxical  doctrine  of  the  independent  existence  of  matter. 
The  ablest  advocates,  too,  for  the  necessity  of  human  actions, 
have  held  a  similar  language  ;  exerting  their  ingenuity  t® 
shew,  that  there  is  nothing  in  this  tenet  which  does  not  per- 
fectly accord  with  our  internal  consciousness,  when  our  sup- 
posed feelings  of  liberty,  with  all  their  concomitant  circum- 
stances, are  accurately  analyzed,  and  duly  weighed.*  In 
this  respect,  Mr.  Hume  forms  almost  a  solitary  exception, 
avowing,  with  the  greatest  frankness,  the  complete  repug- 
nance between  his  philosophy  and  the  laws  of  belief  to 
which  all  men  are  subjected  by  the  constitution  of  their  na- 
ture. "  1  dine  ;  I  play  a  game  at  backgammon  ;  I  converse, 
"  and  am  happy  with  my  friends  ;  and  when,  after  three  or 
"  four  hours  of  amusement,  I  would  return  to  these  spccula- 
"  tions,  they  appear  so  cold,  so  strained,  and  so  ridiculous, 
"  that  I  cannot  find  in  my  heart  to  enter  into  them  any  further. 
"  Here,  then,  I  find  myself  absolutely  and  necessarily  deter- 
"  mined  to  live,  and  talk,  and  act,  like  other  people,  in  the 
;{  common  affairs  of  life. "t 

*  This,  I  own,  appears  to  me  the  only  argument  for  the  scheme  of  necessity, 
which  deserves  a  moment's  consideration,  in  the  present  state  of  the  controversy  : 
and  it  is  certainly  possible  to  state  it  in  such  a  form  as  to  give  it  some  degree  of  plau- 
sibility to  a  superficial  inquirer.  On  this  point,  however,  as  on  many  others,  otir first 
and  third  thoughts  will  be  found  perfectly  to  coincide  ;  a  more  careful  and  profound 
examination  of  the  question  infallibly  bringing  back  to  their  natural  impressions, 
those  who  reflect  on  the  subject  with  candour  and  with  due  attention.  Having  alluded 
to  so  very  important  a  controversy,  I  could  not  help  throwing  out  this  hint  here. 
The  farther  prosecution  of  it  would  be  altogether  foreign  to  my  present  purpose. 

'!  Treatise  of  Human  Nature,  Vol.  I.  p.  467, 


SECT.  III.]  OP    THE    HUMAN   MIND.  5S 

Even  Mr.  Hume  himself,  however,  seems  at  times  to  for- 
get his  sceptical  theories,  and  sanctions,  by  his  own  authori- 
ty, not  only  the  same  logical  maxims,  but  the  same  mode  of 
expressing  them,  which  has  been  so  severely  censured  in 
some  of  his  opponents.  "  Those  (he  observes)  who  have  re- 
■"  fused  the  reality  of  moral  distinctions,  may  be  ranked 
"  among  the  disingenuous  disputants.  The  only  way  of  con- 
"  verting  an  antagonist  of  this  kind  is,  to  leave  him  to  him- 
"self;  for,  finding  that  nobody  keeps  up  the  controversy 
"  with  him,  'tis  probable  he  will  at  last,  of  himself,  from  mere 
"  weariness,  come  over  to  the  side  of  common  sense  and  rea- 
"  son."* 

To  the  authorities  which  have  been  already  produced  by 
Reid  and  his  successors,  in  vindication  of  that  mode  of  ar- 
guing which  is  now  under  our  review,  I  shall  beg  leave  to 
add  another,  which,  as  far  as  I  know,  has  not  yet  been  re«> 
marked  by  any  of  them  ;  and  which,  while  it  effectually  re- 
moves from  it  the  imputation  of  novelty,  states,  in  clear  and 
forcible  terms,  the  grounds  of  that  respect  to  which  it  is  en? 
titled,  even  in  those  cases  where  it  is  opposed  by  logical 
subtleties  which  seem  to  baffle  all  our  powers  of  reasoning. 

"  What  is  it  (said  some  of  the  ancient  sophists)  which  con- 
"  stitutes  what  we  call  little,  much,  long,  broad,  small,  or 
H  great  ?  Do  three  grains  of  corn  make  a  heap  ?  The  answer 
"  must  be — No.  Do  four  grains  make  a  heap  ?  You  must 
"  make  the  same  answer  as  before. — They  continued  their  in- 
"  terrogations  from  one  grain  to  another,  without  end  ;  and  if 
;'  you  should  happen  at  last  to  answer,  here  is  a  heap,  they 
"  pretended  your  answer  was  absurd,  inasmuch  as  it  sup- 
"  posed,  that  one  single  grain  makes  the  difference  between 
"  what  is  a  heap,  and  what  is  not.  I  might  prove,  by  the 
';  same  method,  that  a  great  drinker  is  never  drunk.  Will 
"  one  drop  of  wine  fuddle  him  ? — No.  Two  drops,  then  ?  By 
"  no  means  ;  neither  three  nor  four.  I  might  thus  continue 
"  my  interrogations  from  one  drop  to  another  :  and  if,  at  the 
"  end  of  the  999th  drop,  you  answered  he  is  not  fuddled,  and 

*  Inquiry  concerning  the  Principles  of  Moral' 


54  ELEMENTS    OP    THE    PHILOSOPHY  [CHAP,  h 

"  at  the  1000th  he  is,  I  should  be  entitled  to  infer,  that  one 
"  single  drop  of  wine  makes  the  difference  between  being 
"  drunk  and  being  sober  ;  which  is  absurd.  If  the  interroga- 
"  tions  went  on  from  bottle  to  bottle,  you  could  easily  mark 
"  the  difference  in  question.  But  he  who  attacks  you  with 
"  a  sorites,  is  at  liberty  to  choose  his  own  weapons :  and,  by 
"  making  use  of  the  smallest  conceivable  increments,  renders 
"  it  impossible  for  you  to  name  a  precise  point  which  fixes  a 
*'  sensible  limit  between  being  drunk  and  being  sober  ;  be- 
"  tween  what  is  little  and  what  is  great ;  between  what  is 
"  enough  and  what  is  too  much.  A  man  of  the  world  would 
"  laugh  at  these  sophistical  quibbles,  and  would  appeal  to 
"  common  sense  ;*  to  that  degree  of  knowledge  which,  in  com- 
"  mon  life,  is  sufficient  to  enable  us  to  establish  such  dis- 
"  tinctions.  But  to  this  tribunal  a  professed  dialectician  was 
"  not  permitted  to  resort ;  he  was  obliged  to  answer  in  form  ; 
"  and  if  unable  to  find  a  solution  according  to  the  rules  of  art, 
<;  his  defeat  was  unavoidable.  Even  at  this  day,  an  Irish 
**  Tutor,*  who  should  harass  a  Professor  of  Salamanca  with 
similar  subtleties,  and  should  receive  no  other  answer  but 
this, — common  sense,  and  the  general  consent  of  mankind,  suffi- 
ciently shew  that  your  inferences  are  false, — would  gain  the 
victory  ;  his  antagonist  having  declined  to  defend  himself  with 
those  logical  weapons  with  which  the  assault  had  been  made. 
Had  the  foregoing  passage  been  read  to  the  late  Dr. 
Priestley,  while  he  was  employed  in  combating  the  writings 
of  Reid,  Oswald,  and  Beattie,  he  would,  I  appreheud,  with- 
out hesitation,  have  supposed  it  to  be  the  production  of  one 

*It  is  remarkable  of  this  ingenious,  ejoquent,  and  gallant  nation,  that  it  has  been 
for  ages  distinguished,  in  the  universities  on  the  Continent,  for  its  proficiency  in  the 
school  logic.  Le  Sage  (who  seems  to  have  had  a  very  just  idea  of  the  value  of  this 
accomplishment)  alludes  to  this  feature  in  the  Irish  character,  in  the  account  given  by 
Gil  Bias  of  his  studies  at  Oviedo.  "  Je  m'appliquai  aussi  a  la  logique,  qui  m'apprit  a 
tl  raisonner  beaucoup.  J'aimoistant  la  dispute,  que  j'arretois  lespassans,  connus  on  in- 
"  connus,  pour  leur  proposer  des  argumens.  Je  m'addressois  quelquefois  a  des  fi- 
"  gures  Hibernoises,  qui  ne  demandoient  pas  mieux,  et  il  falloit  alors  nous  voir 
"  disputer.  Quels  gestes,  quelles  grimaces,  quelles  contorsions !  nos  yeux  6toient 
11  pleins  de  fureur,  et  nos  bouches  ecumantes.  On  nous  devoit  plutot  prendre  pour 
"  des  possedes  que  pour  des  philosophies. " 


S£CT«  III. J  OF   THE   HUMAN  MIND.  55 

of  their  disciples.  The  fact  is,  it  is  a  translation  from  Mr. 
Bayle,  an  author  who  was  never  accused  of  an  undue  de* 
ference  for  established  opinions,  and  who  was  himself  un- 
doubtedly one  of  the  most  subtile  disputants  of  modern  times.* 

From  this  quotation  it  clearly  appears,  not  only  that  the 
substance  of  the  doctrine  maintained  by  these  philosophers  is 
of  a  much  earlier  date  than  their  writings  ;  but  that,  in  adop- 
ting the  phrase  common  sense,  to  express  that  standard  or 
criterion  of  truth  to  which  they  appealed,  they  did  not  depart 
from  the  language  previously  in  use  among  the  least  dog- 
matical of  their  predecessors. 

In  the  passage  just  quoted  from  Bayle,  that  passion  for  dis- 
putation which,  in  modern  Europe,  has  so  often  subjected  the 
plainest  truths  to  the  tribunal  of  metaphysical  discussion,  is^ 
with  great  justness,  traced  to  the  unlimited  influence  which 
the  school  logic  maintained  for  so  many  ages  over  the  under- 
standings of  the  learned.  And  although,  since  the  period 
when  Bayle  wrote,  this  influence  has  every  where  most  re- 
markably declined,  it  has  yet  left  traces  behind  it,  in  the 
habits  of  thinking  and  judging  prevalent  among  speculative 
men,  which  are  but  too  discernible  in  all  the  branches  of  sci- 
ence connected  with  the  philosophy  of  the  mind.  In  illus- 
tration of  this  remark,  it  would  be  easy  to  produce  a  copious 
list  of  examples  from  the  literary  history  of  the  eighteenth 
century  ;  but  the  farther  prosecution  of  the  subject  here  would 
lead  me  aside  from  the  conclusions  which  I  have  at  present  in 
view.  I  shall  therefore  content  myself  with  opposing,  to  the 
contentious  and  sceptical  spirit  bequeathed  by  the  schoolmen 
to  their  successors,  the  following  wise  and  cautious  maxims 
of  their  master, — maxims  which,  while  they  illustrate  his 
anxiety  to  guard  the  principles  of  the  demonstrative  sciences 
against  the  captiousness  of  sophists,  evince  the  respect  which 
he  conceived  to  be  due  by  the  philosopher  to  the  universal 
reason  of  the  human  race. 

*  See  Bayle's  Dictionary,  article  Chrysippe.  I  have  availed  myself  in  the  above 
translation,  (with  a  few  retrenchments  and  corrections,)  of  that  which  is  given  in  the 
English  Biographical  and  Critical  Dictionary. 


56  ELEMENTS    OF    THE   PHILOSOPHY  [CHAP.  1, 

"  Those  things  are  to  be  regarded  as  first  truths^  the  credit 
"of  which  is  not  derived  from  other  truths,  but  is  inherent 
"  in  themselves.  As  for  probable  truths,  they  are  such  as 
"  are  admitted  by  all  men,  or  by  the  generality  of  men,  of 
"  by  wise  men  ;  and,  among  these  last,  either  by  all  the  wise, 
"or  by  the  generality  of  the  wise,  or  by  such  of  the  wise  as 
"are  of  the  highest  authority."*1 

The  argument  from  Universal  Consent,  on  which  so  much 
stress  is  laid  by  many  of  the  ancients,  is  the  same  doctrine 
with  the  foregoing,  under  a  form  somewhat  different.  It  is 
stated  with  great  simplicity  and  force  by  a  Platonic  philoso- 
pher in  the  following  sentences  : 

"  In  such  a  contest,  and  tumult,  and  disagreement,  (about 
"  other  matters  of  opinion,)  you  may  see  this  one  law  and 
"  language  acknowledged  by  common  accord.  This  the 
"Greek  says,  and  this  the  barbarian  says;  and  the  inhabi- 
"  tant  of  the  continent,  and  the  islander  ;  and  the  wise  and 
"  the  unwise."! 

It  cannot  be  denied,  that  against  this  summary  species  of 
logic,  when  employed  without  any  collateral  lights,  as  an  in- 
fallible touchstone  of  philosophical  truth,  a  strong  objection 
immediately  occurs.  By  what  test  (it  may  be  asked)  is  a 
principle  of  common  sense  to  be  distinguished  from  one  of 
those  prejudices  to  which  the  whole  human  race  are  irresisti- 
bly led,  in  the  first  instance,  by  the  very  constitution  of  their 
nature  ?  If  no  test  or  criterion  of  truth  can  be  pointed  out  but 

*  Ern  Se  xXyOi)  ftev  xxt  "X^uta,  tx  f&*i  £i'  fTtgav,  ecXXet  it' 
«t*7»v  t^4VT«  Tijv  Trurrtv,  'Evio^x  Se-  tx  ioxovvtx  Tesny,  71  T9/f 
TrXeio-rots  y  rti%  o-e^e*s*  x.xi  rovrots,  y  rotg  nx<rtv,  rj  ra/j  ttXskt- 
T<ws,  ret?  (ixXia-rx  yvagwts,  y,xt  ev$o%ot<;. — Jirislot.  Top.  Lib.  I.  cap. 
i.  (Vol.  F   p.  1.0,  ed    Du   \  ■:].) 

t  E»  totuto)  2e  voXc/lcu)  *£  «"«*«•£«  t£  $tx<paviet  tix  ting  «»  t* 
trccr*)  yvi  opLoQavov  yo/ttev  j£  Xoyov ,  k.e.  Txvrxde  a  'EAA^y  Xeyei, 
scj  i  Bxgfixgoi;  Xeyei,  x}  o  jj?rfif  <wtjjs,  f£  o  Gx\xttio$,  xj  o  c-e^ej,  *} 
8    sss-e^ej. \iax.  Tyr.  (speaking  of  the  existence  of  the  Deity)  Dis.  I. 

"  Una  in  re  consensio  omnium  gentium  lex  naturae  putanda  est." — Cic.  1.  Tusc. 

"  Multum  dare  solemus  praesumptioni  omnium  hominum  :  Apud  nos  veritatis  argu 
"  mentum  est,  aliquid  omnibus  videri,"  &c.  fee. — Sen.  Ep.  117. 


«SECT.  Hlj  OF    THE    HUMAN   MIND.  ;# 

universal  consent,  may  not  all  those  errors  which  Bacon  has 
called  idola   Iribus  claim  a  right  to  admission  among  the  in- 
controvertible axioms  of  science  1  And  might  not  the  popular- 
cavils  against  the  supposition  of  the  earth's  motion,  which  so 
long  obstructed  the  progress  of  the  Copernican  system,  have 
been  legitimately  opposed,  as  a  reply  of  paramount  authori- 
ty, to  all  the  scientific  reasonings  by  which  it  was  supported  ? 
It  is  much  to  be  wished  that  this  objection,  of  which  Dr. 
Reid  could  not  fail  to  be  fully  aware,  had  been  more   parti- 
cularly examined  and  discussed  in  some  of  his  publications, 
than  he  seems  to  have   thought  necessary.     From  different 
parts  of  his  works,  however,  various  important  hints  towards 
a  satisfactory  answer  to  it  might  be  easily  collected."*     At 
present,  I  shall  only  remark,  that,  although  universality  of  be- 
lief is  one  of  the  tests  by  which  (according  to  him)  a  princi- 
ple of  common  sense  is  characterized,  it  is  not  the  only  test 
which    he   represents    as  essential.     Long  before  his  time, 
Father  Buffier,  in  his  excellent  treatise  on  First  Truths,  had 
laid  great  stress  on  two  other  circumstances,  as  criteria  to  be 
attended  to  on  such  occasions;  and  although  I  do  not  recol- 
lect any  passage  in  Reid  where  they  are  so  explicitly  stated, 
yet  the  general  spirit  of  his  reasonings  plainly  shews,  that  he 
had  them  constantly  in  view  in  all  the  practical  applications 
of  his  doctrine.     The  first  criterion  mentioned  by  Buffier  is 
"  That  ihe  truths  assumed  as  maxims  of  common  sense  should 
"  be  such,  that  it  is  impossible  for  any  disputant  either  to  de- 
"  fend  or  to  attack  them,  but  by  means  of  propositions  which 
"  are  neither  more  manifest  nor  more  certain  than  the  proposi- 
"  tions  in  question."    The  second  criterion  is,  "  That  their 
"  practical  influence  should  extend  even  to  those  individuals 
"  who  affect  to  dispute  their  authority." 

To  these  remarks  of  Buffier,  it  may  not  be  altogether  su- 
.  pcrfluous  to  add,  that,  wherever  a  prejudice  is  found  to  obtain 
universally  among  mankind  in  any  stage  of  society,  this  pre- 
judice must  have  some  foundation  in  the  general  principles  of 
our  nature,  and  must  proceed  upon  some  truth  or  fact  inac- 

'•*  See,  in  particular,  Essays  on  the  Int.  Powers,  p.  565.  et  seq.  4to,  edit. 
VOL.  II.  8 


5&  ELEMENTS    OP    THE    PHILOSOPHY  [CHAP   1. 

curately  apprehended,  or  erroneously  applied.  The  suspense 
of  judgment,  therefore,  which  is  proper  with  respect  to  par- 
ticular opinions,  till  they  be  once  fairly  examined,  can  never 
justify  scepticism  with  respect  to  the  general  laws  of  the 
human  mind.  Our  belief  of  the  sun's  motion  is  not  a  conclu- 
sion to  which  we  are  necessarily  led  by  any  such  law,  but  an 
inference  rashly  drawn  from  the  perceptions  of  sense,  which 
do  not  warrant  such  an  inference.  All  that  we  see  is,  that  a 
relative  change  of  position  between  us  and  the  sun  takes 
place ;  and  this  fact  which  is  made  known  to  us  by  our 
senses,  no  subsequent  discovery  of  philosophy  pretends  to 
disprove.  It  is  not,  therefore,  the  evidence  of  perception 
which  is  overturned  by  the  Copernican  system,  but  a  judg- 
ment or  inference  of  the  understanding,  of  the  rashness  of 
which  every  person  must  be  fully  sensible,  the  moment  he  is 
made  to  reflect  with  due  attention  on  the  circumstances  of  the 
case  ;  and  the  doctrine  which  this  system  substitutes  instead 
of  our  first  crude  apprehensions  on  the  subject,  is  founded, 
not  on  any  process  of  reasoning  a  priori,  but  on  the  demon- 
strable inconsistency  of  these  apprehensions  with  the  vari- 
ous phenomena  which  our  perceptions  present  to  us.  Had 
Copernicus  not  only  asserted  the  stability  of  the  Sun,  but, 
with  some  of  the  Sophists  of  old,  denied  that  any  such  thing 
as  motion  exists  in  the  universe,  his  theory  would  have  been 
precisely  analogous  to  that  of  the  non-existence  of  matter ; 
and  no  answer  to  it  could  have  been  thought  of  more  perti- 
nent and  philosophical,  than  that  which  Plato  is  said  to  have 
given  to  the  same  paradox  in  the  mouth  of  Zeno,  by  rising 
up  and  walking  before  his  eyes. 

2.  If  the  foregoing  observations  be  just,  they  not  only  il- 
lustrate the  coincidence  between  Dr.  Reid's  general  argu- 
ment against  those  metaphysical  paradoxes  which  revolt 
common  sense,  and  the  maxims  of  philosophical  discussion 
previously  sanctioned  by  our  soundest  reasoners  ;  but  they 
go  far,  at  the  same  time,  to  refute  that  charge  of  plagiarism 
in  which  he  has  been  involved,  in  common  with  two  other 
Scotish  writers,  who  have  made  their  stand  in  opposition  to 


SECT.  III.]  OP    THE    HUMAN    MIND.  59 

Berkeley  and  Hume,  nearly  on  tbe  same  ground.  This 
charge  has  been  stated,  in  all  its  force,  in  the  preface  to  an 
English  translation  of  Buffier's  Premieres  Verites,  printed  at 
London  in  the  year  1 780  ;  and  it  cannot  be  denied,  that  some 
of  the  proofs  alleged  in  its  support  are  not  without  plausi- 
bility. But  why  suppose  Reid  to  have  borrowed  from  this 
learned  Jesuit,  a  mode  of  arguing  which  has  been  familiar  to 
men  in  all  ages  of  the  world ;  and  to  which,  long  before  the 
publication  of  Buffier's  excellent  book,  the  very  same  phra- 
seology had  been  applied  by  numberless  other  authors.  On 
this  point,  the  passage  already  quoted  from  Bayle  is  of  itself 
decisive.  The  truth  is,  it  is  a  mode  of  arguing  likely  to  occur  to 
every  sincere  and  enlightened  inquirer,  when  bewildered  by 
sceptical  sophistry  ;  and  which,  during  the  long  interval  be- 
tween the  publication  of  the  Berkeleian  theory,  and  that  of 
Reid's  Inquiry,  was  the  only  tenable  post  on  which  the  conclu- 
sions of  the  former  could  be  combated.  After  the  length  to  which 
the  logical  consequences  of  the  same  principles  were  subse- 
quently pushed  in  the  Treatise  of  Human  Nature,  this  must 
have  appeared  completely  manifest  to  all  who  were  aware  of 
the  irresistible  force  of  the  argument,  as  it  is  there  stated  •; 
and,  in  fact,  this  very  ground  was  taken  as  early  as  the  year 
1751,  in  a  private  correspondence  with  Mr.  Hume,  by  an  inti- 
mate friend  of  his  own,  for  whose  judgment,  both  on  philoso* 
phical  and  literary  subjects,  he  seems  to  have  felt  a  peculiar 
deference.*  I  mention  this,  as  a  proof  that  the  doctrine  in 
question  was  the  natural  result  of  the  state  of  science  at  the 
period  when  Reid  appeared  ;  and,  consequently,  that  no  ar- 
gument against  his  originality  in  adopting  it,  can  reasonably 
be  founded  on  its  coincidence  with  the  views  of  any  pre- 
ceding author. 

A  still  more  satisfactory  reply  to  the  charge  of  plagiarism 
may  be  derived  from  this  consideration,  that,  in  Buffier's 
Treatise,  the  doctrine  Avhich  has  furnished  the  chief  ground 
pf  accusation  is  staled  with  far  greater  precision  and  distinct- 
ness than  in  Dr.  Reid's  first  publication  on  the  Human  Mind 

■■  SeelS'cle  fC.1 


60  ELEMENTS  OF  THE  PHILOSOPHY  [CHAP.  I, 

and  that,  in  his  subsequent  performances,  after  he  had  pe- 
rused the  writings  of  Buffier,  his  phraseology  became  consi-> 
derably  more  guarded  and  consistent  than  before. 

If  this  observation  be  admitted  in  the  case  of  Dr.  Reid, 
it  will  be  found  to  apply  with  still  greater  force  to  Dr.  Beat- 
tie,  whose  language  in  various  parts  of  his  book,  is  so  loose 
and  unsettled,  as  to  afford  demonstrative  proof  that  it  was 
not  from  Buffier  be  derived  the  idea  of  his  general  argument. 
In  confirmation  of  this,  I  shall  only  mention  the  first  chapter 
of  the  first  part  of  his  Essay,  in  which  he  attempts  to  draw 
the  line  between  common  sense  and  reason  ;  evidently  con- 
founding (as  many  other  authors  of  high  reputation  have 
done)  the  two  very  different  words,  reason  and  reasoning.  His 
account  of  common  sense  in  the  following  passage,  is  liable 
to  censure  in  almost  every  line  :  "  The  term  common  sense 
^  hath,  in  modern  times,  been  used  by  philosophers,  both 
"  French  and  British,  to  signify  that  power  of  the  mind  which 
"  perceives  truth,  or  commands  belief,  not  by  progressive  ar- 
"  gumentation,  but  by  an  instantaneous,  instinctive,  and  irre- 
"  sistible  impulse  ;  derived  neither  from  education  nor  from 
"  habit,  but  from  nature  ;  acting  independently  on  our  will, 
*'  whenever  its  object  is  presented,  according  to  an  established 
rl  law,  and  therefore  properly  called  sense,*  and  acting  in  a 

*  The  doctrine  of  the  schoolmen  (revived  in  later  liir.es  under  a  form  somewhat 
modified  by  Locke)  which  refers  to  sensation  the  origin  of  all  our  ideas,  has  given 
rise  to  a  very  unwarrantable  extension  of  the  word  sense,  in  the  writings  of  modern 
philosophers.  When  it  was  first  asserted,  that  "  there  is  nothing  in  the  intellect 
f*  which  does  not  come  to  it  through  the  medium  of  sense,"  there  cannot  be  a  doubt 
that,  by  this  last  term,  were  understood  exclusively  our  powers  of  external  perception. 
In  process  of  time,  however,  it  came  to  be  discovered,  that  there  are  many  ideas 
■which  cannot  possibly  be  traced  to  this  source  ;  and  which,  of  consequence,  afford 
undeniable  proof  that  the  scholastic  account  of  the  origin  of  our  ideas  is  extremely 
imperfect.  Such  was  certainly  the  logical  inference  to  which  these  discoveries  should 
have  led  ;  but,  instead  of  adopting  it,  philosophers  have,  from  the  first,  shewn  a  dis- 
position to  save,  as  much  as  possible,  the  credit  of  the  maxims  in  which  they  had  been 
educated,  by  giving  to  the  word  sense  so  great  a  latitude  of  meaning,  as  to  compre 
hend  ail  the  various  sources  of  our  simple  ideas,  whatever  these  sources  may  be.  "  All 
"  the  ideas  (says  Dr  Hutcheson)  or  the  materials  of  our  reasoning  and  judging,  are 
f<  received  by  some  immediate  powers  of  perception,  internal  or  external,  hich  we 
?•  may  call  senses."  Under  the  title  of  internal  senses,  accordingly,  many  writers, 
particularly  of  tfve  medical  profession,  continue  to  this  day  to  comprehend  memory 


SECT.  III.]  ©F    THE    HUMAN   MIND.  61 

"  similar  manner  upon  all,  or  at  least  upon  a  great  majority  of 
i{  mankind,  and  therefore  properly  called  common  sense."* 

"  Reason,"  on  the  other  hand,  (we  are  told  by  the  same 
author,)  u  is  used  by  those  who  are  most  accurate  in  distin- 
"  guishing,  to  signify  that  power  of  the  human  mind  by  which 
"  we  draw  inferences,  or  by  which  we  are  convinced  that  a 
"relation  belongs  to  two  ideas,  on  account  of  our  having 
"  found  that  these  ideas  bear  certain  relations  to  other  ideas. 
Ai  In  a  word,  it  is  that  faculty  which  enables  us,  from  rela- 
"  tions  or  ideas  that  are  known,  to  investigate  such  as  are 
"  unknown  ;  and  without  which  we  never  could  proceed  in 
"  the  discovery  of  truth  a  single  step  beyond  first  principles 
"  or  intuitive  axioms."!  "  It  is  in  this  last  sense  (he  adds) 
({  that  we  are  to  use  the  word  reason  in  the  course  of  this 
*'  inquiry." 

These  two  passages  are  severely,  and,  I  think,  justly,  ani- 
madverted on,  in  the  preface  to  the  English  translation  of 
Buffier's  book,  where  they  are  contrasted  with  the  definition 
of  common  sense  given  by  that  profound  and  original  philoso- 
pher. From  this  definition  it  appears,  that,  far  from  oppos- 
ing common  sense  and  reason  to  each  other,  he  considers 
them  either  as  the  same  faculty,  or  as  faculties  necessarily 
and  inseparably  connected  together.  "  It  is  a  faculty  (he 
'**  says)  which  appears  in  all  men,  or  at  least  in  the  far  great- 
"  er  number  of  them,  when  they  have  arrived  at  the  age  of 
M  reason,  enabling  them  to  form  a  common  and  uniform  judg- 
f*  ment,  on  subjects  essentially  connected  with  the  ordinary 
"  concerns  of  life." 

and  invagination,  and  other  faculties,  both  intellectual  and  active. — (Vid.  Haller, 
Element.  Physiologice,  Lib.  xvii.)  Hence  also  the  phrases  moral  sense,  the  senses  of 
beauty  and  harmony,  and  many  of  the  other  peculiarities  of  Dr.  Hutcheson's  language; 
a  mode  of  speaking  which  was  afterwards  carried  to  a  much  more  blameable  excess 
by  Lord  Kaimes.  Dr.  Beattie,  in  the  passage  quoted  above,  has  indirectly  given  his 
sanction  to  the  same  abuse  of  words ;  plainly  supposing  the  phrase,  common  sense,  not 
Qnly  to  mean  something  quite  distinct  from  reason,  but  something  which  bears  so 
close  an  analogy  to  the  powers  of  external  sense,  as  to  be  not  improperly  called  by 
the  same  name. 

*  Essay  on  Truth,  p.  40. 2d  edit. 

Mbid.  pp.  36,  37.  ?dedit. 


62  Cements  op  the  philosophy       [chap,  i. 

That  this  contrast  turns  out  greatly  to  the  advantage  of 
Buffier*  must,  1  think,  be  granted  to  his  very  acute  and  in- 
telligent translator.  But  while  I  make  this  concession  in 
favour  of  his  argument,  I  must  be  allowed  to  add,  that,  in  the 
same  proportion  in  which  Dr.  Beattie  falls  short  of  the  clear- 
ness and  logical  accuracy  of  his  predecessor,  he  ought  to 
stand  acquitted,  in  the  opinion  of  all  men  of  candour,  of  every 
suspicion  of  a  dishonourable  plagiarism  from  his  writings. 

It  is  the  doctrine  itself,  however,  and  not  the  comparative 
merits  of  its  various  abettors,  that  is  likely  to  interest  the  ge- 
nerality of  philosophical  students  ;  and  as  I  have  always 
thought  that  this  has  suffered  considerably  in  the  public  esti- 
mation, in  consequence  of  the  statement  of  it  given  in  the 
passage  just  quoted  from  the  Essay  on  Truth,  I  shall  avail 
myself  of  the  present  opportunity  to  remark,  how  widely 
that  statement  differs  from  the  language,  not  only  of  Buffier, 
but  of  the  author's   contemporary  aod   friend,  Dr.  Reid» 

*  It  is  remarkable  how  little  attention  the  writings  of  Buffier  have  attracted  in  his 
own  country,  and  how  very  inadequate  to  his  real  eminence  has  been  the  rank  com* 
monly  assigned  to  him  among  French  Philosophers.  This  has  perhaps  been  partly 
owing  to  an  unfortunate  combination  which  he  thought  proper  to  make  of  a  variety 
of  miscellaneous  treatises,  of  very  unequal  merit,  into  a  large  work,  to  which  he  gave 
the  name  of  a  Course  of  the  Sciences.  Some  of  these  treatises,  however,  are  of  great 
value  ;  particularly  that  on  First  Truths,  which  contains  (along  with  some  erroneous 
notions,  easily  to  to  be  accounted  for  by  the  period  when  the  author  wrote,  and  the 
religious  society  with  which  he  was  connected)  many  original  and  important  views 
concerning  the  foundations  of  human  knowledge,  and  the  first  principles  of  a  ra- 
tional logic.  Voltaire,  in  his  catalogue  of  the  illustrious  writers  who  adorned  the 
Tei^n  of  Louis  XIV.  is  one  of  the  very  few  French  authors  who  have  spoken  of  Buf- 
fier with  due  respect.  "  II  y  a  dans  ses  traites  de  m€taphysique  des  morceaux  que 
"  Locke  n'aurait  pas  dgsavoues,  et  c'est  le  seul  jesuite  qui  ait  mis  une  philosophic 
K  raisonnable  dans  ses  ouvrages."  Another  French  philosopher,  too,  of  a  very  differ- 
ent school,  and  certainty  not  disposed  to  overrate  the  talents  of  Buffier,  has  in  a  work 
published  as  lately  as  1805,  candidly  acknowledged  the  lights  which  he  might  have 
derived  from  thelabours  of  his  predecessor,  if  he  had  been  acquainted  with  them  in  an 
earlier  stage  of  his  studies.  Condillac,  he  also  observes,  might  have  profited  great- 
ly by  the  same  lights,  if  he  had  availed  himself  of  their  guidance  in  his  inquiries  con- 
cerning the  human  understanding.  "  Du  moins  est  il  certain,  que  pour  ma  part,  je 
"  suis  fort  fache  de  ne  connoitre  que  depuis  tres  peu  de  temps  ces  opinions  du  Pere 
"  Buffier  :  si  je  les  avais  vues  plulot  enoncees  quelque  part,  elles  m'auraient  epargne 

"  beaucoup  de  peines  et  d'hesitations." "  Je  regrette  beaucoup  que  Condillac,  dans 

. (:  ses  profondes  et  sagaces  meditations  sur  l'intelligence  humaine,  n'ait  pas  fait  plus 
"  d'attention  aux  idees  du  Fere  Buffier,"'  &c.  &c. — Elemeiis  d'Ideo!ogie;par  M.  Z)«- 
tvtt-Trary,  Torn.  III.  pp.  136,  137. 


SECT.    III.]  OF    THE   HUMAN   MINl£  63 

This  circumstance  I  think  it  necessary  to  mention,  as  it  seems 
to  have  been  through  the  medium  of  Dr.  Beattie's  Essay, 
that  most  English  writers  have  derived  their  imperfect  in- 
formation concerning  Reid's  philosophy. 

"  There  is  a  certain  degree  of  sense,  (says  this  Jast  author, 
in  his  Essays  on  the  Intellectual  Powers  of  man,)  "  which  is 
"  necessary  to  our  being  subjects  of  law  and  government^ 
"  capable  of  managing  our  own  affairs,  and  answerable  for 
"  our  conduct  to  others.  This  is  called  common  sense,  be- 
"  cause  it  is  common  to  all  men  with  whom  we  can  transact 
''  business." 

"  The  same  degree  of  understanding"  he  afterwards  ob- 
serves "  which  makes  a  man  capable  of  acting  with  common 
*'  prudence  in  life,  makes  him  capable  of  discerning  what  is 
"  true  and  what  is  false,  in  matters  that  are  self-evident,  and 
"  which  he  distinctly  apprehends."  In  a  subsequent  para- 
graph, he  gives  his  sanction  to  a  passage  from  Dr.  Bentley, 
in  which  common  sense  is  expressly  used  as  synonymous  with 
natural  light  and  reason* 

It  is  to  be  regretted,  as  a  circumstance  unfavourable  to  the 
reception  of  Dr.  Beattie's  valuable  essay  among  accurate 
reasoners,  that,  in  the  outset  of  his  discussions,  he  did  not 
confine  himself  to  some  such  general  explanation  of  this 
phrase  as  is  given  in  the  foregoing  extracts  from  Buffier  and 
Reid,  without  affecting  a  tone  of  logical  precision  in  his  de- 
finitions and  distinctions,  which,  so  far  from  being  necessary 

*  Pages  522,  524,  4to  edit.  In  the  following  verses  of  Prior,  the  word  reason  is  em- 
ployed in  an  acceptation  exactly  coincident  with  the  idea  which  is,  on  most  occasions, 
annexed  b}'  Dr.  Reid  to  the  phrase  common  sense  : 

"  Note  here,  Lucretius  dares  to  teach, 

"  (As  all  our  youth  may  learn  from  Creech,) 

"  That  eyes  were  made,  but  could  not  view, 

<!  Nor  hands  embrace,  nor  feet  pursue, 

"  But  heedless  nature  did  produce 

"  The  members  first,  and  then  the  use ; 

"  What  each  must  act  was  yet  unknown, 

"  Till  all  was  moved  by  Chance  alone. 


:<  Blest  for  his  sake  be  human  reasok, 

-■'  Which  came  at  last,  tho'  late,  in  season." — Mnm,  Cant© 


64  Elements  op  the  philosophy        [chap.  14 

to  his  intended  argument,  were  evidently  out  of  place,  in  a 
work  designed  as  a  popular  antidote  against  the  illusions  of 
metaphysical  scepticism.  The  very  idea,  indeed,  of  appeal- 
ing to  common  sense,  virtually  implies  that  these  words  are  to 
be  understood  in  their  ordinary  acceptation,  unrestricted  and 
unmodified  by  any  technical  refinements  and  comments. 
This  part  of  his  essay,  accordingly,  which  is  by  far  the  most 
vulnerable  part  of  it,  has  been  attacked  with  advantage,  not 
only  by  the  translator  of  Buffier,  but  by  Sir  James  Steuart, 
in  a  very  acute  letter  published  in  the  last  edition  of  his 
works.* 

While  I  thus  endeavour,  however,  to  distinguish  Dr.  Reid's 
definition  of  common  sense  from  that  of  Dr.  Beattie,  I  am  far 
from  considering  even  the  language  of  the  former  on  this  sub- 
ject, as  in  every  instance  unexceptionable  ;  nor  do  I  think  it. 
has  been  a  fortunate  circumstance,  (notwithstanding  the  very 
high  authorities  which  may  be  quoted  in  his  vindication,)  that 
he  attempted  to  incorporate  so  vague  and  ambiguous  a  phrase 
with  the  appropriate  terras  of  logic.  My  chief  reasons  for 
this  opinion  I  have  stated  at  some  length,  in  an  account  pub- 
lished a  few  years  ago  of  Dr.  Reid's  Life  and  Writings.! 

*  To  the  honour  of  Dr.  Eeattieil  must  be  remarked,  that  his  reply  to  this  letter, 
(which  may  be  found  in  Sir  James  Steuart's  works,)  is  written  in  a  strain  of  forbear- 
ance and  of  good  humour,  which  few  authors  would  have  been  able  to  maintain,  af- 
ter being  handled  so  roughly. 

t  In  consequence  of  the  ambiguous  meaning  of  this  phrase,  Dr.  Reid  sometimes 
falls  in*o  a  sort  of  play  on  words,  which  I  have  often  regretted.  "  If  this  be  philoso-, 
"  phy"  says  he,  on  one  occasion,  «  I  renounce  her  guidance.  Let  my  soul  dwell  with 
common  .sense."  {Inquiry  into  the  Human  Mind,  Chap.  i.  Sect.  3.  See  also  Sect.  4. 
of  the  same  chapter.)  And  in  another  passage,  after  quoting  the  noted  saying  of 
Hobbes,  that  "  when  reason  is  against  a  man,  a  man  will  be  against  reason  ;"  he 
adds,  "  This  is  equally  applicable  to  common  sense."  (Essays  on  the  Intellectual 
Powers,  p.  530.  4to  edition.)  In  both  of  these  instances,  and,  indeed,  in  the  general 
slrain  of  argument  which  runs  through  his  works,  he  understands  common  sense  in  its 
ordinary  acceptation,  as  synonymous,  or  very  nearly  synonymous,  with  the  word 
reason,  as  it  is  now  most  frequently  employed.  In  a  few  cases,  however,  he  seems  to 
have  annexed  to  the  same  phrase  a  technical  meaning  of  his  own,  and  has  even  spoken 
of  this  meaning  as  a  thing  not  generally  understood.  Thus,  after  illustrating  the  dif- 
ferent classes  ofnatural  signs,  he  adds  the  following  sentence  :  "  It  may  be  observed, 
"  that  as  the  first  class  of  natural  signs  I  have  mentioned  is  the  foundation  of  true  phi- 
**  losophy,  and  the  second  of  the  fine  arts  or  of  taste,  so  the  last  is  the  foundation  of 
"  common  sense  ;  a  part  of  human  nature  wliicli  hath  nevrr  been  explained."  Inquiry- 
Chap.  v.  sect.  3. 

See  Note  (D.^ 


SECT.  III.]  OP    THE   HUMAN   MINI>>  6& 

One  very  unlucky  consequence  has  unquestionably  result- 
ed from  the  coincidence  of  so  many  writers  connected  with 
this  northern  part  of  the  island,  in  adopting,  about  the  same 
period,  the  same  phrase,  as  a  sort  of  philosophical  watch- 
word ; — that,  although  their  views  differ  widely  in  various 
respects,  they  have  in  general  been  classed  together  as  par' 
tisans  of  a  new  sect,  and  as  mutually  responsible  for  the  doc- 
trines of  each  other.  It  is  easy  to  perceive  the  use  likely  to 
be  made  of  this  accident  by  an  uncandid  antagonist. 

All  of  these  writers  have,  in  my  opinion,  been  occasional- 
ly misled  in  their  speculations,  by  a  want  of  attention  to  the 
distinction  between  first  principles,  properly  so  called,  and 
the  fundamental  laws  of  human  belief.  Buffler  himself  has 
fallen  into  the  same  error ;  nor  do  I  know  of  any  one  logician, 
from  the  time  of  Aristotle  downwards,  who  has  entirely 
avoided  it. 

The  foregoing  critical  remarks  will,  I  hope,  have  their  use 
in  keeping  this  distinction  more  steadily  in  the  view  of  future 
inquirers  ;  and  in  preventing  some  of  the  readers  of  the  pub- 
lications to  which  they  relate,  from  conceiving  a  prejudice, 
in  consequence  of  the  looseness  of  that  phraseology  which 
has  been  accidentally  adopted  by  their  authors,  against  the 
just  and  important  conclusions  which  they  contain. 


VOL.  II. 


ELEMENTS    OF   THE    PHILOSOPHY       "[CHAP.  II. 


CHAPTER  SECOND. 


OF    REASONING    AND    OF    DEDUCTIVE    EVIDENCE. 


SECTION  I. 


Doubts  with  respect  to  Locke's  Distinction  between  the  Powers  otTntuitiota  and  of 
Reasoning. 


ALTHOUGH,  in  treating  of  this  branch  of  the  Philosophy 
of  the  Mint!,  I  have  followed  the  example  of  preceding  wri- 
ters, so  far  as  to  speak  of  intuition  and  reasoning  as  two  dif- 
ferent faculties  of  the  understanding,  I  am  by  no  means  sa- 
tisfied that  there  exists  between  them  that  radical  distinction 
which  is  commonly  apprehended.  Dr.  Beattie,  in  his  Es- 
say on  Truth,  has  attempted  to  shew,  that,  how  closely  soever 
they  may  in  general  be  connected,  yet  that  this  connexion 
is  not  necessary  ;  insomuch,  that  a  being  may  be  conceived 
endued  with  the  one,  and  at  the  same  time  destitute  of  the 
other.*  Something  of  this  kind,  he  remarks,  takes  place 
in  dreams  and  in  madness  ;  in  both  of  which  states  of  the 
system,  the  power  of  reasoning  appears  occasionally  to  be 
retained  in  no  inconsiderable  degree,  while  the  power  of  in- 
tuition is  suspended  or  lost.  But  this  doctrine  is  liable  to 
obvious  and  to  insurmountable  objections  ;  and  has  plainly 
taken  its  rise  from  the  vagueness  of  the  phrase  common  sense. 
which  the  author  employs  through  the  whole  of  his  argument, 
as  synonymous  with  the  power  of  intuition.  Of  the  indisso- 
luble connexion  between  this  last  power  and  that  of  reason- 
ing, no  other  proof  is  necessary  than  the  following  consider- 

*  Beattie's  Essay,  p.  41,  2d  edit. 


SECT.  I.]  OP   THE   HUMAN   MINfi.  67 

ation,  that,  "in  every  step  which  reason  makes  in  demonstra- 
"  tive  knowledge,  there  must  be  intuitive  certainty  ;"  a  pro- 
position which  Locke  has  excellently  illustrated,  and  which, 
since  his  time,  has  been  acquiesced  in,  so  far  as  I  know,  by 
philosophers  of  all  descriptions.  From  this  proposition 
{which,  when  properly  interpreted,  appears  to  me  to  be  per- 
fectly just)  it  obviously  follows,  that  the  power  of  reason- 
ing presupposes  the  power  of  intuition  ;  and,  therefore,  the 
only  question  about  which  any  doubt  can  be  entertained  is, 
Whether  the  power  of  intuition  (according  to  Locke's  idea 
of  it)  does  not  also  imply  that  of  reasoning  ?  Mv  own  opi- 
nion is,  decidedly,  that  it  does  ;  at  least,  when  combined  with 
the  faculty  of  memory.  In  examining  ihose  processes  of 
thought  which  conduct  the  mind  by  a  series  of  consequences 
from  premises  to  a  conclusion,  I  can  detect  no  intellectual 
act  whatever,  which  the  joint  operation  of  intuition  and  of 
memory  does  not  sufficiently  explain. 

Before,  however,  proceeding  farther  in  this  discussion,  it 
is  proper  for  me  to  observe,  by  way  of  comment  on  the  pro- 
position just  quoted  from  Locke,  that,  although,  "  in  a  com- 
"  plete  demonstration,  there  must  be  intuitive  evidence  at 
■"  every  step,"  it  is  not  to  be  supposed,  that,  in  every  de- 
monstration, all  the  various  intuitive  judgments  leading  to 
the  conclusion  are  actually  presented  to  our  thoughts.  In 
by  far  the  greater  numtor  of  instances,  we  trust  entirely  to 
judgments  resting  on  the  evidence  of  memory  ;  by  the 
help  of  which  faculty,  we  are  enabled  to  connect  together  the 
most  remote  truths,  with  the  very  same  confidence  as  if  the. 
one  were  an  immediate  consequence  of  the  other.  Nor  does 
this  diminish,  in  the  smallest  degree,  the  satisfaction  we  feel 
in  following  such  a  train  of  reasoning.  On  the  contrary,  no- 
thing can  be  more  disgusting  than  a  demonstration  where 
even  the  simplest  and  most  obvious  steps  are  brought  forward 
to  view  ;  and  where  no  appeal  is  made  to  that  stock  of  pre- 
vious knowledge  which  memory  has  identified  with  the  ope- 
rations of  reason.  Still,  however,  it  is  true,  that  it  is  by  a 
continued  chain  of  intuitive  judgments,  that  the  whole  science 


68  ELEMENTS    OF    THE    PHILOSOPHY       [CHAP.    IL 

of  geometry  hangs  together  ;  inasmuch  as  the  demonstration 
of  any  one  proposition  virtually  includes  all  the  previous  de- 
monstrations to  which  it  refers. 

Hence  it  appears,  that,  in  mathematical  demonstrations; 
we  have  not,  at  every  step,  the  immediate  evidence  of  intui- 
tion, but  only  the  evidence  of  memory.  Every  demonstra- 
tion, however,  may  be  resolved  into  a  series  of  separate 
judgments,  either  formed  at  the  moment,  or  remembered  as 
the  results  of  judgments  formed  at  some  preceding  period  ; 
and  it  is  in  the  arrangement  and  concatenation  of  these  dif- 
ferent judgments,  or  media  of  proof,  that  the  inventive  and 
reasoning  powers  of  the  mathematician  find  so  noble  a  field 
for  their  exercise. 

With  respect  to  these  powers  of  judgment  and  of  reason- 
ing, as  they  are  here  combined,  it  appears  to  me,  that  the 
results  of  the  former  may  be  compared  to  a  collection  of  se- 
parate stones  prepared  by  the  chisel  for  the  purposes  of  the 
builder  ;  upon  each  of  which  stones,  while  lying  on  the 
ground,  a  person  may  raise  himself,  as  upon  a  pedestal,  to  a 
small  elevation.  The  same  judgments,  when  combined  into 
a  train  of  reasoning,  terminating  in  a  remote  conclusion,  re- 
semble the  formerly  unconnected  blocks,  when  converted  in- 
to the  steps  of  a  staircase  leading  to  the  summit  of  a  tower, 
which  would  be  otherwise  inaccessible.  In  the  design  and 
execution  of  this  staircase,  much  skill  and  invention  may  be 
displayed  by  the  architect ;  but,  in  order  to  ascend  it,  no- 
thing more  is  necessary  than  a  repetition  of  the  act  by  which 
the  first  step  was  gained.  The  fact  I  conceive  to  be  some- 
what analogous,  in  the  relation  between  the  power  of  judg- 
ment, and  what  logicians  call  the  discursive  processes  of  the 
understanding. 

Mr.  Locke's  language,  in  various  parts  of  his  Essay,  seems 
to  accord  with  the  same  opinion.  "  Every  step  in  reason- 
"  ing,"  he  observes  "  that  produces  knowledge,  has  intuitive 
"  certainty  ;  zuhich,  when  the  mind  perceives,  there  is  no  more 
u  required  but  to  remember  it,  to  make  the  agreement  or  disa- 
a  greement  of  the  ideas,  concerning  which  we  inquire,  visi 


SECT.  I.]  OF    THE    HUMAN    MIND.  69 

"  ble  and  certain.  This  intuitive  perception  of  the  agree- 
"  tnent  or  disagreement  of  the  intermediate  ideas,  in  each  step 
"  and  progression  of  the  demonstration,  must  also  be  carried 
"  exactly  in  the  mind,  and  a  man  must  be  sure  that  no  part 
"  is  left  out ;  which,  in  long  deductions,  and  in  the  use  of 
"  many  proofs,  the  memory  does  not  always  so  readily  and 
"  exactly  retain  :  therefore  it  comes  to  pass,  that  this  is  more 
"  imperfect  than  intuitive  knowledge,  and  men  embrace  often 
4£  falsehood  fir  demonstrations."* 

The  same  doctrine  is  stated  elsewhere  by  Mr.  Locke,  more 
than  once,  in  terms  equally  explicit;!  and  yet  his  language 
occasionally  favours  the  supposition,  that,  in  its  deductive 
processes,  the  mind  exhibits  some  modification  of  reason  es- 
sentially distinct  from  intuition.  The  account,  too,  which  he 
has  given  of  their  respective  provinces,  affords  evidence  that 
his  notions  concerning  them  were  not  sufficiently  precise  and 
settled.  ;'  When  the  mind"  (says  he)  "  perceives  the  agree- 
"  ment  or  disagreement  of  two  ideas  immediately  by  them- 
Cl  selves,  without  the  intervention  of  any  other,  its  knowledge 
"  may  be  called  intuitive.  When  it  cannot  so  bring  its  ideas 
*'  together,  as,  by  their  immediate  comparison,  and,  as  it 
*'  were,  juxta-position,  or  application  one  to  another,  to  per- 
ft  ceive  their  agreement  or  disagreement,  it  is  fain,  by  the  in- 
"  tervention  of  other  ideas  (one  or  more  as  it  happens)  to 
"  discover  the  agreement  or  disagreement,'  which  it  searches  ; 
"  and  this  is  that  which  we  call  reasoning. "J  According  to 
these  definitions,  supposing  the  equality  of  two  lines  A  and 
B  to  be  perceived  immediately  in  consequence  of  their  coin- 
cidence; the  judgment  of  the  mind  is  intuitive  :  Supposing  A 
to  coincide  with  B,  and  B  with  C  ;  the  relation  between  A 
and  C  is  perceived  by  reasoning.  Nor  is  this  a  hasty  infe- 
rence from  Locke's  accidental  language.  That  it  is  perfect- 
ly agreeable  to  the  foregoing  definitions,  as  understood  bv. 
their  author,  appears  from  the  following  passage,  which  oc- 

*  B.  IV.  Chap.  ii.  §  7.    See  also  B.  IV.  Chap.  xvii.  §  15. 
t  B.  fV.  Chan.  xvii.  §  2.     B.  IV.  Chap.  xvii.  §  4.  §  14. 
X  B.  IV.  Chap.  ii.  §<j  l.and'2. 


70  ELEMENTS    OP    THE    PHILOSOPHY  [CHAP.  II. 

curs  afterwards :  "  The  principal  act  of  ratiocination  is  the 
■"  finding  the  agreement  or  disagreement  of  two  ideas,  one  with 
"  another,  by  the  intervention  ofa  third.  As  a  man,  by  a  yard, 
"  finds  two  houses  to  be  of  the  same  length,  which  could  not 
"  be  brought  together  to  measure  their  equality  by  juxta-po- 
"  sition."* 

This  use  of  the  words  intuition  and  reasoning,  is  surely 
somewhat  arbitrary.  The  truth  of  mathematical  axioms  has 
always  been  supposed  to  be  intuitively  obvious  ;  and  the 
first  of  these,  according  to  Euciid's  enumeration,  affirms, 
That  if  A  be  equal  to  B,  and  B  to  C,  A  and  C  are  equal. 
Admitting,  however,  Locke's  definition  to  be  just,  it  only  tends 
to  confirm  what  has  been  already  stated  with  respect  to  the 
near  affinity,  or  rather  the  radical  identity,  of  intuition  and 
of  reasoning.  When  the  relation  of  equality  between  A  and 
B  has  once  been  perceived,  A  and  B  are  completely  identi- 
fied as  the  same  mathematical  quantity  5  and  the  two  letters 
may  be  regarded  as  synonymous  wherever  they  occur.  The 
faculty,  therefore,  which  perceives  the  relation  between  A  and 
C,  is  the  same  with  the  faculty  which  perceives  the  relation 
between  A  and  B,  and  between  B  and  Ct 

In  farther  confirmation  of  the  same  proposition,  an  appeal 
might  be  made  to  the  structure  of  syllogisms.  Is  it  possible 
to  conceive  an  understanding  so  formed  as  to  perceive  the 
truth  of  the  major  and  of  the  minor  propositions,  and  yet  not 
to  perceive  the  force  of  the  conclusion  ?  The  contrary  must 
appear  evident  to  every  person  who  knows  what  a  syllogism 
is  ;  or  rather,  as  in  this  mode  of  stating  an  argument,  the  mind 
is  led  from  universals  to  particulars,  it  must  appear  evident, 
that,  in  the  very  statement  of  the  major  proposition,  the  truth 
of  the  conclusion  is  presupposed ;  insomuch,  that  it  was  not 

*  B.  IV.  Chap.  xvii.  §  18. 

i  Dr.  Iteid's  notions,  as  well  as  those  of  Mr.  Locke,  seem  to  have  been  somewhat 
unsettled  with  respect  to  the  precise  line  which  separates  intuition  from  reasoning. 
That  the  axioms  of  geometry  are  intuitive  truths,  he  has  remarked  in  numberless  pas- 
sages of  his  works  :  and  yet,  in  speaking  of  the  application  of  the  syllogistic  theory 
to  mathematics,  he  makes  use  of  the  following  expression :  "  The  simple  reasoning. 
"  A  is  equal  to  B,  and  B  to  C,  therefore  A  is  equal  to  C,'  cannot  be  brought  into  atlji 
"  syllogism  in  figure  and  mad?.'" — §ee  his  Analysis  c/Jlristotk's  Logic. 


SECT.  I.]  OP   THE   HUMAN   MlND.  71 

without  good  reason  Dr.  Campbell  hazarded  the  epigramma- 
tic, yet  unanswerable  remark  that,  "  there  is  always  some 
"  radical  defect  in  a  syllogism,  which  is  not  chargeable  with 
"  that  species  of  sophism  known  among  logicians  by  the  name 
"  of  pelitio  principii,  or  a  begging  of  the  question*"* 

The  idea  which  is  commonly  annexed  to  intuition,  as  op- 
posed to  reasoning,  turns,  I  suspect,  entirely  on  the  circum- 
stance of  time.  The  former  we  conceive  to  be  instantaneous ; 
whereas  the  latter  necessarily  involves  the  notion  of  succes- 
sion, or  of  progress.  This  distinction  is  sufficiently  precise 
for  the  ordinary  purposes  of  discourse  ;  nay,  it  supplies  us, 
on  many  occasions,  with  a  convenient  phraseology  :  but,  in 
the  theory  of  the  mind,  it  has  led  to  some  mistaken  conclu- 
sions, on  which  I  intend  to  offer  a  few  remarks  in  the  second 
part  of  this  section. 

So  much  with  respect  to  the  separate  provinces  of  these 
powers,  according  to  Locke: — a  point  on  which  I  am,  after 
all,  inclined  to  think,  that  my  own  opinion  does  not  differ 
essentially  from  his,  whatever  inferences  to  the  contrary  may 
be  drawn  from  some  of  his  casual  expressions.  The  misap- 
prehensions into  which  these  have  contributed  to  lead  various 
writers  of  a  later  date,  will,  I  hope,  furnish  a  sufficient  apolo- 
gy for  the  attempt  which  I  have  made,  to  place  the  question  in 
a  stronger  light  than  he  seems  to  have  thought  requisite  for  its 
illustration. 

In  some  of  the  foregoing  quotations  from  his  Essay,  there 
is  another  fault  of  still  greater  moment ;  of  which,  although 
not  immediately  connected  with  the  topic  now  under  discus- 
sion, it  is  proper  for  me  to  take  notice,  that  I  may  not  have 
the  appearance  of  acquiescing  in  a  mode  of  speaking  so  ex- 
tremely exceptionable.  What  I  allude  to  is,  the  supposition 
which  his  language,  concerning  the  powers  both  of  intuition 
and  of  reasoning,  involves,  that  knowledge  consists  solely  in 
the  perception  of  the  agreement  or  the  disagreement  of  our  ideas. 
The  impropriety  of  this  phraseology  has  been  sufficiently  ex- 
posed by  Dr.  Rcid,  whose  animadversions  I  would  beg  leave 

*  Phil,  of  Rliet.  Vol.  I.  p.  174. 


72  ELEMENTS    OF    THE    PHILOSOPHY  [CHAP.  U. 

to  recommend  to  the  attention  of  those  readers,  who,  from 
long  habit,  may  have  familiarized  their  ear  to  the  peculiari- 
ties of  Locke's  philosophical  diction.  In  this  place,  I  think 
it  sufficient  for  me  to  add*  to  Dr.  Reid's  strictures,  that  Mr. 
Locke's  language  has,  in  the  present  instance,  been  suggest- 
ed to  him  by  the  partial  view  which  he  took  of  the  subject  ; 
his  illustrations  being  chiefly  borrowed  from  mathematics, 
and  the  relations  about  which  it  is  conversant*  When  ap- 
plied to  these  relations,  it  is  undoubtedly  possible  to  annex 
some  sense  to  such  phrases  as  comparing  ideas, — the  juxta- 
position of  ideas, — the  perception  of  the  agreements  or  disa~ 
greements  of  ideas,  but,  in  most  other  branches  of  know- 
ledge, this  jargon  will  be  found,  on  examination,  to  be  alto- 
gether unmeaning  ;  and,  instead  of  adding  to  the  precision 
of  our  notions,  to  involve  plain  facts  in  technical  and  scho- 
lastic mystery. 

This  last  observation  leads  me  to  remark  farther,  that 
even  when  Locke  speaks  of  reasoning  in  general,  he  seems, 
in  many  cases,  to  have  had  a  tacit  reference,  in  his  own 
mind,  to  mathematical  demonstration  ;  and  the  same  criti- 
cism may  be  extended  to  every  logical  writer  whom  I  know, 
not  excepting  Aristotle  himself.  Perhaps  it  is  chiefly  owing 
to  this,  that  their  discussions  are  so  often  of  very  little  prac- 
tical utility  :  the  rules  which  result  from  them  being  wholly 
superfluous,  when  applied  to  mathematics  ;  and,  when  ex- 
tended to  other  branches  of  knowledge,  being  unsusceptible 
©f  any  precise,  or  even  intelligible  interpretation. 


II. 

Conclusions  obtained   by  a  Process    of  Deduction    often  mistaken    for  Intuitive 

Judgments. 

It  has  been  frequently  remarked,  that  the  justest  and  most 
efficient  understandings  are  often  possessed  by  men  who  are 
incapable  of  stating  to  others,  or  even  to  themselves,  the 
grounds  on  which  they  proceed  in  forming  their  decisions. 


SECT  I.]  OF   THE   HUMAN  MIIfD.  73 

In  some  instances,  I  have  been  disposed  to  ascribe  this  to 
the  faults  of  early  education  ;  but,  in  other  cases,  I  am  per- 
suaded, that  it  was  the  effect  of  active  and  imperious  habits 
in  quickening  the  evanescent  processes  of  thought,  so  as  to 
render  them  untraceable  by  the  memory  ;  and  to  give  the  ap- 
pearance of  intuition  to  what  was  in  fact  the  result  of  a  train 
of  reasoning  so  rapid  as  to  escape  notice.  This  I  conceive  to 
be  the  true  theory  of  what  is  generally  called  common  sense^ 
in  opposition  to  book-learning  ;  and  it  serves  to  account  for 
the  use  which  has  been  made  of  this  phrase,  by  various  wri- 
ters, as  synonymous  with  intuition. 

These  seemingly  instantaneous  judgments  have  always 
appeared  to  me  as  entitled  to  a  greater  share  of  our  confi- 
dence than  many  of  our  more  deliberate  conclusions  ;  inas- 
much as  they  have  been  forced,  as  it  were,  on  the  mind,  by 
the  lessons  of  long  experience  ;  and  are  as  little  liable  to  be 
biassed  by  temper  or  passion,  as  the  estimates  we  form  of 
the  distances  of  visible  objects.  They  constitute,  indeed, 
to  those  who  are  habitually  engaged  in  the  busy  scenes  of 
life,  a  sort  of  peculiar  faculty,  analogous,  both  in  its  origin 
and  in  its  use,  to  the  coup  d'oeil  of  the  military  engineer,  or 
to  the  quick  and  sure  tact  of  the  medical  practitioner,  in 
marking  the  diagnostics  of  disease. 

For  this  reason,  I  look  upon  the  distinction  between  our 
intuitive  and  deductive  judgments  as,  in  many  cases,  merely 
an  object  of  theoretical  curiosity.  In  those  simple  conclu- 
sions which  all  men  are  impelled  to  form  by  the  necessities 
of  their  nature,  and  in  which  we  find  an  uniformity  not  less 
constant  than  in  the  acquired  perceptions  of  sight,  it  is  of  as 
little  consequence  to  the  logician  to  spend  his  time  in  efforts 
to  retrace  the  first  steps  of  the  infant  understanding,  as  it 
would  be  to  the  sailor  or  the  sportsman  to  study,  with  a  view 
to  the  improvement  of  his  eye,  the  Berkeleian  theory  of 
vision.  In  both  instances,  the  original  faculty  and  the  ac- 
quired judgment  are  equally  entitled  to  be  considered  as  the 
work  of  Nature  ;  and  in   both  instances  we  find  it  equally 

VOL.    II.  10 


74  ELEMENTS    OP    THE    PHILOSOPHY  [CHAP.  I:- 

impossible  to  shake  off"  her  authority.  It  is  no  wonder? 
therefore,  that,  in  popular  language,  such  words  as  common 
sense  and  reason  should  be  used  with  a  considerable  degree 
of  latitude  ;  nor  is  it  of  much  importance  to  the  philosopher 
to  aim  at  extreme  nicety  in  defining  their  province,  wheie  all 
mankind,  whether  wise  or  ignorant,  think  and  speak  alike. 

In  some  rare  and  anomalous  cases,  a  rapidity  of  judgment  in 
the  more  complicated  concerns  of  life,  appears  in  individuals 
who  have  had  so  few  opportunities  of  profiting  by  experience, 
that  it  seems,  on  a  superficial  view,  to  be  the  immediate  gift 
of  heaven.  But,  in  all  such  instances  (although  a  great  deal 
must  undoubtedly  be  ascribed  to  an  inexplicable  aptitude 
or  predisposition  of  the  intellectual  powers,)  we  may  be  per- 
fectly assured,  that  every  judgment  of  the  understanding  is 
preceded  by  a  process  of  reasoning  or  deduction,  whether 
the  individual  himself  be  able  to  recollect  it  or  not.  Of  this 
I  can  no  more  doubt,  than  I  could  bring  myself  to  believe 
that  the  Arithmetical  Prodigy,  who  has,  of  late,  so  justly 
attracted  the  attention  of  the  curious,  is  able  to  extract 
square  and  cube  roots  by  an  instinctive  and  instantaneous 
perception,  because  the  process  of  mental  calculation,  by 
which  he  is  led  to  the  result,  eludes  all  his  efforts  to  recover 
it.* 

It  is  remarked  by  Mr.  Hume,  with  respect  to  the  elocution 
of  Oliver  Cromwell,  that  "  it  was  always  confused,  embar- 
"  rassed,  and  unintelligible.1' — "  The  great  defect,  however," 
he  adds,  "  in  Oliver's  speeches  consisted,  not  in  his  want  of 
u  elocution,  but  in  his  want  of  ideas  ;  the  sagacity  of  his  ac- 
"  tions,  and  the  absurdity  of  his  discourse,  forming  the  mosf 
"  prodigious  contrast  that  ever  was  known." — "  In  the  great 
"  variety  of  human  geniuses,"  says  the  same  historian,  upon 
a  different  occasion,  "  there  are  some  which,  though  they  see 
"  their  object  clearly  and  distinctly  in  general ;  yet,  when 
'^  they  come  to  unfold  its  parts  by  discourse  or  writing,  lose 
*":  that  luminous  conception  which  they  had  before  attained. 

>?e  Note  (E  ) 


SECT.  I.}  OP    THE   HUMAN    MIND.  T$ 

"  All  accounts  agree  in  ascribing  to  Cromwell,  a  tiresome, 
"  dark,  unintelligible  elocution,  even  when  he  had  no  intention 
"  to  disguise  his  meaning  :  Yet,  no  man's  actions  were  ever, 
"  in  such  a  variety  of  difficult  incidents,  more  decisive  andju- 
"  dicious." 

The  case  here  described  may  be  considered  as  an  ex- 
treme one  ;  but  every  person  in  common  observation  must  re- 
collect facts  somewhat  analogous,  which  have  fallen  under 
his  own  notice.  Indeed,  it  is  no  more  than  we  should  expect 
a  priori,  to  meet  with,  in  every  individual  whose  early  habits 
have  trained  him  more  to  the  active  business  of  the  world, 
than  to  those  pursuits  which  prepare  the  mind  for  communi- 
cating to  others  its  ideas  and  feelings,  with  clearness  and  ef- 
fect. 

An  anecdote  which  I  heard,  many  years  ago,  of  a  late  very 
eminent  Judge  (Lord  Mansfield)  has  often  recurred  to  my 
memory,  while  reflecting  on  these  apparent  inconsistencies 
of  intellectual  character.  A  friend  of  his,  who  possessed  ex* 
cellent  natural  talents,  but  who  had  been  prevented,  by  his 
professional  duties  as  a  naval  officer,  from  bestowing  on  them 
all  the  cultivation  of  which  they  were  susceptible,  having 
been  recently  appointed  to  the  government  of  Jamaica,  hap- 
pened to  express  some  doubts  of  his  competency  to  preside 
in  the  Court  of  Chancery.  Lord  Mansfield  assured  him,  that 
he  would  find  the  difficulty  not  so  great  as  he  apprehended. 
"  Trust,"  he  said,  "  to  your  own  good  sense  in  forming  your 
"  opinions  ;  but  beware  of  attempting  to  state  the  grounds  of 
■'  your  judgments.  The  judgment  will  probably  be  right; — 
n  the  argument  will  infallibly  be  wrong." 

From  what  has  been  said,  it  seems  to  follow,  that  although 
a  man  should  happen  to  reason  ill  in  support  of  a  sound  con- 
clusion, we  are  by  no  means  entitled  to  infer,  with  confidence, 
that  he  judged  right  merely  by  accident.  It  is  far  from  being 
impossible  that  he  may  have  committed  some  mistake  in 
stating  to  others  (perhaps  in  retracing  to  himseli)  the  grounds 
upon  which  his  judgment  was  really  founded.  Indeed,  this 
must  be  the  case,  wherever  a  shrewd  understanding  in  busi- 


76  ELEMENTS    OP    THE    PHILOSOPHY        [CHAP.    JL 

ness  is  united  with  an  incapacity  for  clear  and  luminous  rea- 
soning ;  and  something  of  the  same  sort  is  incident,  more  or 
less,  to  all  men  (more  particularly  to  men  of  quick  parts) 
when  they  make  an  attempt,  in  discussions  concerning  human 
affairs,  to  remount  to  first  principles.  It  may  be  added,  that 
in  the  old,  this  .correctness  of  judgment  often  remains,  in  a 
surprising  degree,  long  after  the  discursive  or  argumentative 
power  would  seem,  from  some  decay  of  attention,  or  confu- 
sion in  the  succession  of  ideas,  to  have  been  sensibly  im- 
paired by  age  or  by  disease. 

In  consequence  of  these  views,  as  well  as  of  various  others, 
foreign  to  the  present  subject,  I  am  led  to  entertain  great 
doubts  about  the  solidity  of  a  very  specious  doctrine  laid 
down  by  Condorcet,  in  his  "  Essay  on  the  Application  of 
a  Mathematical  Analysis  to  the  Probabilities  of  Decisions 
"  resting  upon  the  Votes  of  a  Majority."  "  It  is  extremely 
"  possible,"  he  observes,  "  that  the  decision  which  unites  in 
{'  its  favour  the  greatest  number  of  suffrages,  may  compre- 
"  hend  a  variety  of  propositions,  some  of  which,  if  stated 
"  apart,  would  have  had  a  plurality  of  voices  against  them ; 
"  and,  as  the  truth  of  a  system  of  propositions,  supposes  that 
"  each  of  the  propositions  composing  it  is  true,  the  probabili- 
il  ty  of  the  system  can  be  rigorously  deduced  only  from  an 
"  examination  of  the  probability  of  each  proposition  sepa- 
"  rately  considered."* 

When  this  theory  is  applied  to  a  court  of  law,  it  is  well 
known  to  involve  one  of  the  nicest  questions  in  practical  ju- 
risprudence ;  and,  in  that  light,  I  do  not  presume  to  have 
formed  any  opinion  with  respect  to  it.  It  may  be  doubled, 
perhaps,  if  it  be  not  one  of  those  problems,  the  solution  "of 
which,  in  particular  instances,  is  more  safely  entrusted  to 
discretionary  judgment,  than  to  the  rigorous  application  of 

*  Essai  sur  1'Applieation  de  l'Analyse  a  la  probability  des  Decisions  rendues  a  la 
pluralite  des  Voix.    Disc.  PrSl.  pp.  46,  47. 

Some  of  the  expressions  in  the  above  quotation  are  not  agreeable  to  the  idiom  of 
our  language ;  but  I  did  not  think  myself  entitled  to  depart  from  the  phraseology  of 
"?hs  original.    The  meaning  is  sufficiently  obvious. 


SECT.  II.]  OP    THE    HUMAN  MIND.  7? 

any  technical  rule  founded  on  abstract  principles.  I  have, 
introduced  the  quotation  here,  merely  on  account  of  the  proof 
which  it  has  been  supposed  to  afford,  that  the  seeming  diver- 
sities of  human  belief  fall,  in  general,  greatly  short  of  the 
reality.  Ori  this  point  the  considerations  already  stated, 
strongly  incline  me  to  entertain  an  idea  directly  contrary. 
My  rrasons  for  thinking  so  may  be  easily  collected  from  the 
tenor  of  the  preceding  remarks. 

It  is  time,  however,  to  proceed  to  the  examination  of  those 
discursive  processes,  the  different  steps  of  which  admit  of 
being  distinctly  stated  and  enunciated  in  the  form  of  logical 
arguments  ;  and  which,  in  consequence  of  this  circumstance, 
furnish  more  certain  and  palpable  data  for  our  speculations. 
I  begin  with  some  remarks  on  the  Power  of  General  Reason- 
ing ;  for  the  exercise  of  which,  (as  I  formerly  endeavoured 
to  shew,)  the  use  of  language,  as  an  instrument  of  thought,  is 
indispensably  requisite. 


SECTION  II. 

OF  GENERAL  REASONING. 
I. 

Illustrations  of  some  Remarks  formerly  stated  in  treating  of  Abstraction. 

I  should  scarcely  have  thought  it  necessary  to  resume 
the  consideration  of  Abstraction  here,  if  I  had  not  neglected, 
in  my  first  volume,  to  examine  the  force  of  an  objection  to 
Berkeley's  doctrine  concerning  abstract  general  ideas,  on 
which  great  stress  is  laid  by  Dr.  Reid,  in  his  Essays  on 
the  Intellectual  Powers  of  Man  ;  and  which  some  late  writers 
seem  to  have  considered  as  not  less  conclusive  against  the 
view  of  the  question  which  I  have  taken.  Of  this  objection 
I  was  aware  from  the  first  ;  but  was  unwilling,  by  replying 
to  it  in  form,  to  lengthen  a  discussion  which  savoured  so 
much  01  the  schools  ;  more  especially,  as  I  conceived  that  I 
had  guarded  my  own  argument  from  any  such  attack,  by  the 


78  ELEMENTS    OP    THE    PHILOSOPHY  [cHAP  If, 

cautious  terms  in  which  I  had  expressed  it.  Having  since 
had  reason  to  believe  that  I  was  precipitate  in  forming  this 
judgment,  and  that  Reid's  strictures  on  Berkeley's  theory  of 
General  Signs  have  produced  a  deeper  impression  than  I  had 
expected,*  I  shall  endeavour  to  obviate  them,  at  least  as  far 
as  they  apply  to  myself,  before  entering  on  any  new  specu- 
lations concerning  our  reasoning  powers  ;  and  shall,  at  the 
same  time,  introduce  some  occasional  illustrations  of  the 
principles  which  I  formerly  endeavoured  to  establish. 

To  prevent  the  possibility  of  misrepresentation,  I  state  Dr» 
Reid's  objection  in  his  own  words. 

"  Berkeley,  in  his  reasoning  against  abstract  general  ideas* 
"seems  unwillingly  or  unwaringly  to  grant  all  that  is  neces- 
"  sary  to  support  abstract  and  general  conceptions. 

"  A  man  (says  Berkeley,)  may  consider  a  figure  merely  as. 
**  triangular,  without  attending  to  the  particular  qualities  of 
Ci  the  angles,  or  relations  of  the  sides.  So  far  he  may  abstract* 
"  But  this  will  never  prove  that  he  can  frame  an  abstract 
"  general  inconsistent  idea  of  a  triangle." 

"  Upon  this  passage  Dr.  Reid  makes  the  followingremark: 
"  If a  man  may  consider  a  figure  merely  as  triangular,  he  must 
"  have  some  conception  of  this  object  of  his  consideration  ;  for 
"  no  man  can  consider  a  thing  which  he  does  not  conceive.  H& 
"  has  a  conception,  therefore,  of  a  triangular  figure,  merely  as 
"  such.  I  know  no  more  that  is  meant  by  an  abstract  gene- 
"  ral  conception  of  a  triangle," 

"  He  that  considers  a  figure  merely  as  triangular  (continues 
"the  same  author)  must  understand  what  is  meant  by  the 
"  word  triangular.  If  to  the  conception  he  joins  to  this  word, 
"  he  adds  any  particular  quality  of  angles  or  relation  of  sides. 
"  he  misunderstands  it,  and  does  not  consider  the  figure  mere- 
"  ly  as  triangular.     Whence  I  think  it  is  evident,  that  he  who 

*  See  a  book  entitled,  Elements  of  Intellectual  Philosophy,  by  the  late  learned  and. 
justly  regretted  Mr.  Scott,  of  King's  College,  Aberdeen,  p.  llfi.etseq.  (Edinburgh, 
1805.)  I  have  not  thought  it  necessary  to  reply  to  Mr.  Scott's  own  reasonings,  which 
do  not  appear  to  me  to  throw  much  new  light  on  the  question ;  but  I  thought  it  right  to 
refer  to  them  here,  that  the  reader  may,  if  he  pleases,  have  an  opportunity  of  judging 
for  himself. 


SECT.  II.]  OP   THE  HOMAN   MIND.  79 

"  considers  a  figure  merely  as  triangular,  must  have  the  con- 
ception of  a  triangle,  abstracting  from  any  quality  of  angles 
"  or  relations  of  sides."* 

For  what  appears  to  myself  to  be  a  satisfactory  answer  to 
this  reasoning,  1  have  only  to  refer  to  the  first  volume  of 
these  Elements.  The  remarks  to  which  I  allude  are  to  be 
found  in  the  third  section  of  chapter  fourth  ;t  and  I  must  beg 
leave  to  recommend  them  to  the  attention  of  my  readers  as  a 
^necessary  preparation  for  the  following  discussion. 

In  the  farther  prosecution  of  the  same  argument,  Dr.  Reid 
lays  hold  of  an  acknowledgment  which  Berkeley  has  made, 
*,'  That  we  may  consider  Peter  so  far  forth  as  man,  or  so  far 
"  forth  as  animal,  inasmuch  as  all  that  is  perceived  is  not  con- 
"  sidered." — "  It  may  here  (says  Reid)  be  observed,  that  he 
■"  who  considers  Peter  so  far  forth  as  man,  or  so  far  forth  as 
"  animal,  must  conceive  the  meaning  of  those  abstract  general 
"  words  man  and  animal ;  and  he  who  conceives  the  meaning 
"  of  them,  has  an  ab-tract  general  conception." 

According  to  the  definition  of  the  word  conception,  which  I 
have  given  in  treating  of  that  faculty  of  the  mind,  a  general 
conception  is  an  obvious  impossibility.  But,  as  Dr.  Reid  has 
chosen  to  annex  a  more  extensive  meaning  to  the  term  than 
seems  to  me  consistent  with  precision,  I  would  be  far  from 
being  understood  to  object  to  his  conclusion,  merely  because 
it  is  inconsistent  with  an  arbitrary  definition  of  my  own. 
Let  us  consider,  therefore,  how  far  his  doctrine  is  consistent 
with  itself;  or  rather,  since  both  parties  are  evidently  so  near- 
ly agreed  about  the  principal  fact,  which  of  the  two  have 
adopted  the  more  perspicuous  and  philosophical  mode  of 
stating  it. 

In  the  first  place,  then,  let  it  be  remembered  as  a  thing  ad- 
mitted on  both  sides,  "  that  we  have  a  power  of  reasoning 
"  concerning  a  figure  considered  merely  as  triangular,  without 
"  attending  to  the  particular  qualities  of  the  angles,  or  rela- 
<'  lions  of  the  sides;"  and  also,  that   "  we  may  reason  con- 

*  Reid's  Intellectual  Powers,  p.  433, 4io.  c<\ 
♦  P.  195.  3d.ed. 


80  ELEMENTS    OP   THE    PHILOSOPHY        [CHAP.  Hv 

"  cerning  Peter  or  John,  considered  so  far  forth  as  wan,  or  so 
"  far  forth  as  animal."  About  these  facts  there  is  but  one 
opinion  ;  and  the  only  question  is,  Whether  it  throws  addi- 
tional light  on  the  subject,  to  tell  us,  in  scholastic  language, 
that  "  we  are  enabled  to  carry  on  these  general  reasonings, 
"  in  consequence  of  the  power  which  the  mind  has  of  forming 
"  abstract  general  conceptions."  To  myself,  it  appears,  that 
this  last  statement  (even  on  the  supposition  that  the  word 
conception  is  to  be  understood  agreeably  to  Dr.  Reid's  own 
explanation)  can  serve  no  other  purpose  than  that  of  involv- 
ing a  plain  and  simple  truth  in  obscurity  and  mystery.  If  it 
be  used  in  the  sense  in  which  I  have  invariably  employed  it 
in  this  work,  the  proposition  is  altogether  absurd  and  incom- 
prehensible. 

For  the  more  complete  illustration  of  this  point,  I  must 
here  recur  to  a  distinction  formerly  made  between  the  ab- 
stractions which  are  subservient  to  reasoning,  and  those 
which  are  subservient  to  imagination.  "  In  every  instance 
"  in  which  imagination  is  employed  in  forming  new  wholes? 
"  by  decompounding  and  combining  the  perceptions  of  sense, 
"  it  is  evidently  necessary  that  the  poet  or  the  painter  should 
"  be  able  to  state  or  represent  to  himself  the  circumstances 
"  abstracted,  as  separate  objects  of  conception.  But  this  is 
"  b\  no  means  requisite  in  every  case  in  which  abstraction 
"  is  subservient  to  the  power  of  reasoning  ;  for  it  frequently 
"  happens,  that  we  can  reason  concerning  the  quality  or  pro* 
"  perty  of  an  object  abstracted  from  the  rest,  while,  at  the 
"  same  time,  we  find  it  impossible  to  conceive  it  separately. 
"  Thus,  I  can  reason  concerning  extension  and  figure,  with- 
"  out  any  reference  to  colour,  although  it  may  be  doubted, 
"  if  a  person  possessed  of  sight  can  make  extension  and 
"  figure  steady  objects  of  conception,  without  connecting 
"  with  them  the  idea  of  one  colour  or  another.  Nor  is  this 
"  always  owing  (as  it  is  in  the  instance  just  mentioned)  mere- 
"  ly  to  the  association  of  ideas  ;  for  there  are  cases,  in  which 
"  we  can  reason  concerning  things  =eparalely,  which  it  is  im- 
"  possible  for  us  to  suppose  any  mind  so  constituted  as  to 


SECT.  I!.]  OF    THE    HUMAN    MINI).  Bl 

"  conceive  apart.  Thus  we  can  reason  concerning  length, 
"  abstracted  from  any  other  dimension  ;  although,  surely,  no 
"  understanding  can  make  length,  without  breadth,  an  object 
"  of  conception. "*  In  like  manner,  while  1  am  studying 
Euclid's  demonstration  of  the  equality  of  the  three  angles  of 
a  triangle  to  two  right  angles,  I  find  no  difficulty  in  following 
his  train  of  reasoning,  although  it  has  no  reference  whatever  to 
the  specific  size  or  to  the  specific  form  of  the  diagram  before 
me.  I  abstract,  therefore,  in  this  instance,  from  both  of  these 
circumstances  presented  to  my  senses  by  the  immediate  objects 
of  my  perceptions  ;  and  yet  it  is  manifestly  impracticable  for 
me  either  to  delineate  on  paper,  or  to  concrive  in  the  mind, 
such  a  fig  ,re  as  shall  not  include  the  circumstances  from 
which  I  abstract,  as  well  as  those  on  which  the  demonstra- 
tion hinges. 

In  order  to  form  a  precise  notion  of  the  manner  in  which. 
this  process  of  the  mind  is  carried  on,  it  is  necessary  to  at- 
tend to  the  close  and  inseparable  connection  which  exists 
between  the  faculty  of  general  reasoning,  and  the  use  of  ar- 
tificial language.  It  is  in  consequence  of  the  aids  which  this 
lends  to  our  natural  faculties,  that  we  are  furnished  with  a 
class  of  signs,  expressive  of  all  the  circumstances  which  we 
wish  our  reasonings  to  comprehend  ;  and,  at  the  same  time, 
exclusive  of  all  those  which  we  wish  to  leave  out  of  consi- 
deration. The  word  triangle,  for  instance,  when  used  with" 
out  any  additional  epithet,  confines  the  attention  to  the  three 
angles  and  three  sides  of  the  figure  before  us  ;  and  re- 
minds us,  as  we  proceed,  that  no  step  of  our  deduction  is  tp 
turn  on  any  of  the  specific  varieties  which  that  figure  may 
exhibit.  The  notion,  however,  which  we  annex  to  the  word 
triangle,  while  we  are  reading  the  demonstration,  is  not  the 
less  a  particular  notion,  that  this  word,  from  its  partial  or  ab- 
stracted import,  is  equally  applicable  to  an  infinite  variety 
of  other  individuals.! 

*  Vol.  I.  pp.  157,  158, 3d  edit. 

i  "  By  this  imposition  of  names,  some  of  larger,  some  of  stricter  signification,  we 
"  turn  the  reckoning  of  the  consequences  of  things  imagined  in  the  mind,  into  a  rec* 
VOL.    II.  1  1 


82  ELEMENTS    OP    THE    PHILOSOPHY  [CHAP.  li. 

These  observations  lead,  in  my  opinion,  to  so  easy  an  ex- 
planation of  the  transition  from  particular  to  general  reason- 
ing, that  I  shall  make  no  apology  for  prosecuting  the  subject 
a  little  further,  before  leaving  this  branch  of  my  argument. 

It  will  not,  I  apprehend,  be  denied,  that  when  a  learner 
first  enters  on  the  study  of  geometry,  he  considers  the  dia- 
grams before  him  as  individual  objects,  and  as  individual  ob- 
jects alone.  In  reading,  for  example,  the  demonstration  just 
referred  to,  of  the  equality  of  the  three  angles  of  every  tri- 
angle to  two  right  angles,  he  thinks  only  of  the  triangle  which 
is  presented  to  him  on  the  margin  of  the  page.  Nay,  so 
completely  does  this  particular  figure  engross  his  attention, 
that  it  is  not  without  some  difficulty  he,  in  the  first  instance, 
transfers  the  demonstration  to  another  triangle  whose  form  is 
very  different,  or  even  to  the  same  triangle  placed  in  an  in- 
verted position.  It  is  in  order  to  correct  this  natural  bias 
of  the  mind,  that  a  judicious  teacher,,  after  satisfying  himself 
that  the  student  comprehends  perfectly  the  force  of  the  de- 
monstration, as  applicable  to  the  particular  triangle  which 
Euclid  has  selected,  is  led  to  vary  the  diagram  in  different 
ways,  with  a  view  to  shew  him,  that  the  very  same  demon- 
stration expressed  in  the  very  same  form  of  words,  is  equally 
applicable  to  them  all.     In  this  manner  he  comes,  by  slow 

u  koning  of  the  consequences  of  appellations.  For  example,  a  man  (hat  hath  no  li.te  of 
"  speech  at  all  (such  as  is  born  and  remains  perfectly  deaf  and  dumb)  if  he  set  before 
*<  his  eyes  a  triangle,  and  by  it  two  right  angles  (such  as  are  the  corners  of  a  square 
"  figure)  he  may  by  meditation  compare  and  find,  that  the  three  angles  of  that  trian- 
<frgle,  are  equal  to  those  right  angles  that  stand  by  it.  But  if  another  triangle  be 
11  shewn  him,  different  in  shape  from  the  former,  he  cannot  know,  without  a  new  la- 
c(  bour,  whether  the  three  angles  of  that  also  be  equal  to  the  same.  But  he  that  hath" 
"  the  use  of  words,  when  he  observes  that  such  equality  was  consequent,  not  to  the 
"  length  of  the  sides,  nor  to  any  particular  thing  in  this  triangle;  but  ouly  to  this, 
M  that  the  sides  were  straight,  and  the  angles  three  ;  and  that  that  was  all  for  which 
a  he  named  it  a  triangle  ;  will  boldly  conclude  universally,  that  such  equality  of  an- 
"  gles  is  in  all  triangles  whatsoever ;  and  register  his  invention  in  these  general  terms : 
"  Every  triangk  hath  its  three  angles  equal  to  two  right  angles.  And  thus  the  conse- 
"quence  found  in  one  particular,  comes  to  be  registered  and  remembered  as  an  rati- 
"  versal  rule  ;  and  discharges  our  mental  reckoning  of  time  and  place  ;  and  delivers 
M  us  from  all  labour  of  the  mind,  saving  the  first ;  and  makes  that  which  was  found 
ct  true  here,  and  now,  to  be  true  in  «//  times  and  vl^es.'' — Hohbes,  Of  Man,  Part  1. 
Chap.  iv. 


SECT.  II.]  OF    THE    HUMAN    MIND*  83 

degrees,  to  comprehend  the  nature  of  general  reasoning, 
establishing  insensibly  in  his  mind  this  fundamental  logical 
principle,  that  when  the  enunciation  of  a  mathematical  pro- 
position involves  only  a  certain  portion  of  the  attributes  of  the 
diagram  which  is  employed  to  illustrate  it,  the  same  proposi- 
tion must  hold  true  of  any  other  diagram  involving  the  same 
attributes,  how  much  soever  distinguished  from  it  by  other 
specific  peculiarities.* 

Of  all  the  generalizations  in  geometry,  there  are  none  into 
which  the  mind  enters  so  easily,  as  those  which  relate  to  di- 
versities in  point  of  size  or  magnitude.  Even  in  reading  the 
very  first  demonstrations  of  Euclid,  the  learner  almost  imme- 
diately sees,  that  the  scale  on  which  the  diagram  is  construct- 
ed, is  as  completely  out  of  the  question  as  the  breadth  or  the 
£olour  of  the  lines  which  it  presents  to  his  external  senses. 

"  In  order  to  impress  the  mind  still  more  forcibly  with  the  same  conviction,  some 
'liave  supposed  that  it  might  be  useful,  in  an  elementary  work,  such  as  that  of  Euclid, 
■to  omit  the  diagrams  altogether,  leaving  the  student  to  delineate  them  for  himself, 
agreeably  Xo  the  terms  of  the  enunciation  and  of  the  construction.  And  were  the  stu- 
dy of  geometry  to  be  regarded  merely  as  subservient  to  that  of  logic,  much  might  be 
alleged  in  confirmation  of  this  idea.  Where,  however,  it  is  the  main  purpose  of  the 
teacher  (as  almost  aJways  happens)  to  familiarize  the  mind  of  his  pupil  with  the  fun- 
damental principles  of  the  science,  as  a  preparation  for  the  study  of  physics,  and  of  the 
other  parts  of  mixed  mathematics,  it  cannot  be  denied,  that  such  a  practice  would  be 
far  less  favourable  to  the  memory,  than  the  plan  which  Euclid  has  adopted,  of  annex- 
ing to  each  theorem  an  appropriate  diagram,  with  which  the  general  truth  comes 
very  soon  to  be  strongly  associated.  Nor  is  this  circumstance  found  to  be  attendee! 
in  practice  with  the  inconvenience  it  may  seem  to  thre&len  ;  inasmuch  as  the  student, 
without  any  reflection  whatever  on  logical  principles,  generalizes  the  particular  ex- 
ample, according  to  the  different  cases  which  may  occur,  as  easily  and  unconsciously 
as  he  could  have  applied  to  these  cases  the  general  enunciation. 

The  same  remark  may  be  extended  to  the  other  departments  of  our  knowledge  ;  in 
all  of  which  it  will  be  found  useful  to  associate  with  every  important  general  conclu- 
sion some  particular  example  or  illustration,  calculated,  as  much  as  possible,  to  pre- 
sent an  impressive  image  to  the  power  of  conception.  By  this  means,  while  the  ex- 
ample gives  us  a  firmer  hold,  and  a  readier  command  of  the  general  theorem,  the 
theorem,  in  its  turn,  serves  to  correct  the  errors  into  which  the  judgment  might  be 
led  by  the  specific  peculiarities  of  the  example.  Hence,  by  the  way,  a  strong  argu- 
ment in  favour  of  the  practice  recommended  by  Bacon,  of  connecting  emblems  with 
■promotions,  as  the  most  powerful  of  all  adminicles  to  the  faculty  of  memory  ;  and 
hence  the  aid  which  this  faculty  may  be  expected  to  receive,  in  point  of  promptitude, 
if  not  of  correctness,  from  a  lively  imagination.  Nor  is  it  the  least  advantage  of  this 
practice,  that  it  supplies  us  at  all  times  with  ready  and  apposite  illustrations  to  facili- 
tate the  communication  of  our  general  conclusions  to  others.  But  the  prosecution  of 
'hese  hints  would  lead  me  too  far  astrav  from  the  suKjc,cl  of  this,  section. 


34  ELEMENTS    OP    THE    PHILOSOPHY  [CHAP.  II. 

The  demonstration,  for  example,  of  the  fourth  proposition, 
is  transferred,  without  any  conscious  process  of  reflection, 
from  the  two  triangles  on  the  margin  of  the  page,  to  those 
comparatively  large  ones  which  a  public  teacher  exhibits  on 
his  board  or  slate  to  a  hundred  spectators.  I  have  frequent- 
ly, however,  observed  in  beginners,  while  employed  in  co- 
pying such  elementary  diagrams,  a  disposition  to  make  the 
copv,  as  nearly  as  possible,  both  in  size  and  figure,  a  fac- 
simile of  the  original. 

The  generalizations  which  extend  to  varieties  of  form  and 
of  position,  are  accomplished  much  more  slowly;  and  for  this 
obvious  reason,  that  these  varieties  are  more  strongly  marked 
and  discriminated  from  one  another,  as  objects  of  vision  and 
of  conception.  How  difficult  (comparatively  speaking)  in 
such  instances,  the  generalizing  process  is,  appears  mani- 
festly from  the  embarrassment  which  students  experience,  in 
applying  the  fourth  proposition  to  the  demonstration  of  the 
fifth.  The  inverted  position,  and  the  partial  coincidence  of 
the  two  little  triangles  below  the  base,  seem  to  render  their 
mutual  relation  so  different  from  that  of  the  two  separate 
triangles  which  had  been  previously  familiarized  to  the  eye, 
that  it  is  not  surprising  this  step  of  the  reasoning  should  be 
followed,  by  the  mere  novice,  with  some  degree  of  doubt  and 
hesitation.  Indeed,  where  nothing  of  this  son  is  manifested, 
I  should  be  more  inclined  to  ascribe  the  apparent  quickness 
of  his  apprehension  to  a  retentive  memory,  seconded  by  im- 
plicit faith  in  his  instrucler ;  than  to  regard  it  as  a  promising 
symptom  of  mathematical  genius. 

Another,  and  perhaps  a  better  illustration  of  that  natural 
logic  which  is  exemplified  in  the  generalization  of  mathema- 
tical reasonings,  may  be  derived  from  those  instances  where 
the  same  demonstration  applies,  in  the  same  words,  to  what 
are  called,  in  geometry,  the  different  cases  of  a  proposition. 
In  the  commencement  of  our  studies,  we  read  the  demonstra- 
tion over  and  over,  applying  it  successively  to  the  different 
diagrams  ;  and  it  is  not  without  some  wonder  we  discover, 
•hat  it  is  equally  adapted  to  them  all.     In  process  of  time. 


SECT   II.]  OP    THE    HUMAN    MINI).  85 

we  learn  that  this  labour  is  superfluous  ;  and  if  we  find  it 
satisfactory  in  one  of  the  cases,  can  anticipate  with  confidence 
the  justness  of  the  general  conclusion,  or  the  modifications 
which  will  be  necessary  to  accommodate  it  to  the  different 
forms  of  which  the  hypothesis  may  admit. 

The  algebraical  calculus,  however,  when  applied  to  ge- 
ometry, places  the  foregoing  doctrine  in  a  point  of  view  si. 11 
more  striking  ;  "  representing,"  to  borrow  the  words  of  Dr. 
Halley,  "  all  the  possible  cases  of  a  problem  at  one  view  ; 
"  and  often  in  one  general  theorem  comprehending  whole 
£i  sciences  ;  which  deduced  at  length  into  propositions,  and 
"  demonstrated  after  the  manner  of  the  ancients,  might  well 
"  become  the  subject  of  large  treatises."*  Of  this  remark, 
Halley  gives  an  instance  in  a  formula,  which,  when  he  first 
published  it,  was  justly  regarded  "  as  a  notable  instance  of 
;'  the  great  use  and  comprehensiveness  of  algebraic  solu- 
"  tions."  I  allude  to  his  formula  for  finding  universally  the 
foci  of  optic  lenses  ;  an  example  which  I  purposely  select,  as 
it  cannot  fail  to  be  familiarly  known  to  all  who  have  the 
slightest  tincture  of  mathematical  and  physical  science. 

In  such  instances  as  these,  it  will  not  surely  be  supposed, 
that  while  we  read  the  geometrical  demonstration,  or  follow 
the  successive  steps  of  the  algebraical  process,  our  general 
conceptions  embrace  all  the  various  possible  cases  to  which 
our  reasonings  extend.  So  very  different  is  the  fact,  that  the 
wide  grasp  of  the  conclusion  is  discovered  only  by  a  sort  of 
subsequent  induction  ;  and,  till  habit  has  familiarized  us  with 
similar  discoveries,  they  never  fail  to  be  attended  with  a  cer- 
tain degree  of  unexpected  delight.  Dr.  Halley  seems  to 
have  felt  this  strongly  when  the  optical  formula  already  men- 
tioned first  presented  itself  to  his  mind. 

In  the  foregoing  remarks,  I  have  borrowed  my  examples 
from  mathematics,  because,  at  the  period  of  life  when  we 
enter  on  this  study,  the  mind  has  arrived  at  a  sufficient  de- 
gree of  maturity  to  be  able  to  reflect  accurately  on  every 
step  of  its  own  progress  ;  whereas,  in  those  general  conclu- 

*  Philos.  Transact   No.  iti5.    Miscp]!.  Car.  Vol'.  I.  p.  343 


86  ELEMENTS    OP    THE  PHILOSOPHY  [cHAP.  U. 

■sions  to  which  we  have  been  habituated  from  childhood,  it  is 
quite  impossible  for  us  to  ascertain,  by  any  direct  examina- 
tion, what  the  processes  of  thought  were,  whith  originally 
led  us  to  adopt  them.  In  this  point  of  view,  the  first  doubt- 
ful and  unassured  steps  of  the  young  geometer,  present  to 
the  logician  a  peculiarly  interesting  and  instructive  class  of 
phenomena,  for  illustrating  the  growth  and  development  of 
our  reasoning  powers.  The  true  theory,  more  especially  of 
general  reasoning,  may  be  here  distinctly  traced  by  every  at- 
tentive observer  ;  and  may  hence  be  confidently  applied  (un- 
der due  limitations)  to  all  the  other  departments  of  human 
knowledge.* 

*  The  view  of  genera]  reasoning  which  is  given  above,  appears  to  myself  to  afford, 
'(without  any  comment)  a  satisfactorj'  answer  to  the  following  argument  of  the  late 
•worthy  and  learned  Dr.  Price  :  "  That  the  universality  consists  in  the  idea,  and  not 
*'  merely  in  the  name,  as  used  to  signify  a  number  of  particulars,  resembling  that  which 
"  is  the  immediate  object  of  reflection,  is  plain  ;  because,  was  the  idea  to  which  the 
"  name  answers,  and  which  it  recalls  into  the  mind,  only  a  particular  one,  we  could 
"  not  know  to  what  other  ideas  to  apply  it,  or  what  particnlar  objects  had  the  resem- 
u  blance  necessary  to  bring  them  within  the  meaning  of  the  name.  A  person,  in 
t(  reading  over  a  mathematical  demonstration,  certainly  is  conscious  that  it  relates  to 
u  somewhat  else,  than  just  that  precise  figure  presented  to  him  in  the  diagram.  But 
a  if  he  knows  not  what  else,  of  what  use  can  the  demonstration  be  to  him  ?  How  is 
il  his  knowledge  enlarged  by  it  ?  Or  how  shajl  he  know  afterwards  to  what  to  apply 
«  it  ?" 

In  a  note  upon  this  passage,  Dr.  Price  observes,  that,  "  according  to  Dr.  Cudworlii, 
"abstract  ideas  are  implied  in  the  cognoscillve  power  of  the  mind;  which,  he  says, 
"  contains  in  itself  virtually  (as  tlve  future  plant  or  tree  is  contained  in  the  seed)  general 
<!  notions  or  exemplars  of  all  things,  which  are  exerted  by  it,  or  unfold  and  discover 
11  themselves,  as  occasions  invite,  and  proper  circumstances  occur."  "  This,  no  doubt, 
"  (Dr.  Price  adds)  many  will  very  freely  condemn  as  whimsical  and  extravagant.  F 
11  have,  I  own,  a  different  opinion  of  it ;  but  yet  I  should  not  care  to  be  obliged  to  de- 
"  fend  it." — Review  of  the  Principal  Questions  in  Morals,  pp.  38,  .39,  2d  edit. 

For  iny  own  part,  I  have  no  scruple  to  say,  that  I  consider  this  fancy  of  Cud  worth 
as  no!  only  whimsical  and  extravagant,  but  as  altogether  unintelligible  ;  ami  yet  it  ap- 
pears to  me,  that  some  confused  analogy  of  the  same  sort  must  exist  in  the  mind  oi 
every  person  who  imagines  that  he  has  the  power  of  forming  general  conceptions 
without  the  intermediation  of  language. 

In  the  continuation  of  the  same  note,  Dr.  Price  seems  disposed  to  sanction  another 
remark  of  Dr.  Cue!  worth  :  in  which  he  pronounces  the  opinion  of  the  nominalists  to  be 
so  ridiculous  and  false,  as  to  deserve  no  confutation.  I  suspect  that  when  Dr.  Cud- 
worth  wrote  this  splenetic  and  oracular  sentence,  he  was  out  of  humour  with  some 
argument  of  Hobbes,  which  he  found  himself  unable  to  answer.  It  is  not  a  little  re 
markable,  that  the  doctrine  which  he  here  treats  with  so  great  contempt,  should,  with 
a  very  few  exceptions,  have  united  the  suffrages  of  all  the  soundest  philosophers  of  the 
eighteenth  ccnturv. 


r4|pGT.  II.j  OP    THE    HUMAN    MIND.  #7' 

From  what  has  been  now  said,  it  would  appear,  that,  in 
order  to  arrive  at  a  general  conclusion  in  mathematics,  (and 
the  same  observation  holds  with  respect  to  other  sciences,) 
-two  different  processes  of  reasoning  are  necessary.  The 
one  is  the  demonstration  of  the  proposition  in  question  ;  in 
studying  which  we  certainly  think  of  nothing  but  the  indi- 
vidual diagram  before  us.  The  other  is,  the  train  of  thought 
by  which  we  transfer  the  particular  conclusion  to  which  we 
have  been  thus  led,  to  any  other  diagram  to  which  the  same 
enunciation  is  equally  applicable.  As  this  last  train  of 
thought  is,  in  all  cases,  essentially  the  same,  we  insensibly 
cease  to  repeat  it  when  the  occasion  for  employing  it  occurs, 
till  we  come  at  length,  without  any  reflection,  to  generalize 
our  particular  conclusion,  the  moment  it  is  formed  ;  or,  in 
other  words,  to  consider  it  as  a  proposition  comprehending 
an  indefinite  variety  of  particular  truths.  When  this  habit  is 
established,  we  are  apt  to  imagine, — forgetting  the  slow 
steps  by  which  the  habit  was  acquired, — that  the  general 
conclusion  is  an  immediate  inference  from  a  general  demon- 
stration -,  and  that,  although  there  was  only  one  particular 
diagram  present  to  our  external  senses,  we  must  have  been 
aware,  at  every  step,  that  our  thoughts  were  really  conver- 
sant, not  about  this  diagram,  but  about  general  ideas,  or,  in 
Dr.  Reid's  language,  general  conceptions.  Hence  the  fami- 
liar use  among  logicians  of  these  scholastic  and  mysterious 
phrases,  which,  whatever  attempts  may  be  made  to  inter- 
pret them  in  a  manner  not  altogether  inconsistent  with  good 
jSense,  have  unquestionably  the  effect  of  keeping  out  of  view 
the  real  procedure  of  the  human  mind  in  the  generalization 
of  its  knowledge. 

Dr.  Reid  seems  to  be  of  opinion,  that  it  is  by  the  power 
of  forming  general  conceptions,  that  man  is  distinguished 
from  the  brutes  ;  for  he  observes,  that  "  Berkeley's  system 
"  goes  to  destroy  the  barrier  between  the  rational  and  ani- 
"  mal  natures."  I  must  own  I  do  not  perceive  the  justuess 
of  this  remark,  at  least  in  its  application  to  the  system  of  the 
nominalists,  as  I  have  endeavoured  to  explain  and  to  limit  it 


HH  ELEMENTS    OF    THE    PHILOSOPHY  [CHAP.  IL 

in  the  course  of  this  work.  On  the  contrary,  it  appears  to 
me,  that  the  account  which  has  been  just  given  of  general 
reasoning,  by  ascribing  to  a  process  of  logical  deduction 
(presupposing  the  previous  exercise  of  abstraction  or  analysis) 
what  Dr.  Reid  attempts  to  explain  by  the  scholastic,  and  not 
very  intelligible  phrase  of  general  conceptions,  places  thp  dis- 
tinction between  man  and  brutes  in  a  far  clearer  and  stronger 
light  than  that  in  which  philosophers  have  been  accustomed 
to  view  it.  That  it  is  to  the  exclusive  possession  of  the  fa- 
culty of  abstraction,  and  of  the  other  powers  subservient  to 
the  use  of  general  signs,  that  our  species  is  chiefly  indebted 
for  its  superiority  over  the  other  animals,  I  shall  afterwards 
endeavour  to  shew. 

I>  still  remains  for  me  to  examine  an  attempt  which  Dr. 
Reid  has  made,  to  convict  Berkeley  of  an  inconsistency,  in 
the  statement  of  his  argument  against  abstract  general  ideas. 
"  Let  us  now  consider,1'1  says  he,  "  the  Bishop's  notion  of 
"  generalizing.  An  idea  (he  tells  us)  which,  considered  in 
"  itself,  is  particular,  becomes  general,  by  being  made  to  re- 
"  present  or  stand  for  all  other  particular  ideas  of  the  same 
"  s^rt.  To  make  this  plain  by  an  example  :  Suppose  (says 
"  Berkeley)  a  geometrician  is  demonstrating  the  method  of 
"  cutting  a  line  into  two  equal  parts.  He  draws,  for'instance, 
"  a  black  line  of  an  inch  in  length.  This,  which  is  in  itself 
"  a  particular  line,  is  nevertheless,  with  rpgard  to  its  signifi- 
"  cation,  general,  since,  as  it  is  there  used,  it  represents  all 
"  particular  lines  whatsoever,  so  that  what  is  demonstrated  of 
"  it,  is  demonstrated  of  all  lines,  or,  in  other  words,  of  a  line 
'*  in  general.  And  as  that  particular  line  becomes  general 
"  by  being  made  a  sign,  so  the  name  line,  which,  taken  abso- 
(l  lutely,  is  particular,  by  being  a  sign,  is  made  general. 

"  Here,"  continues  Dr.  Reid,  "  I  observe,  that  wh^n  a 
"  particular  idea  is  made  a  sign  to  represent  and  stand  for 
H  all  of  a  sort,  this  supposes  a  distinction  of  things  into 
"  sorts  or  species.  To  be  of  a  sort,  implies  having  those 
"  attributes  which  characterize  the  sort,  and  are  common  to 
a  all  the  individuals  that  belong  to  it.     There  cannot  there- 


iiECT.  II.]  OF    THE    HUMAN    MIND.  89 

""  fore,  be  a  sort  without  general  attributes  ;  nor  can  there 
"  be  any  conception  of  a  sort  without  a  conception  of  those 
"  general  attributes  which  distinguish  it.  The  conception  of 
"  a  sort,  therefore,  is  an  abstract  general  conception. 

"  The  particular  idea  cannot  surely  be  made  a  sign  of  a 
"  thing  of  which  we  have  no  conception.  I  do  not  say,  that 
u  you  must  have  an  idea  of  the  sort ;  but  surely  you  ought  to 
"  understand  or  conceive  what  it  means  when  you  make  a 
"  particular  idea  a  representative  of  it  ;  otherwise  your  par- 
"  ticular  idea  represents  you  know  not  what."* 

Although  I  do  not  consider  myself  as  called  upon  to  de- 
fend all  the  expressions  which  Berkeley  may  have  employed; 
in  support  of  his  opinion  on  this  question,  1  must  take  the 
liberty  of  remarking,  that,  in  the  present  instance,  he  appears 
to  me  to  have  been  treated  with  an  undue  severity.  By  ideas 
of  the  same  sort,  it  is  plain  he  meant  nothing  more  than 
things  called  by  the  same  name,  and,  consequently,  (if  our  ib 
lustrations  are  to  be  borrowed  from  mathematics,)  compre- 
hended under  the  terms  of  the  same  definition.  In  such  cases, 
the  individuals  thus  classed  together,  are  completely  identic 
fed  as  subjects  of  reasoning  ;  insomuch,  that  what  is  proved 
with  respect  to  one  individual,  must  hold  equally  true  of  all 
the  others.  As  it  is  an  axiom  in  geometry,  that  things  which 
are  equal  to  one  and  the  same  thing,  are  equal  to  one  ano- 
ther ;  so  it  may  be  stated  as  a  maxim  in  logic,  that  whatever 
things  have  the  same  name  applied  to  them,  in  consequence 
of  their  being  comprehended  in  the  terms  of  the  same  defini- 
tion, may  all  be  considered  as  the  same  identical  subject,  in 
every  case  where  that  definition  is  the  principle  on  which 
our  reasoning  proceeds.  In  reasoning,  accordingly,  con- 
cerning any  sort  or  species  of  things,  our  thoughts  have 'no 
occasion  to  wander  from  the  individual  sign  or  representative 
to  which  the  attention  happens  to  be  directed,  or  to  attempt 
the  fruitless  task  of  grasping  at  those  specific  varieties  which 
are  avowedly  excluded  from  the  number  of  our  premises. 
As  every  conclusion  which  is  logically  deduced  from  the  de- 

*  PageV434,.485. 
VOL.  If.  l'i 


90  ELEMENTS    OP    THE   PHILOSOPHY         [CHAP    If. 

finition  must,  of  necessity,  hold  equally  true  of  all  the  indi- 
viduals to  which  the  common  name  is  applicable,  these  in- 
dividuals are  regarded  merely  as  so  many  units,  which  go  to 
the  composition  of  the  multitude  comprehended  under  the 
collective  or  generick  term.  Nor  has  the  power  of  concep- 
tion any  thing  more  to  do  in  the  business,  than  wnen  we 
think  of  the  units  expressed  by  a  particular  number  in  ai^ 
arithmetical  computation. 

The  word  sort  is  evidently  transferred  to  our  intellectual 
arrangements,  from  those  distributions  of  material  objects  in- 
to separate  heaps  or  collections,  which  the  common  sense  of 
mankind  universally  leads  them  to  make  for  the  sake  of  the 
memory  ;  or  (which  is  perhaps  nearly  the  same  thing)  with  a 
view  to  the  pleasure  arising  from  the  perception  of  order- 
A  familiar  instance  of  this  presents  itself  in  the  shelves,  and 
drawers,  and  parcels,  to  which  every  shop-keeper  has  re- 
course for  assorting,  according  to  their  respective  denomina- 
tions and  prices,  the  various  articles  which  compose  his  stock 
of  goods.  In  one  parcel  (for  example)  he  collects  and  in- 
closes under  one  common  envelope,  all  his  gloves  of  a  particu- 
lar size  and  quality  ;  in  another,  all  his  gloves  of  a  different 
size  and  quality ;  and,  in  like  manner,  he  proceeds  with  the 
stockings,  shoes,  hats,  and  the  various  other  commodities  with 
which  his  warehouse  is  filled.  By  this  means,  the  attention 
of  his  shop-boy,  instead  of  being  bewildered  among  an  infi- 
nitude of  particulars,  is  confined  to  parcels  or  assortments  of 
particulars  ;  of  each  of  which  parcels  a  distinct  idea  may  be 
obtained  from  an  examination  of  any  one  of  the  individuals 
contained  in  it.  These  individuals,  therefore,  are,  in  his  ap- 
prehension, nothing  more  than  so  many  units  in  a  multitude, 
any  one  of  which  units  is  perfectly  equivalent  to  any  other ; 
while,  at  the  same  time,  the  parcels  themselves,  notwithstand- 
ing the  multitude  of  units  of  which  they  are  made  up,  dis- 
tract his  attention,  and  burden  his  memory  as  little,  as  if 
they  were  individual  articles*  The  truth  is,  that  they  be- 
come to  his  mind  individual  objects  of  thought,  like  a  box  of 
counters,  or  rouleau  of  guineas,  or  any  of  the  other  material 


£ECY.  II.]  OP    THE    HUMAN    MIND.  91 

aggregates  with  which  his  senses  are  conversant ;  or,  to  take 
an  example  still  more  apposite  to  our  present  purpose,  like 
the  phrases  one  thousand,  or  one  million,  when  considered 
merely  as  simple  units  entering  into  the  composition  of  a  nu- 
merical sum. 

The  task  which  I  have  here  supposed  the  tradesman  to 
perform,  in  order  to  facilitate  the  work  of  his  shop-boy,  is 
exactly  analogous,  in  its  effect,  to  the  aid  which  is  furnished 
to  the  infant  understanding  by  the  structure  of  its  mother- 
tongue ;  the  generic  words  which  abound  in  language  as- 
sorting, and  (if  I  may  use  the  expression)  packing  up,  under 
a  comparatively  small  number  of  comprehensive  terms,  the 
multifarious  objects  of  human  knowledge.*     In  consequence 
of  the  generic  terms  to  which,  in  civilized  society,  the  mind 
is  early  familiarized,  the  vast  multiplicity  of  things  which 
compose  the  furniture  of  this  globe  are  presented  to  it,  not 
as  they  occur  to  the  senses  of  the  untaught  savage,  but  as 
they  have  been  arranged  and  distributed  into  parcels  or  as- 
sortments by  the  successive  observations  and  reflections  of 
our  predecessors.     Were  these  arrangements  and  distribu- 
tions agreeable,  in  every  instance,  to  sound  philosophy,  the 
chief  source  of  the  errors  to  which  we  are  liable  in  all  our 
general  conclusions  would  be  removed :  but  it  would  be  too 
much  to  expect  (with  some  late  theorists)  that,  even  in  the 
most  advanced  state,  either  of  physical  or  of  moral  science, 
this  supposition  is  ever  to  be  realized  in  all  its  extent.     At 
the  same  time,  it  must  be  remembered,  that  the  obvious  ten- 
dency of  the  progressive  reason  and  experience  of  the  spe- 
cies, is  to  diminish,  more  and  more,  the  imperfections  of  the 
classifications  which  have  been  transmitted   from  ages  of 
comparative  ignorance ;  and,  of  consequence,  to  render  lan- 
guage more  and  more,  a  safe  and  powerful  organ  for  the  in- 
vestigation of  truth. 

The  only  science  which  furnishes  an  exception  to  these 
©bservations  is  mathematics ;  a  science  essentially  distin- 

*  The  same  analogy  had  occurred  to  Locke.    "  To  shorten  its  way  to  knowledge, 
!;  and  make  each  perception  more  comprehensive,  the  mind  binds  them  in(o  bundles." 


92  ELEMENTS  OF  THE  PHILOSOPHY  [CHAP.  II. 

goished  from  every  other  by  this  remarkable  circumstance, 
that  the  precise  import  of  its  generic  terms  is  fixed  and  as- 
certained by  the  definitions  which  form  the  basis  of  all  our 
reasonings,  and  in  which,  of  consequence,  the  very  possibili- 
ty of  error  in  our  classifications  is  precluded,  by  the  virtual 
identity  of  all  those  hypothetical  objects  of  thought  to  which 
the  same  generic  term  is  applied. 

I  intend  to  prosecute  this  subject  farther,  before  conclu- 
ding my  observations  on  general  reasoning.  At  present,  I 
have  only  to  add  to  the  foregoing  remarks,  that,  in  the  com- 
prehensive theorems  of  the  philosopher,  as  well  as  in  the  as- 
sortments of  the  tradesman,  I  cannot  perceive  a  single  step 
of  the  understanding,  which  implies  any  thing  more  than  the 
notion  of  number,  and  the  use  of  a  common  name. 

Upon  the  whole,  tt  appears  to  me,  that  the  celebrated  dis- 
pute concerning  abstract  general  ideas,  which  so  long  divid- 
ed the  schools,  is  now  reduced,  among  correct  thinkers,  to 
this  simple  question  of  fact,  Could  the  human  mind,  without 
the  use  of  signs  of  one  kind  or  another,  have  carried  on  gene- 
ral reasonings,  or  formed  general  conclusions  ?  Before  argu- 
ing with  any  person  on  the  subject,  I  should  wish  for  a  cate- 
gorical explanation  on  this  preliminary  point.  Indeed,  eve- 
ry other  controversy  connected  with  it  turns  on  little  more 
than  the  meaning  of  words, 

A  difference  of  opinion  with  respect  to  this  question  of  fact 
(or  rather,  I  suspect,  a  want  oi  attention  in  some  of  the  dis- 
putants to  the  great  variety  of  signs  of  which  the  mind  can 
avail  itself,  independently  of  words)  still  continues  to  keep 
up  a  sort  of  distinction  between  the  Nominalists  and  the  Con- 
ceptualists.  As  for  the  Realists,  they  may,  I  apprehend,  be 
fairly  considered,  in  the  present  state  of  science,  as  having 
been  already  forced  to  lay  down  their  arms. 

That  the  doctrine  of  the  nominalists  has  been  stated  by 
some  writers  of  note  in  very  unguarded  terms,  I  do  not  deny,* 

f  Particularly  by  Hobbes,  some  of  whose  incidental  remarks  and  expressions 
would  certainly,  if  followed  strictly  out  to  their  logical  consequences,  lead  to  the  com- 
rttetr;  subversion  of  truth,  as  a  thing  real,  and  independent  of  human  opinion,     It  is, 


SECT.  II.]  OF    THE    HUMAN    MIND,  93 

nor  am  I  certain  that  it  was  ever  delivered  by  any  one  of  the 
schoolmen  in  a  form  completely  unexceptionable  ;  but  after 
the  luminous,  and,  at  the  same  time,  cautious  manner  in  which 
it  has  been  unfolded  by  Berkeley  and  his  successors,  I  own  it 
appears  to  me  not  a  little  surprising  that  men  of  talents  and 
candour  should  still  be  found  inclined  to  shut  their  eyes 
against  the  light,  and  to  shelter  themselves  in  the  darkness  of 
the  middle  ages.  For  my  own  part,  the  longer  and  the  more 
attentively  that  I  reflect  on  the  subject,  the  more  am  I  dispos- 
ed to  acquiesce  in  the  eulogium  bestowed  on  Roscellinus  and 
his  followers  by  Leibnitz  ;  one  of  the  very  few  philosophers, 
if  not  the  only  philosopher,  of  great  celebrity,  who  seems  to 
have  been  fully  aware  of  the  singular  merits  of  those  by 
whom  this  theory  was  originally  proposed  :  "  secta  nomina- 

"  LIUM,  OMNIUM  INTER  SCHOLASTICAS  PROFUNDISS1MA,  ET 
"  HODIERN.E   REFORMATS  PH1LOSOPHANDI  RATIONI  CONGRUEN- 

"  tissima."  It  is  a  theory,  indeed,  much  more  congenial  to 
the  spirit  of  the  eighteenth  than  of  the  eleventh  century ;  nor 

to  this,  I  presume,  th  it  Leibnitz  alludes,  when  he  says  of  him,  "  Thomas  Holies, 
"  qui  ut  verumfatear,  mihiplus  quam  nominalis  videtur." 

I  shall  afterwards  point  out  the  mistake  by  which  Hobbes,  seems  to  me  to  have 
iieen  misled.  In  the  mean  time,  it  is  but  justice  to  him  to  say,  that  I  do  not  think  he 
had  any  intention  to  establish  those  sceptical  conclusions  which,  it  must  he  owned, 
may  be  fairly  deduced  as  corollaries  from  some  of  his  principles.  Of  this  I  would  not 
wish  for  a  stronger  proof  than  his  favourite  maxim,  that  "  words  are  the  counters  of 
"  wise  men,  but  the  money  of  fools;"  a  sentence  which  expresses,  with  marvellous 
conciseness,  not  only  the  proper  function  of  language,  as  an  instrument  of  reasoning, 
but  the  abuses  to  which  it  is  liable,  when  in  unskilful  hands. 

Dr.  Gillies,  who  has  taken  much  pains  to  establish  Aristotle's  claims  to  all  that  is 
valuable  in  the  doctrine  of  the  nominalists,  has,  at  the  same  time,  represented  him  as 
the  only  favourer  of  this  opinion,  by  whom  it  has  been  taught  without  any  admixture 
of  those  errors  which  are  blended  with  it  in  the  works  of  its  modern  revivers.  Even 
Bishop  Berkeley  himself  is  involved  with  Hobbes  and  Hume  in  the  same  sweeping 
sentence  of  condemnation.  "  The  language  of  the  nominalists  seems  to  have  been 
:'  extremely  liable  to  be  perverted  to  the  purposes  of  scepticism,  as  taking  away  the 
«  specific  distinctions  of  things;  and  is  in  fac»  thus  perverted  by  Hobbes.  Berkeley, 
■'  Hume,  and  their  innumerable  followers.  But  Aristotle's  language  is  not  liable  to 
'"  this  abuse."—  Gillies's  Aristotle,  Vol.  I.  p.  71,  2d.  ed. 

Among  these  sccp'ical  followers  of  Berkeley,  we  must,  I  presume,  include  the  late 
learned  and  ingenious  Dr.  Campbell :  whose  remarks  on  this  subject  I  will,  neverthe- 
less, venture  to  recommend  to  the  particular  attention  of  my  readers.  Indeed.  I  do 
not  know  of  any  writer  who  has  treated  it  with  mme  aenteness  and  perspicuity.  (See 
Philosophy  o/Rhetorir,  Book  It  chap.  »-ji.) 


94 


ELEMENTS    OP    THE    PHILOSOPHY  [CHAP.  II. 


must  it  be  forgotten,  that  it  was  proposed  and  maintained  at 
a  period  when  the  algebraical  art  (or  to  express  myself  more 
precisely  universal  arithmetic)  from  which  we  now  borrow 
our  best  illustrations  in  explaining  and  defending  it,  was  en- 
tirely unknown. 


11. 

Continuation  of  the  Subject.-^Of  Language  considered  as  an  Instrument  of'Thought, 

Having  been  led,  in  defence  of  some  of  my  own  opinions,  to 
introduce  a  few  additional  remarks  on  the  controversy  with 
respect  to  the  theory  of  general  reasoning,  I  shall  avail  my- 
self of  this  opportunity  to  illustrate  a  little  farther  another 
topic,  (intimately  connected  with  the  foregoing  argument,) 
on  which  the  current  doctrines  of  modern  logicians  seem  to 
require  a  good  deal  more  of  explanation  and  restriction 
than  has  been  commonly  apprehended.  Upon  this  subject 
I  enter  the  more  willingly,  that,  in  my  first  volume,  I  have 
alluded  to  these  doctrines  in  a  manner  which  may  convey, 
to  some  of  my  readers,  the  idea  of  a  more  complete  acqui- 
escence, on  my  part,  in  their  truth,  than  I  am  disposed  to 
acknowledge. 

In  treating  of  abstraction,  I  endeavoured  to  shew  that  we 
think,  as  well  as  speak,  b}7  means  of  words,  and  that,  without 
the  use  of  language,  our  reasoning  faculty  (if  it  could  have 
been  at  all  exercised)  must  necessarily  have  been  limited  to 
particular  conclusions  alone.  The  effects,  therefore,  of 
ambiguous  and  indefinite  terms  are  not  confined  to  our  com- 
munications with  others,  but  extend  to  our  private  and  soli- 
tary speculations.  Dr.  Campbell,  in  his  Philosophy  of  Rhe- 
toric, has  made  some  judicious  and  important  observations 
on  this  subject ;  and,  at  a  much  earlier  period,  it  drew  the 
attention  of  Des  Cartes  ;  who,  in  the  course  of  a  very  valu- 
able discussion  with  respect  to  the  sources  of  our  errors,  has 
laid  particular    stress  on  those  to  which   we   are  exposed 


SECT.  II.}  OF    THE   HUMAN   MINP«  $5 

from  the  employment  of  language  as  an  instrument  of  thought. 
"  And,  lastly,  in  consequence  of  the  habitual  use  of  speech, 
"  all  our  ideas  become  associated  with  the  words  in  which 
"  we  expres  them  ;  nor  do  we  ever  commit  these  ideas  to  me- 
"  mory,  without  their  accustomed  signs.  Hence  it  is,  that 
"  there  is  hardly  any  one  subject,  of  which  we  have  so  distinct 
"  a  notion  as  to  be  able  (o  think  of  it  abstracted  from  all  use 
V"  of  language  ;  and,  indeed,  as  we  remember  words  more  easi- 
"  ly  than  things,  our  thoughts  are  much  more  conversant 
"  with  the  former  than  with  the  latter.  Hence,  too,  it  is, 
"  that  we  often  yield  our  assent  to  propositions,  the  mean- 
"  ing  of  which  we  do  not  understand  ;  imagining  that  we 
"  have  either  examined  formerly  the  import  of  all  the  terms 
46  involved  in  them,  or  that  we  have  adopted  these  terms  on 
"  the  authority  of  others  upon  whose  judgment  we  can 
"  rely."* 

*  •'  Et  denique,  propter  loquela?  usum,  coriceptos  omnes  nostros  verbis,  quibus  eos 
■'  exprimimns,  alligamus,  nee  eos,  nisi  simul  cum  istis  verbis,  memorise  mandamus. 
"  Cumque  facilius  postea  verborum  quam  rerum  recordemur,  vix  unquam  ullius  rei 
u  coneeptum  habemus  tarn  distinctum,  ut  ilium  ab  omni  verborum  conceptu  separc- 
l\  mus  ;  cogitationesque  horninum  fere  omnium,  circa  verba  magis  quam  circa  res 
11  versantur  ;  adeo  ut  persa?pe  vocibusnon  inlellectis  praebeant  assensum,  quia  putant 
if  se  iilos  olim  intellexisse,  vel  ab  aliis  qui  eas  recte  iatelligebant,  aecepisse." — Princ 
Phil  Pars  Prima,  lxxiv. 

I  have  quoted  a  very  curious  passage  nearly  to  the  same  purpose,  from  Leibnitz,  in 
a  n(5te  annexed  to  my  first  volume  (see  note  L.)  1  was  not  then-  aware  of  the  previous 
attention  which  had  been  given  to  this  source  of  error  by  Des  Cartes  ;  nor  did  I  ex- 
pect to  find  so  explicit  an  allusion  to  it  in  the  writings  of  Aristotle,  aJ  I  have  since  ob- 
served in  the  following  paragraph  : 

A/o  Kai  Tftiv  iretpct  rajv  Aef  <v  ovrog  i  rpoiros  6sreo$'  Trparov 
fit,ev,  ort  jK,«*AAev  8j  ctTrctrti  yiverctt  fier*  aXXeai  o-x,o7r6V(x,evot$  n 
kx6  tetvTovf  »  pel  ya.%  per*  ttXXuv  a-KB^/ti  Stat  Xoyy  t>  S'e  tcctd' 
<*VTov$,  %%  jjt7ov  Pi  xvry  m  Trgxy/axros'  eirx,  xxt  x.x6'  uvrovs 
XTrxrxtrOxt  trv/u/iccivei,  orxv  stti  m  Myy  7tohjtxi  tjjv  <rx,e-$/iv 
er*,  r>  f*,ev  xVxtvi  ex.  tjjs  opt  toreros'  y  S'e  o^.o/otjj;,  s  x,  t*h  Aef  £#{. 
De  Sophist  Eknchis,  Lib.  I.  cap.  7. 

"  Quocirea  inter  eos  (Paralogismos)  qui  in  dictione  consistunt,.  hie  falJendi  modus 
'•  est  ponendus.  Primum,  quia  magis  decipimur  considerantes  cum  aliis,  quam  aprt.d 
"  nosmetipsos:  nam  consideratio  cum  aliis  per  sermonem  instifuitur  ;  apud  nosmetip- 
"  sos  autem  non  minus  fit  |^er  rem  ipsam.  Deinde  et  per  nosmetipsos  at  fallamur 
"  aecidit,  cum  in  rebus  considerandis  sermo  adhibctur :  Pra-terea  deceptio  est  er 
'eimilitudine  ;  similLtudo  aufem  p.k  dictione. "—Edit.  Jin  VnL  Vol  I.  p.  2S9. 


$6  Elements  of  the  philosophy      [chap.  h. 

To  these  important  considerations,  it  may  be  worth  white 
to  add,  that  whatever  improvements  may  yet  be  made  in 
language,  by  philosophers,  they  never  can  relieve  the  stu- 
dent from  the  indispensable  task  of  analyzing,  with  accuracy, 
the  complex  ideas  he  annexes  to  the  terms  employed  in  his 
reasonings.  The  use  of  general  terms,  as  Locke  has  remark- 
ed, is  learned,  in  many  cases,  before  it  is  possible  for  us  to 
comprehend  their  meaning  ;  and  the  greater  part  of  man- 
kind continue  to  use  them  through  life,  without  ever  being 
at  the  trouble  to  examine  accurately  the  notions  they  con- 
vey. This  is  a  study  which  every  individual  must  carry  on 
for  himself;  and  of  which  no  rules  of  logic  (how  useful  so- 
ever they  may  be  in  directing  our  labours)  can  supersede 
the  necessity. 

Of  the  essential  utility  of  a  cautious  employment  of  words, 
both  as  a  medium  of  communication  and  as  an  instrument  of 
thought,  many  striking  illustrations  might  be  produced  from 
the  history  of  science  during  the  time  that  the  scholastic  jar- 
gon was  current  among  the  learned  ;  a  technical  phraseolo- 
gy, which  was  not  only  ill-calculated  for  the  discovery  of 
truth,  but  which  was  dexterously  contrived  for  the  propaga- 
tion of  error  ;  and  which  gave  to  those  who  were  habitua- 
ted to  the  use  of  it,  great  advantages  in  controversy  (at  least 

Lest  it  should  be  concluded,  however,  from  this  detached  remark,  that  Aristotle 
had  completely,  anticipated  Locke  and  Condillac  in  their  speculations  with  respect  to 
language,  considered  as  an  msti  iiment  of  thought,  I  must  beg  of  my  readers  to  com- 
pare it  with  the  previous  enumeration  given  by  the  same  author,  of  those  paralogisms 
or  fallacies  which  lie  in  the  diction,  ( De  Sopliist.  Elenchis,  Lib  I.  cap.  4.) — iecom- 
mending  to  them,  at  the  same  time,  as  a  useful  comment  on  the  original,  the  twen- 
tieth chapter  of  the  third  book  of  a  work  entitled  Institulio  Logica,  by  the  learned 
and  justly  celebrated  Dr  Wallis  of  Oxford.  I  select  this  work  in  preference  to  any 
other  modern  one  on  the  same  subject,  as  it  has  been  lately  pronounced,  b)f  an  au- 
thority for  which  I  entertain  a  sincere  respect,  to  be  "  a  complete  and  accurate  trea 
"  tise  of  logic,  strictly  according  to  the  Aristotelian  method  ;"  and  as  we  are  farther 
told,  that  it  is  "  still  used  by  many  in  the  university  to  which  Wallis  belonged,  as 
"  the  lecture-book  in  that  department  of  study."  I  intend  to  quote  part  of  this  chap- 
ter on  another  occasion.  At  present  I  shall  only  observe,  that  it  does  not  contain  the 
slightest  reference  to  the  passage  which  has  led  me  to  introduce  these  observations  ; 
and  which,  1  believe,  will  be  now  very  generally  allowed  to  be  of  greater  value  than 
all  those  puerile  distinctions  put  together,  which  Dr.  Wallis  has  been  at  so  much 
pains  ic  illustrate  and  to  exemplify. 


SECT.    II.]  OF    THE    HUMAN    MIND.  97 

in  the  judgment  of  the  multitude)  over  their  more  enlighten- 
ed and  candid  opponents.  "  A  blind  wrestler,  by  fighting 
"  in  a  dark  chamber,"  to  adopt  an  allusion  of  Des  Cartes, 
"  may  not  only  conceal  his  defect,  but  may  enjoy  some  ad- 
"  vantages  over  those  who  see.  It  is  the  light  of  day  only 
"  that  can  discover  his  inferiority."  The  imperfections  of 
this  philosophy,  accordingly,  have  been  exposed  by  Des 
Cartes  and  his  followers,  less  by  the  force  of  their  reason- 
ings, than  by  their  teaching  men  to  make  use  of  their  own, 
faculties,  instead  of  groping  in  the  artificial  darkness  of  the 
schools  ;  and  to  perceive  the  folly  of  expecting  to  advance 
science  by  ringing  changes  on  words  to  which  they  annex- 
ed no  clear  or  precise  ideas. 

In  consequence  of  the  influence  of  these  views,  the  atten- 
tion of  our  soundest  philosophers  was  more  and  more  turned, 
during  the  course  of  the  last  century,  to  the  cultivation  of 
that  branch  of  logic  which  relates  to  the  use  of  words.  Mr. 
Lo  ke's  observations  on  this  subject  form,  perhaps,  the  most 
valuable  part  of  his  writings  ;  and,  since  his  time,  much  ad- 
ditional light  has  been  thrown  upon  it  by  Condillac  and  his 
successors. 

Important,  however,  as  this  branch  of  logic  is  in  its  prac- 
tical applications  ;  and  highly  interesting,  from  its  intimate 
connection  with  the  theory  of  the  human  mind,  there  is  a  pos- 
sibility of  pushing,  to  an  erroneous  and  dangerous  extreme, 
the  conclusions  to  which  it  has  led.  Condillac  himself  falls, 
in  no  inconsiderable  a  degree,  under  this  censure  ;  having 
upon  more  than  one  occasion,  expressed  himself  as  if  he  con- 
ceived it  to  be  possible,  by  means  of  precise  and  definite 
terms,  to  reduce  reasoning,  in  all  the  sciences,  to  a  sort  of 
mechanical  operation,  analogous,  in  its  nature,  to  those 
which  are  practised  by  the  algebraist,  on  letters  of  the 
alphabet.  "  The  art  of  reasoning  (he  repeats  over  and  over) 
"  is  nothing  more  than  a  language  well  arranged." — "  L'art 
"  dc  raisonner  se  reduit  u  une  langue  bien  faite." 

One  of  the  first  persons,  as  far  as  I  know,  who  objected  to 
the  vagueness  and  incorrectness  of  this  proposition,  was  M 
voir,   ti.  13 


98  ELEMENTS    OP    THfi   PHILOSOPHY         [CHAP.  If. 

De  Gerando  ;  to  whom  we  are  farther  indebted  for  a  clear 
and  satisfactory  exposition  of  the  very  important  fact  to 
which  it  relates.  To  this  fact  Condillac  approximates  nearly 
in  various  parts  of  his  works  ;  but  never,  perhaps,  without 
some  degree  of  indistinctness  and  of  exaggeration.  The 
point  of  view  in  which  it  is  placed  by  his  ingenious  succes- 
sor, strikes  me  as  so  just  and  happy,  that  I  cannot  deny 
myself  the  pleasure  of  enriching  my  book  with  a  few  of  his 
observations. 

"  It  is  the  distinguishing  characteristic  of  a  lively  and  vigo- 
"  rous  conception,  to  push  its  speculative  conclusions  some- 
**  what  beyond  their  just  limits.  Hence,  in  the  logical  discus- 
"  sions  of  this  estimable  writer,  these  maxims  (stated  without 
"  any  explanation,  or  restriction,)  '  That  the  study  of  a  sci- 
t(  ence  is  nothing  more  than  the  acquisition  of  a  language  ;'  and 
"  '  that  a  science  properly  treated  is  only  a  language  well  con- 
"  trivedS  Hence  the  rash  assertion,  '  That  mathematics  pos- 
c>  sess  no  advantage  over  other  sciences,  but  what  they  derive 
"  from  a  better  phraseology  ;  and  that  all  of  these  might  at- 
"  tain  to  the  same  characters  of  simplicity  and  of  certainty, 
u  if  we  knezo  how  to  give  them  signs  equally  perfect.'  "* 

"  The  same  task  which  must  have  been  executed  by  those 
"  who  contributed  to  the  first  formation  of  a  language,  and 
"  which  is  executed  by  every  child  when  he  learns  to  speak 
"  it,  is  repeated  over  in  the  mind  of  every  adult  when  he 
"  makes  use  of  his  mother-tongue  ;  for  it  is  only  by  the  de- 
"  composition  of  his  thoughts  that  he  can  learn  to  select  the 
"  signs  which  he  ought  to  employ,  and  to  dispose  ihem  in  a 
"  suitable  order.  Accordingly,  those  external  actions  which 
"  we  call  speaking  or  writing,  are  always  accompanied  with 
"  a  philosophical  process  of  the  understanding,  unless  we 
"  content  ourselves,  as  too  often  happens,  with  repeating  over 
"  mechanically  what  has  been  said  by  others.  It  is  in  this 
u  respect  that  languages,  with^their  forms  and  rules,  conduct- 
"  ing  (so  to  speak)  those  who  use  them,  into  the  path  of  a 

s  Des  Signes  et  del'Arl  <3e  Penser,  &c.  Introd  pp.  xx.  xxi. 


SECT.  H.]  OF    THE    HUMAN    MIND.  99 

"  regular  analysis ;  tracing  out  to  them,  in  a  well-ordered 
"  discourse,  the  model  of  a  perfect  decomposition,  may  be 
"  regarded,  in  a  certain  sense,  as  analytical  methods — But  I 
"  stop  short  ;  Condillac,  to  whom  this  idea  belongs,  has  de- 
"  veloped  it  too  well  to  leave  any  hope  of  improving  upon 
"  his  statement.1' 

In  a  note  upon  this  passage,  however,  M.  De  Grranda 
has  certainly  improved  not  a  little  on  the  statement  of  Con- 
dillac. *'  In  asserting  (says  he)  that  languages  may  be  re- 
'*  garded  as  analytical  methods,  I  have  added  the  qualifying 
"  phrase,  in  a  certain  sense,  for  the  word  method  cannot  be 
11  employed  here  with  exact  propriety.  Languages  furnish 
**  the  occasions  and  the  means  of  analysis  ;  that  is  to  say, 
"  they  afford  us  assistance  in  following  that  method  ;  but 
u  they  are  not  the  method  itself.  They  resemble  signals  or 
*'  finger-posts  placed  on  a  road  to  enable  us  to  discover  our 
"  way  ;  and  if  they  help  us  to  analyze,  it  is  because  they  are 
"  themselves  the  results,  and  as  it  were,  the  monuments  of 
"  an  analysis  which  has  been  previously  made;  nor  do  they 
"  contribute  to  keep  us  in  the  right  path,  but  in  proportion 
"  to  the  degree  of  judgment  with  which  that  analysis  has 
"  been  conducted."* 

I  was  the  more  solicitous  to  introduce  these  excellent  re- 
marks, as  I  suspect  that  I  have  myself  indirectly  contributed 
to  propagate  in  this  country  the  erroneous  opinion  which  it  is 
their  object  to  correct.  By  some  of  our  later  writers  it  has 
not  only  been  implicitly  adopted,  but  has  been  regarded  as 
a  conclusion  of  too  great  value  to  be  suffered  to  remain  in 
the  quiet  possession  of  the  moderns.  "  Aristotle,"  says  the 
author  of  a  very  valuable  analysis  of  his  works  "  well  knew 
n  that  our  knowledge  of  things  chiefly  depending  on  the  pro- 
"  per  application  of  language  as  an  instrument  of  thought, 
:"  the  true  art  of  reasoning  is  nothing  but  a  language  ac- 
*£  curately  defined  and  skilfully  arranged  ;  an  opinion  which, 
u  after  many  idle  declamations  against  his  barren  general- 

'  Des  Signes  et  de  l'Art  de  Penw.  Sw\  pn.  158}  15J);  Tom.  I 


100  ELEMENTS    OP    THE    PHILOSOPHY         [CHAP.    H. 

"  ities  and   verbal    trifling,  philosophers  have  begun  very 
"  generally  to  adopt."* 

After  this  strong  and  explicit  assertion  of  the  priority  of 
Aristotle's  claim  to  the  opinion  which  we  are  here  told 
"  philosophers  begin  very  generally  to  adopt,"  it  is  to  be  ho- 
ped, that  M.  De  Gerando  will  be  in  future  allowed  to  enjoy 
the  undisputed  honour  of  having  seen  a  little  farther  into  this 
fundamental  article  of  logic  than  the  Stagirite  himself. 

*  Aristotle's  Ethics,  fee.  by  Dr.  Gillies,  Vol.  I.  p.  94,  2d.  edit. 

The  passage  in  my  first  volume,  to  which  I  suspect  an  allusion  is  here  made,  is  as 
follows  : 

"  The  technical  terms,  in  the  different  sciences,  render  the  appropriate  language 
"  of  philosophy  a  still  more  convenient  instkument  of  thought,  than  those  lan- 
H  guages  which  have  originated  from  popular  use  ;  and  in  proportion  as  these  tech- 
"  nical  terms  improve  in  point  of  precision  and  of  comprehensiveness,  they  will 
"  contribute  to  render  our  intellectual  progress  more  certain  and  more  rapid. 
"  l  While  engaged,'  says  Mr.  Lavoisier  '  in  the  composition  of  my  Elements  of  Che- 
"  mistr}',  I  perceived,  better  than  1  had  ever  done  before,  the  truth  of  an  observation 
u  of  Condillac,  that  we  think  only  through  the  medium  of  words,  and  that  languages 
"  are  true  analytic  methods.  Algebra,  which,  of  all  our  modes  of  expression,  is  the 
"most  simple,  the  most  exact,  and  the  best  adapted  to  its  purpose,  is,  at  the  same 
"time,  a  language  and  an  analytical  method.  The  art  of  reasoning  is  nothing  more 
11  than  a  language  well  arranged .'  The  influence  (1  have  added)  which  these  very 
"  enlightened  and  philosophical  views  have  already  had  on  the  doctrines  of  chemis- 
u.  try,  cannot  fail  to  be  known  to  most  of  my  readers." 

When  this  paragraph  was  first  written,  I  was  fully  aware  of  the  looseness  and  in- 
distinctness of  Lavoisier's  expressions  ;  but  as  my  only  object  in  introducing  the  quo- 
tation was  to  illustrate  the  influence  of  general  logical  principles  on  the  progress  of 
particular  sciences,  I  did  not  think  it  necessary,  in  the  introduction  to  my  work,  to 
point  out  in  what  manner  Condillac's  propositions  were  to  be  limited  and  corrected. 
I  am  truly  happy,  for  the  sake  of  M.  l)e  Gerando,  that  t  happened  to  transcribe 
them  in  the  same  vague  and  very  exceptionable  terms  in  which  I  found  them  sanc- 
tioned by  the  names  of  Condillac,  and  of  one  of  the  most  illustrious  of  his  disciples. 

It  will  not,  I  hope,  be  considered  as  altogether  foreign  to  the  design  of  this  note,  if 
I  remark  further,  how  easy  it  is  for  a  translator  of  Aristotle  (in  consequence  of  the 
unparalleled  brevity  which  he  sometimes  affects)  to  accommodate  the  sense  of  the 
original,  by  the  help  of  paraphrastical  clauses,  expressed  in  the  phraseology  of  mo- 
dern science,  to  every  progressive  step  in  the  history  of  human  knowledge.  In  truth, 
there  is  not  one  philosopher  of  antiquity,  whose  opinions,  when  they  are  stated  in 
any  terms  but  his  own,  are  to  be  received  with  so  great  distrust. 

The  unsoundness  of  Condillac's  assertion,  that  the  art  of  reasoning  is  nothing  mort 
than  *  language  well  arranged,  was,  I  believe,  first  pointed  out  by  M.  Prevost. — 
See  some  acute  and  decisive  objections  to  this  proposition  in  his  Treatise  JJes  Signer 
&c.  Paris,  An.  VfH.  p.  20. 


3ECT.II.]  op  the  human  mind.  101 


III 

Continuation  of  the  Subject. — Visionary  Theories  of  some  Logicians,  occasioned  by 
their  inattention  to  the  Essential  Distinction  between  Mathematics  and  other  Sci- 


In  a  passage  already  quoted  from  De  Gerando,  he  takes 
notice  of  what  he  justly  calls  a  rash  assertion  of  Comlillac, 
"  that  mathematics  possess  no  advantage  over  other  sciences, 
"  but  what  they  derive  from  a  better  phraseology  ;  and  that 
"  all  of  them  might  attain  to  the  same  characters  of  simpli- 
"  city  and  of  certainty,  if  we  knew  how  to  give  them  signs 
"  equally  perfect." 

Leibnitz  seems  to  point  at  an  idea  of  the  same  sort,  in 
those  obscure  and  enigmatical  hints  (not  altogether  worthy, 
in  my  opinion,  of  his  powerful  and  comprehensive  genius) 
which  he  has  repeatedly  thrown  out,  about  the  miracles  to  be 
effected  by  a  new  art  of  his  own  invention  ;  to  which  art  he 
sometimes  gives  the  name  of  Ars  Combinatoria  Characteris- 
tica,  and  sometimes  of  Ars  Combinatoria  Generalis  ac  Vera, 
In  one  of  his  letters  to  Mr.  Oldenburg,  he  speaks  of  a  plan 
he  had  long-  been  meditating,  of  treating  of  the  science  of 
mind  by  means  of  mathematical  demonstrations.  '*  Many 
"  wonderful  things,"  he  adds,  "  of  this  kind  have  occurred  to 
"  me ;  which,  at  some  future  period,  I  shall  explain  to  the 
"  public  with  that  logical  precision  which  the  subject  re- 
"  quires."*  In  the  same  letter,  he  intimates  his  belief  in  the 
possibility  of  inventing  an  art,  ';  which,  with  an  exactitude 
"  resembling  that  of  mechanism,  may  render  the  operations 
"  of  reason  steady  and  visible,  and,  in  their  effects  on  the 
"  minds  of  others,  irresistible."!  After  which  he  proceeds 
thus  : 

"  Our  common  algebra,  which  we  justly  value  so  highly,  is 
"  no  more  than  a  branch  of  that  general  art  which  I  have 

*  Multa  in  hoc  genere  mira  i  me  sunt  observata,  quae  aliquando,  quo  par  est  rigore, 
expositadabo." 

t  "Quod  velut  mechanics  ralione  fixam  et  visibilein  et  (ul  ita  dicam)  irresistibiienn 
•'  reddat  rationem." 


102  ELEMENTS    OP   Tift:    PHILOSOPHY  [CHAP  II? 

"  here  in  view.  Bat,  such  as  it  is,  it  puts  it  out  of  our  power 
"  to  commit  an  error,  even  although  we  should  wish  to  do 
"  so  ;  while  it  exhibits  truth  to  our  eyes  like  a  picture  stamp- 
"  ed  on  paper  by  means  of  a  machine.  It  must  at  the  same 
"  time  be  recollected,  that  algebra  is  indebted  for  whatever 
"  it  accomplishes  in  the  demonstration  of  general  theorems 
"  to  the  suggestions  of  a  higher  science  ;  a  science  which  I 
"  have  been  accustomed  to  call  characleristical  combination  ; 
"  very  different,  however,  in  its  nature,  from  that  which  these 
"  words  are  likely,  at  first,  to  suggest  to  the  hearer.  The 
"  marvellous  utility  of  this  art  I  hope  to  illustrate,  both  by 
"  precepts  and  examples,  if  I  shall  be  so  fortunate  as  to  en- 
"  joy  health  and  leisure. 

"  It  is  impossible  for  me  to  convey  an  adequate  idea  of  it 
"  in  a  short  description.  But  this  I  may  venture  to  assert, 
"  that  no  instrument  (or  organ)  could  easily  be  imagined  of 
"  more  powerful  efficacy  for  promoting  the  improvement 
"  of  the  human  understanding  ;  and  that,  supposing  it  to  be 
"  adopted,  as  the  common  method  of  philosophizing,  the 
"  time  would  very  soon  arrive,  when  we  should  be  able  to 
"  form  conclusions  concerning  God  and  the  Mind,  with  not 
"  less  certainty  than  we  do  at  present  concerning  figure§ 
':  and  numbers."* 

The  following  passage  is  translated  from  another  letter  of 
Leibnitz  to  the  same  correspondent : 

"  The  matter  in  question  depends  on  another  of  much 
"  higher  moment ;  I  mean,  on  a  general  and  true  art  of  com- 
"  bination,  of  the  extensive  influence  of  which  I  do  not  know 
"  that  any  person  has  yet  been  fully  aware.  This,  in  truth, 
"  does  not  differ  from  that  sublime  analysis,  into  the  recesses 
"  of  which  Des  Cartes  himself,  as  far  as  I  can  judge,  was  not 
"  able  to  penetrate.  But,  in  order  to  carry  it  into  execution, 
"  an  alphabet  of  human  thoughts  must  be  previously  formed  ; 
"  and  for  the  invention  of  this  alphabet,  an  analysis  of  axioms 
"  is  indispensably  necessary.  I  am  not,  however,  surprised, 
"  that  nobody  has  yet  sufficiently  considered  it ;  for  we  are. 

*  VVallisii  Opera,  Vol,  III.  p.  621- 


SECT.  II-3  ©F   THE   HtfMAN    MltfD.  103 

*  in  general,  apt  to  neglect  what  is  easy  ;  and  to  take  many 
"  things  for  granted,  from  thair  apparent  evidence ;  faults 
"  which,  while  they  remain  uncorrected,  will  for  ever  prevent 
"  us  from  reaching  the  summit  of  things  intellectual,  by  the 
"  aid  of  a  calculus  adapted  to  moral  as  well  as  to  mathemati- 
"cal  science.'1* 

In  these  extracts  from  Leibnitz,  as  well  as  in  that  quoted 
from  Condillac,  in  the  beginning  of  this  article,  the  essential 
distinction  between  mathematics  and  the  other  sciences,  in 
point  of  phraseology,  is  entirely  overlooked.  In  the  former 
science,  where  the  use  of  an  ambiguous  word  is  impossible, 
it  may  be  easily  conceived  how  the  solution  of  a  problem 
may  be  reduced  to  something  resembling  the  operation  of  a 
mill, — the  conditions  of  the  problem,  when  once  translated 
from  the  common  language  into  that  of  algebra,  disappearing 
entirely  from  the  view  ;  and  the  subsequent  process  being  al- 
most mechanically  regulated  by  general  rules,  till  the  final 
result  is  obtained.  In  the  latter  the  whole  of  the  words  about 
which  our  reasonings  are  conversant,  admit,  more  or  less,  of 
different  shades  of  meaning  ;  and  it  is  only  by  considering  at- 
tentively the  relation  in  which  they  stand  to  the  immediate 
context,  that  the  precise  idea  of  the  author  in  any  particular 
instance  is  to  be  ascertained.  In  these  sciences,  according:' 
ly,  the  constant  and  unremitting  exercise  of  the  attention  is  in- 
dispensably necessary,  to  prevent  us,  at  every  step  of  our 
progress,  from  going  astray. 

On  this  subject  1  have  made  various  remarks  in  a  volume 
lately  published  ;  to  which  I  beg  leave  here  to  refer,  in  or- 
der to  save  the  trouble  of  unnecessary  repetitions.!  From 
what  I  have  there  said,  I  trust  it  appears  that,  in  following 

*  Wallisii  Opera,  Vol.  III.  p.  633. 

As  these  reveries  of  this  truly  great  man  are  closely  connected  with  the  subsequent 
history  o(  logical  speculation  in  more  than  one  country  of  Europe,  I  have  been  indu- 
ced lo  incorporate  them,  in  an  English  version,  with  my  own  disquisitions.  Some  ex* 
pressions,  which,  I  am  sensible,  are  not  altogether  agreeable  to  the  idiom  of  our  lan- 
guage, might  have  been  easily  avoided,  if  I  h«dnot  felt  it  incumbent  on  me,  in  trans- 
lating an  author  whose  meaning,  in  this  instance,  1  was  able  but  very  imperfectly  to 
comprehend,  to  deviate  as  little  as  possible  from  his  own  words 
t  Philosophical  Essays,  p.  153.  et  seq.  4to  edit. 


104  ELEMENTS    OF    THE    PHILOSOPHY        [cHAP.    1L 

any  train  of  reasoning,  beyond  the  circle  of  the  mathematical 
sciences,  the  mind  must  necessarily  carry  on,  along  with  the 
logical  deduction  expressed  in  words,  another  logical  process 
of  a  far  nicer  and  more  difficult  nature  5 — that  of  fixing,  with 
a  rapidity  which  escapes  our  memory,  the  precise  sense  of 
every  word  which  is  ambiguous,  by  the  relation  in  which  it 
stands  to  the  general  scope  of  the  argument*  In  proportion 
as  the  language  of  science  becomes  more  and  more  exact, 
the  difficulty  of  this  task  will  be  gradually  diminished  ;  but  let 
the  improvement  be  carried  to  any  conceivable  extent,  not 
one  step  will  have  been  gained  in  accelerating  that  era,  so 
sanguinely  anticipated  by  Leibnitz  and  Condillac,  when  our 
reasonings  in  morals  and  politics  shall  resemble,  in  '.heir  me- 
chanical regularity,  and  in  their  demonstrative  certainty,  the 
investigations  of  algebra.  The  improvements  which  lan- 
guage receives,  in  consequence  of  the  progress  of  knowledge, 
consisting  rather  in  a  more  precise  distinction  and  classifica- 
tion of  the  various  meanings  of  words,  than  in  a  reduction  of 
these  meanings  in  point  of  number,  the  task  of  mental  induc- 
tion and  interpretation  may  be  rendered  more  easy  and  un- 
erring ;  but  the  necessity  of  this  task  can  never  be  superse- 
ded, till  every  word  which  we  employ  shall  be  as  fixed  and 
invariable  in  its  signification  as  an  algebraical  character,  or 
as  the  name  of  a  geometrical  figure. 

In  the  meantime,  the  intellectual  superiority  of  one  man 
above  another,  in  all  the  different  brances  of  moral  and  po- 
litical philosophy,  will  be  tound  to  depend  chiefly  on  the 
success  with  which  he  has  cultivated  these  silent  habits  of  in- 
ductive interpretation, — much  more,  in  my  opinion,  than  on 
his  acquaintance  with  those  rules  which  form  the  great  ob- 
jects of  study  to  the  professed  logician.  In  proof  of  this,  it 
is  sufficient  for  me  to  remind  my  readers,  that  the  whole 
theory  of  syllogism  proceeds  on  the  supposition  that  the  same 
word  is  always  to  be  employed  precisely  in  the  same  sense, 
(for  otherwise,  the  syllogism  would  be  vitiated  by  cons  sting 
of  more  than  three  terms,)  and,  consequently,  it  takes  for  gran- 
ted, in  every  rule  which  it  furnishes  for  the  guidance  of  our 


SECT.  IlJ  OP    THE   HUMAN  MIND;  105 

reasoning  powers,  that  the  nicest,  and  by  far  the  most  diffi- 
cult part  of  the  logical  process,  has  been  previously  brought 
to  a  successful  termination. 

In  treating  of  a  different  question,  I  have  elsewhere  re~ 
marked,  that  although  many  authors  have  spoken  of  the 
wonderful  mechanism  of  speech,  none  has  hitherto  attended 
to  the  far  more  wonderful  mechanism  which  it  puts  into  ac- 
tion behind  the  scene.  A  similar  observation  will  be  found 
to  apply  to  what  is  commonly  called  the  Art  of  Reasoning. 
The  scholastic  precepts  which  profess  to  teach  it*  reach  no 
deeper  than  the  very  surface  of  the  subject ;  being  all  of 
them  confined  to  that  part  of  the  intellectual  process  which 
is  embodied  in  the  form  of  verbal  propositions.  On  the  most 
favourable  supposition  which  can  be  formed  with  respect  to 
them,  they  are  superfluous  and  nugatory  ;  but,  in  many  cases, 
it  is  to  be  apprehended,  that  they  interfere  with  the  right 
conduct  of  the  understanding,  by  withdrawing  the  attention 
from  the  cultivation  of  that  mental  logic  on  which  the  sound- 
ness of  our  conclusions  essentially  depends,  and  in  the  study 
of  which  (although  some  general  rules  may  be  of  use)  every 
man  must  be,  in  a  great  measure,  his  own  master.* 

In  the  practical  application  of  the  foregoing  conclusions, 
it  cannot  fail  to  occur,  as  a  consideration  equally  obvious 
and  important,  that,  in  proportion  as  the  objects  of  our  rea- 
soning are  removed  from  the  particular  details  with  which 
our  senses  are  conversant,  the  difficulty  of  these  latent  in- 
ductive processes  must  be  increased.  This  is  the  real  source 
of  that  incapacity  for  general  speculation,  which  Mr.  Hume 
has  so  well  described  as  a  distinguishing  characteristic  of 
uncultivated  minds.  "  General  reasonings  seem  intricate, 
"  merely  because  they  are  general ;  nor  is  it  easy  for  the 
*'  bulk  of  mankind  to  distinguish,  in  a  great  number  of  par- 
"  ticulars,  that  common  circumstance  in  which  they  all  agree, 
"  or  to  extract  it,  pure  and  unmixed,  from  the  other  superflu- 

*  Those  who  are  interested  in  this  discussion,  will  enter  more  completely  into  my 
views,  if  they  take  the  trouble  to  combine  what  is  here  stated  with  some  observations 
1  have  introduced  in  the  first  Volume  of  this  work.     See  p.  177.  et  seq.  3d  edit,.. 
VOL.    II.  14 


]06  ELEMENTS    OF    THE    PHILOSOPHY        [cHAP.  If* 

"  ous  circumstances.  Every  judgment  or  conclusion  witfe 
"  them  is  particular.  Tney  cannot  enlarge  their  views  to 
"  those  universal  propositions  which  comprehend  under  them 
"  an  infinite  number  of  individuals,  and  include  a  whole  sci- 
"  ence  in  a  single  theorem.  Their  eye  is  confounded  with 
"  such  an  extensive  prospect,  and  the  conclusions  deduced 
"  from  it,  even  though  clearly  expressed,  seem  .intricate  and 
"  obscure."* 

Difficult,  however,  and  even  impossible  as    the  task   of 
general  speculation  is  to  the  bulk  of  mankind,  it  is  neverthe- 
less true,   that  it  is  the  path  which  leads  the  cautious  and 
skilful  reasoner  to  all  his  most  certain,  as  well  as  most  valu- 
able conclusions  in  morals  and   politics.     If  a  theorist,  in- 
deed,  should   expect  that  these  conclusions  are,  in  every 
particular  instance,  to  be  realized,  he  would  totally  misappre- 
hend their  nature  and  application  ;  inasmuch  as  they  are 
only  to  be  brought  to  an  experimental  test,  by  viewing  them 
on  an  extensive  scale,  and  continuing  our  observations  du- 
ring a  long  period  of  time.  c;  When  a  man  deliberates,"  says 
Mr.  Hume  "  concerning  his  conduct  in  any  particular  affair, 
'  and  forms  schemes  in    politics,  trade,  economy,   or  any 
8  business  in  life,  he  never  ought  to  draw  his  arguments  too 
'  fine,  or  connect  too  long  a  chain  of  consequences  together. 
'  Something  is  sure  to  happen  that  will  disconcert  his  rea- 
'  soning,  and  produce  an  event  different  from  what  he  ex- 
'  pected.     But  when  we  reason  upon  general  subjects,  one 
'  may  justly  affirm,  that  our  speculations  can  scarcely  ever 
'  be  too  fine,  provided  they  be  just  ;  and  that  the  difference 
'  between  a  common  man  and  a  man  of  genius  is  chiefly 
seen  in  the  shallowness  or  depth  of  the  principles  on  which 
they  proceed."     The  same  author  afterwards  excellently 
observes,  "  That  general  principles,  however  intricate^  they 
'  may  seem,  must  always  prevail,  if  they  be  just  and  sound, 
'  in  the  general  course  of  things,  though  they  may  fail  in 
6  particular  cases  ;  and  that  it  is  the  chief  business  of  philo- 

*  E?sav  on  Commercp 


;iECT.  II. Y  OF   THE   HUMAN   MIND.  107 

"  sophers  to  regard  the  general  course  of  things." — "  I  may 
"  add,"  continues  Mr.  Hume, "  that  it  is  also  the  chief  business 
"  of  politicians,  especially  in  the  domestic  government  of  the 
"  state,  where  the  public  good,  which  is,  or  ought  to  be,  their 
"  object,  depends  on  the  concurrence  of  a  multitude  of  cau- 
"  ses  ;  not  as  in  foreign  politics,  on  accidents  and  chances,. 
','  and  the  caprices  of  a  few  persons.1'* 

To  these  profound  reflections  of  Mr.  Hume,  it  may  be 
added  (although  the  remark  does  not  bear  directly  on  our 
present  argument)  that,  in  the  systematical  application  of 
general  and  refined  rules  to  their  private  concerns,  men  fre- 
quently err  from  calculating  their  measures  upon  a  scale 
disproportionate  to  the  ordinary  duration  of  human  life. 
This  "is  one  of  the  many  mistakes  into  which  projectors  are 
apt  to  fall  ;  and  hence  the  ruin  which  so  often  overtakes 
them,  while  sowing  the  seeds  of  a  harvest  which  others  are 
to  reap.  A  few  years  more  might  have  secured  to  themselves 
the  prize  which  they  had  in  view  ;  and  changed  the  opinion 
of  the  world  (which  is  always  regulated  by  the  accidental 
circumstances  o(  failure  or  of  success)  from  contempt  of  their 
folly,  into  admiration  of  their  sagacity  and  perseverance. 

It  is  observed  by  the  Comte  de  Bussi,  that  "  time  reme- 
"  dies  all  mischances  ;  and  that  men  die  unfortunate,  only 
"  because  they  did  not  live  long  enough.  Mareschal  d'Es- 
"  tree,  who  died  rich  at  a  hundred,  would  have  died  a  beg- 
"  gar,  had  he  lived  only  to  eighty."  The  maxim,  like  most 
other  apothegms,  is  stated  in  terms  much  too  unqualified  ; 
but  it  may  furnish  matter  for  many  interesting  reflections,  to 
those  who  have  surveyed  with  attention  the  characters  which 
have  passed  before  them  on  the  stage  of  life  ;  or  who  amuse 

*  Essay  on  Commerce. 

This  contrast  between  the  domestic  and  the  foreign  policy  of  a  state,,  occurs  more 
than  once  in  Mr.  Hume's  writings  ;  (see  in  particular  the  first  paragraphs  of  his  Es 
say  on  the  Rise  of  Arts  and  Sciences.)  A  similar  observation  had  long  before  bc*en 
made  by  Polybius.  "  There  are  two  ways  by  which  every  kind  of  government  is  de 
"  stroyed  :  either  by  some  accident  that  happens  from  without  ;  or  some  evil  thar 
u  arises  within  itself.  When  the  first  will  be,  it  is  not  always  easy  to  foresee  ;  but 
-"  the  latter  ts certain  and  delermwrt"'"  —  Bomlc  VI.  Ev.  3.  (Hampton's  Translation.) 


JOB  ELEMENTS    OF   THE    PHILOSOPHY  [CHAP.  I}. 

themselves  with  marking  the  trifling  and  fortuitous  circum- 
stances by  which  the  multitude  are  decided,  in  pronouncing 
their  verdicts  of  foresight  or  of  improvidence. 


IV. 


Continuation  of  the  Subject.—  Peculiar  and  superemrnent    Advantages  possessed  by 
Mathematicians,  in  consequence  of  their  definite  Phraseology. 

If  the  remarks  contained  in  the  foregoing  articles  of  this 
section  be  just,  it  will  follow,  that  the  various  artificial  aids 
to  our  reasoning  powers  which  have  been  projected  by  Leib- 
nitz and  others,  proceed  on  the  supposition  (a  supposition 
which  is  also  tacitly  assumed  in  the  syllogistic  theory)  that, 
in  all  the  sciences,  the  words  which  we  employ  have,  in  the 
course  of  our  previous  studies,  been  brought  to  a  sense  as  un- 
equivocal as  the  phraseology  of  mathematicians.  They  pro- 
ceed  on  the  supposition,  therefore,  that  by  far  the  most  diffi- 
cult part  of  the  logical  problem  has  been  already  solved. 
Should  the  period  ever  arrive,  when  the  language  of 
moralists  and  politicians  shall  be  rendered  as  perfect  as  that 
of  geometers  and  algebraists,  then,  indeed,  may  such  contri- 
vances as  the  Ars  Combinatoria  and  the  Alphabet  of  human 
thoughts,  become  interesting  subjects  of  philosophical  discus- 
sion ;  although  the  probability  is,  that,  even  were  that  era  to 
take  place,  they  would  be  found  nearly  as  useless  in  morals 
and  politics,  as  the  syllogistic  art  is  acknowledged  to  be  at 
present,  in  the  investigations  of  pure  geometry. 

Of  the  peculiar  and  supereminent  advantage  possessed  by 
mathematicians,  in  consequence  of  those  fixed  and  definite 
relations  which  form  the  objects  of  their  science,  and  the 
correspondent  precision  in  their  language  and  reasonings,  \ 
can  think  of  no  illustration  more  striking  than  what  is  affor- 
ded by  Dr.  Halley's  Latin  version  from  an  Arabic  manu- 
script, of  the  two  books  of  Appollonius  Pergasus  de  Sectione 
Rationis.  The  extraordinary  circumstances  under  which 
ihas  version  was  attempted  and  completed  (which  I  presume 


SECT.  II.]  OP    THE   HUMAN   MLVD.  109 

are  little  known  beyond  the  narrow  circle  of  mathematical 
renters)  appear  to  me  so  highly  curious,  considered  as  a 
hi  tier  of  literary  history,  that  I  shall  copy  a  short  detail  of 
them  from  Halley's  preface. 

After  mentioning  the  accidental  discovery  in  the  Bodleian 
library,  by  Dr.  Bernard,  Savilian  Professor  of  Astronomy, 
of  the  Arabic  version  of  Appollonius,  irepi  A«y«  asi-oreum;, 
Dr.   Halley  proceeds  thus  : 

''Do  I:  jilted,  therefore,  with  the  discovery  of  such  a  trea- 
"  sui" ,  Bfnnrd  applied  himself  diligently  to  the  task  of  a 
"  Latin  translation*  But  before  he  had  finished  a  tenth  part 
"  of  his  undertaking,  he  abandoned  it  altogether,  either  from 
H  his  experience  of  its  growing  difficulties,  or  from  the  pres- 
*'  sure  of  other  avocations.  Afterwards,  when,  on  the  death 
*•'  of  Dr.  WalUs,  the  Savilian  professorship  was  bestowed 
"  on  me,  I  was  seized  with  a  strong  desire  of  making  a  trial 
"  to.complete  what  Bernard  had  begun  ;— an  attempt,  of  the 
M  boldness  of  which  the  reader  may  judge,  when  he  is  inform- 
"  ed,  that,  in  addition  to  my  own  entire  ignorance  of  the 
"  Arabic  language,  I  had  to  contend  with  the  obscurities  oc- 
"  casioned  by  innumerable  passages  which  were  either  de- 
"  faced  or  altogether  obliterated*  With  the  assistance,  how- 
"  ever,  of  the  sheets  which  Bernard  had  left,  and  which  ser- 
"  ved  me  as  a  key  for  investigating  the  sense  of  the  original, 
"  I  began  first  with  making  a  list  of  those  words,  the  signifi- 
#  cation  of  which  his  version  had  clearly  ascertained  ;  and 
"  then  proceeded,  by  comparing  these  words,  wherever  they 
ft  occurred,  with  the  train  of  reasoning  in  which  they  were 
"  involved,  to  decypher,  by  slow  degrees,  the  import  of  the 
"  context  ;  till  at  last  I  succeeded  in  mastering  the  whole 
£  work,  and  in  bringing  my  translation  (without  the  aid  of 
:*'  any  other  person)  to  the  form  in  which  I  now  give  it  to  the 
fi  public.1'* 

When  a  similar  attempt  shall  be  made,  with  equal  success, 
in  decyphering  a  moral  or  a  political  treatise,  written  in  an 

*  Appollon.  Ferg.de  Sectione  Rationis?  &c.  Opera  et  Studio  F,dm.  Hallw.    Oxon 
1706.    In  Prsefa* 


110  ELEMENTS    OP    THE    PHILOSOPHY  [CHAP.  II, 

unknown  tongue,  then,  and  not  till  then,  may  we  think  of 
comparing  the  phraseology  of  these  two  sciences  with  the 
simple  and  rigorous  language  of  the  Greek  geometers ;  or 
"with  the  more  refined  and  abstract,  but  not  less  scrupulously 
logical  system  of  signs,  employed  by  modern  mathematicians. 
It  must  not,  however,  be  imagined,  that  it  is  solely  by  the 
nature  of  the  ideas  which  form  the  objects  of  its  reasonings, 
even  when  combined  with  the  precision  and  unambiguity  of 
its  phraseology,  that  mathematics  is  distinguished  from  the 
Other  branches  of  our  knowledge.  The  truths  about  which 
it  is  conversant,  are  of  an  order  altogether  peculiar  and  sin- 
gular; and  the  evidence  of  which  they  admit  resembles  no- 
thing, either  in  degree  or  in  kind,  to  which  the  same  name  is 
given,  in  any  of  our  other  intellectual  pursuits.  On  these 
points  also,  Leibnitz  and  many  other  great  men,  have  adopt- 
ed very  incorrect  opinions  ;  and,  by  the  authority  of  their 
names,  have  given  currency  to  some  logical  errors  of  funda- 
mental importance.  My  reasons  for  so  thinking,  I  shall 
state,  as  clearly  and  fully  as  I  can,  in  the  following  section. 


SECTION  III. 

OF  MATHEMATICAL  DEMONSTRATIONS 
I. 

Of  the  Circumstance  on  which  Demonstrative  Evidence  essentially  depends. 

The  peculiarity  of  that  species  of  evidence  which  is  call- 
ed demonstrative,  and  which  so  remarkably  distinguishes 
our  mathematical  conclusions  from  those  to  which  we  are  led 
in  other  branches  of  science,  is  a  fact  which  must  have  ar- 
rested the  attention  of  every  person  who  possesses  the  slight- 
est acquaintance  with  the  elements  of  geometry.  And  yet  I 
am  doubtful  if  a  satisfactory  account  has  been  hitherto  given  of 
the  circumstances  from  which  it  arises.  Mr.  Locke  tells  us, 
that  "  what  constitutes  a  demonstration  is  intuitive  evidence 
".  at  every  step  ;"  and  I  readily  grant,  that  if,  in  a  single  step. 


sblct.iik]  op  the  human  mind.  Ill 

such  evidence  should  fail,  the  other  parts  of  the  demonstra- 
tion would  be  of  no  value.  It  does  not,  however,  seem  to 
me  that  it  is  on  this  consideration  that  the  demonstrative  evi- 
dence of  the  conclusion  depends, — not  even  when  we  add 
to  it  another  which  is  much  insisted  on  by  Dr.  Reid, — that 
"  in  demonstrative  evidence,  our  first  principles  must  be  in- 
"  tuitively  certain."  The  inaccuracy  of  this  remark  I  form- 
erly pointed  out  when  treating  of  the  evidence  of  axioms  ;  on 
which  occasion  I  also  observed,  that  the  first  principles  of 
our  reasonings  in  mathematics  are  not  axioms,  but  definitions. 
It  is  in  this  last  circumstance  (I  mean  the  peculiarity  of  rea- 
soning from  definitions)  that  the  true  theory  of  mathematical 
demonstration  is  to  be  found  ;  and  I  shall  accordingly  en- 
deavour to  explain  it  at  considerable  length,  and  to  state 
some  of  the  more  important  consequences  to  which  it  leads. 

That  I  may  not,  however,  have  the  appearance  of  claiming, 
in  behalf  of  the  following  discussion,  an  undue  share  of  ori- 
ginality, it  is  necessary  for  me  to  remark,  that  the  leading 
idea  which  it  contains  has  been  repeatedly  started,  and  even 
to  a  certain  length  prosecuted,  by  different  writers,  ancient 
as  well  as  modern  ;  but  that,  in  all  of  them,  it  has  been  so 
blended  with  collateral  considerations,  altogether  foreign  to 
the  point  in  question,  as  to  divert  the  attention  both  of  writer 
and  reader,  from  that  single  principle  on  which  the  solution 
of  the  problem  hinges.  The  advantages  which  mathematics 
derives  from  the  peculiar  nature  of  those  relations  about  which 
it  is  conversant ;  from  its  simple  and  definite  phraseology  ; 
and  from  the  severe  logic  so  admirably  displayed  in  the  con- 
catenation of  its  innumerable  theorems,  are  indeed  immense, 
-and  well  entitled  to  a  separate  and  ample  illustration  ;  but 
they  do  not  appear  to  have  any  necessary  connection  with 
the  subject  of  this  section.  How  far  I  am  right  in  this 
opinion,  my  readers  will  be  enabled  to  judge  by  the  sequel. 

It  was  a  (ready  remarked,  in  th°  first  chapter  of  this 
Part,  that  whereas,  in  all  other  sciences,  the  propositions 
which  we  attempt  to  establish,  express  facts  real  or  suppo- 
sed,— in  mathematics  the  propositions  which  we  demonstrate 


112  ELEMENTS    OF    THE    PHILOSOPHY  [CHAP.  If* 

only  assert  a  connection  between  certain  suppositions  and 
certain  consequences.  Our  reasonings,  therefore,  in  mathe- 
matics, are  directed  to  an  object  essentially  different  from 
what  we  have  in  view,  in  any  other  employment  of  our  intel- 
lectual faculties  ; — not  to  ascertain  truths  with  respect  to  ac» 
tual  existences,  but  to  trace  the  logical  filiation  of  conse- 
quences which  follow  from  an  assumed  hypothesis.  If  from 
this  hypothesis  we  reason  with  correctness,  nothing,  it  is  mani- 
fest j  can  be  wanting  to  complete  the  evidence  of  the  result  j 
as  this  result  only  asserts  a  necessary  connection  between 
the  supposition  and  the  conclusion.  In  the  other  sciences, 
admitting  that  every  ambiguity  of  language  were  removed, 
and  that  every  step  of  our  deductions  were  rigorously  accu- 
rate, our  conclusions  would  still  be  attended  with  more  or  less 
of  uncertainty  ;  being  ultimately  founded  on  principles  which 
may,  or  may  not,  correspond  exactly  with  the  fact.* 

Hence  it  appears,  that  it  might  be  possible,  by  devising  a 
set  of  arbitrary  definitions,  to  form  a  science,  which,  although 
conversant  about  moral,  political,  or  physical  ideas,  should 
yet  be  as  certain  as  geometry.  It  is  of  no  moment,  whether 
the  definitions  assumed  correspond  with  facts  or  not,  pro- 
vided they  do  not  express  impossibilities,  and  be  not  incon- 
sistent with  each  other.  From  these  principles,  a  series  of 
consequences  may  be  deduced  by  the  most  unexceptionable 
reasoning  ;  and  the  results  obtained  will  be  perfectly  analo- 
gous to  mathematical  propositions.  The  terms  true  and  false, 
cannot  be  applied  to  them  ;  at  least  in  the  sense  in  which 
they  are  applicable  to  propositions  relative  to  facts.  All  that 
can  be  said  is,  that  they  are  or  are  not  connected  with  the 
definitions  which  form  the  principles  of  the  science  ;  and, 
therefore,  if  we  choose  to  call  our  conclusions  true  in  the  one 

*  This  distinction  coincides  with  one  which  has  been  very  ingeniously  illustrated 
by  M.  Prevost  in  his  philosophical  essays.  See  his  remarks  on  those  sciences  which 
have  for  their  object  absolute  truth)  considered  in  contrast  with  those  which  are  oc- 
cupied only  about  conditional  or  hypothetical  truths.  Mathematics  is  a  science  of 
the  latter  description  ;  and  is  therefore  called  by  M.  Prevost  a  science  of  pure  reason' 
ing, —  Essais  de  Phitosophie,  Tom,  II.  p.9.  et  sec.  See  also  his  Memoiresur  les  Signes, 
'Paris,  Baudoin,  1800,  pp.  15,  16.  In  what  re->p-?ct?  my  opinion  on  this  subject  differs 
from  his.,  will  appear  afterwards. 


SECT.  III.]  OF    THE    HUMAN    MIND.  US 

case,  and  false  in  the  other,  these  epithets  must  be  under* 
stood  merely  to  refer  to  their  connection  with  the  data,  and 
Hot  to  their  correspondence  with  things  actually  existing,  or 
with  events  which  we  expect  to  be  realized  in  future.  An 
example  of  such  a  science  as  that  which  I  have  now  been 
describing,  occurs  in  what  has  been  called  by  some  writers 
theoretical  mechanics  ;  in  which*  from  arbitrary  hypotheses 
concerning  physical  laws,  the  consequences  are  traced  which 
would  follow,  if  such  was  really  the  order  of  nature. 

In  those  branches  of  study  which  are  conversant  about 
moral  and  political  propositions,  the  nearest  approach  which 
I  can  imagine  to  a  hypothetical  science,  analogous  to  mathe- 
matics, is  to  be  found  in  a  code  of  municipal  jurisprudence  ; 
or  rather  might  be  conceived  to  exist  in  such  a  code,  if  sys- 
tematically carried  into  execution,  agreeably  to  certain  ge- 
neral or  fundamental  principles.  Whether  these  principles 
should  or  should  not  be  founded  in  justice  and  expediency, 
it  is  evidently  possible,  by  reasoning  from  them  consequen- 
tially, to  create  an  artificial  or  conventional  body  of  know- 
ledge, more  systematical,  and,  at  the  same  time,  more  com- 
plete in  all  its  parts,  than,  in  the  present  state  of  our  infor- 
mation, any  science  can  be  rendered,  which  ultimately  ap- 
peals to  the  eternal  and  immutable  standards  of  truth  and 
falsehood,  of  right  and  wrong.  This  consideration  seems  to 
me  to  throw  some  light  on  the  following  very  curious  paral- 
lel which  Leibnitz  has  drawn  (with  what  justness  I  presume 
not  to  decide)  between  the  works  of  the  Roman  civilians  and 
those  of  the  Greek  geometers.  Few  writers  certainly  have 
been  so  fully  qualified  as  he  was  to  pronounce  on  the  cha- 
racteristical  merits  of  both. 

"  I  have  often  said,  that,  after  the  writings  of  geometri- 
"  cians,  there  exists  nothing  which,  in  point  of  force  and  of 
"  subtilty,  can  be  compared  to  the  works  of  the  Roman  law- 
"  yers.  And,  as  it  would  be  scarcely  possible,  from  mere 
"  intrinsic  evidence,  to  distinguish  a  demonstration  of  Eu- 
*'  clid's  from  one  of  Archimedes  or  of  Appollonius,  (the  style 
"  of  all  of  them  appearing  no  less  uniform  than  if  reason  her, 
vor.  ri.  15 


114  ELEMENTS    OF    THE    PHILOSOPHY         [CHAP.  I'l, 

"  self  was  speaking  through  their  organs,)  so  also  the  Roman 
"  lawyers  all  resemble  each  other  like  twin-brothers  ;  inso- 
"  much  that,  from  the  style  alone  of  any  particular  opinion 
"  or  argument,  hardly  any  conjecture  could  be  formed  with 
"  respect  to  the  author.  .  Nor  are  the  traces  of  a  refined  and 
"  deeply  meditated  system  of  natural  jurisprudence  any  where 
"  to  be  found  more  visible,  or  in  greater  abundance.  And, 
"  even  in  those  cases  where  its  principles  are  departed  from, 
"  either  in  compliance  with  the  language  consecrated  by 
"  technical  forms,  or  in  consequence  of  new  statutes,  or  of  an- 
"  cient  traditions,  the  conclusions  which  the  assumed  hypothe- 
"  sis  renders  it  necessary  to  incorporate  with  the  eternal  dic- 
"  tates  of  right  reason,  are  deduced  with  the  soundest  logic, 
"  and  with  an  ingenuity  which  excites  admiration.  Nor  are 
"  these  deviations  from  the  law  of  nature  so  frequent  as  is 
"  commonly  imagined."* 

I  have  quoted  this  passage  merely  as  an  illustration  of  the 
analogy  already  alluded  to,  between  the  systematical  unity  of 
mathematical  science,  and  that  which  is  conceivable  in  a  sys- 
tem of  municipal  law.  How  far  this  unity  is  exemplified  in 
the  Roman  code,  I  leave  to  be  determined  by  more  compe- 
tent judges. t 

As  something  analogous  to  the  hypothetical  or  conditional 
conclusions  of  mathematics  may  thus  be  fancied  to  take 
place  in  speculations  concerning  moral  or  political  subjects, 
and  actually  does  take  place  in  theoretical  mechanics ;  so, 
on  the  other  hand,  if  a  mathematician  should  affirm,  of  a  ge- 
neral property  of  the  circle,  that  it  applies  to  a  particular 
figure  described  on  paper,  he  would  at  once  degrade  a  geo- 
metrical theorem  to  the  level  of  a  fact  resting  ultimately  on 

*  Leibnitz,  Op.  Tom.  IV.  p.  254. 

t  It  is  not  a  little  curious,  that  the  same  code  which  furnished  to  this  very  learned 
and  philosophical  jurist,  the  subject  of  the  euinghim  quoted  above,  should  have  been 
lately  stigmatised  by  an  English  lawj-er,  eminently  distinguished  for  his  acuteness  and 
originality,  as  "  an  enormous  mass  of  confusion  and  inconsistency."  Making  all  due 
allowances  for  the  exaggerations  of  Leibnitz,  it  is  difficult  to  conceive  that  his  opi- 
nion, on  a  subject  which  he  had  so  profoundly  studied,  should  be  so  very  widely  at 
variance  with  the  truth. 


SECT.  III.]  OF    THE    HUMAN   MIND.  H5 

the  evidence  of  our  imperfect  senses.  The  accuracy  of  his 
reasoning  could  never  bestow  on  his  proposition  that  pe- 
culiar evidence  which  is  properly  called  mathematical,  as 
long  as  the  fact  remained  uncertain,  whether  all  the  straight 
lines  drawn  from  the  centre  to  the  circumference  of  the  figure 
were  mathematically  equal. 

These  observations  lead  me  to  remark  a  very  common 
misconception  concerning  mathematical  definitions  ;  which 
are  of  a  nature  essentially  different  from  the  definitions  em- 
ployed in  any  of  the  other  sciences.  It  is  usual  for  writer* 
on  logic,  after  taking  notice  of  the  errors  to  which  we  are 
liable  in  consequence  of  the  ambiguity  of  words,  to  appeal 
to  the  example  of  mathematicians,  as  a  proof  of  the  infinite 
advantage  of  using,  in  our  reasonings,  such  expressions  only 
as  have  been  carefully  defined.  Various  remarks  to  this 
purpose  occur  in  the  writings  both  of  Mr.  Locke  and  of  Dr. 
Reid.  But  the  example  of  mathematicians  is  by  no  means 
applicable  to  the  sciences  in  which  these  eminent  philoso- 
phers propose  that  it  should  be  followed;  and,  indeed,  if  it 
were  copied  as  a  model  in  any  other  branch  of  human  know- 
ledge, it  would  lead  to  errors  fully  as  dangerous  as  any 
which  result  from  the  imperfections  of  language.  The  real 
fact  is,  that  it  has  been  copied  much  more  than  it  ought  to 
have  been,  or  than  would  have  been  attempted,  if  the  pecu- 
liarities of  mathematical  evidence  had  been  attentively  con- 
sidered. 

That  in  mathematics  there  is  no  such  thing  as  an  ambi- 
guous word,  and  that  it  is  to  the  proper  use  of  definitions  we 
are  indebted  for  this  advantage,  must  unquestionably  be 
granted.  But  this  is  an  advantage  easily  secured,  in  conse- 
quence of  the  very  limited  vocabulary  of  mathematicians, 
and  the  distinctness  of  the  ideas  about  which  their  reason- 
ings are  employed.  The  difference,  besides,  in  this  respect, 
between  mathematics  and  the  other  sciences,  however  great, 
is  yet  only  a  difference  in  degree  ;  and  is  by  no  means  suffi- 
cient to  account  for  the  essential  distinction  which  every 
person  must  perceive  between   the  irresistible  cogency  of  a 


1 1  €»  ELEMENTS    OF   THE    PHILOSOPHY         [cHAP,  IR 

mathematical  demonstration,  and  that  of  any  other  process 
of  reasoning. 

From  the  foregoing  considerations  it  appears,  that  in  ma- 
thematics, definitions  answer  two  purposes  ;  first,  To  prevent 
ambiguities  of  language  ;  and,  secondly,  To  serve  as  the 
principles  of  our  reasoning.  It  appears  further,  that  it  is  to  the 
latter  of  these  circumstances  (I  mean  to  the  employment  of 
hypotheses  instead  of  facts,  as  the  data  on  which  we  pro- 
ceed) that  the  peculiar  force  of  demonstrative  evidence  is  to 
be  ascribed.  It  is  however  only  in  {Reformer  use  of  defini* 
tions,  that  any  parallel  can  be  drawn  between  mathematics 
and  those  branches  of  knowledge  which  relate  to  facts  ;  and, 
therefore,  it  is  not  a  fair  argument  in  proof  of  their  general 
utility,  to  appeal  to  the  unrivalled  certainty  of  mathematical 
science, — a  pre-eminence  which  that  science  derives  from  a 
source  altogether  different,  though  comprehended  under  the 
same  name,  and  which  she  will  for  ever  cjaim  as  her  own  ex- 
cluHve  prerogative.* 

Nor  ought  it  to  be  forgotten,  that  it  is  in  pure  mathematics 
alone,  that  definitions  can  be  attempted  with  propriety  at  the 
outset  of  our  investigations.  In  most  other  instances,  some 
previous  discussion  is  necessary  to  shew,  that  the  definitions 
which  we  lay  down  correspond  with  facts  ;  and,  in  many 
cases,  the  formation  of  a  just  definition  is  the  end  to  which 
our  inquiries  are  directed.  It  is  very  judiciously  observed 
by  Mr.  Burke,  in  his  Essay  on  Taste,  that  "  when  we  de- 
"  fine,  we  are  in  danger  of  circumscribing  nature  within  the 
"  bounds  of  our  own  notions,  which  we  often  take  up  by 
"  hazard,  or  embrace  on  trust,  or  form  out  of  a  limited  and 
"  partial  consideration  of  the  object  before  us,  instead  of  ex- 
"  tending  our  ideas  to  take  in  all  that  nature  comprehends, 
u  according  to  her  manner  of  combining.  We  are  limited  in 
*?  our  inquiry  by  the  strict  laws  to  which  we  have  submitted 
*'  at  our  setting  out." 

*  These  two  classes  of  definitions  are  very  generally  confounded  by  logicians  ; 
among  others,  by  the  Abbe  e'e  Condillac.  See  La  Logiqut,  ou  lesjnremiers  developpe- 
Wgfis  de  CJht  de  Penser,  Chap.  VI. 


SECT.  III.]  OF    THE    HUMAN    MIND.  117 

The  same  author  adds,  that  "  a  definition  may  be  very  ex- 
*'  act,  and  yet  go  but  a  very  little  way  towards  informing 
"  us  of  the  nature  of  the  thing  defined  ;"  and  that,  "  in  the 
"  order  of  things  a  definition  (let  its  virtue  be  what  it  will) 
*'  ought  rather  to  follow  than  to  precede  our  inquiries,  of 
il  which  it  ought  to  be  considered  as  the  result.-' 

From  a  want  of  attention  to  these  circumstances,  and  from 
a  blind  imitation  of  the  mathematical  arrangement,  in  specu- 
lations where  facts  are  involved  among  the  principles  of  our 
reasonings,  numberless  errors  in  the  writings  of  philoso- 
phers might  be  easily  traced.  The  subject  is  of  too  great 
extent  to  be  pursued  any  farther  here  ;  but  it  is  well  entitled 
to  the  examination  of  all  who  may  turn  their  thoughts  to  the 
reformation  of  logic.  That  the  ideas  of  Aristotle  himself, 
with  respect  to  it,  were  not  very  precise,  must,  I  think,  be 
granted,  if  the  following  statement  of  his  ingenious  commen- 
tator be  admitted  as  correct, 

"  Every  general  term,"  says  Dr.  Gillies,  "  is  considered  by 
•ft  Aristotle  as  the  abridgement  of  a  definition  ;  and  every 
"  definition  is  denominated  by  him  a  collection,  because  it  is 
"  the  result  always  of  observation  and  comparison,  and  often 
"  of  many  observations  and  of  many  comparisons."* 

These  two  propositions  will  be  found,  upon  examination, 
not  very  consistent  with  each  other.  The  first,  "  That 
"  every  general  term  is  the  abridgement  of  a  definition,"  ap- 
plies, indeed,  admirably  to  mathematics  ;  and  touches  with 
singular  precision  on  the  very  circumstance  which  constitutes 
£in  my  opinion)  the  peculiar  cogency  of  mathematical  rea- 
soning. But  it  is  to  mathematics  that  it  applies  exclusively, 
ff  adopted  as  a  logical  maxim  in  other  branches  of  know- 
ledge, it  would  prove  an  endless  source  of  sophistry  and  er- 
ror.— The  second  proposition,  on  the  other  hand,  "  That 
n  every  definition  is  the  result  of  observation  and  comparison 
H  and  often  of  many  observations  and  many  comparsons  ;" 
''  however  applicable  to  the  definitions  of  natural  history. 
*nd  of  other  sciences  which  relate  to  fads,  cannot,  in  one 

*  Gillies's  Aristotle,  Vol.  I.  p.  92, 2d  edif 


118  ELEMENTS    OP    THE    PHILOSOPHY       [CHAP.  II.'' 

single  instance,  apply  to  the  definitions  of  geometry  ;  inas- 
much as  these  definitions  are  neither  the  result  of  observa- 
tions nor  of  comparisons,  but  the  hypotheses,  or  first  princi- 
ples, on  which  the  whole  science  rests. 

If  the  foregoing  account  of  demonstrative  evidence  be  just, 
it  follows,  that  no  chain  of  reasoning  whatever  can  deserve 
the  name  of  a  demonstration  (at  least  in  the  mathematical 
sense  of  that  word)  which  is  not  ultimately  resolvable  into 
hypotheses  or  definitions.*  It  has  been  already  shewn,  that 
this  is  the  case  with  geometry ;  and  it  is  also  manifestly  the 
case  with  arithmetic,  another  science  to  which,  in  common 
with  geometry,  we  apply  the  word  mathematical.  The  sim- 
ple arithmetical  equations  2+2=4  ;  2-j-3=5,  and  other  ele- 
mentary propositions  of  the  same  sort,  are  (as  was  formerly 
observed)  mere  definitions  ;t  perfectly  analogous,  in  this 
respect,  to  those  at  the  beginning  of  Euclid  ;  and  it  is  from 
a  few  fundamental  principles  of  this  sort,  or  at  least  from 
principles  which  are  essentially  of  the  same  description,  that 
all  the  more  complicated  results  in   the  science  are  derived. 

To  this  general  conclusion,  with  respect  to  the  nature  of 
mathematical  demonstration,  an  exception  may  perhaps  be. 
at  first  sight,  apprehended  to  occur,  in  our  reasonings  con- 
cerning geometrical  problems  :  all  of  these  reasonings  (as  is 
well  known)  resting  ultimately  upon  a  particular  class  of 
principles  called  postulates,  which  are  commonly  understood 
to  be  so  very  nearly  akin  to  axioms,  that  both  might,  with-, 
out    impropriety,  be  comprehended  under  the  same  name. 

*  Although  the  account  given  by  Locke  of  what  constitutes  a  demonstration  be  dif- 
ferent from  that  which  I  have  here  proposed,  he  admits  the  cenverseof  this  doctrine 
as  manifest;  viz.  That  if  we  reason  accurately  from  our  own  definitions,  our  con-, 
elusions  will  possess  demonst  rat ice  evidence  ;  and  "hence,"  he  observes  with  great 
truth,  "  it  comes  to  pass,  that  one  may  often  meet  with  very  clear  and  coherent 
"  discourses,  that  amount  yet  to  nothing."'  He  afterwards  remarks,  that  "  one  may 
"  make  demonstrations  and  undoubted  propositions  in  words,  and  yet  thereby  ad- 
u  vance  not  one  jot  in  the  knowledge  of  the  truth  of  things."  "  Of  this  sort,"  he  add;,. 
ci  a  man  may  find  an  infinite  number  of  propositions,  reasonings,  and  conclusions,  in 
"  books  of  metaphysics,  school-divinity,  and  some  sort  of  natural  philosophy  ;  and; 
*'  after  all,  know  as  little  of  God,  spirits,  or  bodies,  as  he  did  before  he  set  out.'"-' 
Essay  on  Human  Understanding;  Book  IV.  cijop.  viii. 
t  See  page  23. 


SECT.  III.]  OP    THE    HUMAN    MIND.  119 

"  The  definition  of  a  postulate,'1  says  the  learned  and  inge- 
nious Dr.  Hutton,  "  will  nearly  agree  also  to  an  axiom, 
"  which  is  a  self-evident  theorem,  as  a  postulate  is  a  self- 
"  evident  problem."*  The  same  author,  in  another  part  of 
his  work,  quotes  a  remark  from  Dr.  Barrow,  that  "  there  is 
"  the  same  affinity  between  postulates  and  problems,  as  be- 
"  tween  axioms  and  theorems. "I  Dr.  Wallis,  too,  appears, 
from  the  following  passage,  to  have  had  a  decided  leaning 
to  this  opinion :  "  According  to  some,  the  difference  between 
"  axioms  and  postulates  is  analogous  to  that  between  theo- 
"  rems  and  problems  ;  the  former  expressing  truths  which 
"  are  self-evident,  and  from  which  other  propositions  may 
"  be  deduced  ;  the  latter,  operations  which  may  be  easily 
"  performed,  and  by  the  help  of  which  more  difficult  con- 
"  structions  may  be  effected."  He  afterwards  adds,  "  This 
"  account  of  the  distinction  between  postulates  and  axioms 
"  seems  not  ill  adapted  to  the  division  of  mathematical  pro- 
tf  positions  into  problems  and  theorems.  And,  indeed,  if 
"  both  postulates  and  axioms  were  to  be  comprehended  un- 
"  der  either  of  these  names,  the  innovation  would  not,  in  my 
"  opinion,  afford  much  ground  for  censure. "| 

In  opposition  to  these  very  high  authorities,  I  have  no 
hesitation  to  assert,  that  it  is  with  the  definitions  of  Euclid, 
and  not  with  the  axioms,  that  the  postulates  ought  to  be  com- 
pared, in  respect  of  their  logical  character  and  importance  ; — 
inasmuch  as  all  the  demonstrations  in  plane  geometry  are 
ultimately  founded  on  the  former,  and  all  the  constructions 
which  it  recognizes  as  legitimate,  may  be  resolved  ultimate- 
ly into  the  latter.  To  this  remark  it  may  be  added,  that,  ac- 
cording to  Euclid's  view  of  the  subject,  the  problems  of 
geometry  are  not  less  hypothetical  and  speculative  than 
the  theorems  ;  the  possibility  of  drawing  a  mathematical 
straight  line,  and  of  describing  a  mathematical  circle,  being 
assumed  in    the  construction  of  every   problem,  in  a  way 

:  Mathematical  Dicionary,  Art.  Postulate. 
t  Ibid. Art.  Hijpothesis. 
•J'Wallisii  Open,  Vol.  II.  pp,  667, 668. 


120  elements  of  the  philosophy      [chap.  it. 

quite  analogous  to  that  in  which  the  enunciation  of  a  the- 
orem assumes  the  existence  of  straight  lines  and  of  cir- 
cles corresponding  to  their  mathematical  definitions.  The 
reasoning,  therefore,  on  which  the  solution  of  a  problem 
rests,  is  not  less  demonstrative  than  that  which  is  employed 
in  proof  of  a  theorem.  Grant  the  possibility  of  the  three 
operations  described  in  the  postulates,  and  the  correctness 
of  the  solution  is  as  mathematically  certain,  as  the  truth  of 
any  property  of  the  triangle  or  of  the  circle.  The  three 
postulates  of  Euclid  are,  indeed,  nothing  more  than  the  defi- 
nitions of  a  circle  and  a  straight  line  thrown  into  a  form 
somewhat  different ;  and  a  similar  remark  may  be  extended  to 
the  corresponding  distribution  of  propositions  into  theorems 
and  problems.  Notwithstanding  the  many  conveniences  with 
which  this  distribution  is  attended,  it  was  evidently  a  matter 
©f  choice  rather  than  of  necessity  ;  all  the  truths  of  geometry 
easily  admitting  of  being  moulded  into  either  shape,  ac- 
cording to  the  fancy  of  the  mathematician.  As  to  the  axiomst 
there  cannot  be  a  doubt  (whatever  opinion  may  be  enter- 
tained of  their  utility  or  of  their  insignificance)  that  they 
stand  precisely  in  the  same  relation  to  both  classes  of  pro- 
positions.* 

*  In  farlhor  illustration  of  what  is  said  above,  on  the  subject  of  postulates  and  of 
problems,  I  transcribe  with  pleasure,  a  short  passage  from  a  learned  and  interesting 
memoir,  just  published,  by  an  author  intimately  and  critically  conversant  with  the 
classical  remains  of  Greek  geometry. 

<:  The  description  of  an}'  geometrical  line  from  the  data  by  which  it  is  defined, 
u  must  always  be  assumed  as  possible,  and  is  admitted  as  the  legitimate  means  of 
"  a  geometrical  construction  ;  it  is  therefore  properly  regarded  as  a  postulate. 
11  Thus,  the  description  of  a  straight  line  and  of  a  circle  are  the  postulates  of  plane 
a  geometry  assumed  by  Euclid.  The  description  of  the  three  conic  sections,  avcord- 
"  ing  to  the  definitions  of  them,  must  also  be  regarded  as  postulates  ;  and  though  not 
c'<  formally  stated  like  those  of  Euclid,  are  in  truth  admitted  as  such  by  Appollonius, 
a  and  all  other  writers  on  this  branch  of  geometry.  The  same  principle  must  be  ex- 
*'  tended  to  all  superior  lines. 

'■  It  is  true,  however,  that  the  properties  of  such  superior  lines  may  be  treated  of, 
•'■  and  the  description  of  them  may  be  assumed  in  the  solution  of  problems,  without 
"  an  actual  delineation  of  them. — For  it  must  be  observed,  that  no  lines  whatever, 
wts  not  even  the  straight  line  or  circle,  can  be  truly  represented  to  the  senses  according 
"  fo  the  sti  ict  mathematical  definitions  :  but  this  by  no  means  affect?  the  theoretica' 


SECT.  III.]  OF    THE    HUMAN   M1NJ).  121 


II. 

Continuation  of  the  Subject. — How  far  it  is  true  that  all  Mathematical  Evidence  k 
resolvable  into  Identical  Propositions. 

I  had  occasion  to  take  notice,  in  the  first  section  of  the 
preceding  chapter,  of  a  theory  with  respect  to  the  nature  of 
mathematical  evidence,  very  different  from  that  which  I  have 
l)een  now  attempting  to  explain.  According  to  this  theory 
(originally,  I  believe,  proposed  by  Leibnitz)  we  are  taughtB 
that  all  mathematical  evidence  ultimately  resolves  into  the 
perception  of  identity  ;  the  innumerable  variety  of  proposi- 
tions which  have  been  discovered,  or  which  remain  to  be 
discovered  in  the  science,  being  only  diversified  expressions 
of  the  simple  formula,  a  ==  a.*  A  writer  of  great  eminence, 
both  as  a  mathematician  and  a  philosopher,  has  lately  given 
his  sanction,  in  the  strongest  terms,  to  this  doctrine  :  assert- 
ing, that  all  the  prodigies  performed  by  the  geometrician  are 
accomplished  by  the  constant  repetition  of  these  words, — 
the  same  is  the  same,  "  Le  geometre  avance  de  supposition 
"  en  supposition.  Et  retournant  sa  pensee  sous  mille  formes, 
"  c'est  en  repetant  sans  cesse,  le  nieme  est  le  meme,  qu'il 
"  opere  tous  ses  prodiges." 

As  this  account  of  mathematical  evidence  appears  to  me 
quite  irreconcilable  with  the  scope  of  the  foregoing  observa- 
tions, it  is  necessary,  before  proceeding  farther,  to  examine 
its  real  import  and  amount ;  and  what  the  circumstances 
are  from  which  it  derives  that  plausibility  which  it  has  been 
so  generally  supposed  to  possess.? 

"  conclusions  which  are  logically  deduced  from  such  definitions.  It  is  ©nl  v  when  ge- 
"  omelry  is  applied  to  practice,  either  in  mensuration,  or  in  the  arts  connected  with 
"  geometrical  principles,  that  accuracy  of  delineation  becomes  important." — See  an 
Account  of  the  Life  ami  writings  of  Robert  Simson,  M  D.  By  the  Rev.  William 
Trail,  LL.  D.    Published  by  G.  and  W.  JNicol,  London.  1812. 

*  It  is  more  than  probable,  that  this  theory  was  suggested  to  Leibnitz  by  some  very 
curious  observations  in  Aristotle's  Meta2^ysics,  Book  IV.  chap.  iii.  and  iv. 

t  I  must  here  observe,  injustice  to  my  friend  M.  Prevost,  that  the  two  dortrineS 
which  I  have  represented  in  the  above  paragraph  as  quite  irreconcilable,  seem  to  be 
regarded  by  him  as  not  only  consistent  with  each  oilier,  but  as  little  more  than  differ- 
ent modes  of  stating  the  same  proposition.  The  remarks  with  which  he  has  favoured 
VOL.  II.  16 


1£2  ELEMENTS    OF   THE   PHILOSOPHY        [CHAP.  U. 

That  all  mathematical  evidence  resolves  ultimately  into 
the  perception  of  identity,  has  been  considered  by  some  as 
a  consequence  of  the  commonly  received  doctrine,  which  re- 
presents the  axioms  of  Euclid  as  the  first  principles  of  all 
our  subsequent  reasonings  in  geometry.  Upon  this  view  of 
the  subject  I  have  nothing  to  offer,  in  addition  to  what  I  have 
already  stated.  The  argument  which  I  mean  to  combat  at 
present  i's  of  a  more  subtile  and  refined  nature  ;  and,  at  the 
same  time,  involves  an  admixture  of  important  truth,  which 
contributes  not  a  little  to  the  specious  verisimilitude  of  the 
conclusion.  It  is  founded  on  this  simple  consideration,  that 
the  geometrical  notions  of  equality  and  of  coincidence  are  the 
same  ;  and  that,  even  in  comparing  together  spaces  of  dif- 
ferent figures,  ail  our  conclusions  ultimately  lean,  with  their 
whoie  weight;  on  the  imaginary  application  of  one  triangle  to 
another ; — the  object  of  which  imaginary  application  is 
merely  to  identify  the  two  triangles  together,  in  every  circum- 
stance connected  both  with  magnitude  and  figure.* 

Of  the  justness  of  the  assumption  on  which  this  argument 
proceeds,  I  do  not  entertain  the  slightest  doubt.  Whoever 
has  the  curiosity  to  examine  any  one  theorem  in  the  elements 
of  plane  geometry,  in  which  different  spaces  are  compared 

me  on  this  point  will  be  found  in  the  Appendix  annexed  to  this  volume.  At  present, 
it  may  suffice  to  mention,  that  none  of  the  following  reasonings  apply  to  that  particu- 
lar view  of  the  question  which  he  has  taken.  Indeed,  I  consider  the  difference  of  opi- 
nion between  us,  as  to  the  subject  now  under  consideration,  as  chiefly  verbal.  On 
the  subject  of  the  preceding  article,  our  opinions  are  exactly  the  same.  See  Appen- 
dix. 

*  It  was  probably  with  a  view  to  the  establishment  of  this  doctrine,  that  some  fo- 
reign elementary  writers  have  lately  given  the  name  of  identical  triangles  to  such  as 
agree  with  each  other,  both  in  sides,  in  angles,  and  in  area.  The  differences  which 
may  exist  between  them  in  respect  of  place,  and  of  relative  position  (differences 
which  do  not  at  all  enter  into  the  reasonings  of  the  geometer)  seem  to  have  been  con- 
sidered as  of  so  little  account  in  discriminating  them  as  separate  objects  of  thought, 
that  it  has  been  concluded  they  only  form  one  and  the  same  triangle,  in  the  contempla- 
tion of  the  logician. 

This  idea  is  very  explicitly  staled,  more  than  once,  by  Aristotle  :  <5"*  «"  T* 
ircvov  £t>.  ■'  Those  things  are  equal  whose  quantity  is  the  same;"  (Me:  iv.<c.  16.) 
and  still  more  precisely  in  these  remarkable  words,  fv  rural?  q  tcoTug  evaTjj?  ; 
"  In  mathematical  quantities,  equality  is  identity."  (Met.  x.  c  3.) 

f*V>r  some  remarks  on  this  last  passage,  See  Note  (F.) 


SECT.  III.]  OP    THE    HUMAN    MIND.  123 

together,  will  easily  perceive,  that  the  demonstration,  when 
traced  back  to  its  first  principles,  terminates  in  the  fourth 
proposition  of  Euclid's  first  book  :  a  proposition  of  which 
the  proof  rests  entirely  on  a  supposed  application  of  the  one 
triangle  to  the  other.  In  the  case  of  equal  triangles  which  dif- 
fer in  figure,  this  expedient  of  ideal  superposition  cannot  be 
directly  and  immediately  employed  to  evince  their  equality ; 
but  the  demonstration  will  nevertheless  be  found  to  rest  at 
bottom  on  the  same  species  of  evidence.  In  illustration  of 
this  doctrine,  I  shall  only  appeal  to  the  thirty-seventh  propo- 
sition of  the  first  book,  in  which  it  is  proved  that  triangles 
on  the  same  base,  and  between  the  same  parallels,  are  equal ; 
a  theorem  which  appears,  from  a  very  simple  construction, 
to  be  only  a  few  steps  removed  from  the  fourth  of  the  same 
book,  in  which  the  supposed  application  of  the  one  triangle 
to  the  other,  is  the  only  medium  of  comparison  from  which 
their  equality  is  inferred. 

In  general,  it  seems  to  be  almost  self  evident,  that  the 
equality  of  two  spaces  can  be  demonstrated  only  by  shewing, 
either  that  the  one  might  be  applied  to  the  other,  so  that 
their  boundaries  should  exactly  coincide  ;  or  that  it  is  pos- 
sible, by  a  geometrical  construction,  to  divide  them  into 
compartments,  in  such  a  manner,  that  the  sum  of  parts  in  the 
one  may  be  proved  to  be  equal  to  the  sum  of  parts  in  the 
other,  upon  the  principle  of  superposition.  To  devise  the 
easiest  and  simplest  constructions  for  attaining  this  end,  is 
the  object  to  which  the  skill  and  invention  of  the  geometer 
is  chiefly  directed. 

Nor  is  it  the  geometer  alone  who  reasons  upon  this  prin- 
ciple. If  you  wish  to  convince  a  person  of  plain  understand- 
ing, who  is  quite  unacquainted  with  mathematics,  of  the  truth 
of  one  of  Euclid's  theorems,  it  can  only  be  done  by  exhibit- 
ing to  his  eye,  operations  exactly  analogous  to  those  which 
the  geometer  presents  to  the  understanding.  A  good  exam- 
ple of  this  occurs  in  the  sensible  or  experimental  illustration 
which  is  sometimes  given  of  the  forty-seventh  proposition  of 
Euclid's  first  book.     For  this  purpose,  a  card  is  cut  into  the 


124  ELEMENTS  OF  THE  PHILOSOPHY  [CHAP.  II. 

form  of  a  right  angled  triangle,  and  square  pieces  of  card  are 
adapted  to  the  different  sides  ;  after  which,  by  a  simple  and 
ingenious  contrivance,  the  different  squares  are  so  dissected, 
that  those  of  the  two  sides  are  made  to  cover  the  same  space 
with  the  square  of  the  hypothenuse.  In  truth,  this  mode  of 
comparison  by  a  superposition,  actual  or  ideal,  is  the  only  test 
of  equality  which  it  is  possible  to  appeal  to ;  and  it  is  from 
this  (as  seems  from  a  passage  in  Proclus  to  have  been  the 
opinion  of  Appollonius)  that,  in  point  of  logical  rigour,  the  de- 
finition of  geometrical  equality  should  have  been  taken.* 
The  subject  is  discussed  at  great  length,  and  with  much 
acuteness,  as  well  as  learning,  in  one  of  the  mathematicaJ 
lectures  of  Dr.  Barrow  ;  to  which  I  must  refer  those  readers 
who  may  wish  to  see  it  more  fully  illustrated. 

I  am  strongly  inclined  to  suspect,  that  most  of  the  writers 
who  have  maintained  that  all  mathematical  evidence  resolves 
ultimately  into  the  perception  of  identity,  have  had  a  secret 
reference,  in  their  own  minds,  to  the  doctrine  just  stated ; 
and  that  they  have  imposed  on  themselves  by  using  the  words 
identity  and  equality  as  literally  synonymous  and  convertible 
terms.  This  does  not  seem  to  be  at  all  consistent,  either  in 
point  of  expression  or  of  fact,  with  sound  logic.     When  it  is 

*  1  do  not  think,  however,  that  it  would  be  fair,  on  this  account,  to  censure  Euclid 
for  the  arrangement  which  he  has  adopted,  as  he  has  thereby  most  ingeniously  and 
dexterously  contrived  to  keep  out  of  the  view  of  the  student  some  very  puzzling  ques- 
tions, to  which  it  is  not  possible  to  give  a  satisfactory  answer  till  a  considerable  pro- 
gress has  been  made  in  the  elements.  When  it  is  stated  in  the  form  of  a  self-evident 
truth,  that  magnitudes  which  coincide,  or  which  exactly  fill  the  same  space,  are  equal 
to  one  another  ;  the  beginner  readily  yields  his  assent  to  the  proposition  ;  and  this  as~ 
sent,  without  going  any  farther,  is  all  that  is  required  in  any  of  the  demonstrations  of 
the  first  six  books,  whereas,  if  the  proposition  were  converted  into  a  definition,  by  say- 
ing, "  Equal  magnitudes  are  those  which  coincide,  or  which  exactly  fill  the  same 
"  space  ;"  the  question  would  immediately  occur,  Are  no  magnitudes  equal,  but  those 
to  which  this  test  of  equality  can  be  applied  ?  Can  the  relation  of  equality  not  subsist 
between  magnitudes  w  hich  differ  from  each  other  in  figure  ?  In  reply  to  this  question, 
it  would  be  necessary  to  explain  the  definition,  by  adding,  That  those  magnitudes 
likewise  are  said  to  be  equal,  which  are  capable  of  being  divided  or  dissected  in  such 
aniamer  that  the  parts  of  the  one  ma}'  severally  coincide  with  the  parts  of  the 
other  ; — a  conception  much  too  refined  and  complicated  for  the  generality  of  students 
at  their  first  outset ;  and  which,  if  it  were  fully  and  clearly  apprehended,  woujd 
plunge  them  at  once  into  the  profound  speculation  concerning  the  comparison  of  rec\ 
'llrn^ar  with  curvilinear  figures. 


SECT.  III.]  OP    THE    HUMAN    MIND.  125 

affirmed  (for  instance)  that  "  if  two  straight  lines  in  a  circle 
*'  intersect  each  other,  the  rectangle  contained  by  the  segments 
"  of  the  one  is  equal  to  the  rectangle  contained  by  the  segments 
"  of  the  other  ;"  can  it  with  any  propriety  be  said,  that  the  re- 
lation between  these  rectangles  may  be  expressed  by  the 
formula  a  =  a  ?  Or,  to  take  a  case  yet  stronger,  when  it  is 
affirmed,  that  "  the  area  of  a  circle  is  equal  to  that  of  a  tri- 
*}  angle  having  the  circumference  for  its  base,  and  the  radius 
f*  for  its  altitude  ;"  would  it  not  be  an  obvious  paralogism  to 
infer  from  this  proposition,  that  the  triangle  and  the  circle 
are  one  and  the  same  thing  ?  In  this  last  instance,  Dr.  Bar- 
row himself  has  thought  it  necessary,  in  order  to  reconcile 
the  language  of  Archimedes  with  that  of  Euclid,  to  have  re- 
course to  a  scholastic  distinction  between  actual  and  potential 
coincidence  ;  and,  therefore,  if  we  are  to  avail  ourselves  of 
the  principle  of  superposition,  in  defence  of  the  fashionable 
theory  concerning  mathematical  evidence,  we  must,  I  appre- 
hend, introduce  a  correspondent  distinction  between  actual 
and  potential  identity.* 

That  I  may  not  be  accused,  however,  of  misrepresenting 
*he  opinion  which  I  am  anxious  to  refute,  T  shall  state  it  in 
the  words  of  an  author,  who  has  made  it  the  subject  of  a  par- 
ticular dissertation  ;  and  who  appears  to  me  to  have  done  as 
much  justice  to  his  argument  as  any  of  its  other  defenders. 

"  Gmnes  mathematicorum  propositiones  sunt  identicae,  et 
4£  repraesentantur  hac  formula,  a  =  a.     Sunt  veritates  iden- 


*  "  Cum  demonstravit  Archimedes  circulum  sequari  rectangulo  triangulo  cujus  ha- 
c'  sis  radio  circuli,  rathotus  peripheric  exeequetur,  nil  ille,  siquis  propius  attendat, 
"  aliud  quicquam  quam  areatn  circuli  ceu  potygoni  regularis  indefinite  multa  latera 
P  hahentis  in  tot  dividi  posse  minutissima  triangula,  qure  lotidem  exilissimis  dicti  tri- 
"  anguli  irigohis  apquentur  ;  eorum  verd  triangulorum  aequalitas  e  sola  congruentia 
**  demonstralur  in  dementis.  Unde  consequenter  Archimedes  circuli  cum  triangulo 
•**  (sihi  quantum  vis  dissimili)  consrrnentiam  demonstravit. — Ita  congruentiae  nihil  ob- 
*'  stat  figurarum  dissimilitudo ;  veriim  sen  similes  sive  di>similes  sint,  modo  sequales, 
•"  semper  poterunt,  semper  pass  edebebunt  congruere.  Igitur  octavum  axioma  vel 
f*  nullo  nudo  com-ersum  valet,  aut  nniversaliter  convent  potest;  nullo  modo,  si  quae 
f  isthlc  habetur  congruentia  designed  actualem  congrwntiam ;  universim,  si  de  jiotert 
"i  tin.li  tanl&m  accipiatur." — LecHcmes  Mnthernaticce,  Lect.  V. 


126  ELEMENTS    OP    THE    PHILOSOPHY  [CHAP  II. 

"  ticae,  sub  varia  forma  express®,  imo  ipsum,  quod  dicitur 
"  contradictionis  principium,  vario  modo  enunciatum  et  in- 
"  volutum  ;  siquidem  omnes  hujus  generis  propositiones  re- 
li  vera  in  eo  continents.  Secundum  nostram  autem  intelli- 
"  gendi  facultatem  ea  est  propositionum  differentia,  quod 
"  quasdam  longa  ratiociniorum  serie,  alia  autem  breviore  via, 
"  ad  primum  omnium  principium  reducanlur,  et  in  illud  re- 
"  solvantur.  Sic  v.  g,  propositio  2  +  2=4  statim  hue  cedit 
"1  +  14-1  +  1  =  1  +  1  +  1  +  1  ;  i.  e.  idem  est  idem  ;  et 
"  proprie  loquendo,  hoc  modo  enunciari  debet.  Si  contin- 
"  gat,  adesse  vel  existere  quatuor  entia,  turn  existunt  qua- 
"  tuor  entia  ;  nam  de  esistentia  non  agunt  geometrse,  sed  ea 
"  hypothetic  tantum  subintelligitur.  Inde  summa  oritur  cer- 
"  titudo  ratiocinia  perspicienti  ;  observat  nempe  idearum 
"  identitatem  5  et  hasc  est  evidentia  assensum  immediate  co- 
"  gens,  quam  mathematicam  aut  geometricam  vocamus. 
"  Mathesi  tamen  sua  natura  priva  non  est  et  propria  ;  oritur 
"  etenim  ex  identitatis  perceptione,  quas  locum  habere  po- 
"  test,  etiamsi  ideas  non  reprassentent  extensum."* 

With  respect  to  this  passage  I  have  only  to  remark,  that 
the  author  confounds  two  things  essentially  different ; — the  na- 
ture of  the  truths  which  are  the  objects  of  a  science,  and  the 
nature  of  the  evidence  by  which  these  truths  are  established. 
Granting,  for  the  sake  of  argument,  that  all  mathematical 
propositions  may  be  represented  by  the  formula  a  =  a,  it 
would  not  therefore  follow,  that  every  step  of  the  reasoning 
leading  to  these  conclusions,  was  a  proposition  of  the  same 
nature  ;  and  that,  to  feel  the  full  force  of  a  mathematical  de- 
monstration, it  is  sufficient  to  be  convinced  of  this  maxim, 
that  every  thing  may  be  truly  predicated  of  itself  ;  or,  in  plain 

*  The  above  extract  (from  a  dissertation  printed  at  Berlin  in  1764)  has  long  had 
a  verv  extensive  circulation  in  this  country,  in  consequence  of  its  being  quoted  by  Dr. 
Beattie,  in  his  Essay  on  Truth,  (see  p.  221,  2d  edit )  As  the  learned  author  of  the 
essay  has  not  given  the  slightest  intimation  of  his  own  opinion  on  the  subject,  the  doc- 
trine in  question  has,  I  suspect,  been  considered  as  in  some  measure  sanctioned  by  his 
authority.  It  is  only  in  this  way  that  1  can  account  for  the  facility  with  which  it  ha*s 
been  admitted  bv  so  manv  of  our  northern  logicians. 


SECT.  III.}  OP   THE   HUSlAN   MIND.  127 

English,  that  the  same  is  the  same.  A  paper  written  in  cy- 
pher, and  the  interpretation  of  that  paper  by  a  skilful  decy- 
pherer,  may,  in  like  manner,  be  considered  as,  to  all  intents 
and  purposes,  one  and  the  same  thing.  They  are  so,  in  fact, 
just  as  much  as  one  side  of  an  algebraical  equation  is  the 
same  thing  with  the  other.  But  does  it  therefore  follow,  that 
the  whole  evidence  upon  which  the  art  of  decyphering  pro- 
ceeds, resolves  into  the  perception  of  identity  ? 

It  may  be  fairly  questioned,  too,  whether  it  can,  with  strict 
correctness,  be  said  even  of  the  simple  arithmetical  equation 
2  +  2  =  4,  that  it  may  be  represented  by  the  formula  a  =  a. 
The  one  is  a  proposition  asserting  the  equivalence  of  two  dif- 
ferent expressions  ; — to  ascertain  which  equivalence  may,  in 
numberless  cases,  be  an  object  of  the  highest  importance. 
The  other  is  altogether  unmeaning  and  nugatory,  and  can- 
'  not,  by  any  possible  supposition,  admit  of  the  slightest  ap- 
plication of  a  practical  nature.  What  opinion,  then,  shall  we 
form  of  the  proposition  a  =  a,  when  considered  as  the  repre- 
sentative of  such  a  formula  as  the  binomial  theorem  of  Sir 
Isaac  Newton  ?  When  applied  to  the  equation  2  +  2=4 
(which,  from  its  extreme  simplicity  and  familiarity,  is  apt  to 
be  regarded  in  the  light  of  an  axiom)  the  paradox  does  not 
appear  to  be  so  manifestly  extravagant  ;  but,  in  the  other 
case,  it  seems  quite  impossible  to  annex  to  it  any  meaning 
whatever.* 

*  The  foregoing  reasonings  are  not  meant  as  a  refutation  of  the  arguments  urged 
by  any  one  author  in  support  of  the  doctrine  in  question  ;  but  merely  as  an  examina- 
tion of  those  by  which  I  have  either  heard  it  defended,  or  from  which  I  conceived 
that  it  might  possibly  derive  its  verisimilitude  in  the  judgment  of  those  who  have 
adopted  it.  The  arguments  which  I  have  supposed  to  be  alleged  by  its  advocates,  are 
so  completely  independent  of  each  other,  that,  instead  of  being  regarded  as  different 
premises  leading  to  the  same  conclusion,  they  amount  only  to  so  many  different  in- 
terpretations of  the  same  verbal  proposition  : — a  circumstance  which,  I  cannot  help 
thinking,  affords  of  itself  no  slight  proof,  that  this  proposition  has  been  commonly 
stated  in  terms  too  general  and  too  ambiguous  for  a  logical  principle.  What  a  strange 
inference  has  been  drawn  from  it  by  no  less  a  philosopher  than  Diderot  !  "  Interrogez 
"  des  mathematiciens  de  bonne  foi,  et  ils  vous  avoueront  que  leurs  propositions  sont 
"  toul«s  identique*,  et  que  taut  de  volumes  sur  le  cercle,  par  exemple,  se  reduisent  & 
"  nousrepeter  en  cent  milie  fuqons  differentes,que  e'esi  une  figure ou  toutes  les  ligne* 
H  tirees  du  centre  a  la  circonference  sont  egales.  Nous  ne.  savons  done presquerien^ 
Lettrc  sur  les  Aveugles. 


228  ELEMENTS    OP    THE    PHILOSOPHY  [CHAP,  ft 

I  should  scarcely  have  been  induced  to  dwell  so  long  on 
this  theory  of  Leibnitz  concerning  mathematical  evidence,  if 
I  had  not  observed  among  some  late  logicians  (particularly 
among  the  followers  of  Condillac)  a  growing  disposition  to 
extend  it  to  all  the  different  sorts  of  evidence  resulting  from 
the  various  employments  of  our  reasoning  powers.  Condil- 
lac himself  states  his  own  opinion  on  this  point  with  the  most 
perfect  confidence.  "  ^evidence  de  raison  corisiste  uniquement 
*'  dans  Videntite  :  c'est  ce  que  nous  avons  demontre.  II  faut 
"  que  cette  verite  soit  bien  simple  pour  avoir  echappe  a  tous 
•*'  les  philosophes,  quoiqu'ils  eussent  tant  d'interet  a  s'assurer 
"  de  l'evidence,  dont  ils  avoient  continuellement  le  mot  dans, 
"  la  bouche."* 

The  demonstration  here  alluded  to  is  extremely  concise  j 
and  if  we  grant  the  two  data  on  which  it  proceeds,  must  be 
universally  acknowledged  to  be  irresistible.  The  first  is, 
"  That  the  evidence  of  every  mathematical  equation  is  that 
"  of  identity :"  The  second,  u  That  what  are  called,  in  the 
"  other  sciences,  propositions  or  judgments,  are,  at  bottom, 
*'  precisely  of  the  same  nature  with  equations." — But  it  is 
proper,  on  this  occasion,  to  let  our  author  speak  for  himself. 

"  Mais,  dira-t-on,  c'est  ainsi  qu'on  raisonne  en  mathema- 
•"  tiques,  ou  le  raisonnement  se  fait  avec  des  equations.  En 
ei  sera-t-il  de  meme  dans  les  autres  sciences,  ou  le  raisonne- 
*'•  ment  se  fait  avec  des  propositions  ?  Je  reponds  qu'  equa- 
"  tions-,  propositions,  jugemens,  sont  au  fond  la  meme  chose, 
c*  et  que  par  consequent  on  raisonne  de  la  meme  maniere 
e-  dans  toutes  les  sciences. "t 

Upon  this  demonstration  I  have  no  comment  to  offer.  The 
truth  of  the  first  assumption  has  been  already  examined  at 

*  La  Logique,  Chap.  IX. 

On  another  occasion,  Condillac  expresses  himself  thus  :  "  Tout  le  systeme  des 
''■  conn.iissances  humaines  peut  etre  rendu  par  une  expression  plus  abregee  et  tout* 
*'  a-fait  identique  :  les  sensations  sont  des  sensations.  Si  nous  pouvions,  dans  toutes 
"  les  spiences,  suivre  egalement  la  generation  de-  idees,  et.  saisir  le  vrai  systeme  des 
"  choses,  nous  verrions  d'une  verite  naitre  toutes  les  auttes,  et  nous  trouverions  I 'ex 
"  pression  a  br§gee  de  tout  ce  que  nous  saurions,  dans  cette  proposition  identique': 
"  le  meme  est  le  mime." 

i  La  Logique,  Chap  VIII 


SECT.  III.]  OP    THE    HUMAN   MIND.  129 

sufficient  length  ;  and  the  second  (which  is  only  Locke's 
very  erroneous  account  of  judgment,  stated  in  terms  incom- 
parably more  exceptionable)  is  too  puerile  to  admit  of  refu- 
tation. It  is  melancholy  to  reflect,  that  a  writer  who,  in  his 
earlier  years,  had  so  admirably  unfolded  the  mighty  influ- 
ence of  language  upon  our  speculative  conclusions,  should 
have  left  behind  him,  in  one  of  his  latest  publications,  so 
memorable  an  illustration  of  his  own  favourite  doctrine. 

It  was  manifestly  with  a  view  to  the  more  complete  esta- 
blishment of  the  same  theory,  that  Condi llac  undertook  a 
work,  which  has  appeared  since  his  death,  under  the  title  of 
La  Langue  des  Calculs  ;  and  which,  we  are  told  by  the  edi- 
tors, was  only  meant  as  a  prelude  to  other  labours,  more  in- 
teresting and  more  difficult.  From  the  circumstances  which 
they  have  stated,  it  would  seem  that  the  intention  of  the  au- 
thor was  to  extend  to  all  the  other  branches  of  knowledge, 
inferences  similar  to  those  which  he  has  here  endeavoured  to 
establish  with  respect  to  mathematical  calculations  ;  and 
much  regret  is  expressed  by  his  friends,  that  he  had  not 
lived  to  accomplish  a  design  of  such  incalculable  importance 
to  human  happiness.  I  believe  I  may  safely  venture  to  as- 
sert, that  it  was  fortunate  for  his  reputation  he  proceeded  no 
farther  ;  as  the  sequel  must,  from  the  nature  of  the  sub- 
ject, have  afforded,  to  every  competent  judge,  an  experimen- 
tal and  palpable  proof  of  the  vagueness  and  fallaciousness  of 
those  views  by  which  the  undertaking  was  suggested.  In 
his  posthumous  volume,  the  mathematical  precision  and  per- 
spicuity of  his  details  appear  to  a  superficial  reader  to  re- 
flect some  part  of  their  own  light  on  the  general  reasonings 
with  which  they  are  blended;  while,  to  better  judges,  these 
reasonings  come  recommended  with  many  advantages,  and 
with  much  additional  authority,  from  their  coincidence  with 
the  doctrines  of  the  Leibnitzian  school. 

It  would  probably  have  been  not  a  little  mortifying  to  this 
most  ingenious  and  respectable  philosopher,  to  have  disco- 
vered, that,  in  attempting  to  generalize  a  very  celebrated 
theory  of  Leibnitz,  he  had  stumbled  upon  an  obsolete  con- 

VOL.    II.  17 


130  ELEMENTS    OF    THE    PHILOSOPHY        [CHAP.  If, 

ceit,  started  in  this  island  upwards  of  a  century  before. 
"  When  a  man  reasoneth,"  says  Hobbes,  "  he  does  nothing 
"  else  but  conceive  a  sum  total,  from  addition  of  parcels  ;  or 
"  conceive  a  remainder  from  subtraction  of  one  sum  from  an- 
"  other  ;  which  (if  it  be  done  by  words)  is  conceiving  of  the 
"  consequence  of  the  names  of  all  the. parts,  to  the  name  of 
"  the  whole  ;  or  from  the  names  of  the  whole  and  one  part,  to 
"  the  name  of  the  other  part.  These  operations  are  not  in- 
"  cident  to  numbers  only,  but  to  all  manner  of  things  that 
"  can  be  added  together,  and  taken  one  out  of  another.  In 
"  sum,  in  what  matter  soever  there  is  place  for  addition  and 
"  subtraction,  there  also  is  place  for  reason  ;  and  where  these 
"  have  no  place,  there  reason  has  nothing  at  all  to  do. 

"  Out  of  all  which  we  may  define  what  that  is  which  is 
(i  meant  by  the  word  reason,  when  we  reckon  it  amongst  the 
"  faculties  of  the  mind.  For  reason,  in  this  sense,  is  no- 
"  thing  but  reckoning  (that  is,  adding  and  subtracting)  of  the 
"  consequences  of  general  names  agreed  upon,  for  the  mark- 
V  ing  and  signifying  of  our  thoughts  ; — I  say  marking  them, 
M  when  we  reckon  by  ourselves  ;  and  signifying,  when  we 
"  demonstrate,  or  approve  our  reckonings  to  other  men."* 

Agreeably  to  this  definition,  Hobbes  has  given  to  the  first 
part  of  his  elements  of  philosophy,  the  title  of  Computatio, 
sive  Logica  ;  evidently  employing  these  two  words  as  pre- 
cisely synonymous.  From  this  tract  I  shall  quote  a  short 
paragraph,  not  certainly  on  account  of  its  intrinsic  value, 
but  in  consequence  of  the  interest  which  it  derives  from  its 
coincidence  with  the  speculations  of  some  of  our  contempo- 
raries. I  transcribe  it  from  the  Latin  edition,  as  the  anti- 
quated English  of  the  author  is  apt  to  puzzle  readers  not  fa- 
miliarized to  the  peculiarities  of  his  philosophical  diction. 

"  Per  ratiocinationem  autem  intelligo  computationem. 
"  Computare  vero  est  plurium  rerum  simul  additarum  sum- 
"  mam  colligere,  vel  una  re  ab  alia  detractd,  cognoscere  resi- 
"  duum.     Ratiocinari  igilur  idem  est  quod  addere  et  subtra- 

-  Leviathan.  Chap.  [v. 


•ECT.    JII.]  OP    THE    HUMAN"   MIN»,  131 

"  here,  vel  si  quis  adjungat  his  multiplicare  et  dividere,  non 
"  abnuam,  cum  multiphcatio  idem  sit  quod  aequalium  additio, 
"  divisio  quod  aequalium  quoties  fieri  potest  subtractio.  Re- 
"  cidit  itaque  ratiocinatio  omnis  ad  duas  operationes  animi, 
"  additionem  et  sab  tract  ionem.*  How  wonderfully  does  this 
jargon  agree  with  the  assertion  of  Condillac,  that  all  equa- 
tions are  propositions,  and  all  propositions  equations  ! 

These  speculations,  however,  of  Condillac  and  of  Hobbes 
relate  to  reasoning  in  general  ;  and  it  is  with  mathematical 
reasoning  alone,  that  we  are  immediately  concerned  at  pre- 
sent. That  the  peculiar  evidence  with  which  this  is  accom- 
panied is  not  resolvable  into  the  perception  of  identity,  has, 
I  flatter  myself,  been  sufficiently  proved  in  the  beginning  of 
this  article  ;  and  the  plausible  extension  by  Condillac  of  the 
very  same  theory  to  our  reasonings  in  all  the  different 
branches  of  moral  science,  affords  a  strong  additional  pre- 
sumption in  favour  of  our  conclusion. 

From  this  long  digression,  into  which  I  have  been  insensi- 
bly led  by  the  errors  of  some  illustrious  foreigners  concern- 
ing the  nature  of  mathematical  demonstration,  I  now  return 
to  a  further  examination  of  the  distinction  between  sciences 
which  rest  ultimately  on  facts,  and  those  in  which  definitions 
qy  hypotheses  are  the  sole  principles  of  our  reasonings. 

III. 

(Continuation  of  the  Subject. — Evidence  of  the  Mechanical  Philosophy,  not  to  be  con- 
founded with  that  which  is  properly  called  Demonstrative  or  Mathematical. — Op- 
posite Error  of  some  late  Writers. 

Next  to  geometry  and  arithmetic,  in  point  of  evidence  and 
certainty,  is  that  branch  of  general  physics  which  is  now 
called  mechanical  philosophy  ; — a  science  in  which  the  pro- 

*  The  l^ogica  of  Hobbes  has  been  lately  translate  into  French  under  the  title  of 
Galcul,  ou  Logique,  by  M.  Destutt-Tiacy.  It  is  annexed  to  the  third  volume  of  his 
Eleineiis  d'ldeclogie,  where  it  is  honoured  with  the  highest  eulogies  by  the  ingenious 
translator.  "  L'ouvrage  en  masse,"  he  observes  in  one  passage,  "  merite  d*etre  re* 
"  garde  comme  un  produit  precieux  des  meditations  de  Bacon  et  de  Des  Cartes  sur 
<'  le  systeme  d'Aristote,  et  comme  le  gorme  des  progre«  nlterieures  de  la  science." 
DiscPrSl.  p.  117. 


132  ELEMENTS    OF    THE    PHILOSOPHY  [CHAP.  II. 

gress  of  discovery  has  been  astonishingly  rapid,  during  the 
course  of  the  last  century  ;  and  which,  in  the  systematical 
concatenation  and  filiation  of  its  elementary  principles,  ex- 
hibits every  day  more  and  more  of  that  logical  simplicity 
and  elegance  which  we  admire  in  the  works  of  the  Greek 
mathematicians.  It  may,  I  think,  be  fairly  questioned, 
whether,  in  this  department  of  knowledge,  the  affectation  of 
mathematical  method  has  not  been  already  carried  to  an  ex- 
cess ;  the  essential  distinction  between  mechanical  and 
mathematical  truths  being,  in  many  of  the  physical  systems 
which  have  lately  appeared  on  the  Continent,  studiously  kept 
out  of  the  reader's  view,  by  exhibiting  both,  as  nearly  as 
possible,  in  the  same  form.  A  variety  of  circumstances,  in- 
deed, conspire  to  identify  in  the  imagination,  and,  of  conse- 
quence, to  assimilate  in  the  mode  of  their  statement,  these 
two  very  different  classes  of  propositions  ;  but  as  this  assimi- 
lation (beside  its  obvious  tendency  to  involve  experimental 
facts  in  metaphysical  mystery)  is  apt  occasionally  to  lead  to 
very  erroneous  logical  conclusions,  it  becomes  the  more  ne- 
cessary, in  proportion  as  it  arises  from  a  natural  bias,  to  point 
out  the  causes  in  which  it  has  originated,  and  the  limitations 
with  which  it  ought  to  be  understood. 

The  following  slight  remarks  will  sufficiently  explain  my 
general  ideas  on  this  important  article  of  logic. 

1.  As  the  study  of  the  mechanical  philosophy  is,  in  a  great 
measure,  inaccessible  to  those  who  have  not  received  a  regu- 
lar mathematical  education,  it  commonly  happens,  that  a 
taste  for  it  is,  in  the  first  instance,  grafted  on  a  previous  at- 
tachment to  the  researches  of  pure  or  abstract  mathematics. 
Hence  a  natural  and  insensible  transference  to  physical  pur- 
suits, of  mathematical  habits  of  thinking ;  and  hence  an  al- 
most unavoidable  propensity  to  give  to  the  former  science, 
that  systematical  connection  in  all  its  various  conclusions, 
which,  from  the  nature  of  its  first  principles,  is  essential  to 
the  latter,  but  which  can  never  belong  to  any  science,  which 
has  its  foundations  laid  in  facts  collected  from  experience  and 
observation. 


SECT.  III.]  ©F    THE    HUMAN    MIND.  133 

2.  Another  circumstance,  which  has  co-operated  power- 
fully with  the  former  in  producing  the  same  effect,  is  that 
proneness  to  simplification  which  has  misled  the  mind,  more 
or  less,  in  all  its  researches  ;  and  which,  in  natural  philoso- 
phy, is  peculiarly  encouraged  by  those  beautiful  analogies 
which  are  observable  among  different  physical  phenomena — 
analogies,  at  the  same  time,  which,  however  pleasing  to  the 
fancy,  cannot  always  be  resolved  by  our  reason  into  one  ge- 
neral law.  In  a  remarkable  analogy,  for  example,  which  pre- 
sents itself  between  the  equality  of  action  and  re-action  in  the 
collision  of  bodies,  and  what  obtains  in  their  mutual  attrac- 
tions, the  coincidence  is  so  perfect,  as  to  enable  us  to  compre- 
hend all  the  various  facts  in  the  same  theorem  :  and  it  is  diffi- 
cult to  resist  the  temptation  which  this  theorem  seems  to  offer 
to  our  ingenuity,  of  attempting  to  trace  it,  in  both  cases,  to 
some  common  principle.  Such  trials  of  theoretical  skill  I 
would  not  be  understood  to  censure  indiscriminately  ;  but,  in 
the  present  instance,  I  am  fully  persuaded,  that  it  is  at  once 
more  unexceptionable  in  point  of  sound  logic,  and  more  sa- 
tisfactory to  the  learner,  to  establish  the  fact,  in  particular 
cases,  by  an  appeal  to  experiment ;  and  to  state  the  law  of 
action  and  re-action  in  the  collision  of  bodies,  as  well  as  that 
which  regulates  the  mutual  tendencies  of  bodies  towards  each, 
other,  merely  as  general  rules  which  have  been  obtained  by 
induction,  and  which  are  found  to  hold  invariably  as  far  as 
our  knowledge  of  nature  extends.* 

*  It  is  observed  by  Mr.  Robison,  in  his  Elements  of  Mechanical  Philosophy,  that 
"  Sir  Isaac  Newton,  in  the  general  scholium  on  the  laws  of  motion,  seems  to  consi- 
"  der  ihe  equality  of  action  and  re-action,  as  an  axiom  deduced  from  the  relations  of 
"ideas.  But  this,"  says  Mr  Robison,  "  seems  doubtful.  Because  a  magnet  causes 
"  the  iron  to  approach  towards  it,  it  does  not  appear  that  we  necessarily  suppose  that 
"  iron  also  attracts  the  magnet."  In  confirmation  of  this,  he  remarks,  that  notwith- 
standing the  previous  conclusions  of  Wallis,  Wren,  and  Huyghens,  about  the  mutual, 
equal,  and  contrary  action  of  solid  bodies  in  their  collisions,  "  Newton  himself  only 
"  presumed  that,  because  the  sun  attracted  the  planets,  these  also  attracted  the  sun  ;  and 
"  that  he  is  at  much  pains  to  point  out  phenomena  to  astronomers,  by  which  this  may 
"  be  proved,  when  the  art  of  observation  shall  be  sufficiently  perfected.''  According- 
ly, Mr.  Robison,  with  great  propriety,  contents  himself  with  stating  this  thi'd  law 
of  motion,  as  a  fact  "  with  respect  to  all  bodies  on  which  we  can  make  experiment  or 
u  observation  fit  for  deciding  the  question." 

In  the  very  next  paragraph,  however,  he  proceeds  thus :  u  As  it  is  an  universal 


134  ELEMENTS    ©P    THE  PHILOSOPHY  [CHAP.  H 

An  additional  example  may  be  useful  for  the  illustration  of 
the  same  subject.  It  is  well  known  to  be  a  general  princi- 
ple in  mechanics,  that  when,  by  means  of  any  machine,  two 
heavy  bodies  counterpoise  each  other,  and  are  then  made  to 
move  together,  the  quantities  of  motion  with  which  one  de- 
scends, and  the  other  ascends  perpendicularly,  are  equal. 
This  equilibrium  bears  such  a  resemblance  to  the  case  of 
two  moving  bodies  stopping  each  other,  when  they  meet  to- 
gether with  equal  quantities  of  motion,  that,  in  the  opinion  of 
many  writers,  the  cause  of  an  equilibrium  in  the  several  ma- 
chines is  sufficiently  explained,  by  remarking,  "  that  a  body 
"  always  loses  as  much  motion  as  it  communicates."  Hence 
it  is  inferred,  that  when  two  heavy  bodies  are  so  circum- 
stanced, that  one  cannot  descend  without  causing  the  other 
to  ascend  at  the  same  time,  and  with  the  same  quantity  of 
motion,  both  of  these  bodies  must  necessarily  continue  at 
rest.  But  this  reasoning,  however  plausible  it  may  seem  to 
be  at  first  sight,  is  by  no  means  satisfactory  ;  for  (as  Dr. 
Hamilton  has  justly  observed*)  when  we  say,  that  one  body 
communicates  its  motion  to  another,  we  must  suppose  the  mo- 
tion to  exist,  first  in  the  one,  and  afterwards  in  the  other ; 

(t  law,  we  cannot  rid  ourselves  of  the  persuasion  that  it  depends  on  some  general  prin- 
ciple which  influences  all  the  matter  in  the  universe ;" — to  which  observation  he 
subjoins  a  conjecture  or  frypothesis  concerning  'he  nature  of  this  principle  or  cause. 
For  an  outline  of  his  theory  I  must  refer  to  his  own  statement.  See  Elements  of 
Mechanical  Philosophy,  Vol.  I.  pp.  124,  125,  126. 

Of  the  fallaciousness  of  synthetical  reasonings  concerning  physical  phenomena, 
there  cannot  be  a  stronger  proof,  than  the  diversity  of  opinion  among  the  most  emi- 
nent philosophers  with  respect  to  the  species  of  evidence  on  which  the  third  law  of 
motion  rests.  On  this  point,  a  direct  opposition  may  be  remarked  in  the  views  of  Sir 
Isaac  Newton,  and  of  his  illustrious  friend  and  commentator,  Mr.  Maclaurin  :  the  for-^ 
mer  secmin^  to  lean  to  the  supposition,  that  it  is  a  corrollary  deducible  a  priori  from 
abstract  principles  ;  while  the  latter  (manifestly  considering  it  as  the  effect  of  an  ar- 
bitrary arrangement)  strongly  recommends  it  to  the  attention  of  those  who  delight  in 
the  investigation  of  final  causes  (a)  My  own  idea  is,  tha',  in  the  present  state  of  our 
Lnou  ledge,  it  is  at  once  more  safe  and  more  logical,  to  consider  it  merely  as  an  ex- 
perimental truth  ;  without  venturing  to  decide  positively  on  either  side  of  the  question 
As  to  the  doctrine  of  final  causes,  it  fortunately  stands  in  need  of  no  aid  from  such  du- 
bious speculations. 

(a)  Account  of  Newton's  Philosophical  Discoveries.    Book  II.  Chap.  2.  §  28. 

-  See  Philosophical  Essays,  by  Hugh  Hamilton,  D.  D.  Professor  of  Philosophy  in 
the  University  of  Dublin,  p.  135.  et  seq.  3d  edit,  (London,  1772.) 


§flBT.  Ill  J  0F    THE    HUMAN   MIND.1  135 

whereas,  in  the  case  of  the  machine,  the"  ascent  of  the  one 
body  cannot,  by  any  conceivable  refinement,  be  ascribed  to 
a  communication  of  motion  from  the  body  which  is  descend- 
ing at  the  same  moment ;  and,  therefore,  (admitting  the  truth 
of  the  general  law  which  obtains  in  the  collision  of  bodies,) 
we  might  suppose,  that  in  the  machine,  the  superior  weight 
of  the  heavier  body  would  overcome  the  lighter,  and  cause 
it  to  move  upwards  with  the  same  quantity  of  motion  with 
whick  itself  moves  downwards.  In  perusing  a  pretended 
demonstration  of  this  sort,  a  student  is  dissatisfied  and  puz- 
zled ;  not  from  the  difficulty  of  the  subject,  which  is  obvious 
to  every  capacity,  but  from  the  illogical  and  inconclusive 
reasoning  to  which  his  assent  is  required.* 

3.  To  these  remarks  it  may  be  added,  that  even  when  one 
proposition  in  natural  philosophy  is  logically  deducible 
from  another,  it  may  frequently  be  expedient,  in  communi- 
cating the  elements  of  the  science,  to  illustrate  and  confirm 
the  consequence,  as  well  as  the  principle,  by  experiment. 
This  I  should  apprehend  to  be  proper,  wherever  a  conse- 
quence is  inferred  from  a  principle  less  familiar  and  intelli- 
gible than  itself  ;  a  thing  which  must  occasionally  happen  in 
physics,  from  the  complete  incorporation  (if  I  may  use  the  ex- 
pression) which,  in  modern  times,  has  taken  place  between 
physical  truths,  and  the  discoveries  of  mathematicians.  The 
necessary  effect  of  this  incorporation  was,  to  give  to  natural 
philosophy  a  mathematical  form,  and  to  systematize  its  con- 
clusions, as  far  as  possible,  agreeably  to  rules  suggested  by 
mathematical  method. 


*  The  following  observation  of  Dr.  Hamilton  places  this  question  in  its  true  point 
of  view.  "  How  ever,  as  the  theorem  above-mentioned  is  a  very  elegant  one,  it  ought 
u  certainly  to  be  taken  notice  of  in  every  treatise  of  mechanics,  and  may  serve  as  a 
"  very  good  index  of  an  (equilibrium  in  all  machines  ;  but  1  do  not  think  that  we  can 
"  from  thence,  or  from  any  one  general  principle,  explain  the  nature  and  effects  of  all 
"  the  mechanic  powers  in  a  satisfactory  manner." 

To  the  same  purpose,  it  is  remarked  by  Mr.  Maclaurin,  that  "  though  it  be  useful 
^  and  agreeable,  to  observe  how  uniformly  this  principle  prevails  in  engines  of  every 
"  sort,  throughout  the  whole  of  mechanics,  in  all  cases  where  an  (equilibrium  takes 
*'  place  ;  yet  that  it  would  nofbe  right  to  rest  the  evidence  of  so  important  a  doctrine 
Ct  upon  a  proof  of  this  kuid  only." — Jiccmint  of  Newton's  D'scovcries.  B.  II .  c.  8. 


t$6  ELEMENTS    OP    THE    PHILOSOPHY       [CHAP.    II. 

In  pure  mathematics,  where  the  truths  which  we  investi- 
gate are  all  co  existent  in  point  of  time,  it  is  universally  al- 
lowed, that  one  proposition  it  said  to  be  a  consequence  of 
another,  only  with  a  reference  to  our  established  arrange- 
ments. Thus  all  the  properties  of  the  circle  might  be  as 
rigorously  deduced  from  any  one  general  property  of  the 
curve,  as  from  the  equality  of  the  radii.  But  it  does  not, 
therefore,  follow,  that  all  these  arrangements  would  be  equally 
convenient ;  on  the  contrary,  it  is  evidently  useful,  and  indeed 
necessary,  to  lead  the  mind,  as  far  ast  he  thing  is  practicable, 
from  what  is  simple  to  what  is  more  complex.  The  misfor- 
tune is,  that  it  seems  impossible  to  carry  this  rule  universally 
into  execution  :  and,  accordingly,  in  the  most  elegani  geome- 
trical treatises  which  have  yet  appeared,  instances  occur,  in 
which  consequences  are  deduced  from  principles  more  com- 
plicated than  themselves.  Such  inversions,  however,  of  what 
may  justly  be  regarded  as  the  natural  order,  must  always  be 
felt  by  the  author  as  a  subject  of  regret  ;  and,  in  proportion 
to  their  frequency,  they  detract  both  from  the  beauty  and 
from  the  didactic  simplicity  of  his  general  design. 

The  same  thing  oiten  happens  in  the  elementary  doctrines 
of  natural  philosophy.  A  very  obvious  example  occurs  in 
the  different  demonstrations  given  by  writers  on  mechanics, 
from  the  resolution  of  forces,  of  the  fundamental  proposition 
concerning  the  lever  ; — demonstrations  in  which  the  propo- 
sition, even  in  the  simple  case  when  the  directions  of  the 
forces  arc  supposed  to  be  parallel,  is  inferred  from  a  process 
of  reasoning  involving  one  of  the  most  refined  principles  em- 
ployed in  the  mechanical  philosoph}'.  I  do  not  object  to 
this  arrangement  as  illogical  ;  nor  do  I  presume  to  say  that 
it  is  injudicious.*     1  would  only  suggest  the  propriety,  in 

s  In  sortie  of  these  demonstrations,  however,  there  is  a  logical  inconsistency  so  glar- 
ing, that  I  canno-  resist  the  temptation  of  pointing  it  out  here,  as  a  good  instance  of 
that  undue  predilection  for  mathematical  evidence,  in  the  exposition  of  physical  prin- 
ciples, which  is  conspicuous  in  many  elemental'  treatises.  I  allude  to  those  demon- 
strations of  the  property  of  the  lever,  in  which,  after  attempting  to  prove  the  general 
theorem,  on  the  supposition  that  the  directions  of  the  forces  meet  in  a  point,  the  same 
conclusion  is  extended  to  the  simple  case  in  which  these  directions  are  parallel,  by 


SECT.  III.]  6$  THE   HUMAN  MIND.  1 37 

such  instances,  of  confirming  and  illustrating  the  conclusion, 
by  an  appeal  to  experiment  ;  an  appeal  which,  in  natural 
philosophy,  possesses  an  authority  equal  to  that  which  is  ge- 
nerally, but  very  improperly,  considered  as  a  mathematical 
demonstration  of  physical  truths.  In  pure  geometry,  no  re- 
ference to  the  senses  can  be  admitted,  but  in  the  way  of 
illustration  ;  and  any  such  reference,  in  the  most  trifling  step 
of  a  demonstration,  vitiates  the  whole.  But,  in  natural  phi- 
losophy, all  our  reasonings  must  be  grounded  on  principles 
for  which  no  evidence  but  that  of  sense  can  be  obtained  ; 
and  the  propositions  which  we  establish,  differ  from  each 
other  only  as  they  are  deduced  from  such  principles  imme- 
diately, or  by  the  intervention  of  a  mathematical  demonstra- 
tion. An  experimental  proof,  therefore,  of  any  particular 
physical  truth,  when  it  can  be  conveniently  obtained,  al- 
though it  may  not  always  be  the  most  elegant  or  the  most 
expedient  way  of  introducing  it  to  the  knowledge  of  the  stu- 
dent, is  as  rigorous  and  as  satisfactory  as  any  other  ;  for  the 
intervention  of  a  process  of  mathematical  reasoning  can  ne- 
ver bestow  on  our  conclusions  a  greater  degree  of  certainty 
than  our  principles  possessed.* 

the  fiction  (for  it  deserves  no  other  name)  of  conceiving  parallel  lines  to  meet  at  an 
infinite  distance,  or  to  form  with  each  other  an  angle  infinitely  small.  It  is  strange, 
that  such  a  proof  should  ever  have  been  thought  more  satisfactory  than  the  direct  evi- 
dence of  our  senses.  How  much  more  reasonable  and  pleasing  to  begin  with  the 
simpler  ca?e,  (which  may  be  easily  brought  to  (he  test  of  experiment,)  and  then  to  de- 
duce from  it,  by  the  resolution  of  forces,  the  general  proposition  ?  Even  Dr.  Hamil- 
ton himself,  who  has  treated  of  the  mechanical  powers  with  much  ingenuity,  seems 
to  have  imagined,  that  by  demonstrating  the  theorem,  in  all  its  cases,  from  the  com- 
position and  resolution  of  forces  alone,  he  had  brought  the  whole  subject  within  the 
compass  of  pure  geometry.  It  could  scarcely,  however,  (one  should  think,)  have 
escai  ed  him,  that  evary  valid  demonstration  of  t!i2  composition  offerees  must  neces- 
sarily assume  as  a  fxct,  that  "  when  a  body  is  acted  upon  by  a  force  parallel  to  a 
"  straight  line  given  in  position,  this  force  has  no  effect,  either  to  accelerate  or  to  re- 
"  tard  the  progress  of  the  body  towards  that  line."  Is  not  this  fact  much  farther  re- 
moved from  common  observation  than  the  fundamental  property  of  the  lever,  which 
is  fiim  i  liar  to  every  peasant,  and  even  to  every  savage?  And  yet  the  same  author 
objects  to  the  demonstration  of  Huyghens,  that  it  depends  upon  a  principle,  which, 
(he  says)  ought  not  to  be  granted  on  this  occasion,— that  "  when  two  equal  bodies 
"  are  placed  on  the  arms  of  a  lever,  that  which  is  farthest  from  U\c  fulcrum  will  pre- 
"  ponderate."' 

*  Several  of  the  foregoing  remarks  were  suggested  by  certain  peculiarities  of  opi- 
nion relative  to  the  distinct  provinces  of  experimental  and  of  mathematical  evidence 
VOL.    II.  18 


138  ELEMENTS   OP   THE    PHILOSOPHY  [CHAP.  II. 

I  have  been  led  to  enlarge  on  these  topics  by  that  unquali- 
fied application  of  mathematical  method  to  physics,  which 
has  been  fashionable  for  many  years  past  among  foreign 
writers  ;  and  which  seems  to  have  originated  chiefly  in  the 
commanding  influence  which  the  genius  and  learning  of  Leib- 
nitz have  so  long  maintained  over  the  scientific  taste  of  most 
European  nations.*     In  an  account,  lately  published,  of  the 

in  the  study  of  physics,  which  were  entertained  by  my  learned  and  excellent  friend, 
the  late  Mr.  Robison.  Though  himself  a  most  enlightened  and  zealous  advocate  for 
the  doctrine  of  final  causes,  he  is  well  known  to  have  formed  his  scientific  taste  chief- 
ly upon  the  mechanical  philosophers  of  the  Continent,  and,  in  consequence  of  this  cir- 
cumstance, to  have  undervalued  experiment,  wherever  a  possibility  offered  of  intro- 
ducing mathematical,  or  even  metaphysical  reasoning.  Of  this  bias  various  traces 
occur,  both  in  his  Element*  of  Mechanical  Philosophy,  and  in  the  valuable  articles 
which  he  furnished  to  the  Encyclopaedia  Britar.nica. 

*  The  following  very  extraordinary  passage  occure  in  a  letter  from  Leibnitz  to  Mr. 
Oldenburg. 

"  Ego  id  agere  constitui,  ubi  piimum  otium  nactus  ero,  ut  rem  oninem  mechani- 
"  cam  reducam  ad  puram  geomelriam  ;  problemataque  circa  elateria,  et  aquas,  et 
"  pendnla,  et  projecta,  et  solidorum  resistentiam,  et  frictiones,  Sic.  definiam.  Quae 
"  hactenus  altigit  nemo.  Credo  autem  rem  omnem  nunc  esse  in  potestate  ;  ex  quo 
"  circa  rpgnlas  motuum  mihi  penitus  perfeclis  demonstrationibus  satisfeci  ;  neque 
'•'  quicquam  amplms  in  eo  gcnere  desidero.  Tota  autem  res,  quod  mireris,  pendet  ex 
"  axiomate  metaphysico  pulcherrimo,  quod  non  minoris  momenli  est  circa  motum, 
"  quam  hoc,  tolum  esse  majus  parte,  circa  magnitudinem." — Wallisii  Opera,  Vol. 
III.  p.  633. 

The  beautiful  metaphysical  axiom  here  referred  to  by  Leibnitz,  is  plainly  the  prin- 
ciple of  the  sufficient  reason  ;  and  it  is  not  a  little  remarkable,  that  the  highest  praise 
which  he  had  to  bestow  upon  it  was,  to  compare  it  to  Euclid's  axiom,  "  That  the 
"  whole  is  greater  than  its  part."  Upon  this  principle  of  the  sufficient  reason,  Leib- 
nitz, as  is  well  known,  conceived  that  a  complete  system  of  physical  science  might 
be  built,  as  he  thought  the  whole  of  mathematical  science  resolvable  into  the  princi- 
ples of  identity  and  of  contradiction. — By  the  first  of  these  principles  (it  may  not  be 
altogether  superfluous  to  add)  is  to  be  understood  the  maxim,  "^Whatever  is,  is  ;" 
By  the  second,  the  maxim,  that  "  It  is  impossible  for  the  same  thing  to  be,  and  not 
"  to  be  :" — two  maxims  which,  it  is  evident,  are  only  different  expressions  of  the 
same  proposition. 

In  the  remarks  made  by  Locke  on  the  logical  inutility  of  mathematical  axioms,  and 
on  the  logical  danger  of  assuming  metaphysical  axioms  as  the  principles  of  our  rea- 
sonings in  other  sciences,  I  think  it  highly  probable,  that  he  had  a  secret  reference  to 
the  philosophical  writings  and  epistolary  correspondence  of  Leibnitz.  This  appears 
to  me  to  furnish  a  key  to  some  of  Locke's  observations,  the  scope  of  which  Dr.  Reid 
professes  his  inability  to  discover.  One  sentence,  in  particular,  on  which  he  has 
animadverted  with  some  severity,  is,  in  my  opinion,  distinctly  pointed  at  the  letter 
to  Mr.  Oldenburg,  quoted  in  the  beginning  of  this  note. 

"  Mr.  Locke  farther  says  (I  borrow  Dr.  Reid's  own  statement)  that  maxims  are 
"  not  of  use  to  help  men  forward  in  the  advancement  of  the  sciences,  or  new  diseove 


*-ECT.  III.]  OF    THE    HUMAN    MIND.  139 

Life  and  Writings  of  Dr.  Reid,  I  have  taken  notice  of  seme 
other  inconveniencies  resulting  from  it,  still  more  impor- 
tant than  the  introduction  of  an  unsound  logic  into  the  ele- 
ments of  natural  philosophy  ;  in  particular,  of  the  obvious 
tendency  which  it  has  to  withdraw  the  attention  from  that 
unity  of  design  which  it  is  the  noblest  employment  of  philo- 
sophy to  illustrate,  by  disguising  it  under  the  semblance  of 
an  eternal  and  necessary  order,  similar  to  what  the  matbe* 
matician  delights  to  trace  among  the  mutual  relations  of 
quantities  and  figures.  The  consequence  has  been,  (in  too 
many  physical  systems,)  to  level  the  study  of  nature,  in  point 
of  moral  interest,  with  the  investigations  of  the  algebraist; — 
an  effect  too,  which  has  taken  place  most  remarkably,  where, 

"  ries  of  yet  unknown  truths  :  that  Newton,  in  the  discoveries  he  has  made  in  his 
u  never  enough  to  be  admired  book,  has  not  been  assisted  by  the  general  maxim, 
ci  whatever  is,  is  ;  or  the  whole  is  greater  than  a  part,  or  the  like." 

As  the  Letter  to  Oldenburg  is  dated  in  1676,  (twelve  years  before  the  publication 
«f  the  Essay  on  Human  Understanding,)  and  as  Leibnitz  expresses  a  desire  that  it 
may  be  communicated  to  Mr.  Newton,  there  can  scarcely  be  a  doubt  that  Locke  had 
read  it ;  and  it  reflects  infinite  honour  on  his  sagacity,  that  he  seems,  at  that  early 
period,  to  have  foreseen  the  extensive  influence  which  the  errors  of  this  illustrious 
man  were  so  long  to  maintain  over  the  opinions  of  the  learned  world.  The  truth  is 
that  even  then  he  prepared  a  reply  to  some  reasonings  which,  at  the  distance  of  a 
century,  were  to  mislead,  both  in  physics  and  in  logic,  the  first  philosophers  ia 
Europe. 

If  these  conjectures  be  well  founded,  it  must  be  acknowledged  that  Dr.  Rcid  has 
sot  only  failed  in  his  defence  of  maxims  against  Locke's  attack  :  but  that  he  has  totally 
misapprehended  the  aim  of  Locke's  argument. 

"  I  answer,"  says  he,  in  the  paragraph  immediately  following  that  which  was 
quoted  above,  '•<■  the  first  of  these  maxims  (whatever  is,  is)  is  an  identical  proposition, 
of  no  use  in  mathematics  or  in  any  other  science.  The  second  (that  the  whole  is 
greater  than  a  part)  is  often  used  by  Newton,  and  by  all  mathematicians,  and  many 
demonstrations  rest  upon  it.  In  general,  Newton,  as  well  as  all  other  mathemati- 
cians, grounds  his  demonstrations  of  mathematical  propositions  upon  the  axioms  laid 
down  by  Euclid,  or  upon  propositions  which  have  been  before  demonstrated  by  help 
of  these  axioms. 

«  But  it  deserves  to  be  particularly  observed,  that  Newton,  intending  in  the  third 
»  book  of  his  Principia  to  give  a  more  scientific  form  to  the  physical  part  of  astrono- 
"  my,  which  he  had  at  first  composed  in  a  popular  form,  thought  proper  to  follow 
«  the  example  of  Euclid,  and  to  lay  down  first,  in  what  lie  calls  Regulce  Philoso- 
'•'  phandi,  and  in  his  Phenomena,  the  first  principles  which  he  assumes  in  his  reasoning. 
«  Nothing,  therefore,  could  have  been  more  unluckily  adduced  by  Mr.  Locke  to  sup- 
•'«  port  his  aversion  to  first  principles,  than  the  example  of  Sir  Isaac  N«wton."-r 
Essays  on  the  Int.  Pacers,  pp.  6-17, 648, 4to  edit. 


140  ELEMENTS    OF    THE    PHILOSOPHY  [CHAP.  II, 

from  the  sublimity  of  the  subject,  it  was  least  to  be  expect- 
ed,— in  the  application  of  the  mechanical  philosophy  to  the 
phenomena  of  the  heavens.  But  on  this  very  extensive  and 
important  topic,  !  must  not  enter  at  present. 

Tn  the  opposite  extreme  to  the  error  which  I  have  now 
been  endesrvouring  to  correct,  is  a  paradox  which  was 
broached,  about  twenty  years  ago,  by  the  late  ingenious  Dr. 
Beddoes  ;  and  which  has  since  been  adopted  by  some  writ- 
ers whose  names  are  better  entitled,  on  a  question  of  this 
sort,  to  give  v-eight  to  their  opinions.*  By  the  partisans  of 
this  nev/  doctrine  it  seems  to  be  imagined,  that— so  far  from 
physics  being  a  branch  of  mathematics,— mathematics,  and 
more  particularly  geometry,  is,  in  reality,  only  a  branch  of 
physics.  "  The  mathematical  sciences,1'  says  Dr.  Beddoes, 
"  are  sciences  of  experiment  and  observation,  founded  sole- 
"  ly  on  the  induction  of  particular  facts  ;  as  much  so  as  me- 
"  chanics,  astronomy,  optics,  or  chemistry.  In  the  kind  of 
"  evidence  there  is  no  difference  ;  for  it  originates  from  per- 
"  ception  in  all  these  cases  alike ;  but  mathematical  experi- 
"  ments  are  more  simple,  and  more  perfectly  within  the  grasp 
"  of  our  senses,  and  our  perceptions  of  mathematical  objects 
"  are  clearer."? 

A  doctrine  essentially  the  same,  though  expressed  in  terms 
not  quite  so  revolting,  has  been  lately  sanctioned  by  Mr. 

*  l  allude  here  more  particularly  to  my  learned  friend,  Mr.  Leslie,  whose  high  and 
justly  merited  reputation,  both  as  a  mathematician  and  an  experimentalist,  renders  it 
indispensably  necessary  for  me  to  take  notice  of  some  fundamental  logical  mistakes 
which  he  appears  to  mc  to  have  committed  in  the  course  of  those  ingenious  excursions,, 
in  which  he  occasionally  indulges  himself,  beyond  the  strict  limits  of  his  favourite 
studies. 

t  Into  this  train  ofthinking,  Dr.  Beddoes  informs  us,  he  was  first  led  by  Mr.  Home 
Tooke's  speculations  concerning  language.  "  In  whatever  study  you  are  engaged, 
ci  to  leave  difficulties  belaind  is  distressing  :  and  when  these  difficulties  occur  at  your 
K  very  entrance  upon  a  science,  professing  to  be  so  clear  and  certain  as  geometry, 
a  your  feelings  become  still  more  uncomfortable  ;  and  you  are  dissatisfied  with  your 
"  own  nowprs  of  comprehension.  I  therefore  think  it  due  to  the  author  of  EIIEA 
«  DTEPOENTAj  to  acknowledge  my  obligations  to  him  for  relieving  me  from 
?f  this  sort  of  distress.  For  although  I  had  often  made  the  attempt,  I  could  never 
u  solve  certain  difficulties  in  Euclid,  till  my  reflections  were  revived  and  assisted  by 
**  Mr.  Tooke's  discoveries." — See  Observations  on  the  Nature  of  Dem.onstra.titt  Evi 
'dence,  London?  1793,  pp.  5,  and  15. 


SECT.  III.]  OF    THE    HUMAN  MIND.  141 

Leslie  ;  and  if  is  to  his  view  of  the  argument  that  I  mean  to 
confine  my  attention  at  present.  "  The  whole  structure  of 
"  geometry."  he  remarks,  "  is  grounded  on  the  simple  eom- 
"  parison  of  triangles  ;  and  all  the  fundamental  theorems 
"  whirh  relatf  to  this  comparison,  derive  their  evidence 
"  from  the  mere  superposition  of  the  triangles  themselves  ;  a 
"  mode  of  proof  which,  in  reality,  is  nothing  but  an  ultimate 
"  appeal,  though  of  the  easiest  and  most  familiar  kind,  to 
"  external  observation.'1*  And,  in  another  passage  :  "  Geo- 
"  metry,  like  the  other  sciences  which  are  not  concerned 
■"  about  the  operations  of  mind,  rests  ultimately  on  exter- 
"  nal  observations.  But  those  ultimate  facts  are  so  few,  so 
"  distinct  and  obvious,  that  the  subsequent  train  of  reasoning 
"  is  safely  pursued  to  unlimited  extent,  without  ever  appeal- 
"  ing  again  to  the  evidence  of  the  senses.!" 

Before  proceeding  to  make  any  remarks  on  this  theory,  it 
is  proper  to  premise,  that  it  involves  two  separate  considera- 
tions, which  it  is  of  material  consequence  to  distinguish  from 
each  other.  The  first  is,  that  extension  and  figure  (the  sub- 
jects of  geometry)  are  qualities   of  body  which  are  made 

a  Elements  of  Geometry  and  of  Geometrical  Analysis,  8ic.  By  Mr.  Leslie.  Edin- 
burgh, 1809. 

The  assertion  that  the  whole  structure  of  geometry  is  founded  on  the  comparison  of 
triangles,  is  expressed  in  terms  loo  unqualified.  D'Alembert  has  mentioned  another 
principle  as  not  less  fundamental,  the  measurement  of  angles  by  circular  arches.' 
"  Les  propositions  fondamentales  de  geomgtrie  peuvent  etre  reduites  a  deux  ;  la  me- 
"  sure  des  angles  par  les  arcs  de  cercle,  et  le  principede  la  superposition.' — Elemens 
de  Philosophie,  Art.  Geometrie — The  same  writer,  however,  justly  observes,  in  an- 
other part  of  his  works,  that  the  measure  of  angles  by  circular  arches,  is  itself  de- 
pendent on  the  principle  of  superposition  ;  and  that,  consequently,  however  extensive 
and  important  in  its  application,  it  is  entitled  only  to  rank  with  what  he  calls  principles 
of  a  second  order. "  La  mesure  des  angles  par  les  arcs  de  cercle  decnt  de  leur  somrnet, 
"  est  elle-meme  dependante  du  principe  de  la  superposition.  Car  quan.l  on  dit  que 
"  la  mesure  d'un  angle  est  I'arc  circulaire  clecrit  de  son  somrnet,  on  veut  dire  que  si 
"  deux  angles  sont  egaux,  les  angles  decrits  de  leur  somrnet  a  meme  rayon,  seront 
"  egaux  ;  verite  qui  se  demontre  par  le  principe  de  la  superposition,  comme  torn  gfio- 
"  metre  tant  soit  pen  initio  dans  cette  science  le  sentira  facilement." — Eclaircissemens 
stir  les  Elemens  de  Philosophie-,  §  IV. 

Instead,  therefore,  of  saying  that  the  whole  structure  of  geometry  is  grounded  on 
the  comparison  of  triangles,  it  would  be  more  correct  to  say,  that  it  is  grounded  on 
•  he  principle  of  superposition. 

I  Elements  of  Geometry,  and  of  Geometrical  Analysis,  p.  453. 


142  ELEMENTS    OF   THE    PHILOSOPHY         [CHAP.    II. 

known  lo  us  by  our  external  senses  alone,  and  which  actual- 
ly fall  under  the  consideration  of  the  natural  philosopher,  as 
well  as  of  the  mathematician.  The  second,  that  the  whole 
fabric  of  geometrical  science  rests  on  the  comparison  of  tri- 
angles, in  forming  which  comparison,  we  are  ultimately  obli- 
ged to  appeal  (in  the  same  manner  as  in  establishing  the  first 
principles  of  physics)  to  a  sensible  and  experimental  proof. 

1.  In  answer  to  the  first  of  these  allegations,  it  might  per- 
haps be  sufficient  to  observe,  that  in  order  to  identify  two 
sciences,  it  is  not  enough  to  state,  that  they  are  both  conver- 
sant about  the  same  objects  ;  it  is  necessary  farther  to  shew, 
that,  in  both  cases,  these  objects  are  considered  in  the  same 
point  of  view,  and  give  employment  to  the  same  faculties  of 
the  mind.  The  poet,  the  painter,  the  gardener,  and  the  bo- 
tanist, are  all  occupied  in  various  degrees  and  modes,  with 
the  study  of  the  vegetable  kingdom ;  yet  who  has  ever  thought 
of  confounding  their  several  pursuits  under  one  common 
name  ?  The  natural  historian,  the  civil  historian,  the  moralist, 
the  logician,  the  dramatist,  and  the  statesman,  are  all  en- 
gaged in  the  study  of  man,  and  of  the  principles  of  human 
nature  ;  yet  how  widely  discriminated  are  these  various  de- 
partments of  science  and  of  art !  how  different  are  the  kinds 
of  evidence  on  which  they  repcclively  rest !  how  different 
the  intellectual  habits  which  they  have  a  tendency  to  form  ! 
Indeed,  if  this  mode  of  generalization  were  to  be  admitted  as 
legitimate,  it  wou  d  lead  us  to  blend  all  the  objects  of  sci- 
ence into  one  and  the  same  mass  ;  inasmuch  as  it  is  by  the 
same  impressions  on  our  external  senses,  that  our  intellectu- 
al faculties  are,  in  the  first  instance,  roused  to  action,  and  all 
the  first  elements  of  our  knowledge  unfolded. 

In  the  instance,  however,  before  us,  there  is  a  very  re- 
markable specialty,  or  rather  singularity,  which  renders  the 
attempt  to  identify  the  objects  of  geometrical  and  of  physical 
science,  incomparably  more  illogical  than  it  would  be  to 
classify  poetry  with  botany,  or  the  natural  history  of  man 
with  the  political  history  of  nations.  This  specialty  arises 
from  certain  peculiarities  in  the  metaphysical  nature  of  those 


SECT.  III.  I  OP   THE    HUMAN    MIND.  143 

sensible  qualities  which  fall  under  the  consideration  of  the 
geometer  ;  and  which  led  me,  in  a  different  work,  to  distin- 
guish them  from  other  sensible  qualities,  (both  primary  and 
secondary,)  by  bestowing  on  them  the  title  of  mathematical 
affections  of  matter.*  Of  these  mathematical  affections  {mag- 
nitude and  figure,)  our  first  notions  are,  no  doubt,  derived 
(as  well  as  of  hardness,  softness,  roughness,  and  smoothness) 
from  the  exercise  of  our  external  senses ;  but  it  is  equally 
certain,  that  when  the  notions  of  magnitude  and  figure  have 
once  been  acquired,  the  mind  is  immediately  led  to  consider 
them  as  attributes  of  space  no  less  than  of  body ;  and  (ab- 
stracting them  entirely  from  the  other  sensible  qualities  per- 
ceived in  conjunction  with  them)  becomes  impressed  with 
an  irresistible  conviction,  that  their  existence  is  necessary 
and  eternal,  and  that  it  would  remain  unchanged  if  all  the 
bodies  in  the  universe  were  annihilated.  It  is  not  our  bu- 
siness here  to  inquire  into  the  origin  and  grounds  of  this  con- 
viction. It  is  with  the  fact  alone  that  we  are  concerned  at 
present ;  and  this  1  conceive  to  be  one  of  the  most  obviously 
incontrovertible  which  the  circle  of  our  knowledge  embraces. 
Let  those  explain  it  as  they  best  can,  who  are  of  opinion, 
that  all  the  judgments  of  the  human  understanding  rest  ulti- 
mately on  observation  and  experience. 

Nor  is  this  the  only  case  in  which  the  mind  forms  conclu- 
sions concerning  space,  to  which  those  of  the  natural  philo- 
sopher do  not  bear  the  remotest  analogy.  Is  it  from  expe- 
rience we  learn  that  space  is  infinite  ?  or,  (to  express  myself 
in  more  unexceptionable  terms,)  that  no  limits  can  be  as- 
signed to  its  immensity  ?  Here  is  a  fact,  extending  not  only 
beyond  the  reach  of  our  personal  observation,  but  beyond 
the  observation  of  all  created  beings  ;  and  a  fact  on  which 
we  pronounce  with  no  less  confidence,  when  in  imagination 
we  transport  ourselves  to  the  utmost  vergp  of  the  material 
universe,  than  when  we  confine  our  thoughts  to  those  regions 
of  the  globe  which  have  been  explored  by  travellers.  How 
unlike  those  general  laws  which  we  investigate  in  physics, 

-  Philosophical  Essays,  pp.  94,  96,  4to  edit. 


144  ELEMENTS    OF    THE    PHILOSOPHY  [CHAP.  If* 

and  which,  how  far  soever  we  may  find  them  to  reach,  may- 
still,  for  any  thing  we  are  able  to  discover  to  the  contrary, 
be  only  contingent,  local,  and  temporary  ! 

It  must  indeed  be  owned,  with  respect  to  the  conclusions 
hitherto  mentioned  on  the  subject  of  space,  that  they  are 
rather  of  a  metaphysical  than  of  a  mathematical  nature  ;  but 
they  are  not,  on  that  account,  the  less  applicable  to  our  pur- 
pose ;  for  if  the  theory  of  Beddoes  had  any  foundation,  it 
would  lead  us  to  identify  with  physics  the  former  of  these 
sciences  as  well  as  the  latter ;  at  least,  all  that  part  of  the 
former  which  is  employed  about  space,  or  extension, — a  fa- 
vourite object  of  metaphysical  as  well  as  of  mathematical 
speculation.  The  truth,  however,  is,  that  some  of  our  meta- 
physical conclusions  concerning  space  are  more  nearly  al- 
lied to  geometrical  theorems  than  we  might  be  disposed  at 
first  to  apprehend  ;  being  involved  or  implied  in  the  most 
simple  and  fundamenial  propositions  which  occur  in  Euclid's 
Elements.  When  it  is  asserted,  for  example,  that  "  if  one 
"  straight  line  falls  on  two  other  straight  lines,  so  as  to  make 
"  the  two  interior  angles  on  the  same  side  together  equal  to 
"  two  right  angles,  these  two  straight  lines,  though  indefinite- 
'*  ly  produced,  will  never  meet  ;" — is  not  the  boundless  im- 
mensity of  space  tacitly  assumed  as  a  thing  unquestionable? 
And  is  not  a  universal  affirmation  made  with  respect  to  a  fact 
which  experience  is  equally  incompetent  to  disprove  or  to 
confirm  ?  In  like  manner,  when  it  is  said,  that  "  triangles 
"  on  the  same  base,  and  between  the  same  parallels  are 
"  equal,"  do  we  feel  ourselves  the  less  ready  to  give  our 
assent  to  the  demonstration,  if  it  should  be  supposed,  that 
the  one  triangle  is  confined  within  the  limits  of  the  paper 
before  us,  and  that  the  other,  standing  on  the  same  base,  has 
its  vertex  placed  beyond  the  sphere  of  the  fixed  stars  ?  la 
various  instances,  we  are  led,  with  a  force  equally  imperious, 
to  acquiesce  in  conclusions,  which  not  only  admit  of  no  illus- 
tration or  proof  from  the  perceptions  of  sense,  but  which,  at 
first  sight,  are  apt  to  stagger  and  confound  the  faculty  of 
imagination.     It  is  sufficient  to  mention,  as  examples  of  this, 


SECT.  III.]  OP    THE    HUMAN   MIND.  145 

the  relation  between  the  hyperbola  and  its  asymptotes  ;  and 
the  still  more  obvious  truth  of  the  infinite  divisibility  of  ex- 
tension. What  analogy  is  there  between  such  propositions 
as  these,  and  that  which  announces,  that  the  mercury  in  the 
Torricellian  lube  will  fall,  if  carried  up  to  the  top  of  a  moun- 
tain ;  or  that  the  vibrations  of  a  pendulum  of  a  given  length 
will  be  performed  in  the  same  time,  while  it  remains  in  the 
same  latitude  ?  Were  there,  in  reality,  that  analogy  between 
mathematical  and  physical  propositions,  which  Beddoes  and 
his  followers  have  fancied,  the  equality  of  the  square  of  the 
hypothenuse  of  a  right  angled  triangle  to  the  squares  de- 
scribed on  the  two  other  sides,  and  the  proportion  of  1,  2,  3, 
between  the  cone  and  its  circumscribed  hemisphere  and  cy- 
linder, might,  with  fully  as  great  propriety,  be  considered  in 
the  light  of  physical  phenomena,  as  of  geometrical  theorems  : 
Nor  would  it  have  been  at  all  inconsistent  with  the  logical 
unity  of  his  work,  if  Mr.  Leslie  had  annexed  to  his  Elements 
of  Geometry,  a  scholium  concerning  the  final  causes  of  cir- 
cles and  of  straight  lines,  similar  to  that  which,  with  such 
sublime  effect,  closes  the  Principia  of  Sir  Isaac  Newton.* 

*  In  (he  course  of  my  own  experience,  I  have  met  with  one.  person,  of  no  common, 
ingenuity,  who  seemed  seriously  disposed  to  consider  the  truths  of  geometry  very 
nearly  in  this  light.  The  person  1  allude  to  was  James  Ferguson,  author  of  the 
justly  popular  works  on  Astronomy  and  Mechanics.  In  the  year  1768,  he  paid  a  visit 
to  Edinburgh,  when  I  had  not  only  an  opportunity  of  attending  his  public  course  of 
lectures,  but  of  frequently  enjoying,  in  private,  Ihe  pleasure  of  his  very  interesting 
conversation.  I  remember  distinctly  to  have  heard  him  say,  that  he  had  more  than 
once  attempted  to  stud}'  the  Elements  of  Euclid  ;  but  found  himself  quite  unable  to 
enter  into  that  species  of  reasoning.  The  second  proposition  of  the  first  book,  he 
mentioned  particularly  as  one  of  his  stumbling-blocks  at  the  very  outset ; — the  cir- 
cuitous process  by  which  Euclid  sets  ahoul  an  operation  which  never  could  puzzle, 
for  a  single  moment,  an}'  man  who  had  seen  a  pair  of  compasses,  appearing  to  him 
altogether  capricious  and  ludicrous.  He  added,  at  the  same  time,  that  as  there  were 
various  geometrical  theorems  of  which  he  had  daily  occasion  to  make  use,  he  had 
•satisfied  himself  of  their  truth,  either  by  means  of  his  compasses  and  scale,  or  by 
some  mechanical  contrivances  of  his  own  invention.  01' one  of  these  I  have  still  a 
pei  feet  recolle*  lion  ; — his  mechaivcal  or  experimental  demonstration  of  the  47th  propo- 
sition of  Euclid's  first  book,  by  cutting  a  card  so  as  to  afford  an  ocular  proof,  that  the 
squares  of  the  two  sides  actually  filled  the  same  space  with  the  square  ol  the  hypc- 
thenuse. 

To  those  who  reflect  on  the  disadvantages  under  \\  iii'.o  Mr.  Ferguson  had  labour- 
ed in  point  of  education,  and  on  the  early  and  exclusive  hold  which  experimental  sci. 

VOL.   II.  19 


146  ELEMENTS    OP    THE    PHILOSOPHY        [CHAP.  II. 

2.  It  yet  remains  for  me  to  say  a  few  words  upon  that 
superposition  of  triangles  which  is  the  ground-work  of  all 
our  geometrical  reasonings  concerning  the  relations  which 
different  spaces  bear  to  one  another  in  respect  of  magnitude. 
And  here  1  must  take  the  liberty  to  remark,  in  the  first  place, 
that  the  fact  in  question  has  been  stated  in  terms  much  too 
loose  and  incorrect  for  a  logical  argument.  When  it  is  said, 
that  "  all  the  fundamental  theorems  which  relate  to  the  com- 
"  parison  of  triangles,  derive  their  evidence  from  the  men 
"  superposition  of  the  triangles  themselves,"  it  seems  diffi- 
cult, or  rather  impossible,  to  annex  to  the  adjective  mere,  an 
idea  at  all  different  from  what  would  be  conveyed,  if  the 
word  actual  were  to  be  substituted  in  its  place  ;  more  espe- 
cially, when  we  attend  to  the  assertion  which  immediately 
follows,  that  "  this  mode  of  proof  is,  in  reality,  nothing  but 
"  an  ultimate  appeal,  though  of  the  easiest  and  most  familiar 
"  kind,  to  external  observation."  But  if  this  be,  in  truth, 
the  sense  in  which  we  are  to  interpret  the  statement  quoted 
above,  (and  1  cannot  conceive  any  other  interpretation  of 
which  it  admits,)  it  must  appear  obvious,  upon  the  slightest 
reflection,  that  the  statement  proceeds  upon  a  total  misap- 
prehension of  the  principle  of  superposition  ;  inasmuch  as  it 
is  not  to  an  actual  or  mere  superposition,  but  to  an  imaginary 
or  ideal  one,  that  any  appeal  is  ever  made  by  the  geometer. 

ence  had  taken  of  his  mind,  it  will  not  perhaps  seein  altogether  unaccountable,  that 
the  refined  and  scrupulous  logic  of  Euclid  should  have  struck  him  as  tedious,  and 
even  unsatisfactory,  in  comparison  of  that  more  summary  and  palpable  evidence  on 
which  his  judgment  was  accustomed  to  rest.  Considering,  however,  the  great  num- 
ber of  years  which  have  elapsed  since  this  conversation  took  place,  I  should  have 
hesitated  about  recording,  solely  on  my  own  testimony,  a  fact  so  singular  with  re- 
spect to  so  distinguished  a  man,  if  I  had  not  lately  found,  from  Dr.  Hutton's  Mathe- 
maucal  Dictionary,  lhai/ie  also  had  heard  from  Mr.  Ferguson's  mouth,  the  most  im- 
portant of  those  particulars  which  I  have  now  stated ;  and  of  which  my  own  recollec- 
tion is  probably  the  more  lively  and  circumstantial,  in  consequence  of  the  very  early 
period  of  my  life  when  they  fell  under  my  notice. 

"  Mr.  Ferguson's  general  mathematical  knowledge,"  says  Dr.  Hutton,  "  was  little 
"  or  nothing.  Of  algebra,  he  understood  little  more  than  the  notation  ;  and  he  has 
tl  often  told  me  he  could  never  demonstrate  one  proposition  in  Euclid's  Elements  ; 
"  his  constant  method  being  to  satisfy  himself,  as  to  the  truth  of  any  problem,  with  a 
"  measurement  by  scale  and  compasses." — Hutton''i  Mahematical  and  Philosophical 
Dictionary,  Article  Ferguson. 


SECT.  III.]  OP    THE    HUMAN    MIND.  14? 

Between  these  two  modes  of  proof,  the  difference  is  not  only 
wide,  but  radical  and  essential.  The  one  would,  indeed, 
level  geometry  with  physics,  in  point  of  evidence,  by  build- 
ing the  whole  of  its  reasonings  on  a  fact  ascertained  by  me- 
chanical measurement :  The  other  is  addressed  to  the  under- 
standing, and  to  the  understanding  alone,  and  is  as  rigorous- 
ly conclusive  as  it  is  possible  for  demonstration  to  be.* 

That  the  reasoning  employed  by  Euclid  in  proof  of  the 
fourth  proposition  of  his  first  book  is  completely  demonstra- 
tive, will  be  readily  granted  by  those  who  compare  its  dif- 
ferent steps  with  the  conclusions  to  which  we  were  formerly 

*  The  same  remark  was,  more  than  fifty  yeai -s  ago,  made  by  D'AJeinbert,  in  reply 
to  some  mathematicians  on  the  Continent,  who,  it  would  appear,  had  then  adopted 
a  paradox  very  nearly  approaching  to  that  which  I  am  now  combating.  "  Le  prin- 
"  cipede  la  superposition  n'est  point,  comme  l'ont  pretendu  plusieurs  geometres,  une 
"  methode  de  demontrer  peu  exacte  et  purement  meehanique  La  superposition, 
"  telle  que  les  mathematiciens  la  conqoivent,  ne  consiste  pas  a  appliquer  grossigre- 
w  ment  une  figure  sur  une  autre,  pour  juger  par  les  yeux  de  leur  egalite  ou  de  leur 
**  difference,  comme  un  ouvrier  applique  son  pie  sur  une  ligne  pour  la  mesurer ;  elle 
'"'  consiste  a  imaginer  une  figure  transportee  sur  une  autre,  et  a  conclure  de  1'egalite 
'<  supposee  de  certaines  parties  de  deux  figures,  la  coincidence  de  ces  parties  entr'el- 
"  les,  et  de  leur  coincidence  la  coincidence  du  reste  :  d'ou  resulle  1'egalite  et  la  simili- 
"  tude  parfaites  des  figures  entieres.'' 

About  a  century  before  the  time  when  D'Alembert  wrote  these  observations,  a 
similar  view  of  the  subject  was  taken  by  Dr.  Barrow,  a  writer  who,  like  D'Alem- 
bert, added  to  the  skill  and  originality  of  an  inventive  mathematician,  the  most  re- 
fined, and,  at  the  same  time,  the  justest  ideas  concerning  the  theory  of  those  intellec- 
tual processes  which  are  subservient  to  mathematical  reasoning. — "  Unde  merito  vir 
::  acutissimus  Willebrordus  SneHius  luculentissimum  appellat  geometrise  supellectilis 
"  instrumenlum  hanc  ipsam  efiotgft.oG'iv .  Earn  igitur  in  demonstralianibus  mathe- 
"  malicis  qui  faslidiunt  et  respuunt,ut  mechanicce  crassitudinis  ac  ctvrvpy  tot-;  oli- 
"  quidredolenlem,  ipsissimam geometries  basin  labefactare  student  ;  ast  imprudenter  et 
<!  fruslra.  Nam  »<pag[4.a<rtv  geometrse  suam  nor.  manu  sed  mente  peragunt,  non 
"oculisensu,  sed  animi  judiciooestimant.  Supponunt  (id  quod  nulla  nianus  praestare, 
"  nullus  sensus  discernere  valet)  accuratam  et  perfectam  congruentiam,  ex  eaque 
"  supposita  justas  et  logicas  eliciunt  consequentias.  Nullus  hie  reguloe,  cireini,  vel 
■'•'  normae  usus,  nullus  brachiorum  labor,  aut  lalerum  contentio,  rationis  totum  opus, 
*'  artificium  et  machinatio  est  ;  nil  mechanicam  sapiens  ccvtxp yixv  exigitur  ;  nil, 
"  inquam,  mechanicum,  nisi  quatenus  omnis  magnitudo  sit  ahquo  modo  maferioe  in* 
"  voluta,  sensibus  exposita,  visibilis  et  palpabilis,  sic  uS  quod  mens  intelligi  jubet,  id 
"  manus  quadantenus  exequi  possit,  et  contemplationem  praxis  utcunque  conetur 
"  aemulari.  Quae  tamen  imitatio  c,  -  Mricae  demonstrationis  roburac  dignitatem 
w  nedum  non  infirmat  aut  deprimit,  at  validius  constabilit,  et  atollit  altius,"  &c. — 
Lectiones  Mathematical,  Lect.  Ill, 


14B  ELEMENTS    OF    THE    PHILOSOPHY  [CHAP.  II, 

led,  when  treating  of  the  nature  of  mathematical  demonstra- 
tion. In  none  of  these  steps  is  any  appeal  made  to  facts 
resting  on  the  evidence  of  sense,  nor,  indeed,  to  any  facts 
whatever.  The  constant  appe  1  is  to  the  definition  of  equal- 
ity.* "  Let  the  triangle  A  B  C,"  says  Euclid,  "  be  applied 
"  to  the  triangle  DEF;  the  point  A  to  the  point  D,  and  the 
"  straight  line  A  B  to  the  straight  line  D  E  ;  the  point  B 
"  will  coincide  with  the  point  E,  because  A  B  is  equal  to 
"  D  E.  And  A  B  coinciding  with  D  E,  A  C  will  coincide 
"  with  D  F,  because  the  angle  B  A  C  is  equal  to  the  angle 
"  E  D  JV'  A  similar  remark  will  be  found  to  apply  to 
every  remaining  step  of  the  reasoning  ;  and,  therefore,  this 
reasoning  possesses  the  peculiar  characteristic  which  distin- 
guishes mathematical  evidence  from  that  of  all  the  other  sci- 
ences,— that  it  rests  wholly  on  hypotheses  and  definitions,  and 
in  no  respect  upon  any  statement  of  facts,  true  or  false.  The 
ideas,  indeed,  of  extension  of  a  triangle,  and  of  equality, 
presuppose  the  exercise  of  our  senses.  Nay,  the  very  idea 
of  superposition  involves  that  of  motion*  and,  consequently, 
(as  the  parts  of  space  are  immoveable)  of  a  material  triangle. 
But  where  is  there  any  thing  analogous  in  all  this,  to  those 
sensible  facts,  which  are  the  principles  of  our  reasoning  in 
physics;  and  which,  according  as  they  have  been  accurately 
or  inaccurately  ascertained,  determine  the  accuracy  or  inac- 
curacy of  our  conclusions  ?  The  material  triangle  itself,  as 
conceived  by  the  mathematician,  is'  the  object,  not  of  sense, 
but  of  intellect.  It  is  not  an  actual  Measure,  liable  to  expan- 
sion or  contraction,  from  the  influence  of  heat  or  of  cold  ; 
nor  does  it  require,  in  the  ideal  use  which  is  made  of  it  by 
the  student,  the  slightest  address  of  hand  or  nicety  of  eye. 
Even  in  explaining  this  demonstration,  for  the  first  time,  to  a 
pupil,  how  slender  soever  his  capacity  might  be,  I  do  not 

*  It  was  before  observed  (see  p.  123)  that  Euclid's  eighth  axiom  {magnitudes  which 
Cpintp.de  with  each  other  are  equal)  ought,  in  point  of  logical  rigour,  to  have  been  stated 
in  the  (onn  of  a  definition.  In  our  present  argument,  however,  it  is  not  of  material 
consequence  whether  this  criticism  be  adopted  or  not.  Whether  we  consider  the  pro- 
position in  question  in  the  light  of  an  axiom  or  of  a  definition,  it  is  equally  evident 
that  if.  ches  not  express  a  fact  ascertained  by  observation  or  by  experiment. 


SECT.  III.]  OF    THE    HUMAN    MINI*.  149 

believe  that  any  teacher  ever  thought  of  illustrating  its  mean- 
ing by  the  actual  application  of  the  one  triangle  to  the  other. 
No  teacher,  at  least,  would  do  so,  who  had  formed  correct 
notions  of  the  nature  of  mathematical  science. 

If  the  justness  of  these  remarks  be  admitted,  the  demon- 
stration in  question  must  be  allowed  to  be  as  well  entitled 
to  the  name,  as  any  other  which  the  mathematician  can  pro- 
duce ;  for  as  our  conclusions  relative  to  the  properties  of 
the  circle  (considered  in  the  light  of  hypothetical  theorems) 
are  not  the  less  rigorously  and  necessarily  true,  that  no  ma- 
terial circle  may  any  where  exist  corresponding  exactly  to 
the  definition  of  that  figure,  so  the  proof  given  by  Euclid  of 
the  fourth  proposition,  would  not  be  the  less  demonstrative, 
although  our  senses  were  incomparably  less  acute  than  they 
are,  and  although  no  material  triangle  continued  of  the  same 
magnitude  for  a  single  instant.  Indeed,  when  we  have  once 
acquired  the  ideas  of  equality  and  of  a  common  measure, 
our  mathematical  conclusions  would  not  be  in  the  least  af- 
fected, if  all  the  bodies  in  the  universe  should  vanish  into 
nothing. 

To  many  of  my  readers,  I  am  perfectly  aware,  the  forego- 
ing remarks  will  be  apt  to  appear  tedious  and  superfluous. 
My  only  apology  for  the  length  to  which  they  have  extend- 
ed is,  my  respect  for  the  talents  and  learning  of  some  of 
those  writers  who  have  lent  the  sanction  of  their  authority  to 
the  logical  errors  which  I  have  been  endeavouring  to  cor- 
rect ;  and  the  obvious  inconsistency  of  these  conclusions 
with  the  doctrine  concerning  the  characteristics  of  mathema- 
tical or  demonstrative  evidence,  which  it  was  the  chief  ob- 
ject of  this  section  to  establish.* 

*  This  doctrine  is  concisely  and  clearly  stated  by  a  writer,  whose  acute  and  origi- 
nal, though  very  eccentric  genius,  seldom  fails  to  redeem  his  wildest  paradoxes  by  the 
new  lights  which  he  strikes  out  in  defending  them.  '.'  DemonsSratio  est  syllogismus 
j'  vel  syllogismorum  series  a  nominum  definitionibus  usque  ad  conclusionem  ullimam 
"derivata." — Computatio  sine  Logica,  cap.  6. 

It  will  not,  t  trust,  be  inferred,  from  my  having  adopted,  in  the  words  of  Hobbes, 
this  detached  proposition,  that  I  am  disposed  to  sanction  any  one  ol  those  conclusions 
which  have  been  commonly  supposed  to  br?  connected  with  it,  in  the  mind  of  the  au- 


150  ELEMENTS    OP    THE    PHILOSOPHY  [CHAP.  II, 

SECTION  IV. 

OF  OUR  REASONINGS  CONCERNING  PROBABLE  OR  CONTINGENT 

TRUTHS. 


I. 

Narrow  Field  of  demonstrative  Evidence. — Of  demonstrative  Evidence,  when  com- 
bined with  that  of  Sense,  as  in  Practical  Geometry  ;  and  with  those  of  Sense,  and 
of  Induction,  as  in  the  Mechanical  Philosophy. — Remarks  on  a  Fundamental 
Law  of  Belief,  involved  in  all  our  Reasonings  concerning  Contingent  Truths. 

If  the  account  which  has  been  given  of  the  nature  of  de- 
monstrative evidence  be  admitted,  the  province  over  which 
it  extends  must  be  limited  almost  entirely  to  the  objects  of 
pure  mathematics.  A  science  perfectly  analogous  to  this, 
in  point  of  evidence,  may,  indeed,  be  conceived  (as  I  have  al- 

thor : — I  say,  supposed,  because  I  am  by  no  means  satisfied  (notwithstanding  the 
loose  and  unguarded  manner  in  which  he  has  stated  some  of  his  logical  opinions) 
that  justice  has  been  done  to  his  views  and  motives  in  this  part  of  his  works.  My 
own  notions  on  the  subject  of  evidence  in  general,  will  be  sufficiently  unfolded  in  the 
progress  of  my  speculations.  In  the  mean  time,  to  prevent  the  possibility  of  any 
misapprehension  of  my  meaning,  I  think  it  proper  once  more  to  remark,  that  the  de- 
finition of  Hobbes,  quoted  above,  is  to  be  understood  (according  to  my  interpretation 
of  it)  as  applying  solely  to  the  word  demonstration  in  pure  mathematics.  The  exten- 
sion of  the  same  term  by  Dr.  Clarke  and  others,  to  reasonings  which  have  for 
their  object,  not  conditional  or  hypothetical,  but  absolute  truth,  appears  to  me  to  have 
been  attended  with  many  serious  inconveniences,  which  these  excellent  authors  did 
not  foresee.  Of  the  demonstrations  with  which  Aristotle  has  attempted  to  fortify  his 
syllogistic  rules,  I  shall  afterwards  have  occasion  to  examine  the  validity. 

The  charge  of  unlimited  scepticism  brought  against  Hobbes,  has,  in  m}'  opinion, 
been  occasioned,  partly  by  his  neglecting  to  draw  the  line  between  absolute  and  hy- 
pothetical truth,  and  partly  by  his  applying  the  word  demonstration  to  our  reasonings 
in  other  sciences  as  well  as  in  mathematics.  To  these  causes  may  perhaps  be  added 
the  offence  which  his  logical  writings  must  have  given  to  the  Realists  of  his  time. 

It  is  not,  however,  to  Realists  alone,  that  the  charge  has  been  confined.  Leibnitz 
himself  has  given  some  countenance  to  it,  in  a  dissertation  prefixed  to  a  work  ofMa- 
rius  Nizolius  ;  and  Brucker,  in  referring  to  this  dissertation,  has  aggravated  not  a  lit- 
tle the  censure  of  Hobbes,  which  it  seems  to  contain.  "  Quin  si  illustrem  Leibnitz- 
"  ium  audimus,  Hobbesius  quoque  inter  nominales  referendus  est,  earn  ob  causam. 
i(  quod  ipso  Occamo  nominalior,  rerum  veritatem  dicat  in  nominibus  consistere,  ac, 
M  quod  majus  est,  pendere  ab  arbitrio  humano." — Histor.  PhilosopJu  deldeis,  p.  209 
Augustae  Vindelicorum,  1723. 


SECT.  IT.]  OP    THE    HUMAN    MIND.  151 

ready  remarked)  to  consist  of  a  series  of  propositions  relat- 
ing to  moral,  to  political,  or  to  physical  subjects,  but  as  it 
could  answer  no  other  purpose  than  to  display  the  ingemuity 
of  the  inventor,  hardly  any  thing  of  the  kind  has  been  hither- 
to attempted.  The  only  exception  which  I  can  think  of  oc- 
curs in  the  speculations  formerly  mentioned,  under  the  title 
of  theoretical  mechanics. 

But,  if  the  field  of  mathematical  demonstration  be  limited 
entirely  to  hypothetical  or  conditional  truths,  whence  (it 
may  be  asked)  arises  the  extensive  and  the  various  utility 
of  mathematical  knowledge,  in  our  physical  researches,  and 
in  the  arts  of  life  ?  The  answer,  I  apprehend,  is  to  be  found 
in  certain  peculiarities  of  those  objects  to  which  the  suppo- 
sitions of  the  mathematician  are  confined  ;  in  consequence  of 
which  peculiarities,  real  combinations,  of  circumstances  may 
fall  under  the  examination  of  our  senses,  approximating  far 
more  nearly  to  what  his  definitions  describe,  than  is  to  be 
expected  in  any  other  theoretical  process  of  the  human  mind. 
Hence  a  corresponding  coincidence  between  his  abstract 
conclusions,  and  those  facts  in  practical  geometry  and  in 
physics  which  they  help  him  to  ascertain. 

For  the  more  complete  illustration  of  this  subject,  it  ma}- 
be  observed,  in  the  first  place,  that  although  the  peculiar 
force  of  that  reasoning  which  is  properly  called  mathematical, 
depends  on  the  circumstance  of  its  principles  being  hypotheti- 
cal, yet  if,  in  any  instance,  the  supposition  could  be  ascer- 
tained as  actually  existing,  the  conclusion  might,  with  the  very 
same  certainty,  be  applied.  If  I  were  satisfied,  for  example, 
that  in  a  particular  circle  drawn  on  paper,  all  the  radii  were 
exactly  equal,  every  property  which  Euclid  has  demonstra- 
ted of  that  curve  might  be  confidently  affirmed  to  belong  to 
this  diagram.  As  the  thing,  however,  here  supposed,  is  ren- 
dered impossible  by  the  imperfection  of  our  senses,  the  truths 
of  geometry  can  never,  in  their  practical  applications,  pos- 
sess demonstrative  evidence ;  but  only  that  kind  of  evidence 
which  our  organs  of  perception  enable  us  to  obtain. 


152  ELEMENTS    OP    THE    PHILOSOPHY         [CHAP.  II. 

But  although,  in  the  practical  applications -of  mathematics, 
the  evidence  of  our  conclusions  differs  essentially  from  that 
which  belongs  to  the  truths  investigated  in  the  theory,  it  does 
not  therefore  follow,  that  these  conclusions  are  the  less  im- 
portant. In  proportion  to  the  accuracy  of  our  data,  will  be 
that  of  all  our  subsequent  deductions  ;  and  it  fortunately  hap- 
pens, that  the  same  imperfections  of  sense  which  limit  what 
is  physically  attainable  in  the  former,  limit  also,  to  the  very 
same  extent,  what  is  practically  useful  in  the  latter.  The  as- 
tonishing precision  which  the  mechanical  ingenuity  of  modern 
times  has  given  to  mathematical  instruments,  has,  in  fact, 
communicated  a  nicety  to  the  results  of  practical  geometry, 
beyond  the  ordinary  demands  of  human  life,  and  far  beyond 
the  most  sanguine  anticipations  of  our  forefathers.* 

This  remarkable,  and,  indeed,  singular  coincidence  of  pro- 
positions purely  hypothetical,  with  fac  ts  which  fall  under  the 
examination  of  our  senses,  is  owing,  a5.  I  already  hinted,  to 
the  peculiar  nature  of  the  objects  about  which  mathematics  is 
conversant ;  and  to  the  opportunity  which  wp  have  (in  con- 
sequence of  that  mensurability]  which  belongs  to  all  of  them) 

*  See  a  very  interesting  and  able  article,  in  the  fifth  volume  of  the  Edinburgh  Re- 
\  lew,  on  Colonel  Mudge's  account  of  the  operations  carried  on  for  accomplishing  a 
trigonometrical  survey  of  England  and  Wales.  I  cannot  deny  myself  the  pleasure  of 
quoting  a  few  sentences. 

"  In  two  distances  that  weie  deduced  from  sets  of  triangles,  the  one  measured  by 
"  Geaeial  Roy  in  1787,  the  other  by  Major  Mudge  in  1794,  one  of  24.133  miles,  and 
"  the  other  of  38.688,  the  two  measures  agree  within  a  foot  as  to  the  first  distance,  and 
"  16  inches  as  to  the  second.  Such  an  agreement,  where  the  observers  and  the  in- 
'•'  struments  were  both  different,  where  the  lines  measured  were  of  such  extent,  and 
u  deduced  from  such  a  variety  of  data,  is  probably  without  any  other  example.  Coin- 
"  cidences  of  this  sort  are  frequent  in  the  trigonometrical  survey,  and  prove  how  much 
"  more  good  instruments,  used  by  skilful  and  attentive  observers,  are  capable  of  per- 
'•  forming,  than  the  most  sanguine  theorist  could  have  ever  ventured  to  foretell. — 

"  It  is  curious  to  compare  the  early  essays  of  practical  geometry  with  the  perfec- 
"  tion  to  which  its  operations  have  now  reached,  and  to  consider  that,  while  the  artist 
■  had  made  so  little  progress,  the  theorist  had  reached  many  of  the  sublimest  heights 
'■  of  mathematical  speculation  ;  that  the  latter  had  found  out  the  area  of  the  circle, 
"  and  calculated  its  circumference  to  more  than  a  hundred  places  of  decimals,  when 
;'  the  former  could  hardly  divide  an  arch  into  minutes  of  a  degree ;  and  that  many  ex- 
•'  cellent  treatises  had  been  written  on  the  properties  of  curve  lines,  beibre  a  straight 
"  line  of  considerable  length  had  ever  been  carefully  cliavvn,  op  exactly  measured  en 
"  the  surface  of  the  earth.'' 

i  See  Kote  (G.) 


SECT.  IV.}  OP    THE    HUM  All    MIND.  15$ 

of  adjusting,  with  a  degree  of  accuracy  approximating  near- 
ly to  the  truth,  the  data  from  which  we  are  to  reason  in  our 
practical  operations,  to  those  which  are  assumed  in  our  theo- 
ry. The  only  affections  of  matter  which  these  objects  com- 
prehend are  extension  and  figure ;  affections  which  matter 
possesses  in  common  with  space,  and  which  may,  therefore, 
be  separated  in  fact,  as  well  as  abstracted  in  thought,  from 
all  its  other  sensible  qualities.  In  examining,  accordingly, 
ihe  relations  of  quantity  connected  with  these  affections,  we 
are  not  liable  to  be  disturbed  by  those  physical  accidents, 
which,  in  the  other  applications  of  mathematical  science, 
necessarily  render  the  result,  more  or  less,  at  variance  with 
the  theory.  In  measuring  the  height  of  a  mountain,  or  in 
the  survey  of  a  country,  if  we  are  at  due  pains  in  ascertain- 
ing our  data,  and  if  we  reason  from  them  with  mathematical 
strictness,  the  result  may  be  depended  on  as  accurate  within 
very  narrow  limits  ;  and  as  there  is  nothing  but  the  incor- 
rectness of  our  data  by  which  the  result  can  be  vitiated,  the 
limits  of  possible  error  may  themselves  be  assigned.  But, 
in  the  simplest  applications  of  mathematics  to  mechanics  or 
to  physics,  the  abstractions  which  are  necessary  in  the  theo- 
ry, must  always  leave  out  circumstances  which  are  essential- 
ly connected  with  the  effect.  In  demonstrating,  for  example, 
the  property  of  the  lever,  we  abstract  entirely  from  its  own 
weight,  and  consider  it  as  an  inflexible  mathematical  line  ;— - 
suppositions  with  which  the  fact  cannot  possibly  correspond  ; 
and  for  which,  of  course,  allowances  (which  nothing  but 
physical  experience  can  enable  us  to  judge  of)  must  be 
made  in  practice.* 

JNVxt  to  practical  geometry,  properly  so  called,  one  of  the 
easiest  applications  of  mathematical  theory  occur.?  in  those 
branches  of  optics  which  are  distinguished  by  the  name  of 
catoptrics  and  dioptrics.  In  these,  the  physical  principles 
from  which  we  reason  are  few  and  precisely  definite,  and  the 
rest  of  the  process  is  as  purely  geometrical  as  the  Elements 
of  Euclid. 

*  See  Note  (H.) 


154  ELEMENTS    OF    THE    PHILOSOPHY  [CHAP.  II. 

In  that  part  of  astronomy,  too,  which  relates  solely  to  the 
phenomena,  wi  hout  any  consideration  of  physical  causes, 
our  reasonings  are  purely  geometrical.  The  data,  indeed,  on 
which -we  proceed  must  have  been  previously  ascertained  by 
observation;  but  the  inferences  we  draw  from  these  are  con- 
nected with  them  by  mathematical  demonstration,  and  are 
accessible  to  all  who  are  acquainted  with  the  theory  of 
spherics. 

In  physical  astronomy,  the  law  of  gravitation  becomes  also 
a  principle  or  datum  in  our  reasonings  ;  but  as  in  the  ce- 
lestial phenomena,  it  is  disengaged  from  the  effects  of  the  va- 
rious other  causes  which  arc  combined  with  it  near  the  sur- 
face of  our  planet,  this  branch  of  physics,  as  it  is  of  all  the 
most  sublime  and  comprehensive  in  its  objects,  so  it  seems, 
in  a  greater  degree  than  any  other,  to  open  a  fair  and  advan- 
tageous field  for  mathematical  ingenuity. 

In  the  instances  which  have  been  last  mentioned,  the  evi- 
dence of  our  conclusions  resolves  ultimately  not  only  into 
that  of  sense,  but  into  another  law  of  belief  formerly  mention- 
ed ;  that  which  leads  us  to  expect  the  continuance,  in  future, 
of  the  established  order  of  physical  phenomena.  A  very 
striking  illustration  of  this  presents  itself  in  the  computations 
of  the  astronomer ;  on  the  faith  of  which  he  predicts,  with 
the  most  perfect  assurance,  many  centuries  before  they  hap- 
pen, the  appearances  which  the  heavenly  bodies  are  to  ex- 
hibit. The  same  fact  is  assumed  in  all  our  conclusions  in 
natural  philosophy  ;  and  something  extremely  analogous  to  it 
in  all  our  conclusions  concerning  human  affairs.  They  re- 
late, in  both  cases,  not  to  necessary  connections,  but  to 
probable  or  contingent  events  ;  of  which  (how  confidently  so- 
ever we  may  expect  them  to  take  place)  the  failure  is  by  no 
means  perceived  to  be  impossible.  Such  conclusions,  there- 
fore, differ  essentially  from  those  to  which  we  are  led  by  the 
demonstrations  of  pure  mathematics,  which  not  only  com- 
mand our  assent  to  the  theorems  they  establish,  but  satisfy 
us  that  the  contrary  suppositions  are  absurd. 


SECT.  IV.]  OP    THE    HUMAN   MIND.  155 

These  examples  may  suffice  to  convey  a  general  idea  of 
the  distinction  between  demonstrative  and  probable  evidence  ; 
and  I  purposely  borrowed  them  from  sciences  where  the  two 
are  brought  into  immediate  contrast  with  each  other,  and 
where  the  authority  of  both  has  hitherto  been  equally  undis- 
puted. 

Before  prosecuting  any  farther  the  subject  of  probable  evi- 
dence, some  attention  seems  to  be  due,  in  the  first  place,  to 
the  grounds  of  that  fundamental  supposition  on  which  it  pro- 
ceeds,— the  stability  of  the  order  of  nature.  Of  this  impor- 
tant subject,  accordingly,   I  propose  to  treat  at  some  length. 


II. 


Continuation  of  the  Subject. — Of  that  Permanence  or  Stability  in  the  Order  of  Na- 
ture, which  is  presupposed  in  our  Reasonings  concerning  Contingent  Truths. 

I  have  already  taken  notice  of  a  remarkable  principle  of 
the  mind,  (whether  coeval  with  the  first  exercise  of  its  pow- 
ers, or  the  gradual  result  of  habit,  it  is  not  at  present  mate- 
rial to  inquire,)  in  consequence  of  which,  we  are  irresistibly 
led  to  apply  to  future  events  the  results  of  our  past  experi- 
ence. In  again  resuming  the  subject,  I  do  not  mean  to  add 
any  thing  to  what  was'  then  stated  concerning  the  origin  or 
the  nature  of  this  principle  ;  but  shall  confine  myself  to  a  few 
reflections  on  that  established  order  in  the  succession  of 
events,  which  it  unconsciously  assumes  as  a  fact ;  and  which, 
if  it  were  not  real,  would  render  human  life  a  continued  se- 
ries of  errors  and  disappointments.  In  any  incidental  re- 
marks that  may  occur  on  the  principle  itself,  1  shall  consider 
its  existence  as  a  thing  universally  acknowledged,  and  shall 
direct  my  attention  chiefly  to  its  practical  effects  ; — effects 
which  will  be  found  to  extend  equally  to  the  theories  of  the 
learned,  and  to  the  prejudices  of  the  vulgar.  The  question 
with  regard  to  its  origin  is,  in  truth,  a  problem  of  mere  curi- 
©sity ;  for  of  its  actual  influence  on  our  belief,  and  on  our 


156  ELEMENTS    OP   THE   PHILOSOPHY  [CHAP.  It. 

conduct,  no  doubts  have  been  suggested  by  the  most  scepti- 
cal writers. 

Before  entering,  however,  upon  the  following  argument,  it 
may  not  be  superfluous  to  observe,  with  respect  to  this  ex- 
pectation,  that,  in  whatever  manner  it  at  first  arises,  it  can- 
not fail  to  be  mightily  confirmed  and  strengthened  by  habits 
of  scientific  research  ;  the  tendency  of  which  is  to  familiar- 
ize us  more  and  more  with  the  simplicity  and  uniformity 
of  physical  laws,  by  gradually  reconciling  with  them,  as  our 
knowledge  extends,  those  phenomena  which  we  had  previous- 
ly been  disposed  to  consider  in  the  light  of  exceptions.  Tt  is 
thus  that,  when  due  allowances  are  made  for  the  different  cir- 
cumstances of  the  two  events,  the  ascent  of  smoke  appears  to 
be  no  less  a  proof  of  the  law  of  gravitation  than  the  fall  of  a 
stone.  This  simplification  and  generalization  of  the  laws  of 
nature  is  one  of  the  greatest  pleasures  which  philosophy 
yields;  and  the  growing  confidence  with  which  it  is  antici- 
pated, forms  one  of  the  chief  incentives  to  philosophical  pur- 
suits. Few  experiments,  pfrhaps,  in  physics,  afford  more 
exquisite  delight  to  the  novice,  or  throw  a  stronger  light  on 
the  nature  and  object  of  that  science,  than  when  he  sees,  for 
the  first  time,  the  guinea  and  the  feather  drop  together  in, 
the  exhausted  receiver. 

In  the  language  of  modern  science,  the  established  order 
in  the  succession  of  physical  events  is  commonly  referred 
(by  a  sort  of  figure  or  metaphor)  to  ike  general  laws  of  na- 
ture. It  is  a  mode  of  speaking  extremely  convenient  from 
its  conciseness,  but  is  apt  to  suggest  to  the  fancy  a  ground- 
less, and,  indeed,  absurd  analogy  between  the  material  and 
the  moral  worlds.  As  the  order  of  society  results  from  the 
laws  prescribed  by  the  legislator,  so  the  order  of  the  uni- 
verse is  conceived  to  result  from  certain  laws  established  by 
the  Deityf  Thus,  it  is  customary  to  say,  that  the  fall  of  hea- 
vy bodies  towards  the  earth's  surface,  the  ebbing  and  flow- 
ing of  the  sea,  and  the  motions  of  the  planets  in  their  orbits, 
are  consequences  of  the  law  of  gravitation.  But  although,  in 
one  sense,  this  may  be  abundantly  accurate,  it  ought  always 


fSECT.  IV.]  U  OF    THE   HUMAN    MIND.  137 

to  be  kept  in  view,  that  it  is  not  a  literal  but  a  metaphorical 
statement  of  the  truth  ;  a  statement  somewhat  analogous  to 
that  poetical  expression  in  the  sacred  writings,  in  which  God 
is  said  "  to  have  given  his  decree  to  the  seas,  that  they 
w  should  not  pass  his  commandment."  In  those  political  as- 
sociations from  which  the  metaphor  is  borrowed,  the  laws 
are  addressed  to  rational  and  voluntary  agents,  who  are  able 
to  comprehend  their  meaning,  and  to  regulate  their  conduct 
accordingly  ;  whereas,  in  the  material  universe,  the  subjects 
of  our  observation  are  understood  by  all  men  to  be  uncon- 
scious and  passive,  (that  is,  are  understood  to  be  unchange- 
able in  their  state,  without  the  influence  of  some  foreign  and 
external  force,)  and,  consequently,  the  order  so  admirably 
maintained,  amidst  all  the  various  changes  which  they  ac- 
tually undergo,  not  only  implies  intelligence  in  its  first  con- 
ception, but  implies,  in  its  continued  existence,  the  incessant 
agency  of  power,  executing  the  purposes  of  wise  design.  If 
the  word  law,  therefore,  be,  in  such  instances,  literally  interpre- 
ted, it  must  mean  a  uniform  mode  of  operation,  prescribed  by 
the  Deity  to  himself;  and  it  has  accordingly  been  explained 
in  this  sense  by  some  of  our  best  philosophical  writers,  par- 
ticularly by  Dr.  Clarke.*  In  employing,  however,  the  word 
with  an  exclusive  reference  to  experimental  philosophy,  it  is 
more  correctly  logical  to  consider  it  as  merely  a  statement  of 
some  general fact  with  respect  to  the  order  of  nature; — a  fact 
which  has  been  found  to  hold  uniformly  in  our  past  experi- 
ence, and  on  the  continuance  of  which,  in  future,  the  consti- 
tution of  our  mind  determines  us  confidently  to  rely. 

After  what  has  been  already  said,  it  is  hardly  necessary 
io  take  notice  of  the  absurdity  of  that  opinion,  or  rather 
of  that  mode  of  speaking,  which  seems  to  refer  the  order  of 
the  universe  to  general  laws   operating  as    efficient  causes, 

n  So  likewise  Halley,  in  his  Latin  verses  prefixed  to  Newton's  Principia  : 
"  En  tibi  norma  poli,  et  diva?  Hbramina  molis, 
"  Computus  en  Jovis  ;  et  quas,  dum  primordia  reritm 
"  Pangeret,  omniparens  leges  violate  Great  err 


158  ELEMENTS    OP    THE    PHILOSOPHY       [CHAP.    II. 

Absurd,  however,  as  it  is,  there  is  reason  to  suspect,  that  it 
has,  with  many,  had  the  effect  of  keeping  the  Deily  out  of 
view,  while  they  were  studying  his  works.  To  an  incautious 
use  of  the  same  very  equivocal  phrase,  may  be  traced  the 
bewildering  obscurity  in  the  speculations  of  some  eminent 
French  writers,  concerning  its  metaphysical  import.  Even 
the  great  Montesquieu,  in  the  very  first  chapter  of  his  prin- 
cipal work,  has  lost  himself  in  a  fruitless  attempt  to  explain 
its  meaning,  when,  by  a  simple  statement  of  the  essential 
distinction  between  its  literal  and  its  metaphorical  accepta- 
tions, he  might  have  at  once  cleared  up  the  mystery.  After 
telling  us  that  "  laws,  in  their  most  extensive  signification, 
"  are  the  necessary  relations  (les  rapports  necessaires)  which 
"  arise  from  the  nature  of  things,  and  that,  in  this  sense,  all 
"  beings  have  their  laws  ; — that  the  Deity  has  his  laws  ; 
"  the  material  world  its  laws;  intelligences  superior  to  man 
i(  their  laws  ;  the  brutes  their  laws  ;  man  his  laws  5" — he 
proceeds  to  remark,  "  That  the  moral  world  is  far  from 
"  being  so  well  governed  as  the  material  ;  for  the  former, 
"  although  it  has  its  laws,  which  are  invariable,  does  not 
"  observe  these  laws  so  constantly  as  the  latter."  It  is  evi- 
dent that  this  remark  derives  whatever  plausibility  it  pos- 
sesses from  a  play  upon  words  ;  from  confounding  moral 
laws  with  physical  ;  or,  in  plainer  terms,  from  confounding 
laws  which  are  addressed  by  a  legislator  lo  intelligent  be- 
ings, with  those  general  conclusions  concerning  the  establish- 
ed order  of  the  universe,  to  which,  when  legitimately  infer- 
red from  an  induction  sufficiently  extensive,  philosophers 
have  metaphorically  applied  the  title  of  Laws  of  Nature,  In 
the  one  case,  the  conformity  of  the  law  with  the  nature  of 
things,  does  not  at  all  depend  on  its  being  observed  or  not, 
but  on  the  reasonableness  and  moral  obligation  of  the  law. 
In  the  other  case,  the  very  definition  of  the  word  law  suppo- 
ses that  it  applies  universally  ;  insomuch  that,  if  it  failed  in 
one  single  instance,  it  wrould  cease  to  be  a  law.  It  is,'  there- 
fore, a  mere  quibble  to  say,  that  the  laws  of  the  material 
world  are  better  observed  than  those  of  the  moral :  the  mean- 


SECT.  IV.]  OP    THE    HUMAN   MIND.  159 

ing  of  the  word  law,  in  the  two  cases  to  which  it  is  here  ap- 
plied, being  so  totally  different,  as  to  render  the  comparison 
or  contrast,  in  the  statement  of  which  it  is  involved,  altoge- 
ther illusory  and  sophistical.  Indeed,  nothing  more  is  ne- 
cessary to  strip  the  proposition  of  every  semblance  of  plau- 
sibility, but  an  attention  to  this  verbal  ambiguity.* 

This  metaphorical  employment  of  the  word  law,  to  ex- 
press a  general  fact,  although  it  does  not  appear  to  have 
been  adopted  in  the  technical  phraseology  of  ancient  philo- 
sophy, is  not  unusual  among  the  classical  writers,  when 
speaking  of  those  physical  arrangements,  whether  on  the 
earth  or  in  the  heavens,  which  continue  to  exhibit  the  same 
appearance  from  age  to  age. 

"  Hie  segetes,  illic  veaiunt  felicius  uvae  : 
"  Arhorei  fetus  alibi,  atque  injussa  virescunt 
"  Gramiaa     Nonne  vides,  rroceos  ut  Tmolus  odores, 
"  India  mitiit  ebur,  molles  sua  thura  Sabsei  ? 
"  At  Chalybes  nudi  (errum,  virosaque  Pontus 
"  Castorea.  Eliadum  palms'!  Epiros  equarum  ? 
"  Continue  has  leges,  (Bternaque  foedera  certis 
"  Imposuit  nalura  locis."t 

The  same  metaphor  occurs  in  another  passage  of  the 
Georgics,  where  the  poet  describes  the  regularity  which  is 
exhibited  in  the  economy  of  the  bees  : 

"  Solas  communes  natos,  consortia  tecta 

"  Urbis  habent,  magnisque  agitant  sub  legibus  aevum.' + 

The  following  lines  from  Ovid's  account  of  the  Pytha- 
gorean philosophy,  are  still  more  in  point : 

*  I  do  not  recollect  any  instance  in  the  writings  of  Montesquieu,  where  he  has  rea- 
soned more  vaguely  than  in  this  chapter  ;  and  yet  I  am  inclined  to  believe,  that  few 
chapters  in  the  Spirit  of  Laws  have  been  more  admired.  "  Montesquieu,"  says  a 
French  writer,  f*  paroissoit  a.  Thomas  le  premier  des  ecrivains,  pour  la  force  et  l'eten- 
"  due  des  idees,  pour  la  multitude,  la  profondeur,  la  nouveaut€  des  rapports.  II  cs>. 
"  incroyable  (didoil-il)  tout  ce  que  Montesquieu  a  fait  apnerqevoir  dans  ce  mot  si 
<!  court,  le  mot  Lot." — Noveau  Diction.  H;storique,  Art.  Thomas.    Lyon,  1804. 

For  some  important  remarks  on  the  distinction  between  moral  and  physical  laws, 
aee  Dr.  Ferguson's  Institutes  of  Moral  Philosophy,  last  edit. 

1  Virg.  I.  Georg.  GO. 

t  Georg.  IV.  153. 


160  ELEMENTS    OP    THE  PHILOSOPHY  [cHAP.  II. 

u  Et  rerum  causas,  et  quid  natura  docebat ; 

"  Quid  Deus  :  Unde  nives  :  qua?  fulminis  esset  origo  : 

"  Jupiter,  an  venti,  discussa  nube  tonarent  *. 

"  Quid  quateret  terras,  qua.  sidera  lege  niearent, 

"  Et  quodcunque  latet.'* 

i  have  quoted  these  different  passages  from  ancient  au- 
thors, chiefly  as  an  illustration  of  the  strength  and  of  the 
similarity  of  the  impression  which  the  order  of  nature  has 
made  on  the  minds  of  reflecting  men,  in  all  ages  of  the  world. 
Nor  is  this  wonderful :  for,  were  things  differently  constituted, 
it  would  be  impossible  for  man  to  derive  benefit  from  expe- 
rience ;  and  the  powers  of  observation  and  memory  would 
be  subservient  only  to  the  gratification  of  an  idle  curiosity. 
In  consequence  of  those  uniform  laws  by  which  the  succes- 
sion of  events  is  actually  regulated,  every  fart  collected  with 
respect  to  the  past  is  a  foundation  of  sagacity  and  of  skill 

*  Ovid.  Met.  XV.  68. 

1  shall  only  add  to  these  quotations  the  epigram  of  Claudian  on  the  instrument  said 
to  be  invented  by  Archimedes  for  representing  the  movements  of  the  heavenly  bodies, 
in  which  various  expressions  occur  coinciding  remarkably  with  the  scope  of  the' 
•foregoing  observation?. 

Ci  Jupiter  in  paivo  cum  cerneret  aeihera  vitro 

"  Risit,  et  ad  superos  talia  dicta  dedit. 
';  Huccinemortalis  progressa  potentia  curae  ;. 

"  Jam  meus  in  fragili  luditur  orbe  labor. 
lt  Jura  Poli,  rerwnque  fdem,  legesque  Deorunt 

w  Ecce  Syracusius  transtulit  arte  senex. 
"  lnclusus  Variis  famulatur  spiritus  astris, 

"  Et  vivum  certis  motibus  urget  opus. 
il  Percurrit  proprium  mentitus  signifer  annum, 

il  Et  simulata  novo  C3'nthia  mense  redit. 
"  Jamque  suum  volvens  audax  industria  mundunS 

"  Gaudet,  et  humana  Sydera  mente  regit. 
a  Quid  falso  insonlem  tonitru  Salmonea  miror  ? 

"  jiEmula  naturae  parva  reperta  manus." 

Jn  the  progress  of  philosophical  refinement  at  Rome,  this  metaphorical  application 
of  the  word  law  seems  to  have  been  attended  with  the  same  consequences  which  (as 
I  already  observed)  have  resulted  from  an  incautious  use  of  it  among  some  philoso- 
phers of  modern  Europe.  Pliny  tells  us,  that,  in  his  time,  these  consequences  ex- 
tended  both  to  the  lettered,  and  to  the  unlettered  multitude.  "  Pars  alia  astro  suo 
u  evenlus  assigna',  et  nascendi  legibvs  ;  semelque  in  omnes  futuros  unquam  Deo  de- 
"  cretum,  in  reb'qiium  vero  otium  datum.  Sedere  csepi;  sententia  haec,  pariterque 
9  ft  erudilum  vulgm  -et  rude  in  earn  cursu  vadit." — Plm.  Nat.  Hist.  Lib.  i?. 


SECT.  IV.]  OF   THE  HUMAN   MIND.  161 

with  respect  to  the  future  ;  and,  in  truth,  it  is  chiefly  this 
application  of  experience  to  anticipate  what  is  yet  to  hap- 
pen, which  forms  the  intellectual  superiority  of  one  indivi- 
dual above  another.  The  remark  holds  equally  in  all  the 
various  pursuits  of  mankind,  whether  speculative  or  active. 
As  an  astronomer  is  able,  by  reasonings  founded  6n  past 
observations,  to  predict  those  phenomena  of  the  heavens 
which  astonish  or  terrify  the  savage  ;  as  the  chemist,  from 
his  previous  familiarity  with  the  changes  operated  upon  bo- 
dies by  heat  or  by  mixture,  can  predict  the  result  of  innu- 
merable experiments,  which  to  others  furnish  only  matter  of 
amusement  and  wonder  ; — so  a  studious  observer  of  human 
affairs  acquires  a  prophetic  foresight  (still  more  incompre- 
hensible to  the  multitude)  with  respect  to  the  future  fortunes 
of  mankind  ;— a  foresight  whichj  if  it  does  not  reach,  like 
our  anticipations  in  physical  science,  to  particular  and  defi- 
nite events^  amply  compensates  for  what  it  wants  in  preci- 
sion, by  the  extent  and  variety  of  the  prospects  which  it 
opens.  It  is  from  this  apprehended  analogy  between  the 
future  and  the  past,  that  historical  knowledge  derives  the 
whole  of  its  value  ;  and  were  the  analogy  completely  to  fail, 
the  records  of  former  ages  would,  in  point  of  utility,  rank 
with  the  fictions  of  poetry.  Nor  is  the  case  different  in  the  bu- 
siness of  common  life.  Upon  what  does  the  success  of  men. 
in  their  private  concerns  so  essentially  depend  as  on  their 
own  prudence  ;  and  what  else  does  this  word  mean,  than  a 
wise  regard,  in  every  step  of  their  conduct,  to  the  lessons 
which  experience  has  taught  them  ?* 

The  departments  of  the  universe,  in  which  we  have  an 
opportunity  of  seeing  this  regular  order  displayed,  are  the 
three  following:  1.  The  phenomena  of  inanimate  matter; 
2.  The  phenomena  of  the  lower  animals  ;  and,  3.  The  phe- 
nomena exhibited  by  the  human  race. 

1.  On  the  first  of  these  heads,  I  have  only  to  repeat  what 
was  before  remarked,  That,  in  all  the  phenomena  of  the  ma- 
terial world,  the  uniformity  in  the  order  of  events  is  conceiv- 

*  '<  Prtu'etitiam  qnoilninitjodo  esse  divinationon."    Corn.  JYep.  in  vita  .lit-iti. 
VOL.  u.  2l 


162  ELEMENTS    OF   THE    PHILOSOPHY  [CHAP.  II, 

ed  by  us  to  be  complete  and  infallible  ;  insomuch  that,  to  be 
assured  of  the  same  result  upon  a  repetition  of  the  same  ex- 
periment, we  require  only  to  be  satisfied,  that  both  have 
been  made  in  circumstances  precisely  similar.  A  single  ex- 
periment, accordingly,  if  conducted  with  due  attention,  is  con- 
sidered, by  the  most  cautious  inquirers,  as  sufficient  to  esta- 
blish a  general  physical  fact ;  and  if,  on  any  occasion,  it 
should  be  repeated  a  second  time,  for  the  sake  of  greater 
certainty  in  the  conclusion,  it  is  merely  with  a  view  of  guard- 
ing against  the  effects  of  the  accidental  concomitants  which 
may  have  escaped  notice,  when  the  first  result  was  obtained. 
2.  The  case  is  nearly  similar  in  the  phenomena  exhibited 
by  the  brutes  ;  the  various  tribes  of  which  furnish  a  subject 
of  examination  so  steady,  that  the  remarks  made  on  a  few 
individuals  may  be  extended,  with  little  risk  of  error,  to  the 
whole  species.  To  this  uniformity  in  their  instincts  it  is 
owing,  that  man  can  so  easily  maintain  his  empire  over  them, 
and  employ  them  as  agents  or  instruments  for  accomplishing, 
his  purposes ;  advantages  which  would  be  wholly  lost  to 
him,  if  the  operations  of  instinct  were  as  much  diversified  as 
those  of  human  reason.  Here,  therefore,  we  may  plainly 
trace  a  purpose  or  design,  perfectly  analogous  to  that  alrea- 
dy remarked,  with  respect  to  the  laws  which  regulate  the  ma- 
terial world  ;  and  the  difference,  in  point  of  exact  uniformity, 
which  distinguishes  the  two  classes  of  events,  obviously 
arises  from  a  certain  latitude  of  action,  which  enables  the 
brutes  to  accommodate  themselves,  in  some  measure,  to  their 
accidental  situations  ; — rendering  them,  in  consequence  of 
this  power  of  accommodation,  incomparably  more  service- 
able to  our  race  than  they  would  have  been,  if  altogether 
subjected,  like  mere  matter,  to  the  influence  of  regular  and 
assignable  causes.  It  is,  moreover,  extremely  worthy  of  ob- 
servation, concerning  these  two  departments  of  the  universe, 
that  the  uniformity  in  the  phenomena  of  the  latter  presup- 
poses a  corresponding  regularity  in  the  phenomena  of  the 
former  ;  insomuch  that,  if  the  established  order  of  the  mate- 
rial world  were  to  be  essentially  disturbed,  (the  instincts  of 


SECT.  IV.]  OP    THE    HUMAN    MINI).  163 

the  brutes  remaining  the  same.)  all  their  various  tribes  would 
inevitably  perish.  The  uniformity  of  animal  instinct,  there- 
fore, bears  a  reference  to  the  constancy  and  immutability  of 
physical  laws,  not  less  manifest,  than  that  of  the  fin  of  the 
fish  to  the  properties  of  the  water,  or  of  the  wing  of  the  bird 
to  those  of  the  atmosphere. 

3.  When  from  the  phenomena  of  inanimate  matter  and 
those  of  the  lower  animals,  we  turn  our  attention  to  the  histo- 
ry of  our  own  species,  innumerable  lessens  present  themselves 
for  the  instruction  of  all  who  reflect  seriously  on  the  great 
concerns  of  human  life.  These  lessons  require,  indeed,  an 
uncommon  degree  of  acuteness  and  good  sense  to  collect 
them,  and  a  still  more  uncommon  degree  of  caution  to  apply 
them  to  practice  ;  not  only  because  it  is  difficult  to  find  cases 
in  which  the  combinations  of  circumstances  are  exactly  the 
same  ;  but  because  the  peculiarities  of  individual  character 
are  infinite,  and  the  real  springs  of  action  in  our  fellow-crea- 
tures are  objects  only  of  vague  and  doubtful  conjecture.  It 
js,  however,  a  curious  fact,  and  one  which  opens  a  wide  field 
of  interesting  speculation,  that,  in  proportion  as  we  extend 
our  views  from  particulars  to  generals,  and  from  individuals 
to  communities,  human  affairs  exhibit,  more  and  more,  a  stea- 
dy subject  of  philosophical  examination,  and  furnish  a  greater 
number  of  general  conclusions  to  guide  our  conjectures  con- 
cerning future  contingencies.  To  speculate  concerning  the 
character  or  talents  of  the  individual  who  shall  possess  the 
throne  of  a  particular  kingdom,  a  hundred  years  hence,  would 
be  absurd  in  the  extreme  :  But  to  indulge  imagination  in  antici- 
pating, at  the  same  distance  of  time,  the  condition  and  cha- 
racter of  any  great  nation,  with  whose  manners  and  political 
situation  we  are  well  acquainted,  (although  even  here  our 
conclusions  may  be  widely  erroneous,)  could  not  be  justly 
censured  as  a  misapplication  of  our  faculties  equally  vain 
and  irrational  with  the  former.  On  this  subject,  Mr.  Hume 
has  made  some  very  ingenious  and  important  remarks  in  the* 
beginning  of  his  Essay  on  the  Rise  and  Progress  of  the  Arte 
and  Sciences. 


164  ELEMENTS    OF    THE   PHILOSOPHY         [CHAP.  II. 

The  same  observation  is  applicable  to  all  other  cases,  in 
which  events  depend  on  a  multiplicity  of  circumstances.  ' 
How  accidental  soever  these  circumstances  may  appear, 
and  how  much  soever  they  may  be  placed,  when  individu- 
ally considered,  beyond  the  reach  of  our  calculations,  expe- 
rience shews,  that  they  are  somehow  or  other  mutually  ad- 
justed, so  as  to  produce  a  certain  degree  of  uniformity  in  the 
result  j  and  this  uniformity  is  the  more  complete,  the  greater 
is  the  number  of  circumstan  es  combined.  What  can  ap- 
pear more  uncertain  than  the  proportion  between  the  sexes 
among  the  children  of  any  one  family  !  and  yet  how  wonder- 
fully is  the  balance  preserved  in  the  case  of  a  numerous  so- 
ciety !  What  more  precarious  than  the  duration  of  life  in  an 
individual !  and  yet,  in  a  long  list  of  persons  of  the  same  age, 
and  placed  in  the  same  circumstances,  the  mean  duration  of 
life  is  found  to  vary  within  very  narrow  limits.  In  an  ex- 
tensive district,  too,  a  considerable  degree  of  regularity  may 
sometimes  be  traced  for  a  course  of  years,  in  the  proportion 
of  births  and  of  deaths,  to  the  number  of  the  whole  inhabi- 
tants. Thus,  in  France,  Necker  informs  us,  that  "  the  num- 
"  ber  of  births  is  in  proportion  to  that  of  the  inhabitants  as 
"  one  to  twenty-three  and  twenty-four,  in  the  districts  that 
"  are  not  favoured  by  nature,  nor  by.  moral  circumstances  r 
"  this  proportion  is  as  one  to  twenty-five,  twenty-five  and 
"  a  half,  and  twenty-six,  in  the  greatest  part  of  France  :  in 
"  cities,  as  one  to  twenty-seven,  twenty-eight,  twenty-nine, 
"  and  even  thirty,  according  to  their  extent  and  their  trade." 
"  Such  propositions,"  he  observes,  "  can  only  be  remarked 
"  in  districts  where  there  are  no  settlers  nor  emigrants  ;  but 
"  even  the  differences  arising  from  these,"  the  same  author 
adds,  "  and  many  other  causes,  acquire  a  kind  of  uniformity, 
"  when  collectively  considered,  and  in  the  immense  extent 
"  of  so  great  a  kingdom."* 

It  may  be  worth  while  to  remark,  that  on  the  principle 
just  stated,  all  the  different  institutions  for  Assurances  are 
founded.     The  object  at  which  they  all  aim,  in  common,  is. 

*  Traite  de  rAdmiuistration  des  Finances  de  France. 


SECT.    IV.]  OP    THE   HUMAN    MINJi.  16& 

to  diminish  the  number  of  accidents  to  which  human  life  is 
exposed  ;  or  rather,  to  counteract  the  inconveniences  result- 
ing from  the  irregularity  of  individual  events,  by  the  unifor- 
mity of  general  laws. 

The  advantages  which  we  derive  from  such  general  con- 
clusions as  we  possess  concerning  the  order  of  nature,  are 
so  great,  and  our  propensity  to  believe  in  its  existence  is  so 
strong,  that,  even  in  cases  where  the  succession  of  events 
appears  the  most  anomalous,  we  are  apt  to  suspect  the  ope- 
ration of  fixed  and  constant  laws,  though  we  may  be  unable 
to  trace  them.  The  vulgar,  in  all  countries,  perhaps,  have 
a  propensity  to  imagine,  that,  after  a  certain  number  of  years, 
the  succession  of  plentiful  and  of  scanty  harvests  begins  again 
to  be  repeated  in  the  same  series  as  before  ; — a  notion  to  which 
Lord  Bacon  himself  has  given  some  countenance  in  the  fol- 
lowing passage  :  "  There  is  a  toy  which  I  have  heard,  and 
"  I  would  not  have  it  given  over,  but  waited  upon  a  little. 
"  They  say  it  is  observed  in  the  low  countries,  (I  know  not 
"  in  what  part,)  that  every  five  and  thirty  years,  the  same 
"kind  and  suite  of  years  and  weathers  come  about  again  j 
"  as  great  frosts,  great  wet,  great  droughts,  warm  winters, 
"  summers  with  little  heat,  and  the  like  ;  and  they  call  it  the 
"prime.  It  is  a  thing  I  do  the  rather  mention,  because  com- 
*'  puting  backwards,  I  have  found  some  concurrence.'1* 

Among  the  philosophers  of  antiquity,  the  influence  of  the 
same  prejudice  is  observable  on  a  scale  still  greater ;  many 
of  them  having  supposed,  that  at  the  end  of  the  annus  mag- 
nus,  or  Platonic  year,  a  repetition  would  commence  of  all 
the  transactions  that  have  occurred  on  the  theatre  of  the 
world.  According  to  this  doctrine  the  predictions  in  Virgil's 
Pollio,  will,  sooner  or  later,  be  literally  accomplished  : 

"  Alter  erit  turn  Tiphys,  et  altera  quae  vehat  Argo 

"  Pelectos  Heroas;  erunt  eliam  altera  bella  ; 

"  Atque  iterum  ad  Trojam  magnus  mittetur  Achilles."f 

**  Essays,  Art.  59. 

t  "  Turn  efficitur,"  says  Cicero,  speaking  of  this  period,  "cum  solis  et  'unse,  et 
"  quinque  errantium  ad  eandem  inter  se  comparationem  confectis  omnium  -patiis,  est 
'';  facta  coriversio,    Qiw  quam  longa  sit,  magna  quneslio  est :  esse  vero  certam  et  defi- 


166  ELEMENTS    OF    THE    PHILOSOPHY        [CHAP.  EC. 

The  astronomical  cycles  which  the  Greeks  borrowed  from 
the  Egyptians  and  Chaldeans,  when  combined  with  that  natu- 
-  ral  bias  of  the  mind  which  I  have  just  remarked,  account  suffi- 
ciently for  this  extension  to  the  moral  world,  of  ideas  sug- 
gested by  the  order  of  physical  phenomena. 

Nor  is  this  hypothesis  of  a  moral  cycle,  extravagant  as  it 
unquestionably  is.  without  its  partisans  among  modern  theo- 
rists.    The  train  of  thought,  indeed,  by  which  they  have 
been  led  to  adopt  it  is  essentially  different ;  but  it  probably 
received  no  small  degree  of  countenance,  in  their  opinion, 
from  the  same  bias  which  influenced  the  speculations  of  the 
ancients.     It  has  been  demonstrated  by  one  of  the  most  pro- 
found mathematicians  of  the  present  age,*  that  all  (he  irregu- 
larities arising  from  the  mutual  action  of  the  planets,  are,  by 
a  combination  of  various  arrangements,  necessarily  subject- 
ed to  certain  periodical  laws,  so  as  forever  to  secure  the  sta- 
bility and  order  of  the  system.     Of  this  sublime  conclusion, 
it  has  been  justly  and  beautifully  observed,  that  "  after  New- 
"  ton's*  theory  of  the  elliptic  orbits  of  the  planets,  La  Grange's 
"discovery  of  their  periodical  inequalities,  is,  without  doubt, 
"  the  noblest  truth  in  physical  astronomy  ;  while,  in  respect 
"  of  the  doctrine  of  final  causes,  it  may  truly  be  regarded  as 
"  the  greatest  of  all."t     The  theorists,  however,  to  whom  I 
at  present  allude,  seem  disposed  to  consider  it  in  a  very  dif- 
ferent light,  and  to  employ  it  for  purposes  of  a  very  different^ 
tendency.     "  Similar  periods  (it  has  been  said)  but  of  an  ex- 
16  tent  that  affright  the  imagination,  probably  regulate  the 
"modifications  of  the  atmosphere  ;  inasmuch  as  the  same  se- 
"  ries  of  appearances  must  inevitably  recur,  whenever  a  coin- 
"  cidence  of  circumstances  takes  place.  The  aggregate  labours 
"  of  men,  indeed,  may  be  supposed,  at  first  sight,  to  alter  the 
"  operation  of  natural  causes,  by  continually  transforming  the 

"nitam  necesse  est." — De  Nat.  Deorum,  Lib.  ii.  11.  (i  Hoc  intervallo,"  Clavius  ob- 
serves, "quidam  volant,  omnia  qufficitnque  in  mundo  sunt,  eodem  ordine  esse  reditu- 
u  ra,  quo  nunc  cernuntur." — Clew.  Commeniar .  in  Sphceram  Jocmnh  de  Sacro  Boscq, 
p.  57.  Romre,  1GC7. 

~  M.  De  la  Grange. 

f  Edinburgh  Review,  Vol.  XI.  p.  284. 


SlEOT.  IV.]  OF   THE    HUMAN   MIND.  167 

"  face  of  our  globe  ;  but  it  must  be  recollected  that,  as  the 
"  agency  of  animals  is  itself  stimulated  and  determined  solely 
"by  the  influence  of  external  objects,  there-actions  of  living 
"  beings  are  comprehended  in  the  same  necessary  system ; 
"  and,  consequently,  that  all  the  events  within  the  immeasura- 
"  ble  circuit  of  the  universe,  are  the  successive  evolution  of 
"  an  extended  series,  which,  at  the  returns  of  some  vast  period, 
"  repeats  its  eternal  round  during  the  endless  flux  of  time."* 

On  this  very  bold  argument,  considered  in  its  connexion 
with  the  scheme  of  necessity,  I  have  nothing  to  observe  here. 
I  have  mentioned  it  merely  as  an  additional  proof  of  that 
irresistible  propensity  to  believe  in  the  permanent  order  of 
physical  events,  which  seems  to  form  an  original  principle 
of  the  human  constitution  ; — a  belief  essential  to  our  exis- 
tence in  the  world  which  we  inhabit,  as  well  as  the  founda- 
tion of  all  physical  science  ;  but  which  we  obviously  extend 
far  beyond  the  bounds  authorized  by  sound  philosophy, 
when  we  apply  it,  without  any  limitation,  to  that  moral  sys- 
tem, which  is  distinguished  by  peculiar  characteristics,  so 
numerous  and  important,  and  for  the  accommodation  of 
which,  so  many  reasons  entitle  us  to  presume,  that  the  ma- 
terial universe,  with  all  its  constant  and  harmonious  laws, 
was  purposely  arranged. 

To  a  hasty  and  injudicious  application  of  the  same  belief, 
in  anticipating  the  future  course  of  human  affairs,  might  be 
traced  a  variety  of  popular  superstitions,  which  have  pre- 
vailed, in  a  greater  or  less  degree,  in  all  nations  and  ages  ; 
those  superstitions,  for  example,  which  have  given  rise 
to  the  study  of  charms,  of  omens,  of  astrology,  and  of  the 
different  arts  of  divination.  But  the  argument  has  been  al- 
ready prosecuted  as  far  as  its  connection  with  this  part  of 
the  subject  requires.  For  a  fuller  illustration  of  it,  I  refer  to 
some  remarks  in  my  former  volume,  on  the  superstitious  ob- 
servances which,  among  rude  nations,  are  constantly  found 

*  The  foregoing  passage  is  transcribed  from  an  article  in  the  Monthly  Review.-  I 
have  neglected  to  mark  the  volume  ;  but  I  think  it  is  one  of  those  published  since 
MSQO.    See  Note  (I.) 


168  ELEMENTS    OF    THE    PHILOSOPHY        [CHAP.  II. 

blended  with  the  practice  of  physic  ;  and  which,  contempti- 
ble and  ludicrous  as  they  seem,  have  an  obvious  foundation, 
during  the  infancy  of  human  reason,  in  those  important  prin- 
ciples of  our  nature,  which,  when  duly  disciplined  by  a  more 
enlarged  experience,  lead  to  the  sublime  discoveries  of  in- 
ductive science.* 

Nor  is  it  to  the  earlier  stages  of  society,  or  to  the  lower 
classes  of  the  people,  that  these  superstitions  are  confined. 
Even  in  the  most  enlightened  and  refined  periods  they  occa- 
sionally appear  ;  exercising,  not  unfrequently,  over  men  of 
the  highest  genius  and  talents,  an  ascendant,  which  is  at  once 
consolatory  and  humiliating  to  the  species. 

"  Ecce  fulgurum  monitus,  oraculorum  praescita,  aruspicuna 
"  prasdicta,  atque  etiam  parva  dictu  in  auguriis  sternutam- 
lt  enta  et  offensiones  pedum.  Divus  Augustus  laevum  prod- 
"  idit  sibi  calceum  praspostere  inductum,  quo  die  seditione 
;'  militari  prope  aiflictus  est."t 

"  Dr.  Johnson,"  says  his  affectionate  and  very  communi- 
cative biographer,  "  had  another  particularity,  of  which 
"  none  of  his  friends  ever  ventured  to  ask  an  explanation. 
"  It  appeared  to  me  some  superstitious  habit,  which  he 
"  had  contracted  early,  and  from  which  he  had  never 
"  called  upon  his  reason  to  disentangle  him.  This  was, 
"  his  anxious  care  to  go  out  or  in  at  a  door  or  passage, 
"  by  a  certain  number  of  steps  from  a  certain  point,  or  at 
"  least  so  as  that  either  his  right  or  his  left  foot  (I  am  not 
"  certain  which)  should  constantly  make  the  first  actual 
"  movement  when  he  came  close  to  the  door  or  passage. 
"  Thus  1  conjecture  :  for  I  have,  upon  innumerable  occasions, 
"observed  him  suddenly  stop,  and  then  seem  to  count  his 
"  steps  with  a  deep  earnestness  ;  and  when  he  had  neglected 
14  or  gone  wrong  in  this  sort  of  magical  movement,  I  have 
"  seen  him  go  back  again,  put  himself  in  a  proper  posture  to 
"  begin  the  ceremony,  and,  having  gone  through  it,  break  from 
"  his  abstraction,  walk  briskly  on.  and  join  his  companion. "t 

*  Vol.  I.  pp.  355,  3o6,  357,  3d  edit. 

tPlin.  Nat.  Hist.  Lib.  ii. 

t  Boswonh's  Johnson,  Vol.  J.  p.  264^4to„  edit. 


SECT.  IV.]  OP   THE    HUMAN   MIND,  169 

The  remark  may  appear  somewhat  out  of  place,  but,  after, 
the  last  quotation,  I  may  be  permitted  to  say,  that  the  per- 
son to  whom  it  relates,  great  as  his  powers,  and  splendid  as 
his  accomplishments  undoubtedly  were,  was  scarcely  entitled 
to  assert,  that  "  Education  is  as  well  known,  and  has  long 
"  been  as  well  known,  as  ever  it  can  be."*  What  a  limited 
estimate  of  the  objects  of  education  must  this  great  man  have 
formed  !  They  who  know  the  value  of  a  well  regulated  and 
unclouded  mind,  would  not  incur  the  weakness  and  wretch- 
edness exhibited  in  the  foregoing  description,  for  all  his  lite' 
rary  acquirements  and  literary  fame. 

III. 

Continuation  of  the  Subject—General  Remarks  on  the  Difference  between  the  Evi- 
dence ofExperier.ee,  and  that  of  Analogy. 

According  to  the  account  of  experience  which  has  been, 
hitherto  given,  its  evidence  reaches  no  farther  than  to  an  an- 
ticipation of  the  future  from  the  past,  in  cases  where  the  same 
physical  cause  continues  to  operate  in  exactly  the  same  cir- 
cumstances. That  this  statement  is  agreeable  to  the  strict 
philosophical  notion  of  experience,  will  not  be  disputed. 
Wherever  a  change  takes  place,  either  in  the  cause  itself,  or 
in  the  circumstances  combined  with  it  in  our  former  trials, 
the  anticipations  which  we  form  of  the  future  cannot  with 
propriety  be  referred  to  experience  alone,  but  to  experience 
co-operating  with  some  other  principles  of  our  nature.  In 
common  discourse,  however,  precision  in  the  use  of  language 
is  not  to  be  expected,  where  logical  or  metaphysical  ideas 
are  at  all  concerned  ;  and,  therefore,  it  is  not  to  be  wonder- 
ed at,  that  the  word  experience  should  often  be  employed 
with  a  latitude  greatly  beyond  what  the  former  definition  au- 
thorizes. When  I  transfer,  for  example,  my  conclusions  con- 
cerning the  descent  of  heavy  bodies  from  one  stone  to  an- 
other stone,  or  even  from  a  stone  to  a  leaden  buHet,  my 

*  Boswsll's  Johnson,  Vol.  I.  p.  514,  4to  edit. 
VOL.  II.  22 


170  ELEMENT*    OF    THE    PHILOSOPHY         [CHAP.  II. 

inference  might  be  said,  with  sufficient  accuracy  for  the  ordi- 
nary purposes  of  speech,  to  have  the  evidence  of  experience 
in.  its  favour  ;  if  indeed  it  would  not  savour  of  scholastic  af- 
fectation to  aim  at  a  more  rigorous  enunciation' of  the  pro- 
position* Nothing,  at  the  same  time,  can  be  more  evident 
than  this,  that  the  slightest  shade  of  difference  which,  tends 
to  weaken  the  resemblance,  or  rather  to  destroy  the  identi- 
ty of  two  eases,  invalidates  the  inference  from  the  one  to 
the  other,  as  far  as  it  rests  on  experience  solely,  no  less  than 
the  most  prominent  dissimilitudes  which  characterize  the  dif- 
ferent kingdoms  and  departments  of  nature. 

Upon  what  ground  do  I  conclude  that  the  thrust  of  a  sword 
through  my  body,  in  a  particular  direction,  would  be  follow- 
ed by  instant  death  ?  According  to  the  popular  use  of  lan- 
guage, the  obvious  answer  would  be, — upon  experience,  and 
experience  alone.  But  surely  this  account  of  the  matter  is 
extremely  loose  and  incorrect ;  for  where  is  the  evidence 
that  the  internal  structure  of  my  body  bears  any  resemblance 
to  that,  of  any  of  the  other  bodies  which  have  been  hitherto 
examined  by  anatomists  1  It  is  no  answer  to  this  question  to 
tell  me,  that  the  experience  of  these  anatomists  has  ascertain- 
ed a  uniformity  of  structure  in  every  human  subject  which  has 
as  yet  been  dissected ;  and  that,  therefore,  I  am  justified  in 
concluding,  that  my  body  forms  no  exception  to  the  general 
rule.  My  question  does  not  relate  to  the  soundness  of  this 
inference,  but  to  the  principle  of  my  nature,  which  leads  me 
thus  not  only  to  reason  from  the  past  to  the  future,  but  to  rea- 
son from  one  thing  to  another,  which,  in  its  external  marks, 
bears  a  certain  degree  of  resemblance  to  it.  Something 
more  than  experience,  in  the  strictest  sense  of  that  word,  is 
surely  necessary  to  explain  the  transition  from  what  is  iden- 
tically the  same,  to  what  is  only  similar ;  and  yet  my  infe- 
rence in  this  instance  is  made  with  the  most  assured  and  un- 
qualified confidence  in  the  infallibility  of  the  result.  No  in- 
ference, founded  on  the  most  direct  and  long-continued  ex- 
perience, nor,  indeed,  any  proposition  established  by  mathe- 


SECT.  IV.]  OP    THE    HUMAN   MIND.  171 

matical  demonstration.,  could  more  imperiously  command  my 
assent. 

In  whatever  manner  the  province'  of  experience,  strictly 
so  called,  comes  to  be  thus  enlarged,  it  is  perfectly  manifest, 
that,  without  some  provision  for  this  purpose,  the  principles 
of  our  constitution  would  not  have  been  duly  adjusted  to  the 
scene  in  which  we  have  to  act.  Were  we  not  so  formed  as 
eagerly  to  seize  the  resembling  features  of  different  things 
and  different  events,  and  to  extend  our  conclusions  from  the 
individual  to  the  species,  life  would  elapse  before  we  had  ac- 
quired the  first  rudiments  of  that  knowledge  which  is  essen- 
tial to  the  preservation  of  our  animal  existence. 

This  step  in  the  history  of  the  human  mind  has  been  little, 
if  at  all,  attended  to  by  philosophers  ;  and  it  is  certainly  not 
easy  to  explain  in  a  manner  completely  satisfactory,  how  it 
is  made.  The  following  hints  seem  to  me  to  go  a  considera- 
ble way  towards  a  solution  of  the  difficulty. 

It  is  remarked  by  Mr.  Smith,  in  his  considerations  on  the 
Formation  of  Languages,  that  the  origin  of  genera  and  spe- 
cies, which  is  commonly  represented  in  the  schools  as  the 
effect  of  an  intellectual  process  peculiarly  mysterious  and  un- 
intelligible, is  a  natural  consequence  of  our  disposition  to 
transfer  to  a  new  object  the  name  of  any  other  familiar  ob- 
ject which  possesses  such  a  degree  of  resemblance  to  it,  as 
to  serve  the  memory  for  an  associating  tie  between  them. 
It  is  in  this  manner,  he  has  shewn,  and  not  by  any  formal  or 
scientific  exercise  of  abstraction,  that,  in  the  infancy  of  Ian* 
guage,  proper  names  are  gradually  transformed  into  appel- 
latives ;  or,  in  other  words,  that  individual  things  come  to  be 
referred  to  classes  or  assortments.* 


*  A  writer  of  great  learning  and  ability  (Dr.  Magee,  of  Dcjblin)  who  has  done  me 
the  honour  to  animadvert  on  a  few  passages  of  my  works,  and  who  has  softened  his 
critkisms  by  some  expressions  of  regard,  by  which  f  feel  myself  highly  flattered,  has 
started  a  very  acute  objection  to  this  theory  of  Mr.  Smith,  which  I  think  it  incumbent 
on  me  to  submit  to  my  readers,  in  his  own  words.  As  the  quotation,  however,  with 
the  remarks  which  1  have  to  offer  upon  it,  would  extend  to  too  great  a  length  to  be 
introduced  here,  I  must  delay  entering  on  the  subject  till  the  end,  of  this  volume.  Set 
Note(K.) 


172  ELEMENTS    OP    THE    PHILOSOPHY  [CHAP.  II. 

This  remark  becomes,  in  my  opinion,  much  more  lumi- 
nous and  important,  by  being  combined  with  another  very- 
original  one,  which  is  ascribed  to  Turgot  by  Condorcet,  and 
which  I  do  not  recollect  to  have  seen  taken  notice  of  by  any 
later  writer  on  the  human  mind.  According  to  the  common 
doctrine  of  logicians,  we  are  led  to  suppose  that  our  know- 
ledge begins  in  an  accurate  and  minute  acquaintance  with 
the  characteristical  properties  of  individual  objects  ;  and 
that  it  is  only  by  the  slow  exercise  of  comparison  and  ab- 
straction, that  we  attain  to  the  notion  of  classes  or  genera. 
In  opposition  to  this  idea,  it  was  a  maxim  of  Turgot's,  that 
some  of  our  most  abstract  and  general  notions  are  among  the 
earliest  which  we  form.*  What  meaning  he  annexed  to  tjiis 
maxim,  we  are  not  informed  ;  but  if  he  understood  it  in  the 
same  sense  in  which  I  am  disposed  to  interpret  it,  he  ap- 
pears to  me  entitled  to  the  credit  of  a  very  valuable  sugges- 
tion with  respect  to  the  natural  progress  of  human  know- 
ledge. The  truth  is,  that  our  first  perceptions  lead  us  inva- 
riably to  confound  together  things  which  have  very  little  in 
common ;  and  that  the  speciiical  differences  of  individuals 
do  not  begin  to  be  marked  with  precision  till  the  powers  of 
observation  and  reasoning  have  attained  to  a  certain  degree 
of  maturity.  To  a  similar  indistinctness  of  perception  are  to 
be  ascribed  the  mistakes  about  the  most  familiar  appearances. 
which  we  daily  see  committed  by  those  domesticated  ani- 
mals with  whose  instincts  and  habits  we  have  an  opportunity 
of  becoming  intimately  acquainted.  As  an  instance  of  this, 
it  is  sufficient  to  mention  the  terror  which  a  horse  sometimes 


*  "  M.  Turgot  croyoit  qu'on  s'etoit  trompe  en  imaginant  qu'en  general  1 'esprit 
u  n'acquiert  des  idees  generates  ou  abstraites  que  par  la  comparaison  d'idees  plus 
M  particulieres.  Au  eontraire,  nos  premieres  idees  sent  lres-g6nerales,  puisque  ne 
"  voyant  d'abord  qu'an  petit  nombre  de  quali'.es,  not  re.  idee,  renferme  tons  les  e"tres 
'*  auxquels  ces  qualites  sont  communes.  En  nous  eclairant,  en  extiminant  davantage. 
"  nos  idees  deviennent  plus  particulieres  sans  jamais  atteindre  le  dernier  terme;  et 
"cequi  a  pn  tromperles  metaphysiciens,  e'est  qu'alors  precisement  nous  apprenons 
u  que  ces  idees  sont  plus  generates-  que  nous  ne  l'avions  d'abord  supposed"—  Vie  dt 
Turgot,  p.  189.    Berne,  1787. 

I  have  searched  in  vain  for  some  additional  light  on  this  interesting  hint,  in  the 
Complete  edition  of  Turgot's  works,  published  at  Paris  in  1803. 


&ECT.  IV.]  OP    THE    HUMAN  MIND.  173 

disrovers  in  passing,  on  the  road,  a  large  stone,  or  the  water- 
fall of  a  mill. 

Notwithstanding,  however,  the  justness  of  this  maxim,  it  is 
nevertheless  true,  that  every  scientific  classification  must  be 
founded  on  an  examination  and  comparison  of  individuals. 
These  individuals  must,  in  the  first  instance,  have  been  ob- 
served with  accuracy,  before  their  specific  characteristics 
could  be  rejected  from  the  generic  description,  so  as  to  limit 
the  attention  to  the  common  qualities  which  it  comprehends. 
What  are  usually  called  general  ideas  or  general  notions,  are, 
therefore,  of  two  kinds,  essentially  different  from  each  other; 
those  which  are  general,  merely  from  the  vagueness  and  im- 
perfection of  our  information  ;  and  those  which  have  been 
methodically  generalized,  in  the  way  explained  by  logicians, 
in  consequence  of  an  abstraction  founded  on  a  careful  study 
of  particulars.  Philosophical  precision  requires,  that  two 
sets  of  notions,  so  totally  dissimilar,  should  not  be  confounded 
together ;  and  an  attention  to  the  distinction  between  them 
will  be  found  to  throw  much  light  on  various  important  steps 
in  the  natural  history  of  the  mind.* 

One  obvious  effect  of  the  grossness  and  vagueness  in  the 
perceptions  of  the  inexperienced  observer  must  necessarily 
be  to  identify,  under  the  same  common  appellations,  im- 
mense multitudes  of  individuals,  which  the  philosopher  will 
afterwards  find  reason  to  distinguish  carefully  from  each 

*  The  distinction  above  stated,  furnishes  what  seems  to  me  the  true  answer  to  an 
argument  which  Charron,  and  many  other  writers  since  his  time,  have  drawn,  in 
proof  of  ihe  reasoning  powers  of  brutes,  from  the  universal  conclusions  which  they 
appear  to  found  on  the  observation  of  particulars.  "  Les  bestes  des  singuliers  con- 
"  cluent  les  universels,du  regard  d'un  homme  seul  cognoissent  tons  hommes,"  &c.  &c. 
De  la  Sagessf,  Lib.  I.  Chap.  8. 

Instead  of  saying,  that  brutes  generalize  things,  which  are  similar,  would  it  not  be 
nearer  the  truth  to  say,  that  they  confound  things  which  are  different  ? 

Many  years  after  these  observations  were  written,  I  had  the  satisfaction  to  meet 
with  the  following  experimental  confirmation  of  them,  in  the  Abbe  Sicard's  Course 
of  Instruction  for  the  Deaf  and  Dumb:  "  J'avois  remarque  que  Massieu  donnoit 
f*  plus  volontiers  le  meme  nom,  un  nom  commun,  a  plusieurs  individus  dans  lesquels  il 
"  trouvoit  des  traits  de  ressemblance ;  les  noms  individuels  supposoient  des  differences 
"  qu'il  n'etoit  pas  encore  temps  de  lui  faire  observer." — Sicard,p\~>.  39,  31.  The 
whole  of  the  passage  is  well  worth  consulting. 


174  ELEMENTS    OF    THE    PHILOSOPHY        [CHAP.  II. 

other ;  aed  as  language,  by  its  unavoidable  re-action  on 
thought,  never  fails  to  restore  to  it  whatever  imperfections  it 
has  once  received,  all  the  indistinctness  which,  in  the  case 
of  individual  observers,  originated  in  an  ill-informed  judg- 
ment, or  in  a  capricious  fancy,  comes  afterwards,  in  succeed- 
ing ages,  to  be  entailed  on  the  infant  understanding,  in  con- 
sequence of  its  incorporation  with  vernacular  speech.  These 
confused  apprehensions  produced  by  language,  must,  it  is  easy 
to  see,  operate  exactly  in  the  same  way  as  the  undistinguish- 
ing  perceptions  of  children  or  savages  ;  the  familiar  use  of  a 
generic  word,  insensibly  and  irresistibly  leading  the  mind  to 
extend  its  conclusions  from  the  individual  to  the  genus,  and 
thus  laying  the  foundation  of  conclusions  and  anticipations 
which  we  suppose  to  rest  on  experience,  when,  in  truth,  ex- 
perience has  never  been  consulted. 

In  all  such  instances,  it  is  worthy  of  observation,  we  pro- 
ceed ultimately  on  the  common  principle, — that  in  similar  cir- 
cumstances, the  same  cause  will  produce  the  same  effects ;  and, 
when  we  err,  the  source  of  our  error  lies  merely  in  identify- 
ing different  cases  which  ought  to  be  distinguished  from  each 
other.  Great  as  may  be  the  occasional  inconveniences,, 
arising  from  this  general  principle  thus  misapplied,  they  bear 
no  proportion  to  the  essential  advantages  resulting  from  the 
disposition  in  which  they  originate,  to  arrange  and  to  clasr 
sify :  a  disposition  on  which  (as  I  have  elsewhere  shewn) 
the  intellectual  improvement  of  the  species  in  a  great  man- 
ner hinges.  That  the  constitution  of  our  nature  in  this  re- 
spect is,  on  the  whole,  wisely  ordered,  as  well  as  perfectly 
conformable  to  the  general-  economy  of  our  frame,  will  ap- 
pear from  a  slight  survey  of  some  other  principles,  nearly 
allied  to  those  which  are  at  present  under  our  consideration. 

It  has  been  remarked  by  some  eminent  writers  in  this  part- 
of  the  island,*  that  our  expectation  of  the  continuance  of  the 
laws  of  nature  has  a  very  close  affinity  to  our  faith  in  human 

*  See  Reid's  Inquiry  into  the  Human  Mind.  Chap.  VI.  Sect.  24.  Campbell's  Dis- 
sertation on  Miracles,  Pari  I.  Sect.  1.  Smith's  Theory  ^  Moral  Sentiments.  Vol. 
II.  p.  382,  sixth  edition. 


S£CT.  1V.1  OP   ffffi    HUMAN    MINI).  17  J 

testimony.  The  parallel  might  perhaps  be  carried,  without 
any  over-refinement,  a  little  farther  than  these  writers  have, 
attempted  ;  inasmuch  as,  in  both  cases,  the  instinctive  prin- 
ciple is  in  the  first  instance  unlimited,  and  requires,  for  its 
correction  and  regulation,  the  lessons  of  subsequent  experi- 
ence. As  the  credulity  of  children  is  originally  without 
bounds,  and  is  afterwards  gradually  checked  by  the  exam- 
ples which  they  occasionally  meet  with  of  human  falsehood,  so, 
in  the  infancy  of  our  knowledge,  whatever  objects  or  events, 
present  to  our  seuses  a  strong  resemblance  to  each  other, 
dispose  us,  without  any  very  accurate  examination  of  the 
minute  details  by  which  they  may  be  really  discriminated,  to 
conclude  with  eagerness,  that  the  experiments  and  observa- 
tions which  we  make  with  respect  to  one  individual,  may  be 
safely  extended  to  the  whole  class.  It  .is  experience  alone 
that  teaches  us  caution  in  such  inferences,  and  subjects  the 
natural  principle  to  the  discipline  prescribed  by  the  rules  of 
induction. 

It  must  not,  however,  be  imagined,  that,  in  instances  of 
this  sort,  the  instinctive  principle  always  leads  us  astray  -, 
for  the  analogical  anticipations  which  it  disposes  us  to  form, 
although  they  may  not  stand  the  test  of  a  rigorous  examina- 
tion, may  yet  be  sufficiently  just  for  all  the  common  purpo- 
ses of  life.  It  is  natural,  for  example,  that  a  man  who  has 
been  educated  in  Europe  should  expect,  when  he  changes 
his  residence  to  any  of  the  other  quarters  of  the  globe,  to 
see  heavy  bodies  fall  downwards,  and  smoke  to  ascend, 
agreeably  to  the  general  laws  to  which  he  has  been  accus- 
tomed ;  and  that  he  should  take  for  granted,  in  providing 
the  means  of  his  subsistence,  that  the  animals  and  vegetables 
which  he  has  found  to  be  salutary  and  nutritious  in  his  na- 
tive regions,  possess  the  same  qualities  wherever  they  ex- 
hibit the  same  appearances.  Nor  are  such  expectations 
less  useful  than  natural  ;  for  they  are  completely  realized, 
as  far  as  they  minister  to  the  gratification  of  our  more  ur- 
gent wants.  It  is  only  when  we  begin  to  indulge  our  curio- 
sity with  respect  to  those  nicer  details  which  derive  their  in- 


176  ELEMENTS    OP    THE  PHILOSOPHY  [CHAP.  II. 

terest  from  great  refinement  in  the  arts,  or  from  a  very  ad- 
vanced state  of  physical  knowledge,  that  we  discover  our 
first  conclusions,  however  just  in  the  main,  not  to  be  mathe- 
matically exact  ;  and  are  led  by  those  habits  which  scientific 
pursuits  communicate,  to  investigate  the  difference  of  cir- 
cumstances to  which  the  variety  in  the  result  is  owing.  Af- 
ter having  found  that  heavy  bodies  fall  downwards  at  the 
equator  as  they  do  in  this  island,  the  most  obvious,  and  per- 
haps, on  a  superficial  view  of  the  question,  the  most  reasona- 
ble inference  would  be,  that  the  same  pendulum  which 
swings  seconds  at  London,  will  vibrate  at  the  same  rate  un- 
der the  line.  In  this  instance,  however,  the  theoretical  in- 
ference is  contradicted  by  the  fact  ; — but  the  contradiction  is 
attended  with  no  practical  inconvenience  to  the  multitude, 
while,  in  the  mind  of  the  philosopher,  it  only  serves  to  awa- 
ken his  attention  to  the  different  circumstances  of  the  two 
cases,  and,  in  thr  last  result,  throws  a  new  lustre  on  the  sim- 
plicity and  uniformity  of  that  law,  from  which  it  seemed,  at 
first  sight,  an  anomalous  deviation. 

To  this  uniformity  in  the  laws  which  regulate  the  order  of 
physical  events,  there  is  something  extremely  similar  in  the 
systematical  regularity  (subject  indeed  to  many  exceptions) 
which,  in  every  language,  however  imperfect,  runs  through 
the  different  classes  of  its  words,  in  respect  of  their  inflexions, 
forms  of  derivation,  and  other  verbal  filiations  or  affinities. 
How  much  this  regularity  or  analogy  (as  it  is  called  by  gram- 
marians) contributes  to  facilitate  the  acquisition  of  dead  and 
foreign  languages,  every  person,  who  has  received  a  liberal 
education,  knows  from  his  own  experience.  Nor  is  it  less 
manifest,  that  the  same  circumstance  must  contribute  power- 
fully to  aid  the  memories  of  children  in  learning  to  speak 
their  mother-tongue.  It  is  not  my  present  business  to  trace 
the  principles  in  the  human  mind  by  which  it  is  produced. 
All  that  I  would  remark  is,  the  very  early  period  at  which  it 
is  seized  by  children  ;  as  is  strongly  evinced  by  their  dispo- 
sition to  push  it  a  great  deal  too  far,  in  their  first  attempts 
towards  speech.  This  disposition  seems  to  be  closely  con- 
nected with  that  which  leads  them  to  repose  faith  in  testimo- 


S.ECT.  IV.]  OP    THE    HUMAN   MIND.  177 

ny  ;  and  it  also  bears  a  striking  resemblance  to  that  which 
prompts  them  to  extend  their  past  experience  to  those  ob- 
jects and  events  of  which  they  have  not  hitherto  had  any 
means  of  acquiring  a  direct  knowledge.  It  is  probable,  in- 
deed, that  our  expectation,  in  all  these  cases,  has  its  origin 
in  the  same  common  principles  of  our  nature  ;  and  it  is  cer- 
tain that,  in  all  of  them,  it  is  subservient  to  the  important 
purpose  of  facilitating  the  progress  of  the  mind.  Of  this, 
nobody  can  doubt,  who  considers  for  a  moment,  that  the 
great  end  to  be  first  accomplished,  was  manifestly  the  com- 
munication of  the  general  rule  ;  the  acquisition  of  thelex- 
ceptions  (a  knowledge  of  which  is  but  of  secondary  impor- 
tance) being  safely  entrusted  to  the  growing  diligence  and 
capacity  of  the  learner. 

The  considerations  now  stated,  may  help  us  to  conceive 
in  what  manner  conclusions  derived  from  experience  come 
to  be  insensibly  extended  from  the  individual  to  the  spej 
cies  ;  partly  in  consequence  of  the  gross  and  undistinguish- 
ing  nature  of  our  first  perceptions,  and  partly  in  consequence 
of  the  magical  influence  of  a  common  name.  They  seem 
also  to  shew,  that  this  natural  process  of  thought,  though  not 
always  justified  by  a  sound  logic,  is  not  without  its  use  in 
the  infancy  of  human  knowledge. 

In  the  various  cases  which  have  been  hitherto  under  our 
review,  our  conclusions  are  said  in  popular,  and  even  in  phi- 
losophical language,  to  be  founded  on  experience.  And  yet 
the  truth  unquestionably  is,  (as  was  formerly  observed,)  that 
the  evidence  of  experience  reaches  no  farther  than  to  an  an- 
ticipation of  the  future  from  the  past,  in  instances  where  the 
same  cause  continues  to  operate  in  circumstances  exactly 
similar.  How  much  this  vagueness  of  expression  must  con- 
tribute to  mislead  us  in  many  of  our  judgments,  will  after- 
wards appear. 

The  observations  which   I    have  to  offer  upon  analogy, 
considered  as  a  ground  of  scientific  conjecture  and  reason- 
ing,  will  be  introduced   with  more    propriety  *in   a  future 
chapter. 
vol.  ii.  23 


1 78  ELEMENTS    OP    THE    PHILOSOPHY        [CHAP,  tf, 


IV. 


Continuation  of  the  Subject. — Evidence  of  Testimony  tacitly  recognized  as  a  Ground 
of  Belief,  in  our  most  certain  Conclusions  concerning  contingent  Truths. — Differ- 
ence between  the  Logical  and  the  Popular  Meaning  of  the  word  Probability. 

'  In  some  of  the  conclusions  which  have  been  already  un- 
der ©ur  consideration  with  respect  to  contingent  truths,  a 
species  of  evidence  is  admitted,  of  which  no  mention  has 
hitherto  been  made  ;  I  mean  the  evidence  of  testimony.  la 
astronomical  calculations,  for  example,  how  few  are  the  in- 
stances in  which  the  data  rest  on  the  evidence  of  our  own 
senses  ;  and  yet  our  confidence  in  the  result,  is  not,  on  that 
account,  in  the  smallest  degree  weakened.  On  the  contrary, 
what  certainty  can  be  more  complete,  than  that  with  which 
we  look  forward  to  an  eclipse  of  the  sun  or  the  moon,  on  the 
faith  of  elements  and  of  computations  which  we  have  never 
verified,  and  for  the  accuracy  of  which  we  have  no  ground  of 
assurance  whatever,  but  the  scientific  reputation  of  the 
writers  from  whom  we  have  borrowed  them.  An  astrono- 
mer who  should  affect  any  scepticism  with  respect  to  an 
event  so  predicted,  would  render  himself  no  less  an  object 
of  ridicule,  than  if  he  were  disposed  to  cavil  about  the  cer- 
tainty of  the  sun's  rising  to-morrow. 

E*en  in  pure  mathematics,  a  similar  regard  to  testimony, 
accompanied  with  a  similar  faith  in  the  faculties  of  others, 
is  by  no  means  uncommon.  Who  would  scruple,  in  a  geo- 
metrical investigation,  to  adopt,  as  a  link  in  the  chain,  a 
theorem  of  Appollonius  or  of  Archimedes,  although  he  might 
not  have  leisure  at  the  moment,  to  satisfy  himself,  by  an  ac* 
tual  examination  of  their  demonstrations,  that  they  had  been 
guilty  of  no  paralogism,  either  from  accident  or  design,  in 
the  course  of  their  reasonings  ? 

In  our  anticipations  of  astronomical  phenomena,  as  well 
as  in  those  which  we  form  concerning  the  result  of  any  fami- 
liar experiment    in  physics,  philosophers    are  accustomed 


IWEICT.    IV.]  OP    THE    HUMAN    MIND.  '  179 

to  speak  of  the  event  as  only  probable  ;  although  our  confi- 
dence in  its  happening  is  not  less  complete,  than  if  it  rested 
oft  the  basis  of  mathematical  demonstration.     The  word  pro- 
bable, therefore,  when  thus  used,  does  not  imply  any  deficien- 
cy in  the  proof,  but  only  marks  the  particular  nature  of  that 
proof,  as  contradistinguished  from  another  species  of  evi- 
dence.    It  is  opposed,  not  to  what  is  certain,  but  to  what  ad- 
mits of  being  demonstrated  after  the  manner  of  mathematicians. 
This  differs  widely  from  the  meaning  annexed  to  the  same 
word  in  popular  discourse  ;  according  to  which,  whatever 
«vent  is  said  to  be  probable,  is  understood  to  be  expected 
with  some  degree  of  doubt.     As  certain  as  death — as  certain 
as  the  rising  of  the  sun — are  proverbial  modes  of  expression, 
in  all  countries  ;  and  they  are,  both  of  them,  borrowed  from 
events  which,  in  philosophical  language,  are  only  probable 
or  contingent.     In  like  manner,  the  existence  of  the  city  of 
Pekin,  and  the  reality  of  Caesar's  assassination,  which  the 
philosopher  classes  with  probabilities,  because  they  rest  sole- 
ly upon  the  evidence  of  testimony,  are  universally  classed 
with  certainties  by  the  rest  of  mankind  ;  and  in  any  case  but 
the  statement  ©f  a  logical  theory,  the  application  to  such 
truths  of  the  word  probable,  would  be  justly  regarded  as  an 
impropriety  of  speech.     This  difference  between  the  techni- 
cal meaning  of  the  word  probability,  as  employed  by  logi- 
cians, and  the  notion  usually  attached  to  it  in  the  business  of 
life  ;  together  with  the  erroneous  theories  concerning  the 
nature  of  demonstration,  which  I  have  already  endeavoured 
to  refute, — have  led  many  authors  of  the  highest  name,  in 
some  of  the  most  important  arguments  which  can  employ 
human  reason,  to  overlook  that  irresistible  evidence  which 
was  placed  before  their  eyes,  in  search  of  another  mode  of 
proof  altogether  unattainable  in  moral  inquiries,  and  which, 
if  it  could  be  attained,  would  not  be  less  liable  to  the  cavils 
of  sceptics. 

But  although,  in  philosophical  language,  the  epithet  pro- 
bable be  applied  to  events  which  are  acknowledged  to  be  cer- 
tain, it  is  also  applied  to  those  events  which  are  called  pro- 


180  ELEMENTS    OP    THE    PHILOSOPHY  [CHAP.  II 

bable  by  the  vulgar.  T\y  philosophical  meaning  of  the 
word,  therefore,  is  more  comprehensive  than  the  popular  ;  the 
former  denoting  that  particular  species  of  evidence  of  which 
contingent  truths  admit  ;  the  latter  being  confined  to  such 
degrees  of  this  evidence  as  fall  short  of  the  highest.  These 
different  degrees  of  probability  the  philosopher  considers  as 
a  series,  beginning  with  bare  possibility,  and  terminating  in 
that  apprehended  infallibility,  with  which  the  phrase  moral 
certainty  is  synonymous.  To  this  last  term  of  the  series,  the 
word  probable  is,  in  its  ordinary  acceptation,  plainly  inappli- 
cable. 

The  satisfaction  which  the  astronomer  derives  from  the 
exact  coincidence,  in  point  of  time,  between  his  theoretical 
predictions  concerning  the  phenomena  of  the  heavens,  and 
the  corresponding  events  when  they  actually  occur,  does  not 
imply  the  smallest  doubt,  on  his  part,  of  the  constancy  of  the 
laws  of  nature.  It  resolves  partly  into  the  pleasure  of  ar- 
riving at  the  knowledge  of  the  same  truth  or  of  the  same  fact 
by  different  media  ;  but,  chiefly,  into  the  gratifying  assurance 
which  he  thus  receives,  of  the  correctness  of  his  principles, 
and  of  the  competency  of  the  human  faculties  to  these  sub- 
lime investigations.  What  exquisite  delight  must  La  Place 
have  felt,  when,  by  deducing  from  the  theory  of  gravitation, 
the  cause  of  the  acceleration  of  the  moon's  mean  motion — 
an  acceleration  which  proceeds  at  the  rate  of  little  more  than 
11"  in  a  century, — he  accounted,  with  such  mathematical 
precision,  for  all  the  recorded  observations  of  her  place  from 
the  infancy  of  astronomical  science !  It  is  from  the  length 
and  abstruseness,  however,  of  the  reasoning  process,  and 
from  the  powerful  effect  produced  on  the  imagination,  by  a 
calculus,  which  brings  into  immediate  contrast  with  the  im- 
mensity of  time,  such  evanescent  elements  as  the  fractional 
parts  of  a  second,  that  the  coincidence  between  the  compu- 
tation and  the  event  appears  in  this  instance  so  peculiarly 
striking.  In  other  respects,  our  confidence  in  the  future  re- 
sult rests  on  the  same  principle  with  our  expectation  tha 
the  sun  will  fise  to-morrow  at  a  particular  instant ;  and,  ac 


SECT.  IV.]  OP    THE    HUMAN    MIND.  l8l 

cordingly,  now  that  the  correctness  of  the  theory  has  been 
so  wonderfully  verified  by  a  comparison  with  facts,  the  one 
event  is  expected  with  no  less  assurance  than  the  other. 

With  respect  to  those  inferior  degrees  of  probability  to 
whi'  h,  in  common  discourse,  the  meaning  of  that  word  is  ex- 
clusively confined,  it  is  not  my  intention  to  enter  into  any 
discussions.  The  subject  is  of  so  great  extent,  that  I  could 
not  hope  to  throw  upon  it  any  lights  satisfactory  either  to  my 
reader  or  to  myself,  without  encroaching  upon  the  space 
destined  for  inquiries  more  intimately  connected  with  the 
theory  of  our  reasoning  powers.  One  set  of  questions,  too, 
arising  out  of  it,  (I  mean  those  to  which  mathematical  calcu- 
lations have  been  applied  by  the  ingenuity  of  the  moderns,) 
involve  some  very  puzzling  metaphysical  difficulties,*  the 
consideration  of  which  would  completely  interrupt:  the  train 
of  our  present  speculations.  I  proceed,  therefore,  in  conti- 
nuation of  those  in  which  we  have  been  lately  engaged,  to 
treat  of  other  topics  of  a  more  general  nature,  tending  to  illus- 
trate the  logical  procedure  of  the  mind  in  the  discovery  of 
scientific  truth.  As  an  introduction  to  these,  I  propose  to  de- 
vote one  whole  chapter  to  some  miscellaneous  strictures  and 
reflections  on  the  logic  of  the  schools. 

*  I  allude  more  particularly  to  the  doubts  started  on  this  subject  by  D'Alembert,  i» 
itis  Opuscules  Math§matiques ;  and  in  his  Melanges  de  Literature-. 


1&2  ELEMENTS  OF  THE  PHILOSOPHY  [CHAP,  ft 


CHAPTER  THIRD. 


OF    THE    ARISTOTELIAN    LOGIC, 


SECTION  I. 

Of  the  demonstrations  of  the  Syllogistic  Rules  given  by  Aristotle  and  his  Commenta- 


tors. 


HP 

1  HE  great  variety  of  speculations  which,  in  the  pfesenl 

st'ate  of  science,  the  Aristotelian  logic  naturally  suggests  to 
a  philosophical  inquirer,  lays  me,  in  this  chapter,  under  the 
necessity  of  selecting  a  few  leading  questions,  bearing  imme- 
diately upon  the  particular  objects  which  I  have  in  view. 
In  treating  of  these,  I  must,  of  course,  suppose  my  readers 
to  possess  some  previous  acquaintance  with  the  subject  to 
which  they  relate  ;  but  it  is  only  such  a  general  knowledge  of 
its  outlines  and  phraseology,  as,  in  all  universities,  is  justly 
considered  as  an  essential  accomplishment  to  those  who  re- 
ceive a  liberal  education. 

I  begin  with  examining  the  pretensions  of  the  Aristotelian 
logic  to  that  pre-eminent  rank  which  it  claims  among  the 
sciences  ;  professing,  not  only  to  rest  all  its  conclusions  on 
the  immoveable  basis  of  demonstration,  but  to  have  reared 
this  mighty  fabric  on  the  narrow  ground-work  of  a  single 
axiom.  "  On  the  basis,"  says  the  latest  of  his  commentators, 
"  of  one  simple  truth,  Aristotle  has  reared  a  lofty  and  vari- 
"  ous  structure  of  abstract  science,  clearly  expressed  and 
"  fully  demonstrated."*  Nor  have  these  claims  been  dis- 
puted by  mathematicians  themselves.     "  In  logica,"  says  Dr. 

*  Analysis  of  Aristotle's  Works  by  Dr.  Gillies,  Vol.  I.  p.  83, 2d  edit. 


SECT.  I.]  OF   THE   HUMAN   MIN"D.  183 


'■> 


structura  syllogismi  demonstratione  nititur  pure 
"  mathematics.."*  And,  in  another  passage  :  "  Sequitur  in- 
"  stitutio  logica,  communi  usui  accommodata. — Quo  videant 
"  Tirones,  syllogismorum  leges  strictissimis  demonstration^ 
u  bus  plane  mathematicis  ita  fundatas,  ut  consequentias  ha- 
"  beant  irrefragabiles,  quasque  offuciis  fallaciisque  detegendis 
"  sint  accommodatae."!  Dr.  Reid,  too,  although  he  cannot 
be  justly  charged,  on  the  whole,  with  any  undue  reverence 
for  the  authority  of  Aristotle,  has  yet,  upon  one  occasion, 
spoken  of  his  demonstrations  with  much  more  respect  than 
they  appear  to  me  entitled  to.  "  I  believe,"  says  he,  "  it 
"  will  be  difficult,  in  any  science,  to  find  so  large  a  system  of 
"  truths  of  so  very  abstract  and  so  general  a  nature,  all  for- 
u  tified  by  demonstration,  and  all  invented  and  perfected  by 
"  one  man.  It  shews  a  force  of  genius,  and  labour  of  inves- 
"  tigation,  equal  to  the  most  arduous  attempts. "J 

As  the  fact  which  is  so  confidently  assumed  in  these  passa- 
ges would,  if  admitted,  completely  overturn  all  I  have  hitherto 
said  concerning  the  nature  both  of  axioms  and  of  demonstra- 
tive evidence,  the  observations  which  follow  seem  to  form  a  ne- 
cessary sequel  to  some  of  the  preceding  discussions.  I  ac- 
knowledge, at  the  same  time,  that  my  chief  motive  for  intro- 
ducing them,  was  a  wish  to  counteract  the  effect  of  those  tri- 
umphant panegyrics  upon  Aristotle's  Organon,  which  of  late 
have  been  pronounced  by  some  writers,  whose  talents  and 
learning  justly  add  much  weight  to  their  literary  opinions  ; 
and  an  anxiety  to  guard  the  rising  generation  against  a  waste 
of  time  and  attention,  upon  a  study  so  little  fitted,  in  my  judg- 
ment, to  reward  their  labour. 

*  See  the  Monitum  prefixed  to  the  Miscellaneous  Treatises  annexed  to  the  third 
Volume  of  Dr.  Wallis's  Mathematical  Works. 

t  Preface  to  the  same  volume. 

J  Analysis  of  Aristotle's  Logic. 

That  Dr.  Reid,  however,  was  perfectly  aware  that  these  demonstrations  are  more 
specious  than  solid,  may  be  safely  inferred  from  a  sentence  which  afterwards  occurs 
in  the  same  tract.  "  When  we  go  without  the  circle  of  the  mathematical  sciences,  I 
,(  know  nothing  in  which  there  seems  to  be  so  much  demonstration  as  in  that  part  of 
rt  logic  which  treats  of  the  figures  and  modes  of  syllogisms." 


184  ELEMENTS    OF    THE    PHILOSOPHY       [CHAP.  IH, 

The  first  remark  which  I  have  to  offer  upon  Aristotle's  de- 
monstrations, is,  That  they  proceed  on  the  obviously  false 
supposition  of  its  being  possible  to  add  to  the  conclusiveness 
and  authority  of  demonstrative  evidence.  One  of  the  most 
remarkable  circumstances  which  distinguishes  this  from  that 
species  of  evidence  which  is  commonly  called  moral  or  pro- 
bable, is,  that  it  is  not  susceptible  of  degrees  ;  the  process  of 
reasoning  of  which  it  is  the  result,  being  either  good  for 
nothing,  or  so  perfect  and  complete  in  itself,  as  not  to  admit 
of  support  from  any  adventitious  aid.  Every  such  process 
of  reasoning,  it  is  well  known,  may  be  resolved  into  a  series 
of  legitimate  syllogisms,  exhibiting  separately  and  distinctly, 
in  a  light  as  clear  and  strong  as  language  can  afford,  each 
successive  link  of  the  demonstration.  How  far  this  condu- 
ces to  render  the  demonstration  more  convincing  than  it  was 
before,  is  not  now  the  question.  Some  doubts  may  reasona- 
bly be  entertained  upon  this  head,  when  it  is  considered, 
that,  among  the  various  expedients  employed  by  mathematical 
teachers  to  assist  the  apprehension  of  their  pupils,  none  of 
them  have  ever  thought  of  resolving  a  demonstration  (as  may 
always  be  easily  done)  into  the  syllogisms  of  which  it  is  com- 
posed.* But,  abstracting  altogether  from  this  consideration, 
and  granting  that  a  demonstration  may  be  rendered  more 
manifest  and  satisfactory  by  being  syllogistically  stated  ;  upon 
what  principle  can  it  be  supposed  possible,  after  the  demon- 
stration has  been  thus  analysed  and  expanded,  to  enforce 
and  corroborate,  by  any  subsidiary  reasoning,  that  irresisti- 
ble conviction  which  demonstration  necessarily  commands  ? 

*  From  a  passage  indeed  in  a  memoir  by  Leibnitz,  (printed  in  the  sixth  volume  of 
the  Acta  Euriditoruni)  it  would  seem,  that  a  commentary  of  this  kind  on  the  first  six 
books  of  Euclid,  bad  been  actually  carried  into  execution  by  two  writers,  whose  names 
he  mentions.  "  Firma  autem  demonstrate  est,  qure  prsescriptam  a  logica  formam 
«  servat,  non  quasi  semper  ordinatis  scho'arum  more  syllogismis  opus  sit  (quales 
«  Christians  Herlinus  et  Conradus  Dasypodius  in  sex  priores  Euclidis  libros  exhi- 
"  buerum)  sed  ita  saltern  ut  argumentatioconcludat  vi  formae,'' &c.  k.c.—J3cta Erudi- 
tor.  Lips.  Vol.  I.  p.  285.  Vera*.  1740. 

I  have  not  seen  either  of  the  works  alluded  to  in  the  above  sentence  ;  and,  upon  less 
respectable  authority,  should  scarcely  have  conceived  it  to  be  credible,  that  any  per- 
son, capable  of  understanding  Euclid,  had  ever  seriously  engaged  in  such  an  under- 
taking It  would  have  been  difficult  to  devise  a  more  effectual  expedient  for  expos- 
ing to  the  meanest  understanding,  the  futility  of  the  syllogistic  theory. 


SECT.  I.]  OF    THE   HUMAN    MIND.  '  185 

It  furnishes  no  valid  reply  to  this  objection,  to  allege,  that 
mathematicians  often  employ  themselves  in  inventing  dif- 
ferent demonstrations  of  the  same  theorem  ;  for,  in  such  in- 
stances, their  attempts  do  not  proceed  from  any  anxiety  to 
swell  the  mass  of  evidence,  by  finding  (as  in  some  other  sci- 
ences) a  variety  of  collateral  arguments,  all  bearing,  with 
their  combined  force,  on  the  same  truth  ;— their  only  wish  is, 
to  discover  the  easiest  and  shortest  road  by  which  the  truth 
may  be  reached.  In  point  of  simplicity,  and  of  what  geome- 
ters call  elegance,  these  various  demonstrations  may  differ 
widely  from  each  other ;  but.  in  point  of  sound  logic,  they 
are  all  precisely  on  the  same  footing.  Each  of  them  shines 
with  its  own  intrinsic  light  alone  ;  and  the  first  which  occurs 
(provided  they  be  all  equally  understood)  commands  the  as- 
sent not  less  irresistibly  than  the  last. 

The  idea,  however,  on  which  Aristotle  proceeded,  in  at- 
tempting to  fortify  one  demonstration  by  another,  bears  no 
analogy  whatever  to  the  practice  of  mathematicians  in  multi- 
plying proofs  of  the  same  theorem  ;  nor  can  it  derive  the 
slightest  countenance  from  their  example.  His  object  was 
not  to  teach  us  how  to  demonstrate  the  same  thing  in  a  varie- 
ty of  different  ways  ;  but  to  demonstrate,  by  abstract  rea- 
soning,- the  conclusiveness  of  demonstration.  By  what 
means  he  set  about  the  accomplishment  of  his  purpose,  will 
afterwards  appear.  At  present,  I  speak  only  of  his  design; 
which,  if  the  foregoing  remarks  be  just,  it  will  not  be  easy 
to  reconcile  with  correct  views,  either  concerning  the  nature 
of  evidence,  or  the  theory  of  the  human  understanding. 

For  the  sake  of  those  who  have  not  previously  turned 
their  attention  to  Aristotle's  Logic,  it  is  necessary,  before 
proceeding  farther,  to  take  notice  of  a  peculiarity  (and,  as 
appears  to  me,  an  impropriety)  in  the  use  which  he  makes 
of  the  epithets  demonstrative  and  dialectical,  to  mark  the 
distinction  between  the  two  great  classes  into  which  he  di- 
vides syllogisms  ;  a  mode  of  speaking  which*,  according  to 
the  common  use  of  language,  would  seem  to  imply,  that  one 
species  of  syllogisms  may  be  more  conclusive  and  cogent 

vol.  11.  24 


186  ELEMENTS    OP    THE    PHILOSOPHY         [cHAP.    IK- 

than  another.  That  this  is  not  the  case,  is  almost  self-evi- 
dent ;  for,  if  a  syllogism  be  perfect  in  form,  it  must,  of  ne- 
cessity, be  not  only  conclusive,  but  demonstratively  conclu- 
sive. Nor  is  this,  in  fact,  the  idea  which  Aristotle  himself 
annexed  to  the  distinction  ;  for  he  tells  us,  that  it  does  not 
refer  to  the  form  of  syllogisms,  but  to  their  matter  ] — or,  1r 
plainer  language,  to  the  degree  of  evidence  accompanying 
the  premises  on  which  they  proceed.*  In  the  two  books  of 
his  last  Analytics,  accordingly,  he  treats  of  syllogisms  which 
are  said  to  be  demonstrative,  because  their  premises  are 
certain  ;  and  in  his  Topics,  of  what  he  calls  dialectical  syllo- 
gisms, because  their  premises  are  only  probable.  Would  it 
not  have  been  a  clearer  andjuster  mode  of  stating  this  dis- 
tinction, to  have  applied  the  epithets  demonstrative  and  dia- 
lectical to  the  truth  of  the  conclusions  resulting  from  these 
two  classes  of  syllogisms,  instead  of  applying  them  to  the 
syllogisms  themselves  ?  The  phrase  demonstrative  syllogism 
certainJy  seems,  at  first  sight,  to  express  rather  the  com- 
plete and  necessary  connection  between  the  conclusion  and 
the  premises,  than  the  certainty  or  the  necessity  of  the 
truths  which  the  premises  assume. 

To  this  observation  it  may  be  added,  (in  order  to  prevent 
any  misapprehensions  from  the  ambiguity  of  language,)  that 
Aristotle's  idea  of  the  nature  of  demonstration,  is  essentially 
different  from  that  which  I  have  already  endeavoured  to  ex- 
plain. "  In  all  demonstration,"  says  Dr.  Gillies,  who,  in 
this  instance,  has  very  accurately  and  clearly  stated  his  au- 
thor's doctrine,  "  the  first  principles  must  be  necessary,  im- 
"  mutable,  and  therefore  eternal  truths,  because  those  qual- 
9  ities  could  not  belong  to  the  conclusion,  unless  they  belonged 

M  To  the  same- purpose  also  Dr.  Wallis  :  "  Syllogismus  Topkuv  (qui  et  Dmlecticus 
:tDici  solet)  talis  haberi  solet  syllogismus  (seu  syllogismorum  series)  qui  firmam 
"  potius  praesumptkmem,  seu  opinionem  valde  probabilem  creat,  quam  absolutam, 
«'  certitudinem.  Non  quidem  ratione  Formm,  (nam  syllogismi  omnes,  si  iiijusta forma ■> 
"  sunt  demonstrativa  ;  hoc  est,  si  prsemissoe  verse  sint,  vera  erit  et  conclusio,)  sed  ra- 
"  tione  Materia,  seu  Prcemissarum  ;  quae  ipsa?,  utplurimum,  non  sunt  absolute  cer- 
■"  fae.  et  universaliler  vera?  ;  sed  saltern  probabiles,  afque  utplurimum  vera?." — Wcalis, 
Logim,  Lib.  iii.  cap,  23, 


SECT.  I.]  OF    THE    HUMAN    MIND.  187 

"  to  the  premises,  which  are  its  causes."*  According  to  the 
account  of  demonstrative  or  mathematical  evidence  formerly 
given,  the  first  principles  on  which  it  rests  are  not  eternal 
and  immutable  truths,  but  definitions  or  hypotheses ;  and 
therefore,  if  the  epithet  demonstrative  be  understood,  in  our 
present  argument,  as  descriptive  of  that  peculiar  kind  of  evi- 
dence which  belongs  to  mathematics,  the  distinction  between 
demonstrative  and  dialectical  syllogisms  is  reduced  to  this  ; 
that  in  the  former,  where  all  that  is  asserted  is  the  necessary 
connection  between  the  conclusion  and  the  premises,  neither 
the  one  nor  the  other  of  these  can  with  propriety  be  said  to 
be  either  true  or  false,  because  both  of  them  are  entirely  hy- 
pothetical :  in  the  latter,  where  the  premises  are  meant  to 
express  truths  or  facts,  (supported  on  the  most  favourable 
supposition,  by  a  very  high  degree  of  probability,)  the  con- 
clusion must  necessarily  partake  of  that  uncertainty  in  which 
the  premises  are  involved. 

But  what  I  am  chiefly  anxious  at  present  to  impress  on 
the  minds  of  my  readers,  is  the  substance  of  the  two  following 
propositions  :  First,  That  dialectical  syllogisms  (provided 
they  be  not  sophistical)  are  not  less  demonstratively  conclu- 
sive,  so  far  as   the  process  of  reasoning  is  concerned,  than 

*  Aristotle's  Ethics  and  Politics,  &c.    By  Dr.  Gillies.    Vol.  I.  p.  96. 

I  am  much  at  a  loss  how  to  reconcile  this  account  of  demonstrative  evidence  with 
jilie  view  which  is  given  by  Dr.  Gillies  of  the  nature  of  syllogism,  and  of  the  princi- 
ples on  which  the  syllogistic  theory  is  founded.  Jn  one  passage  (p.  81.)  he  tells  us, 
that  "  Aristotle  invented  the  syllogism,  to  prevent  imposition  arising  from  the  abuse 
n  of  words  ;"  in  a  second,  (p.  83.)  that  "the  simple  truth  on  which  Aristotle  has 
"  reared  a  lofty  and  various  structure  of  abstract  science,  clearly  expressed  and  fully 
"  demonstrated — is  itself  founded  in  the  natural  and  universal  texture  of  language  :' 
in  a  third,  (p.  86.)  that  "  the  doctrines  of  Aristotle's  Organon  have  been  strangely 
"  perplexed  by  confounding  the  grammatical  principles  on  which  that  ivork  is  built 
u  with  mathematical  axioms."  Is  it  possible  to  suppose,  that  Aristotle  could  have 
ever  thought  of  applying  to  mere  grammatical  jn'inciples, — to  truths  founded  in  the 
twtural  and  universal  texture  of  language — the  epithets  of  necessary,  immutable,  and 
eternal  ? 

I  am  unwilling  to  lengthen  this  note,  otherwise  it  might  be  easily  shewn,  how  ut- 
terly irreconcileable,  in  the  present  instance,  are  the  glosses  of  this  ingenious  com- 
mentator with  the  text  of  his  author.  Into  some  of  these  glosses  \l  is  probable  that  he 
has  been  unconsciously  betrayed,  by  his  anxiety  to  establish  the  claim  of  his  favour- 
ite philosopher  to  the  important  speculations  of  Locke  on  the  abuse  of  words,  and  to 
ihose  of  some  later  writers  on  language  considered  as  an  instrument  of  thought 


J  88  ELEMENTS    OF    THE    PHILOSOPHY       [CHAP.    HI, 

those  to  which  this  latter  epithet  is  restricted  by  Aristotle  ; 
and,  secondly,  That  it  is  to  the  process  of  reasoning  alone,  and 
not  to  the  premises  on  which  it  proceeds,  that  Aristotle's 
demonstrations  exclusively  reler.  The  sole  object,  there- 
fore, of  these  demonstrations,  is  (as  I  already  remarked)  not 
to  strengthen,  by  new  proofs,  principles  which  were  doubful, 
or  to  supply  new  links  to  a  chain  of  reasoning  which  was  im- 
perfect, but  to  confirm  one  set  of  demonstrations  by  means 
of  another.  The  mistakes  into  which  some  of  my  readers 
might  have  been  led  by  the  contrast  which  Aristotle's  lan- 
guage implies  between  dialectical  syllogisms,  and  those 
which  he  honours  with  the  title  of  demonstrative,  will,  I 
trust,  furnish  a  sufficient  apology  for  the  length  of  this  ex^ 
planation. 

Having  enlarged  so  fully  on  the  professed  aim  of  Aristo- 
tle's demonstrations,  I  shall  dispatch,  in  a  very  few  pages, 
what  I  have  to  offer  on  the  manner  in  which  he  has  carried 
his  design  into  effect.  If  the  design  be  as  unphilosophical 
as  I  have  endeavoured  to  shew  that  it  is,  the  apparatus  con- 
trived for  its  execution  can  be  considered  in  no  other  light 
than  as  an  object  of  literary  curiosity.  A  process  of  rea- 
soning which  pretends  to  demonstrate  the  legitimacy  of  a 
conclusion  which,  of  itself,  by  its  own  intrinsic  evidence,  ir- 
resistibly commands  the  assent,  must,  we  may  be  perfectly 
assured,  be  at  bottom  unsubstantial  and  illusory,  how  spe- 
cious soever  it  may  at  first  sight  appear.  Supposing  all 
its  inferences  to  be  strictly  just,  it  can  only  bring  us  round 
again  to  the  point  from  whence  we  set  out. 

The  very  acute  strictures  of  Dr.  Re  id,  in  his  Analysis  of 
Aristotle's  Logic,  on  this  part  of  the  Syllogistic  Theory, 
render  it  superfluous  for  me,  on  the  present  occasion,  to  en- 
ter into  any  details  upon  the  subject.  To  this  small,  but 
valuable  tract,  therefore,  I  beg  leave  to  refer  my  readers  ; 
contenting  myself  with  a  short  extract,  which  contains  a  ge- 
neral and  compendious  view  of  the  conclusion  drawn,  and  of 
the  argument  used,  to  prove  it,  in  each  of  the  three  figures 
3f  syllogisms. 


SE€T.  I.]  OF    THE    HUMAN    MINI*.  189 

"  In  the  first  figure,  the  conclusion  affirms  or  denies  some- 
"  thing  of  a  certain  species  or  individual  ;  and  the  argument 
"  to  prove  this  conclusion  is,  That  the  same  thing  may  be.  af- 
«  firmed  or  denied  of  the  whole  genus  to  which  that  species 
"  or  individual  belongs. 

"  In  the  second  figure,  the  conclusion  is,  That  some  spe- 
"  cies  or  individual  does  not  belong  to  such  a  genus  ;  and 
"  the  argument  is,  That  some  attribute  common  to  the  whole 
"  genus  does  not  belong  to  that  species  or  individual. 

"  In  the  third  figure,  the  conclusion  is,  That  such  an  at- 
"  tribute  belongs  to  part  of  a  genus  ;  and  the  argument  is, 
"  That  the  attribute  in  question  belongs  to  a  species  or  indi- 
"  vidual  which  is  part  of  that  genus. 

"  I  apprehend  that,  in  this  short  view,  every  conclusion 
"  that  falls  within  the  compass  of  the  three  figures,  as  well 
"  as  the  mean  of  proof,  is  comprehended.  The  rules  of  all 
"  the  figures  might  be  easily  deduced  from  it  ;  and  it  ap- 
S.1  pears  that  there  is  only  one  principle  of  reasoning  in  all 
"  the  three  ;  so  that  it  is  not  strange,  that  a  syllogism  of  one 
"  figure  should  be  reduced  to  one  of  another  figure. 

"  The  general  principle  in  which  the  whole  terminates, 
"  and  of  which  every  categorical  syllogism  is  only  a  parti- 
"  cular  application,  is  this,  That  what  is  affirmed  or  denied 
"  of  the  whole  genus  may  be  affirmed  or  denied  of  every 
"  species  and  individual  belonging  to  it.  This  is  a  princi- 
"  pie  of  undoubted  certainty  indeed,  but  of  no  great  depth. 
"  Aristotle  and  all  the  logicians  assume  it  as  an  axiom,  or 
"  first  principle,  from  which  the  syllogistic  system,  as  it  were, 
"  takes  its  departure  ;  and  after  a  tedious  voyage,  and  great 
'*  expense  of  demonstration,  it  lands  at  last  in  this  principle, 
"  as  its  ultimate  conclusion.  O  curas  hominum  !  0  quantum 
"  est  in  rebus  inane  /"* 

When  we  compare  this  mockery  of  science  with  the  unri- 
valled powers  of  the  inventor,  it  is  scarcely  possible  to  avoid 
suspecting,  that  he  was  anxious  to  conceal  its  real  poverty 

*  This  axiom  is  called,  in  scholastic  language,  the  dictum  de  o?7ini  et  de  nullo. 


190  ELEMENTS    OP   THE    PHILOSOPHY        [CHAP.  HI. 

and  nakedness,  under  the  veil  of  the  abstract  language  in 
which  it  was  exhibited.  It  is  observed  by  the  author  last 
quoted,  that  Aristotle  hardly  ever  gives  examples  of  real 
syllogisms  to  illustrate  his  rules  ;  and  that  his  commentators, 
by  endeavouring  to  supply  this  defect,  have  only  brought 
into  contempt  the  theory  of  their  master.  "  We  acknow- 
"  ledge,"  says  he,  "  that  this  was  charitably  done,  in  order 
"  to  assist  the  conception  in  matters  so  very  abstract  ;  but 
"  whether  it  was  prudently  done  for  the  honour  of  the  art, 
"  may  be  doubted."  One  thing  is  certain,  that  when  we 
translate  any  of  Aristotle's  demonstrations  from  the  general 
and  enigmatical  language  in  which  he  states  it,  into  more  fa- 
miliar and  intelligible  terms,  by  applying  it  to  a  particular 
example,  the  mystery  at  once  disappears,  and  resolves  into 
some  self-evident  or  identical  puerility.  It  is  surely  a  strange 
mode  of  proof,  which  would  establish  the  truth  of  what  is  ob- 
vious, and  what  was  never  doubted  of,  by  means  of  an  argu- 
ment which  appears  quite  unintelligible,  till  explained  and 
illustrated  by  an  iastance  perfectly  similar  to  the  very  thing 
to  be  proved. 

"  If  A,"  says  Aristotle,  "  is  attributed  to  every  B,  and  B 
"  to  every  C,  it  follows  necessarily,  that  A  may  be  attributed 
"  to  every  C."*  Such  is  the  demonstration  given  of  the  first 
mode  of  the  first  figure  ;  and  it  is  obviously  nothing  more 
than  the  axiom,  called  the  dictum  de  omni,  concealed  under 
the  disguise  of  an  uncouth  and  cabalistical  phraseology.  The 
demonstrations  given  of  the  other  legitimate  modes  are  all 
of  the  same  description. 


*  Analyt.  Prior,  cap.  iv. 

It  is  obvious,  that  Aristotle's  symbolical  demonstrations  might  be  easily  thrown  in- 
to the  form  of  symbolical  syllogisms.  The  circumstance  which  induced  him  to  pre- 
fer the  former  mode  of  statement,  was  probably  that  he  might  avoid  the  appearance 
of  reasoning  in  a  circle,  by  employing  the  syllogistic  theory  to  demonstrate  itself.  It 
is  curious  how  it  should  have  escaped  him,  that,  in  attempting  to  sbun  this  fallacy, 
he  had  fallen  into  another  exactly  of  the  same  description ; — that  of  employing  an  ar- 
gument in  the  common  form  to  demonstrate  the  legitimacy  of  syllogisms,  after  hav- 
ing represented  a  syllogistic  analysis  as  the  only  infallible  test  of  th.e  legitimacy  of  a. 
demonstration. 


SECT.  I.]  OP    THE   HUMAN   MIND.  19* 

In  disproving  the  illegitimate  modes,  he  proceeds  after  a 
similar  manner ;  condescending,  however,  in  general,  to  sup- 
ply us,  by  way  of  example,  with  three  terms,  such  as  bo- 
num,  habitus,  prudentia  ;  album,  equus,  cygnus  ; — which 
three  terms,  we  are  left,  for  our  own  satisfaction,  to  form  into 
illegitimate  syllogisms  of  the  particular  figure  and  mode 
which  may  be  under  consideration.  The  manifest  inconclu- 
siveness  of  every  such  syllogism,  he  seems  to  have  thought, 
might  assist  readers  of  slower  apprehension  in  perceiving 
more  easily  the  import  of  the  general  proposition.  The 
inconclusivenessr  for  instance,  of  those  modes  of  the  first 
figure,  in  which  the  major  is  particular,  is  thus  stated  and  ex- 
plained. "  If  A  is  or  is  not  in  some  B,  and  B  in  every  C, 
"  no  conclusion  follows.  Take  for  the  terms  in  the  affirma- 
"  tive  case,  good,  habit,  prudence  ;  in  the  negative,  good, 
"  habit,  ignorance."*  With  respect  to  such  passages  as  this, 
Pr.  Reid  has  perfectly  expressed  my  feeling,  when  he 
says  :  "  That  the  laconic  style  of  the  author,  the  use  of  sym- 
"  bols  not  familiar,  and,  in  place  of  giving  an  example,,  his 
^  leaving  us  to  form  one  from  three  assigned  terms,  give 
"  such  embarrassment  to  a  reader,  that  he  is  like  one  read- 
"  ing  a  book  of  riddles."!  Can  it  be  reasonably  supposed, 
that  so  great  an  obscurity  in  such  a  writer  was  not  the  effect 
of  some  systematical  design  ? 

From  the  various  considerations  already  stated,  1  might 
perhaps,  without  proceeding  farther,  be  entitled  to  conclude, 
that  Aristotle's  demonstrations  amount  to  nothing  more  than 
to  a  specious  and  imposing  parade  of  words  5  but  the  innu- 
merable testimonies  to  their  validity,  from  the  highest  names, 
and  the  admiration  in  which  they  continue  to  be  held  by 
men  of  distinguished  learning,  render  it  necessary  for  me, 
before  dismissing  the  subject,  to  unfold  a  little  more  com- 
pletely some  parts  of  the  foregoing  argument. 

It  may  probably  appear  to  some  of  my  readers  superflu- 

*  Analyt.  Prior,  cap.  iv. 

t  Dr.  Gillies  has  attempted  a  vindication  of  the  use  which  Aristotle,  in  his  demon- 
strations, has  made  of  the  letters  of  tins  alphabet.  Fnrsome  remarks  on  this  attempt, 
S*e  Note  ft.) 


£92  ELEMENTS    OP    THE    PHILOSOPHY        [CHAP*  III, 

ous  to  remark,  after  the  above-cited  specimens  of  the  reason- 
ings in  question,  that  not  one  of  these  demonstrations  ever 
carry  the  mind  forward,  a  single  step,  from  one  truth  to  an- 
other ;  but  merely  from  a  general  axiom  to  some  of  its  par- 
ticular exemplifications.  Nor  is  this  all  ;  they  carry  the 
mind  in  a  direction  opposite  to  that  in  which  its  judgments 
are  necessarily  formed.  The  meaning  of  a  general  axiom, 
it  is  well  known,  is  seldom,  if  ever  intelligible,  till  it  has  been 
illustrated  by  some  example  ;  whereas  Aristotle,  in  all  his 
demonstrations,  proceeds  on  the  idea,  that  the  truth  of  an 
axiom,  in  particular  instances,  is  a  logical  consequence  of  its 
truth,  as  enunciated  in  general  terms.  Into  this  mistake,  it 
must  be  owned,  he  was  not  unnaturally  led  by  the  place 
which  is  assigned  to  axioms  at  the  beginning  of  the  elements 
of  geometry,  and  by  the  manner  in  which  they  are  after- 
wards referred  to  in  demonstrating  the  propositions.  "  Since 
"  A,"  it  is  said,  "  is  equal  to  B,  and  B  to  C,  A  is  equal  to  C  ; 
"  for,  things  which  are  equal  to  one  and  the  same  thing,  are 
£i  equal  to  one  another."  This  place,  I  have  little  dou'ut, 
has  been  occupied  by  mathematical  axioms,  as  far  back,  at 
least,  as  the  foundation  of  the  Pythagorean  school  ;  and 
Aristotle's  fundamental  axiom  will  be  found  to  be  precisely 
of  the  same  description.  Instead,  therefore,  of  saying,  with 
Dr.  Gillies,  that  "  on  the  basis  of  one  single  truth  Aristotle 
"  has  reared  a  lofty  and  various  structure  of  abstract  sci- 
"  ence," — it  would  be  more  correct  to  say,  that  the  whole 
of  this  science  is  comprised  or  implied  in  the  terms  of  one 
single  axiom.  Nor  must  it  be  forgotten,  (if  we  are  to  retain 
Dr.  Gillies's  metaphor,)  that  the  structure  may,  with  much 
more  propriety,  be  considered  as  the  basis  of  the  axiom, 
than  the  axiom  of  the  structure. 

When  it  is  recollected,  that  the  greater  part  of  our  best 
philosophers  (and  among  the  rest,  Dr.  Reid)  still  persevere, 
after  all  that  Locke  has  urged  on  the  opposite  side  of  the 
question,  in  considering  axioms  as  the  ground-work  of  math- 
ematical science,  it  will  not  appear  surprising,  that  Aristo- 
tle's demonstrations  should  have  so  long  continued  to  main- 


SECT.  I.]  OF   THE   HUMAN   MIND.  193 

tain  their  ground  in  books  of  logic.  That  this  idea  is  alto- 
gether erroneous,  in  so  far  as  mathematics  is  concerned,  has 
been  already  sufficiently  shewn  ;  the  whole  of  that  science 
resting  ultimately,  not  on  axioms,  but  on  definitions  or  hy- 
potheses. By  those  who  have  examined  my  reasonings  on 
this  last  point,  and  who  take  the  pains  to  combine  them  with 
the  foregoing  remarks,  I  trust  it  will  be  readily  allowed,  that 
the  syllogistic  theory  furnishes  no  exception  to  the  general 
doctrine  concerning  demonstrative  evidence,  which  I  former- 
ly endeavoured  to  establish  ;  its  pretended  demonstrations 
being  altogether  nugatory,  and  terminating  at  last  (as  must 
be  the  case  with  every  process  of  thought  involving  no  data 
but  what  are  purely  axiomatical)  in  the  very  proposition  from 
which  they  originally  set  out. 

The  idea  that  all  demonstrative  science  must  rest  ultimate- 
ly on  axioms,  has  been  borrowed,  with  many  other  errone- 
ous maxims,  from  the  logic  of  Aristotle  ;  but  is  now,  in  ge- 
neral, stated  in  a  manner  much  more  consistent  (although 
perhaps  not  nearer  to  the  truth)  than  in  the  works  of  that 
philosopher.  According  to  Dr.  Reid,  the  degree  of  evidence 
which  accompanies  our  conclusions,  is  necessarily  determin- 
ed by  the  degree  of  evidence  which  accompanies  our  first 
principles ;  so  that,  if  the  latter  be  only  probable,  it  is  per- 
fectly impossible  that  the  former  should  be  certain.  Agree- 
ing, therefore,  with  Aristotle,  in  considering  axioms  as  the 
basis  of  all  demonstrative  science,  he  was  led,  at  the  same 
time,  in  conformity  with  the  doctrine  just  mentioned,  to  con- 
sider them  as  eternal  and  immutable  truths,  which  are  per- 
ceived to  be  such  by  an  intuitive  judgment  of  the  under- 
standing- This,  however,  is  not  the  language  of  Aristotle  ; 
for,  while  he  tells  us,  that  there  is  no  demonstration  but  of 
eternal  truths,*  he  asserts,  that  the  first  principles  which  are 

*  <&xvegov  2*e  >£,  ectv  artv  at  vrgcTctirits  xaScXx  ff  av  i 
crvPiMyMrp.0  5,  hrt  ccvenytcn  xj  to  <rvfA7regxtr[*,x  etdlov  UVeti  tjj$ 
ToixvTqt;  eesreiJeff  £»s,  ^  tjj?  o.^Xw,  enreiv  cfxro$£i%ea<;»  ax,  ctrrtv 
xgx  X7rt$ei%is  T»y  tpOxgrav,  X&'  fsrjo-rjjjujj  an^as,  et/A'  xtnc, 
aa-ireg  kxtx  a-vfijicfiriKos' — Analyt.  Post.  Lib.  i.  cap.  viii. 

VOL.   II.  25 


194  ELEMENTS    OF    THE    PHILOSOPHY         [CHAP.  III? 

the  foundation  of  all  demonstration,  are  got  by  induction 
from  the  informations  of  sense.*  In  what  manner  this  appa- 
rent contradiction  is  to  be  reconciled,  I  leave  to  the  consid- 
eration of  his  future  commentators. 

For  my  own  part,  I  cannot  help  being  of  opinion  with  Lord 
Monboddo,  (who  certainly  was  not  wanting  in  a  due  respect 
for  the  authority  of  Aristotle,)  that  the  syllogistic  theory  would 
have  accorded  much  better  with  the  doctrine  of  Plato  con- 
cerning general  ideas,  than  with  that  held  on  the  same  sub- 
ject by  the  founder  of  the  Peripatetic  school.!  To  maintain 
that,  in  all  demonstration,  we  argue  from  generals  to  particu- 
lars, and,  at  the  same  time,  to  assert,  that  the  necessary  pro- 
gress of  our  knowledge  is  from  particulars  to  generals,  by  a 
gradual  induction  from  the  informations  of  sense,  do  not  ap- 
pear, to  an  ordinary  understanding,  to  be  very  congruous 
parts  of  the  same  system  ;|  and  yet  the  last  of  these  tenets 
has  been  eagerly  claimed  as  a  discovery  of  Aristotle,  by  some 
of  the  most  zealous  admirers  of  his  logical  demonstrations. § 

*  Ex  ft,ev  aw  cii<r6i}<rea<;  ytyvtroct  f*,v>)fi.ti.  ex.  $e  i4.ii)(A.7)$ 
iroXXctKH;  m  avm  y/vo/K,f  vjjs,  e^-jFet^tx.  at  yx(>  iroXXxt  ftvyfAXt 
rep  xe,  i6[*.a> ,  ep-Tretgix  (a.ix  ea-Ttv  ex.  2"  e^vetgixc,  y  ex.  ttxvtos 
ygefwo-avTes  m  x.xGo\x  ev  t»j  t^«%»1,  ra  'eves  vrxgx  rx  TroAAas,  o 
«v  ev  u7rxFiv  ev  tvy  ex.eivoii  to  xvto,  tc^vsjs  «f/C7  ^  £5r<<rTjj/ttjj$. 
exv  f&ev  negi  yevertv,  Te%vys'  eat  2e  vregt  to  ov,  eTFta-riif^m, 
(An<tiyt.  post.  L,ib.  ii  .cap.  xix.)  The  whole  cha.ter  may  be  read  with  advantage 
by  those  who  wish  tor  a  fuller  explanation  of  Aristotle's  opinion  on  this  question. 
His  illustration  of  the  intellectual  process  by  which  general  principles  are  obtained 
from  the  perceptions  of  sense,  and  from  reiterated  acts  of  memory  resolving  into  ok? 
experience,  is  more  particularly  deserving  of  attention. 

t  Ancient  Metaphysics,  Vol.  V.  pp.  184, 185. 

t  It  may  perhaps  be  asked,  Is  not  this  the  very  mode  of  philosophizing  recommend- 
ed by  Bacon,  first,  to  proceed  analytically  from  particulars  to  generals,  and  then  to 
reason  synthetically  from  generals  to  particulars  ?  My  reply  to  this  question  (a  ques- 
tion which  will  not  puzzle  any  person  at  all  acquainted  with  the  subject)  I  must  de- 
lay, till  I  shall  have  an  oppoi  lunity,  in  the  progress  of  my  work,  of  pointing  ou'  the 
essential  difference  between  the  meanings  annexed  to  the  word  induction,  in  the 
Aristotelian,  and  in  the  Baconian  logic. — Upon  the  present  occasion,  it  is  sufficient  t* 
observe,  that  Bacon's  plan  of  investigation  was  never  supposed  to  be  applicable  to  the 
discovery  of  principles  which  are  necessary  and  eternal. 

§  See  Dr.  Gillies 's  Analysis  of  Aristotle's  works,  passim. 

In  this  learned,  and,  on  the  whole,  very  instructive  performance,  I  find  several  doc- 
trines asctibed  to  Aristotle,  which  appear  not  a  little  at  variance  with  each  other. 


SECT.  I.]  OF    THE    HUMAN  MINI).  195 

In  this  point  of  view,  Lord  Monboddo  has  certainly  con- 
ducted, with  greater  skill,  his  defence  of  the  syllogistic  theo- 
ry ;  inasmuch  as  he  has  entirely  abandoned  the  important 
conclusions  of  Aristotle  concerning  the  natural  progress  of 
human  knowledge  ;  and  has  attempted  to  entrench  himself  in 
(what  was  long  considered  as  one  of  the  most  inaccessible 
fastnesses  of  the  Platonic  philosophy)  the  very  ancient  theo- 
ry, which  ascribes  to  general  ideas  an  existence  necessary 
and  eternal.  Had  he,  upon  this  occasion,  after  the  example 
of  Aristotle,  confined  himself  solely  to  abstract  principles,  it 
might  not  have  been  an  easy  task  to  refute,  to  the  satisfac- 
tion of  common  readers,  his  metaphysical  arguments.  For- 
tunately, however,  he  has  favoured  us  with  some  examples 
and  illustrations,  which  render  this  undertaking  quite  unne- 
cessary ;  and  which,  in  my  opinion,  have  given  to  the  cause 

The  following  passages  (which  I  am  led  to  select  from  their  connection  with  the  pre 
sent  argument)  strike  me  as  not  only  widely  different,  but  complete'}'  contradictory, 
in  their  import. 

"  According  to  Arisiotle,  definitions  are  the  foundations  of  all  science  ;  but  those 
"fountains  are  pure  only  when  tJtey  originate  in  an  accurate  examination,  and  patient 
u  comparison  of  the  perceptible  qualities  of  individual  objects."     Vol.  I.  p.  77. 

"  Demonstrative  truth  can  apply  only  to  those  things  which  necessarily  exist  after 
"  a  certain  manner,  and  whose  state  is  unalterable :  and  we  know  those  things  when 
f  we  know  their  causes :  Thus  we  know  a  mathematical  proposition,  when  we  know 
"  the  causes  that  make  it  true  ;  that  is,  when  we  know  all  the  intermediate  proposi- 
"  lions,  up  to  the  first  principles  or  axioms,  on  which  it  is  ultimately  built."  Ibid.  pp. 
35,  96. 

It  is  almost  superfluous  to  observe,  that  while  the  former  of  these  quotations  founds 
all  demonstrative  evidence  «n  definitions,  the  latter  found*  it  upon  axioms.  Nor  is 
this  all.  The  former  (as  is  manifest  from  the  second  clause  of  the  sentence)  can  refer 
only  to  contingent  truths  ;  inasmuch  as  the  most  accurate  examination  of  the  percepti- 
ble qualities  of  individual  objects  can  never  lead  to  the  knowledge  of  things  which 
necessarily  exist  after  a  certain  manner.  The  latter  as  obviously  refers  (and  exclusive* 
ly  refers)  to  truths  which  resemble  mathematical  theorems. 

As  to  Aristotle'-;  assertion,  that  definitions  ate  the  first  principles  of  all  demonstrations, 
tsc'i  *g%#i  Tav  <t7ro$ei%ewi>  o't  af«e-jtto<),  it  undoubtedly  seems,  at  first 
view,  to  coincide  exactly  with  the  doctrine  which  I  was  at  so  much  pains  to  inculcate, 
in  treating  of  that  peculiar  evidence  which  belongs  to  mathematics.  I  hope,  how- 
ever, I  shall  not,  on  this  account,  be  accused  of  plagiarism,  when  it  is  considered, 
that  the  commentary  upon  these  words,  quoted  above  from  Dr.  Gillies,  absolutely 
excludes  mathematics  from  the  number  of  those  sciences  to  which  the}'  are  to  be  ap- 
plied.— On  this  point,  too,  Aristotle's  own  language  is  decisive.  J£|  ecyatyxxiav 
ttpct  trvJiXoyte-i&os  sttiv  q  <t7r*$tt%t$. — Analyt,  Poster.  I*ib..  j.  cap.  iv. 


196  ELEMENTS    OF   THE    PHILOSOPHY         [CHAP.  IH. 

which  he  was  anxious  to  support,  one  of  the  most  deadly 
blows  which  it  has  ever  received.  The  following  panegyric, 
in  particular,  on  the  utility  of  logic,  while  it  serves  to  shew 
that,  in  admiration  of  the  Aristotelian  demonstrations,  he  did 
not  yield  to  Dr.  Gillies,  forms  precisely  such  a  comment  as 
I  myself  could  have  wished  for,  on  the  leading  propositions 
which  I  have  now  been  attempting  to  establish. 

"  In  proof  of  the  utility  of  logic/''*  says  Lord  Monboddo, 
"  I  will  give  an  example  of  an  argument  to  prove  that  man 
"  is  a  substance  ;  which  argument,  put  into  the  syllogistic 
"  form,  is  this : 

u  Every  Animal  is  a  Substance  / 

"  Every  Man  is  an  Animal ; 

"  Therefore  every  Man  is  a  Substance.*3 

"  There  is  no  man,  I  believe,  who  is  not  convinced  of  the 
"  truth  of  the  conclusion  of  this  syllogism  :  But,  how  he  is 
"  convinced  of  this,  and  for  what  reason  he  believes  it  to  be 
"  true,  no  man  can  tell,  who  has  not  learned,  from  the  logic 
"  of  Aristotle,  to  know  what  a  proposition,  and  what  a  syl- 
"  logism  is.  There  he  will  learn,  that  every  proposition 
"  affirms  or  denies  something  of  some  other  thing.  What  is 
"  affirmed  or  denied  is  called  the  Predicate  ;  and  that  of 
"which  it  is  affirmed  or  denied,  is  called  the  Subject.  The 
"  predicate  being  a  more  general  idea  than  the  subject  of 
"  which  it  is  predicated,  must  contain  or  include  it,  if  it  be 
"  an  affirmative  proposition  ;  or  if  it  be  a  negative  proposi- 
"  tion,  it  must  exclude  it.  This  is  (he  nature  of  proposi- 
"  tions  :  And  as  to  syllogism,  the  use  of  it  is  to  prove  any 
"  proposition  that  is  not  self-evident.  And  this  is  done  by 
"  finding  out  what  is  called  a  middle  term  ;  that  is,  a  term 
"connected  with  both  the  predicate  and  the  subject  of  the 
"  proposition  to  be  proved.  Now,  the  proposition  to  be  prov- 
"  ed  here  is,  that  man  is  a  substance  ;  or,  in  other  words, 
"  that  substance  can  be  predicated  of  man  :  And  the  middle 
"  term,   by  which  this  connection  is  discovered,  is  animal. 

Ancient  Metaphysics;  Vol]  V  p.  (53 


SECT.  I.J  OF    THE    HUMAN   MIND.  19? 

"  of  which  substance  is  predicated  ;  and  this  is  the  major 
"  proposition  of  the  syllogism,  by  which  the  major  term  of 
"  the  proposition  to  be  proved,  is  predicated  of  the  middle 
"  term.  Then  animal  is  predicated  of  man  ;  and  this  is  the 
*'  minor  proposition  of  the  syllogism,  by  which  the  middle 
"  term  is  predicated  of  the  lesser  term,  or  subject  of  the 
"  proposition  to  be  proved.  The  conclusion,  therefore,  is, 
"  that  as  substance  contains  animal,  and  man  is  contained  in 
"  animal5  or  is  part  of  animal,  therefore  substance  contains 
"  man.  And  the  conclusion  is  necessarily  deduced  from  the 
"  axiom  I  have  mentioned,  as  the  foundation  of  the  truth  of 
"  the  syllogism,  '  That  the  whale  is  greater  than  any  of  its 
"  parts,  and  contains  them  all.1  So  that  the  truth  of  the  syl- 
'*  logism  is  as  evident  as  when  we  say,  that  if  A  contain  B, 
"  and  B  contain  C,  than  A  contains  C.  . 

"  In  this  manner  Aristotle  has  demonstrated  the  truth  of 
"  the  syllogism.  But  a  man,  who  has  not  studied  his  logic, 
"  can  no  more  tell  why  he  believes  the  truth  of  the  syllogism 
"  above  mentioned,  concerning  man  being  a  substance,  than 
ft  a  joiner,  or  any  common  mechanic,  who  applies  a  foot  or 
"  a  yard  to  the  length  of  two  bodies,  and  finds  that  both 
rt  agree  exactly  to  that  measure,  and  are  neither  longer  nor 
"  shorter,  can  give  a  reason  why  he  believes  the  bodies  to 
"  be  equal,  not  knowing  the  axiom  of  Euclid,  {  That  two 
'*  things,  which  are  equal  to  a  third  thing,  are  equal  to  one 
"  another.'  " 

"  By  this  discovery  Aristotle  has  answered  the  question 
"  which  Pontius  Pilate,  the  Roman  Governor,  asked  of  our 
"  Saviour,  What  Truth  is  ?  The  answer  to  which  appears 
"  now  to  be  so  obvious,  that  I  am  persuaded  Pilate  would 
"  not  have  asked  it  as  a  question,  which  he  no  doubt  thought 
"  very  difficult  to  be  answered,  if  he  had  not  studied  the  lo* 
"  gic  of  Aristotle."* 

*  Ancient  Metaphysics,  Vol.  V.  pp.  152,  153,  154. 

I  have  quoted  this  passage  at  length,  because  I  consider  it  as  an  instructive  exam- 
ple of  the  effects  likely  to  be  produced  on  the  understanding  by  scholastic  studies, 
where  they  become  a  favourite  and  habitual  object  of  pursuit.  The  author  (whom  I 
inew  well,  and  for  whose  memory  I  entertain  a  sincere  respect)  was  a  man  of  w 


198  ELEMENTS    OP    THE    PHILOSOPHY        [CHAP.  III. 

After  perusing  the  above  exposition  of  Aristotle's  demon- 
stration, the  reader,  if  the  subject  be  altogether  new  to  him, 
will  be  apt  to  imagine,  that  the  study  of  logic  is  an  under- 
taking of  much  less  difficulty  than  he  had  been  accustomed 
formerly  to  apprehend  ;  the  whole  resolving  ultimately  into 
this  axiom,  "  That  if  A  contains  B,  and  B  contains  C,  then 
"  A  contains  C."  In  interpreting  this  axiom,  he  will  proba- 
bly figure  to  himself  A,  B,  and  C,  as  bearing  some  resem- 
blance to  three  boxes,  the  sizes  of  which  are  so  adapted  to 
each  other,  that  B  may  be  literally  put  into  the  inside  of  A, 
and  C  into  the  inside  of  B.  Perhaps  it  may  be  reasonably 
doubted,  if  there  is  one  logician  in  a  hundred,  who  ever 
dreamed  of  understanding  it  in  any  other  sense.  When  con- 
sidered in  this  light,  it  is  not  surprising  that  it  should  in- 
stantly command  the  assent  of  the  merest  novice  :  nor  would 
he  hesitate  one  moment  longer  about  its  truth,  if,  instead  of 
being  limited  (in  conformity  to  the  three  terms  of  a  syllogism) 
to  the  three  letters,  A,  B,  C,  it  were  to  be  extended  from  A 
to  Z  ;  the  series  of  boxes  corresponding  to  the  series  of  letters, 
being  all  conceived  to  be  nestled,  one  within  another,  like 
those  which  we  sometimes  see  exhibited  in  the  hands  of  a 

j"gglpr- 

If  the  curiosity  of  the  student,  however,  should  lead  him 

to  inquire  a  little  more  accurately  into  Aristotle's  meaning,, 
he  will  soon  have  the  mortification  to  learn,  that  when  one 
thing  is  said  by  the  logician,  to  be  in  another,  or  to  be  contain- 
ed in  another,  these  words  are  not  to  be  understood  in  their 

common  mental  powers.  Besides  possessing  a  rich  fund  of  what  is  commonly  called 
learning,  he  was  distinguished  by  natural  acuteness ;  by  a  more  than  ordinary  share 
of  wit  ;  and,  in  the  discharge  of  his  judicial  functions,  by  the  singular  correctness, 
gravity,  and  dignity  of  his  unpremeditated  elocution  ; — and  yet,  so  completely  had 
his  faculties  been  subdued  by  the  vain  abstractions  and  verbal  distinctions  of  the 
schools,  that  he  had  brought  himself  seriously  to  regard  such  discussions  as  that 
which  I  have  here  transcribed  from  his  works,  not  only  as  containing  much  excellent 
sense,  but  as  the  quintessence  of  sound  philosophy.  As  for  the  mathematical  and  phy- 
sical discoveries  of  the  Newtonians,  he  held  them  in  comparative  contempt,  and  was 
probably  prevented,  by  this  circumstance,  from  ever  proceeding  farther  than  the  first 
elements  of  these  sciences.  Indeed,  his  ignorance  of  both  was  wonderful,  considering 
the  very  liberal  education  which  he  had  received,  not  only  in  his  own  country,  but  at 
a  foreign  university. 


SECT.  I.]  OP    THE    HUMAN    MIN0.  199 

ordinary  and  most  obvious  sense,  but  in  a  particular  and 
technical  sense,  known  only  to  adepts  ;  and  about  which 
(we  may  remark  by  the  way)  adepts  are  not,  to  this  day, 
unanimously  agreed*  "  To  those,"  says  Lord  Monboddo, 
"  who  know  no  more  of  logic  nor  of  ancient  philosophy  than 
"  Mr.  Locke  did,  it  will  be  necessary  to  explain  in  what 
"  sense  one  idea  can  be  said  to  contain  another,  or  the  idea 
"  less  general  can  be  said  to  be  a  part  of  the  more  general. 
"  And,  in  the  first  place,  it  is  not  in  the  sense  that  one  body 
"  is  said  to  be  a  part  of  another,  or  the  greater  body  to  con- 
"  tain  the  lesser  ;  nor  is  it  as  one  number  is  said  to  contain 
"  another  ;  but  it  is  virtually  or  potentially  that  the  more 
"  general  idea  contains  the  less  general.  In  this  way  the 
"  genus  contains  the  species  ;  for  the  genus  may  be  predi- 
"  cated  of  every  species  under  it,  whether  existing  or  not 
"  existing  ;  so  that  virtually  it  contains  all  the  specieses  un- 
"  der  it,  which  exist  or  may  exist.  And  not  only  does  the 
"  more  general  contain  the  less  general,  but  (what  at  first 
"  sight  may  appear  surprising)  the  less  general  contains  the 
"  more  general,  not  virtually  or  potentially,  but  actually, 
"  Thus,  the  genus  animal  contains  virtually  man,  and  every 
"  other  species  of  animal  either  existing  or  that  may  exist : 
"  But  the  genus  animal  is  contained  in  man,  and  in  other 
"  animals  actually  ;  for  man  cannor  exist  without  being  in 
Ci  actuality,  and  not  potentially  only  an  animal."* 

If  we  have  recourse  to  Dr.  Gillies  for  a  little  more  light 
upon  this  question,  we  shall  meet  with  a  similar  disappoint- 
ment. According  to  him,  the  meaning  of  the  phrases  in 
question  is  to  be  sought  for  in  the  following  definition  of 
Aristotle  :    "  To  say  that  one  thing  is  contained  in  another, 

*  Ancient  Metaphysics,  Vol.  IV.  p.  73. 

For  the  distinction  betwixt  containing  potoj/w/ty  and  actually,  Lord  Mouboddo  ac- 
knowledges himself  indebted  to  a  Greek  author  then  living,  Engenius  Diaeonus. 
(Jlnc.  Met.  Vol.  IV.  p.  73.)  Of  this  author  we  are  elsewhere  told,  that  he  was  a  Pro- 
fessor in  the  Patriarch's  University  at  Constantinople  ;  and  that  he  published,  in  pure 
Attic  Greek,  a  system  of  logic,  at  Leipsic,  in  (he  year  17G6.  (Origin  and  Progress 
of  Language,  Vol.  1.  p.  45,  2d  edit.)  It  is  an  extraordinary  circumstance,  that  a  dis- 
covery, on  which,  in  Lord  Monboddo's  opinion,  the  whole  truth  of  thtstjllogisrn.de 
pencil,  should  have  been  of  so  very  recent  a  date. 


200 


ELEMENTS    OF    THE    PHILOSOPHY       [CHAP.  IIJ. 


"  is  the  same  as  saying,  that„the  second  can  be  predicated 
"  of  the  first  in  the  full  extent  of  its  signification  ;  and  one 
"  term  is  predicated  of  another  in  the  full  extent  of  its  signifi- 
"  cation,  when  there  is  no  particular  denoted  by  the  sub- 
"  ject,  to  which  the  predicate  does  not  apply."*  In  order, 
therefore,  to  make  sure  of  Aristotle's  idea,  we  must  sub- 
stitute the  definition  instead  of  the  thing  defined  ;  that  is, 
instead  of  saying  that  one  thing  is  contained  in  another,  we 
must  say,  that  "  the  second  can  be  predicated  of  the  first  in 
"  the  full  extent  of  its  signification."  In  this  last  clause,  I 
give  Aristotle  all  the  advantage  of  Dr.  Gillies's  very  para- 
phrastical  version  ;  and  yet,  such  is  the  effect  of  the  comment, 
that  it  at  once  converts  our  axiom  into  a  riddle.  I  do  not 
say  that,  when  thus  interpreted,  it  is  altogether  unintelligi- 
ble ;  but  only  that  it  no  longer  possesses  the  same  sort  of  evi- 
dence which  we  ascribe  to  it,  while  we  supposed  that  one 
thing  was  said  by  the  logician  to  be  contained  in  another,  in 
the  same  sense  in  which  a  smaller  box  is  contained  in  a 
greater.! 

To  both  comments  the  same  observation  may  be  applied  j 

*  Gillies's  Aristotle,  Vol.  I.  p.  73.  "This  remark,"  says  Dr.  Gillies,  which  is  the 
"foundation  of  all  Aristotle's  logic,  "has  been  sadly  mistaken  by  many.  Among 
"  others,  Dr.  Reid  accuses  Aristotle  of  using  as  synonymous  phrases,  the  being  in  a 
/  subject,  and  the  being  truly  predicated  of  a  subject  ;  whereas  the  truth  is,  that, 
"  according  to  Aristotle,  the  meaning  of  the  one  phrase  is  directly  the  reverse  of  the 
"  meaning  of  the  oilier." — [bid. 

While  I  readily  admit  the  justness  of  this  criticism  on  Dr.  Reid,  I  must  take  the 
liberty  of  adding,  that  I  consider  Reid's  error  as  a  mere  oversight,  or  slip  of  the 
pen.  That  he  might  have  accused  Aristotle  of  confounding  two  things  which,  al- 
though different  in  fact,  had  yet  a  certain  degree  of  resemblance  or  affinity,  is  by  no 
means  impossible  :  but  it  is  scarcely  conceivable,  that  he  could  be  so  careless  as  to 
accuse  him  of  confounding  two  things  which  he  invariably  states  in  direct  opposition 
to  each  other.  I  have  not  a  doubt,  therefore,  that  Reid's  idea  was,  that  Aristotle  used, 
as  synonymous  phrases,  the  being  in  a  thing,  and  the  being  a  subject  of  which  that 
thing  can  be  truly  predicated  ;  more  especially,  as  either  statement  would  equally' 
well  have  answered  his  purpose. 

\  It  is  worthy  of  observation,  that  Cor.dillac  b.as  availed  himself  of  the  same  meta- 
phorical and  equivocal  void  which  the  foregoing  comments  profess  to  explain, in  sup- 
port of  the  theory  which  represents  every  process  of  sound  reasoning  as  a  series  of 
identical  propositions.  "  L'Analyse  est  la  meme  dans  toutes  les  sciences,  parce  que 
"  dans  tomes  elle  conduit  du  connu  a  l'ir.connu  par  le  raisonnement,  c'est-a-dire,  par 
■''  ime  suile  de  jugemens  ntvi  sont  reiifermcs  les   uns  dans  let  au'.res." — La  Logique. 


SECT.  II.]  OP   THE    HUMAN   MIND.  201 

that,  the  moment  a  person  reads  them,  he  must  feel  himself 
disposed  to  retract  his  assent  to  the  axiom  which  they  are 
brought  to  elucidate  ;  inasmuch  as  they  must  convince  him, 
that  what  appeared  to  be,  according  to  the  common  signifi- 
cation of  words,  little  better  than  a  truism,  becomes,  when 
translated  into  the  jargon  of  the  schools,  an  incomprehensi- 
ble, if  not,  at  bottom,  an  unmeaning  eenigma. 

1  have  been  induced  to  enlarge,  with  more  minuteness  than 
I  could  have  wished,  on  this  fundamental  article  of  logic,  that 
I  might  not  be  accused  of  repeating  those  common-place 
generalities  which  have,  of  late,  been  so  much  complained  of 
by  Aristotle's  champions.  I  must  not,  however,  enter  any 
farther  into  the  details  of  the  system  ;  and  shall  therefore 
proceed,  in  the  next  section,  to  offer  a  few  remarks  of  a  more 
practical  nature,  on  the  object  and  on  the  value  of  the  syllo- 
gistic art. 

SECTION  II. 

General  Reflections  on  the  Aim  of  the  \ristotelian  Logic,  and  on  the  Intellectual 
Habits  which  the  study  of  it  has  a  tendency  to  form. — That  the  improvement  of 
the  power  of  reasoning  ought  to  be  regarded  as  only  a  secondary  Object  in  the 
culture  of  the  Understanding. 

The  remarks  which  were  long  ago  made  by  Lord  Bacon 
on  the  inutility  of  the  syllogism  as  an  organ  of  scientific  dis- 
covery, together  with  the  acute  strictures  in  Mr.  Locke's 
Essay  on  this  form  of  reasoning,  are  so  decisive  in  point  of 
argument,  and,  at  the  same  time,  so  familiarly  known  to  all 
who  turn  their  attention  to  philosophical  inquiries,  as  to  ren- 
der it  perfectly  unnecessary  for  me,  on  the  present  occasion, 
to  add  any  thing  in  support  of  them.  I  shall,  therefore,  in 
the  sequel,  confine  myself  to  a  few  very  general  and  miscel? 
laneous  reflections  on  one  or  two  points  overlooked  by  these 
eminent  writers  ;  but  to  which  it  is  of  essential  importance  to 
attend, in  order  to  estimate  justly  the  value  of  the  Aristo* 
telian  logic,  considered  as  a  branch  of  education.* 

*  To  some  of  my  readers  it  may  not  be  superfluous  to  recommend,  as  a  valuable 
supplement  to  the  discussions  of  Locke  and  Bacon  concerning  the  syllogistic  artt 
VOL.  II.  26 


202  ELEMENTS    OP    THE   PHILOSOPHY  [CHAP.  III. 

It  is  an  observation  which  has  been  often  repeated  since 
Bacon's  time,  and  which,  it  is  astonishing,  was  so  long  in 
forcing  itself  on  the  notice  of  philosophers,  That,  in  all  our 
reasonings  about  the  established  order  of  the  universe,  expe- 
rience is  our  sole  guide,  and  knowledge  is  to  be  acquired 
only  by  ascending  from  particulars  to  generals ;  whereas  the 
syllogism  leads  us  invariably  from  universals  to  particulars, 
the  truth  of  which,  instead  of  being  a  consequence  of  the  uni- 
versal proposition,  is  implied  and  presupposed  in  the  very 
terms  of  its  enunciation.  The  syllogistic  art,  therefore,  it 
has  been  justly  concluded,  can  be  of  no  use  in  extending  our 
knowledge  of  nature.* 

To  this  observation  it  may  be  added,  That,  if  there  are 
any  parts  of  science  in  which  the  syllogism  can  be  advanta- 
geously applied,  it  must  be  those  where  our  judgments  are 
formed,  in  consequence  of  an  application  to  particular  cases 
of  certain  maxims  which  we  are  not  at  liberty  to  dispute. 
An  example  of  this  occurs  in  the  practice  of  Law.     Here, 

what  has  been  since  written  on  the  fame  subject,  in  farther  prosecution  of  their  views 
by  Dr.  Reid,  in  his  Analysis  of  Aristotle's  Logic,  and  by  Dr.  Campbell  in  his 
Philosophy  of  Rhetoric. 

*  On  this  point  it  would  be  a  mere  waste  of  time  to  enlarge,  as  it  has  been  of  late 
explicitly  admitted  by  some  of  the  ablest  advocates  for  the  Organon  of  Aristotle. 
"  When  Mr.  Locke,"  I  quote  the  words  of  a  very  judicious  and  acute  logician, 
'*  when  Mr.  Locke  sa}'s — '  I  am  apt  to  think  that  he  who  should  employ  all  the  force 
"  of  his  reason  only  in  brandishing  of  syllogisms,  will  discover  very  little  of  that  mass 
K  of  knowledge,  which  lies  yet  concealed  in  the  secret  recesses  ofnature  ;— he  expresses 
f  himself  with  needless  caution.  Such  a  man  will  certainly  not  discover  any  of  it.  And 
"  if  any  imagined,  that  the  mere  brandishing  of  syllogisms  could  increase  their 
11  knowledge  (as  some  of  the  schoolmen  seemed  to  think),  they  were  indeed  very  ab- 
"  surd."  {Commentary  on  the  Compendium  of  Logic  used  in  the  University  oI'Dublin. 
By  the  Rev.  John  Walker.    Dublin,  1805.) 

To  the  same  effect,  it  is  remarked,  by  a  later  writer,  with  respect  to  Lord  Bacon's 
assertion,  "  \\iMdiscov-eries  in  Natural  Philosophy  are  not  likely  to  be  promoted  by  the 
"  engine  of  syllogism  ;" — «  that  this  is  a  proposition  which  no  one  of  the  present  day 
"  disputes  ;  and  which,  when  alleged  by  our  adversaries,  as  their  chief  objection  to 
"  the  study  cf  logic,  only  proves,  that  ihey  are  ignorant  of  the  subject  about  which 
"  they  are  speaking,  and  of  the  manner  in  which  it  is  wn»  taught."  {See  an  Anony- 
mous Pamphlet  printed  at  Oxford  in  1810,  p.  26.)  Dr.  Gillies  has  expressed  himself 
in  terms  extremely  similar  upon  various  occasions.  (See,  in  particular,  Vol.  I.  pp-. 
63,64,  2d  edit.) 

This  very  important  concession  reduces  the  question  about  the  utility  of  the  Aristo- 
telian logic  within  a  very  narrow  compass. 


SECT.    II.]  OP   THE    HUMAN   MIND.  203 

the  particular  conclusion  must  be  regulated  by  the  general 
principle,  whether  right  or  wrong.  The  case  was  similar  in 
every  branch  of  philosophy,  as  long  as  the  authority  of  great 
names  prevailed,  and  the  old  scholastic  maxims  were  allow- 
ed, without  examination,  to  pass  as  incontrovertible  truths.* 
Since  the  importance  of  experiment  and  observation  was 
fully  understood,  the  syllogistic  art  has  gradually  fallen  into 
contempt. 

A  remark  somewhat  similar  occurs  in  the  preface  to  the 
Novum  Organon.  "  They  who  attributed  so  much  to  logic," 
"  says  Lord  Bacon,  "  perceived  very  well  and  truly,  that  it 
"  was  not  safe  to  trust  the  understanding  to  itself,  without 
"  the  guard  of  any  rules.  But  the  remedy  reached  not  the 
■"  evil,  but  became  a  part  of  it :  For  the  logic  which  took 
"  place,  though  it  might  do  well  enough  in  civil  affairs,  and 
u  the  arts  which  consisted  in  talk  and  opinion,  yet  comes  very 
"  far  short  of  subtilty,  in  the  real  performances  of  nature ; 
-"  and,  catching  at  what  it  cannot  reach,  has  served  to  confirm 
"  and  establish  errors,  rather  than  open  a  way  to  truth. "f 

It  is  not,  however,  merely  as  a  useless  or  inefficient  organ 

*  "  Ce  sera  un  sujet  elernel  d'etonnement  pour  les  personnesqui  savent  bien  ce  que 
"  c'est  que  philosophie,  que  de  voir  que  l'autorite  d'Aristote  a  ete  tellement  respectee 
"  dans  les  ecoles  pendant  quelques  siedes,  que  lors  qu'un  disputant  citoit  un  passage 
<•' de  ce  philosophe,  celui  qui  soutenoit  la  these  n'osoit  point  dire  transeat  ;  il  falloit 
"  qu'il  niat  le  passage,  ou  qu'il  l'expliquiat  a  sa  maniere."  Diet,  de  Bay Ie.  Art. 
Jiristote. 

t  As  the  above  translation  is  by  Mr.  Locke,  who  has  introduced  it  in  the  way  of 
apology  Tor  the  freedom  of  his  own  strictures  on  the  school  logic,  the  opinion  which  it 
expresses  may  be  considered  as  also  sanctioned  by  the  authority  of  his  name. — See  the 
Introduction  to  his  Treatise  on  the  Conduct  of  the  Understanding .  I  cannot  forbear 
remarking,  on  this  occasion,  that  when  Lord  Bacon  speaks  of  the  school  logic  as 
"  answering  well  enough  in  civil  affairs,  and  the  arts  which  consist  in  talk  and  opi- 
"  nion,"  his  words  can  only  apply  to  dialectical  syllogisms,  and  cannot  possibly  be  ex- 
tended to  those  which  Aristotle  calls  demonstrative.  Whatever  praise,  therefore,  it 
may  be  supposed  to  imply,  must  be  confined  to  the  Books  of  Topics.  The  same  ob- 
servation will  be  found  to  hold  with  respect  to  the  greater  part  of  what  has  been  al- 
leged in  defence  of  the  syllogistic  art,  by  Dr.  Gillies,  and  by  the  other  authors  refer- 
red to  in  the  beginning  of  this  section.  One  of  the  ablest  of  these  seems  to  assent  to 
an  assertion  of  Bacon,  "  That  logic  does  not  help  towards  the  invention  ol  arts  and 
"  sciences,  but  only  of  arguments."  If  it  only  helps  towards  the  invention  of  argu- 
ments, for  what  purpose  has  Aristotle  treated  so  fully  of  demonstration  and  of  science 
in  the  two  boojts  of  the  Last  Analytics  ? 


204  ELEMENTS    OF    THE    PHILOSOPHY       [CHAP.  Ilf. 

for  the  discovery  of  truth,  that  this  art  is  exceptionable.  The 
importance  of  the  very  object  at  which  it  professedly  aims  is 
not  a  little  doubtful.  To  exercise  with  correctness  the  pow- 
ers of  deduction  and  of  argumentation  ;  or,  in  other  words,  to 
make  a  legitimate  inference  from  the  premises  before  us, 
would  seem  to  be  an  intellectual  process  which  requires  but 
little  assistance  from  rule.  The  strongest  evidence  of  this 
is,  the  facility  with  which  men  of  the  most  moderate  capacity 
learn,  in  the  course  of  a  few  months,  to  comprehend  the  long- 
est mathematical  demonstrations  ;  a  facility  which,  when  con^ 
trasted  with  the  difficulty  of  enlightening  their  minds  on  ques- 
tions of  morals  or  of  politics,  affords  a  sufficient  proof,  that  it 
is  not  from  any  inability  to  conduct  a  mere  logical  process,, 
that  our  speculative  errors  arise.  The  fact  is,  that,  in  most 
of  the  sciences,  our  reasonings  consist  of  a  very  few  steps  5 
and  yet,  how  liable  are  the  most  cautious  and  the  most  saga- 
cious, to  form  erroneous  conclusions  ! 

To  enumerate  and  examine  the  causes  of  these  false  judg- 
ments is  foreign  to  my  purpose  in  this  section.  The  follow- 
ing (which  I  mention  only  by  way  of  specimen)  seem  to  be 
among  the  most  powerful.  1.  The  imperfections  of  lan- 
guage, both  as  an  instrument  of  thought,  and  as  a  medium 
of  philosophical  communication.  2.  The  difficulty,  in  many 
of  our  most  important  inquiries,  of  ascertaining  the  facts  on 
which  our  reasonings  are  to  proceed.  3.  The  partial  and 
narrow  views,  which,  from  want  of  information,  or  from  some 
defect  in  our  intellectual  comprehension,  we  are  apt  to  take 
of  subjects,  which  are  peculiarly  complicated  in  their  details, 
or  which  are  connected,  by  numerous  relations,  with  other 
questions  equally  problematical.  And  lastly,  (what  is  of  all, 
perhaps,  the  most  copious  source  of  speculative  error,)  the 
prejudices  which  authority  and  fashion,  fortified  by  early 
impressions  and  associations,  create  to  warp  our  opinions. 
To  illustrate  these  and  other  circumstances  by  which  the 
judgment  is  apt  to  be  misled  in  the  search  of  truth,  and  to 
point  out  the  most  effectual  means  of  guarding  against  them, 
would  form  a  very  important  article  in  a  philosophical  sys- 


SECT,  H.]  OF    THE    HUMAN    MIND.  205 

tern  of  logic  ;   but  it  is  not  on  such  subjects  that  we  are  to 
expect  information  from  the  logic  of  Aristotle.* 

The  fundamental  idea  on  which  this  philosopher  evidently 
proceeded,  and  in  which  he  has  been  too  implicitly  followed 
by  many  even  of  those  who  have  rejected  his  syllogistic  the- 
ory, takes  for  granted,  that  the  discovery  of  truth  chiefly  de- 
pends on  the  reasoning  faculty,  and  that  it  is  the  comparative 
strength  of  this  faculty,  which  constitutes  the  intellectual  su- 
periority of  one  man  above  another.  The  similarity  between 
the  words  reason  and  reasoning,  of  which  1  formerly  took  no- 
tice, and  the  confusion  which  it  has  occasioned  in  their  ap- 
propriate meanings,  has  contributed  powerfully  to  encourage 
and  to  perpetuate  this  unfortunate  mistake.  If  I  do  not 
greatly  deceive  myself,  it  will  be  found,  on  an  accurate  exa- 
mination of  the  subject,  that,  of  the  different  elements  which 
enter  into  the  composition  of  reason,  in  the  most  enlarged 
acceptation  of  that  word,  the  power  of  carrying  on  long  pro- 
cesses of  reasoning  or  deduction,  is.  in  point  of  importance, 
one  of  the  least. t 

*  In  the  Logic  of  Port-Royal,  there  is  a  chapter,  entitled,  Des  sophismes  d'amcur 
propre,  d'interet,  et  de  passion,  which  is  well  worthy  of  a  careful  perusal.  Some 
useful  hints  may  be  also  collected  from  Gravesande's  Introductio  ad  Fhilosophiam. 
^ee  Book  ii.  Part  ii.     (De  Causis  Errorum.) 

t  It  was  before  observed  (pp.  147,  148.),  "  That  the  whole  theory  of  syllogism 
"  proceeds  on  the  supposition,  that  the  same  word  is  always  to  be  employed  in  the 
"  same  sense  ;  and  that,  consequently,  it  takes  for  granted,  in  every  rule  which  it 
"  furnishes  for  the  guidance  of  our  reasoning  powers,  that  the  nicest,  and  by  far  the 
"  most  difficult  part  of  the  logical  process,  has  been  previously  brought  to  a  successful 
"  termination." 

In  this  remark  (which,  obvious  as  it  may  seem,  has  been  very  generally  overlook- 
ed,) I  have  found,  since  the  foregoing  sheets  were  printed,  that  1  have  been  anticipa- 
ted by  M.  Turgpt.  "  Tout  l'artifice  de  ce  calcul  ingenieux,  dont  Aristote  nous  a 
"  donne  les  regies,  tout  l'art  du  syllogisme  est  fonde  sur  1  usage  des  mots  dans  le  me- 
"me  sens;  I'emploi  d'un  raeitie  mot  dans  deux  sens  differens  fait  de  tout  raisonne- 
U  ment  un  sophisme  ;  et  ce  genre  de  sophisme,  peut-etre  le  plus  eommun  de  tous,  est 
a  une  des  sources  les  plus  ordinaires  de  nos  erreurs."  Oeuvres  de  M.  Turgot,  Tom. 
III.  p  G6. 

Lord  Bacon  had  manifestly  the  same  conclusion  in  view,  in  the  following  aphorism : 
*'  Syllogism  consists  of  propositions,  propositions  of  words,  and^  words  are  the  signs 
"  of  notions  ;  therefore,  if  our  notions,  the  basis  of  all,  are  confined,  and  over  hastily 
"  taken  from  things,  nothing  that  is  built  on  them  can  be  firm  ;  whence  our  only 
1  hope  rests  upon  genuine  induction."  Nov.  Org.  Pari  I.  Sect.  1  Aph.  14.  (Shaw  s 
Translation) 


206  ELEMENTS    OP    THE    PHILOSOPHY       [CHAP.  III. 

The  slightest  reflection,  indeed,  may  convince  us,  how- 
very  little  connection  the  mere  reasoning  faculty  has  witla 
the  general  improvement  of  mankind.  The  wonders  which 
it  has  achieved  have  been  confined,  in  a  great  measure,  to 
the  mathematical  sciences, — the  only  branches  of  human 
knowledge  which  furnish  occasion  for  long  concatenated  pro- 
cesses of  thought  ;  and  even  there,  method,  together  with  a 
dexterous  use  of  the  helps  to  our  intellectual  faculties  which 
art  has  discovered,  will  avail  more  than  the  strongest  con- 
ceivable capacity,  exercised  solely  and  exclusively  in  habits 
of  synthetic  deduction.  The  tendency  of  these  helps,  it  may 
be  worth  while  to  add,  is  so  far  from  being  always  favourable 
to  the  power  of  reasoning,  strictly  so  called,  that  it  may  be 
questioned,  whether,  among  the  ancient  Greek  geometers,  this 
power  was  not  in  a  higher  state  of  cultivation,  in  consequence 
of  their  ignorance  of  the  algebraical  symbols,  than  it  exists  in 
at  this  day,  among  the  profoundest  mathematicians  of  Europe. 

In  the  ether  sciences,  however,  the  truth  of  the  remark  is 
far  more  striking.  By  whom  was  ever  the  art  of  reasoning 
so  sedulously  cultivated  as  by  the  schoolmen,  and  where 
shall  we  find  such  monuments  of  what  mere  reasoning  can 
accomplish,  as  in  their  writings  ?  Whether  the  same  end 
might  not  have  been  attained  without  the  use  of  their  tech- 
nical rules,  is  a  different  question  ;  but  that  they  did  suc- 
ceed, to  a  great  degree,  in  the  acquisition  of  the  accomplish- 
ments at  which  they  aimed,  cannot  be  disputed.  And  yet, 
I  believe,  it  will  be  now  very  generally  admitted,  that  never 
were  labour  and  ingenuity  employed,  for  so  many  ages,  to 
so  little  purpose  of  real  utility.  The  absurdity  of  expecting 
to  rear  a  fabric  of  science  by  the  art  of  reasoning  alone,  was 
remarked,  with  singular  sagacity,  even  amidst  the  darkness 
oflhe  12th  century,  by  John  of  Salisbury,  himself  a  distin- 
guished proficient  in  scholastic  learning,  which  he  had  studi- 
ed under  the  celebrated  Abdard.     (i  After  a  long  absence 

On  what  grounds  Dr.  Gillies  was  led  to  hazard  the  assertion  formerly  quoted  (p. 
264.),  that  "  Aristotle  invented  the  syllogism;  to  prevent  imposition  arising  from 
ic  the  abuss  of  words,"  I  am  quite  unable  to  form  a  conjecture. 


SECT.  II.}  OP   THE    HUMAN   MIND.  207 

"  from  Paris,"  he  tells  us  in  one  passage,  "  I  went  to  visit 
"  the  companions  of  my  early  studies.  I  found  them,  in 
"  every  respect,  precisely  as  I  had  left  them  ;  not  a  single 
"  step  advanced  towards  a  solution  of  their  old  difficulties, 
"  nor  enriched  by  the  accession  of  one  new  idea  : — a  strong 
"  experimental  proof,  that,  how  much  soever  logic  may  con- 
"  tribute  to  the  progress  of  other  sciences,  it  must  for  ever 
"  remain  barren  and  lifeless,  while  abandoned  to  itself."* 

Among  ihe  various  pursuits  now  followed  by  men  liberally 
educated,  there  is  none,  certainly,  which  affords  such  scope 
to  the  reasoning  faculty,  as  the  science  and  profession  of 
law ;  and,  accordingly,  it  has  been  observed  by  Mr.  Burke, 
"  That  they  do  more   to  quicken  and  invigorate  the  under- 
"  standing,  than  all  the  other  kinds  of  learning  put  together." 
The  same  author,  however,  adds,  that  "  they  are  not  apt,  ex- 
<;  cept  in  persons  very  happily  born,  to  open  and  to  liberalize 
"  the  mind,  exactly  in  the  same  proportion."     Nor  is  this 
surprising  ;  for  the  ultimate  standards  of  right  and  wrong  to 
which  they  recognize  the  competency  of  an  appeal,  being 
conventional  rules  and  human  authorities,  no  field  is  opened 
to  that  spirit  of  free  inquiry  which  it  is  the  boast  of  philoso- 
phy to  cultivate.     The  habits  of  thought,  besides,  which  the 
long  exercise  of  the  profession  has  a   tendency  to  form,  on 
its  appropriate  topics,  serin  unfavourable  to  the  qualities  con- 
nected with  what  is   properly  called  judgment ;  or,  in  other 
words,  to  the  qualities  on  which  the  justness  or  correctness 
of  our  opinions  depends  ;  they  accustom  the  mind  to  those 
partial  views  of  things  which  are  suggested  by  the  separate 
interests  of  litigants  ;  not  to  a  calm,  comprehensive,  and  dis- 
criminating survey  of  details,  in  all  their  bearings  and  rela- 
tions.    Hence  the  apparent  inconsistencies  which  sometimes 
astonish  us  in  the  intellectual  character  of  the  most  distin- 
guished pracinioners, — a  talent  for  acute  and  refined  distinc- 
tions ;  powers  of  subtle,  ingenious,  and  close  argumentation  ; 
iuexhaustibk*  resources  of    invention,  of  wit,  and  of  elo- 
quence ; — combined,  not  only  with  an  infantine  imbecility  in 

*  Metalog.  Lib.  ii.  cap.  10. 


208  ELEMENTS    OP    THE  PHILOSOPHY  [CHAP.  Ill 

the  affairs  of  life,  but  with  an  incapacity  of  forming  a  sound 
decision,  even  on  those  problematical  questions  which  are 
the  subjects  of  their  daily  discussion.  The  great  and  en- 
lightened minds,  whose  judgments  have  been  transmitted  to 
posterity,  as  oracles  of  legal  wisdom,  were  formed  (it  may 
be  safely  presumed)  not  by  the  habits  of  their  professional 
warfare,  but  by  contending  with  these  habits,  and  shaking 
off  their  dominion. 

The  habits  of  a  controversial  writer  are,  in  some  respects, 
analogous  to  those  of  a  lawyer  ;  and  their  effects  on  the  intel- 
lectual powers,  when  engaged  in  the  investigation  of  truth, 
are  extremely  similar.     They  confine  the  attention  to  one 
particular  view  of  the  question,  and,  instead  of  training  the 
understanding  to  combine  together  the  various  circumstances 
which  seem  to  favour  opposite  conclusions,  so  as  to  limit 
each  other,  and  to  guard   the  judgment  against  either  ex- 
treme,— they  are  apt,  by  presenting  the  subjects  sometimes 
wholly  on  the  one  side,  and  sometimes  wholly  on  the  other, 
to  render  the  disputant  the  sceptical  dupe  of  his  own  ingenui- 
ty.    Such  seems  to  have  been  nearly  the  case  with  the  re- 
doubtable Chillingworth  ;  a  person  to  whose  native  candour 
the  most  honourable  testimony  has  been  borne  by  the  most  emi- 
nent of  his  contemporaries,  and  whose  argumentative  powers 
have  almost  become  matter  of  proverbial  remark.     Dr.  Reid 
has   pronounced  him   the  "  best  reasoner,  as   well  as  the 
"  acutest  logician  of  his  age;"  and  Locke  himself  has  said, 
"  If  you  would  have  your  son  to  reason  well,  let  him  read  Chil- 
li  lingworth."     To  what  consequences  these   rare  endow- 
ments and  attainments  led,  we  may  learn  from  Lord  Claren- 
don. 

"  Mr.  Chillingworth  had  spent  ail  his  younger  time  in  dis- 
"  putations,  and  had  arrived  at  so  great  a  mastery,  that  he 
,"  was  inferior  to  no  man  in  those  skirmishes  :  but  he  had, 
"  with  his  notable  perfection  in  this  exercise,  contracted  such 
"an  irresolution  and  habit  of  doubting,  that  by  degrees  he 
"  grew  confident  of  nothing." — "  Neither  the  books  of  his 
"  adversaries,  nor  any  of  their  persons,  though  he  was  ac- 


SECT.  II.]  OF   THE   HUMAN   MIND.  209 

"  quainted  with  the  best  of  both,  had  ever  made  great  im- 
"  pression  on  him ;  all  his  doubts  grew  out  of  himself, 
"  when  he  assisted  his  scruples  with  all  the  strength  of  his 
"  own  reason,  and  was  then  too  hard  for  himself:  but  find* 
"  ing  as  little  quiet  and  repose  in  those  victories,  he  quickly 
"  recovered,  by  a  new  appeal  to  his  own  judgment ;  so  that, 
"  in  truth,  he  was,  in  all  his  sallies  and  retreats,  his  own  con- 
"  vert." 

The  foregoing  observations,  if  well  founded,  conclude 
strongly,  not  merely  against  the  form  of  the  school  logic,  but 
against  the  importance  of  the  end  to  which  it  is  directed. 
Locke  and  many  others  have  already  sufficiently  shewn,  how 
inadequate  the  syllogistic  theory  is  to  its  avowed  purpose  £ 
but  few  seem  to  be  sufficiently  aware,  how  very  little  this 
purpose,  if  it  were  attained,  would  advance  us  in  the  know- 
ledge of  those  truths  which  are  the  most  interesting  to  human 
happiness. 

"  There  is  one  species  of  madman,1'  says  Father  Buffier, 
"  that  makes  an  excellent  logician.1'*— The  remark  has  the 
appearance  of  being  somewhat  paradoxical ;  but  it  is  not 
without  a  solid  foundation,  both  in  fact,  and  in  the  theory  of 
the  human  understanding.  Nor  does  it  apply  merely  (as 
Buffier  seems  to  have  meant  it)  to  the  scholastic  defenders  of 
metaphysical  paradoxes  :  it  extends  to  all  whose  ruling  pas- 
sion is  a  display  of  argumentative  dexterity,  without  much 
solicitude  about  the  justness  of  their  premises,  or  the  truth  of 
their  conclusions.  It  is  observed  by  Lord  Erskine,  in  one 
of  his  admirable  pleadings  lately  published,  that  "  in  all  the 
"  cases  which  have  filled  Westminster-Hall  with  the  most 
"  complicated  considerations — the  lunatics,  and  other  insane 
"  persons,  who  have  been  the  subjects  of  them,  have  not  only 
"  had  the  most  perfect  knowledge  and  recollection  of  all  the 
li  relations  they  stood  in  towards  others,  and  of  the  acts  and 
t:  circumstances  of  their  lives,  but  have,  in  general,  been  re- 
"  markable  for  subtlety  and  acuteness." — "  These,"  he  adds, 
:'  are  the  cases  which  frequently  mock  the  wisdom  of  the 

*  Traile  des  Prcin.  Veritas.    Part  I.  chap.  xi. 
VOL.  II.  27 


210  ELEMENTS   OP    THE   PHILOSOPHY        [CHAP.  III. 

"  wisest  in  judicial  trials  ;  because  such  persons  often  reason 
"  with  a  subtlety  which  puts  in  the  shade  the  ordinary  concep- 
tltions  of  mankind;  their  conclusions  are  just,  and  frequently 
"  profound  ;  but  the  premises  from  which  they  reason,  when 
"  within  the  range  of  the  malady,  are  uniformly  false  : — not 
"  false  from  any  defect  of  knowledge  or  judgment ;  but  be- 
"  cause  a  delusive  image,  the  inseparable  companion  of  real 
"  insanity,  is  thrust  upon  the  subjugated  understanding,  in- 
"  capable  of  resistance,  because  unconscious  of  attack." 

In  the  instances  here  alluded  to,  something,  it  is  probable, 
ought  to  be  attributed  to  the  physical  influence  of  the  disor- 
der in  occasioning,  together  with  an  increased  propensity  to 
controversy,  a  preternatural  and  morbid  excitation  of  the 
power  of  attention,  and  of  some  other  intellectual  faculties  ; 
but  much  more,  in  my  opinion,  to  its  effects  in  removing  the 
check  of  those  collateral  circumstances  by  which,  in  more 
§ober  understanding51,  the  reasoning  powers  are  perpetually 
retarded  and  controlled  in  their  operation.  Among  these 
circumstances,  it  is  sufficient  to  specify,  for  the  sake  of  illus- 
tration, 1.  That  distrust,  which  experience  gradually  teaches, 
of  the  accuracy  and  precision  of  the  phraseology  in  which 
our  reasonings  are  expressed  ; — accompanied  with  a  cor- 
responding apprehension  of  involuntary  mistakes  from  the 
ambiguity  and  vagueness  of  language  ;  2.  A  latent  suspicion, 
that  we  may  not  be  fully  in  possession  of  all  the  elements  on 
which  the  solution  of  the  problem  depends  ;  and,  3.  The 
habitual  influence  of  those  first  principles  of  propriety,  of 
morality,  and  of  common  sense,  which,  as  long  as  reason 
maintains  her  ascendant,  exercise  a  paramount  authority  over 
all  those  speculative  conclusions  which  have  any  connection 
with  the  business  of  life.  Of  these  checks  or  restraints  on 
our  reasoning  processes,  none  are  cultivated  and  strengthen- 
ed, either  by  the  rules  of  the  logician,  or  by  the  habits  of 
viva  voce  disputation.  On  the  contrary,  in  proportion  as 
their  regulating  power  is  confirmed,  that  hesitation  and  sus- 
pense of  judgment  are  encouraged,  which  are  so  congenial  to 
the  spirit  of  true  philosophy,  but  such  fatal  incumbrances  in 


SECT.  II.]  OF    THE    HUMAN    MIND.  211 

contending  with  an  antagonist  whose  object  is  not  truth  but 
victory.  In  madness,  where  their  control  is  entirely  thrown 
off,  the  merely  logical  process  (which  never  stops  to  analyze 
the  meaning  of  words)  is  likely  to  go  on  more  rapidly  and 
fearlessly  than  before  ; — producing  a  volubility  of  speech, 
and  an  apparent  quickness  of  conception,  which  present  to 
common  observers  all  the  characteristics  of  intellectual  su- 
periority. It  is  scarcely  necessary  to  add,  that  the  same 
appearances,  which,  in  this  extreme  case  of  mental  aberra- 
tion, are  displayed  on  so  great  a  scale,  may  be  expected  to 
shew  themselves,  more  or  less,  wherever  there  is  any  defi- 
ciency in  those  qualities  which  constitute  depth  and  sagacity 
of  judgment. 

For  my  own  part,  so  little  value  does  my  individual  expe- 
rience lead  me  to  place  on  argumentative  address,  when  com- 
pared with  some  other  endowments  subservient  to  our  intel- 
lectual improvement,  that  I  have  long  been  accustomed  to 
consider  that  promptness  of  reply  and  dogmatism  of  decision 
which  mark  the  eager  and  practised  disputant,  as  almost  in- 
fallible symptoms  of  a  limited  capacity  ;  a  capacity  deficient 
in  what  Locke  has  called  (in  very  significant,  though  some- 
what homely  terms)  large,  sound,  roundabout  sense.*  In  all 
the  higher  endowments  of  the  understanding,  this  intellectual 
quality  (to  which  nature  as  well  as  education  must  liberally 
contribute)  may  be  justly  regarded  as  an  essential  ingredi- 
ent. It  is  this  which,  when  cultivated  by  study,  and  directed 
to  great  objects  or  pursuits,  produces  an  unprejudiced,  com- 
prehensive, and  efficient  mind  ;  and,  where  it  is  wanting, 
though  we  may  occasionally  find  a  more  than  ordinary  share 
of  quickness  and  of  information  ;  a  plausibility  and  brillian- 
cy of  discourse  ;  and  that  passive  susceptibility  of  polish 
from  the  commerce  of  the  world,  which  is  so  often  united 
with  imposing  but  secondary  talents, — we  may  rest  assured, 
that  there  exists  a  total  incompetency  for  enlarge^  views  and 

:<  Conduct  of  the  Und«rstanding,  §  3. 


212  ELEMENTS    OP    THE    PHILOSOPHY       [CHAP.    Hi. 

sagacious  combinations,  cither  in  the  researches  of  science 
or  in  the  conduct  of  affairs.* 

If  these  observations  hold  with  respect  to  the  art  of  rea- 
soning or  argumentation,  as  it  is  cultivated  by  men  undisci- 
plined in  the  contention*  of  the  schools,  they  will  be  found 
to  .pi'lv  with  infinitely  greater  force  to  those  disputants  (if 
any  such  are  still  to  be  found)  who,  in  the  present  advanced 
state  of  human  knowledge,  have  been  at  pains  to  fortify 
themselves,  by  a  course  of  persevering  study,  with  the  arms 
of  the  Aristotelian  logic.  Persons  of  the  former  description 
often  reason  conscientiously  with  warmth  from  false  premi- 
ses which  they  are  led  by  passion,  or  by  want  of  informa- 
tion, to  mistake  for  truth.  Those  of  the  latter  description 
proceed  systematically  on  the  radical  error  of  conceiving  the 
reasoning  process  to  be  the  most  powerful  instrument  by 
which  truth  is  to  be  attained  ;  combined  with  the  secondary 
error  of  supposing  that  the  power  of  reasoning  may  be 
strengthened  and  improved  by  the  syllogistic  art. 

In  one  of  Lord  Karnes's  sketches,  there  is  an  amusing  and 
instructive  collection  of  facts  to  illustrate  the  progress  of  reo> 
son  ;  a  phrase,  by  which  he  seems  to  mean  chiefly  the  pro- 
gress of  good  sense,  or  of  that  quality  of  the  intellect  which  is 

*  The  outlines  of  an  intellectual  character,  approaching  neatly  to  this  description, 
is  exhibited  by  Martnontel  in  his  highly  finished  (and  I  have  been  assured,  very 
faithful)  portrait  of  M.  de  Brienne.  Among  the  other  defects  of  that  unfortunate 
statesman,  he  mentions  particularly  un  esprit  <<■  facetles  ;  by  which  expression  he 
seems,  from  the  context,  to  mean  a  quality  of  mind  precisely  opposite  to  that  descri- 
bed by  Locke  in  the  words  quoted  above  : — "  quelques  lumitres,  mats  (parses  ;  des  ap- 
ic  pergus  plutot  que  des  pues  ;  et  dans  les  grands  objets,  de  la  facilite  il  saisir  les  petit  $ 
t<  details,  nulle  capacity  pour  emhrasser  I'eh&emble."  A  consciousness  of  some  similar 
deficiency  has  suggested  to  Gibbon  the  following  criticism  on  his  own  juvenile  per- 
formance, entitled  Essai  sv,r  V Elude  It  is  executed  by  an  impartial  and  masterly 
hand  ;  and  may,  perhaps,  without  much  injustice,  be  extended  not  only  to  his  Ro- 
man history,  but  to  the  distinguishing  features  of  that  peculiar  cast  of  genius,  which 
so  strongly  marks  all  Ins  writings. 

"  The  most  serious  defect  of  m}'  essay  is  a  kind  of  obscuritj'  and  abruptness  which 
M  always  fatigues,  and  may  often  elude  the  attention  of  the  reader.  The  obscurity  of 
!i  many  passages  is  often  affected  ;  proceeding  from  the  desire  of  expressing  perhaps  a 
,:  common  idea  with  sententious  brevity:  brevis  esse  laboro,  obscurusfio.  Alas! 
"  how  fatal  lias  been  the  imitation  of  Montesquieu  !  But  this  obscurity  sometimes  pro. 
«{  weds  from  a  mixture  of  light  and  darkness  in  the  author's  mind  ;  from  a,  partial  rait 
''  vhich  strikes  upon  an  o.ngle-  instead  of  spreading  itself  over  the  surface  of  an  object." 


SECT.  II.]  OP    THE   HUMAN   MINI).  2l3 

very  significantly  expressed  by  the  epithet  enlightened.  To 
what  is  this  progress  (which  has  been  going  on  with  such 
unexampled  rapidity  during  the  two  last  centuries)  to  be  as- 
cribed ?  Not  surely  to  any  improvement  in  the  art  of  rea- 
soning ;  for  many  of  the  most  melancholy  weaknesses  which 
he  has  recorded,  were  exhibited  by  men,  distinguished  by 
powers  of  discussion,  and  a  reach  of  thought,  which  have 
jiever  been  surpassed  ;  while,  on  the  other  hand,  the  same 
weakness  would  now  be  treated  with  contempt  by  the 
lowest  of  the  vulgar.  The  principal  cause,  I  apprehend, 
has  been,  the  general  diffusion  of  knowledge  (and  more  es- 
pecially of  experimental  knowledge)  by  the  art  of  printing  : 
in  consequence  of  which,  those  prejudices  which  had  so  long 
withstood  the  assaults  both  of  argument  and  of  ridicule,  have 
been  gradually  destroyed  by  their  mutual  collision,  or  lost 
in  the  infinite  multiplicity  of  elementary  truths  which  are 
identified  with  the  operations  of  the  infant  understanding. 
To  examine  the  process  by  which  truth  has  been  slowly 
and  insensibly  cleared  from  that  admixture  of  error,  with 
which,  during  the  long  night  of  Gothic  ignorance,  it  was 
contaminated  and  disfigured,  would  form  a  very  interesting 
subject  of  philosophical  speculation.  At  present,  it  is  suffi- 
cient to  remark,  how  little  we  are  indebted  for  our  emanci- 
pation from  this  intellectual  bondage,  to  those  qualities 
which  it  was  the  professed  object  of  the  school  logic  to  cul- 
tivate ;  and  that,  in  the  same  proportion  in  which  liberality 
and  light  have  spread  over  Europe,  this  branch  of  study  has 
sunk  in  the  general  estimation. 

Of  the  inefficacy  of  mere  reasoning  in  bringing  men  to  an 
agreement  on  those  questions  which,  in  all  ages,  have  fur- 
nished to  the  learned  the  chief  matter  of  controversy,  a  very 
just  idea  seems  to  have  been  formed  by  the  ingenious  author 
of  the  following  lines  :  who  has,  at  the  same  time,  hinted  at  a 
remedy  against  a  numerous  and  important  class  of  specula- 
tive errors,  more  likely  to  succeed  than  any  which  is  to  be 
derived  from  the  most  skilful  application  of  Aristotle's  rules 
or,  indeed,  from  any  direct  argumentative  refutation,  how 


2M  ELEMENTS    OP    THE    PHILOSOPHY         [CHAP.    HI. 

conclusive  and  satisfactory  soever  it  may  appear  to  an  un- 
biassed judgment.  It  must,  at  the  same  time,  be  owned, 
that  this  remedy  is  not  without  danger  ;  and  that  the  same 
habits  which  are  so  useful  in  correcting  the  prejudices  of  the 
monastic  bigot,  and  so  instructive  to  all  whose  principles  are 
sufficiently  fortified  by  reflection,  can  scarcely  fail  to  pro- 
duce pernicious  effects,  where  they  operate  upon  a  character 
not  previously  formed  and  confirmed  by  a  judicious  educa- 
tion. 

En  parcourant  au  loin  la  planete  ou  nous  sommes, 
Que  verrons  nous  ?  les  torts  et  les  travers  des  hpmmes  J 
Ici  c'est  un  synode,  et  la  c'est  un  divan, 
Nous  verrons  le  Mufti,  le  Derviche,  1'iman, 
Le  Bonze,  le  Lama,  le  Talapoin,  le  Pope, 
Les  antiques  Rabbins  ct  les  Abbes  d'Europe, 
Nos  moines,  nos  prelats,  nos  docteurs  agreges  j 
Etes  vous  disputeurs,  mesamis  ?  voyagez.* 

To  these  verses  it  may  not  be  altogether  useless  to  subjoin 
a  short  quotation  from  Mr.  Locke  ;  in  whose  opinion  the  aid 
of  foreign  travel  seems  to  be  less  necessary  for  enlightening 
some  of  the  classes  of  controversialists  included  in  the  fore- 
going enumeration,  than  was  suspected  by  the  poet.  The 
moral  of  the  passage  (if  due  allowances  be  made  for  the 
satirical  spirit  which  it  breathes)  is  pleasing  on  the  whole, 
as  it  suggests  the  probability,  that  our  common  estimates  of 
the  intellectual  darkness  of  our  own  times  are  not  a  little  ex- 
aggerated. 

"  Notwithstanding  the  great  noise  that  is  made  in  the 
"  world  about  errors  and  opinions,  I  must  do  mankind  that 
"  right  as  to  say,  There  are  not  so  many  men  in  errors  and 
il  wrong  opinions,  as  is  commonly  supposed.  Not  that  I  think 
"  they  embrace  the  truth  ;  but,  indeed,  because  concerning 
11  those  doctrines  they  keep  such  a  stir  about,  they  have  no 
"  thought,  no  opinion  at  all.  For  if  any  one  should  a  little 
"  catechize  the  greatest  part  of  the  partizans  of  most  of  the 
"  sects  in  the  world,  he  would  not  find,  concerning  those  mat- 
"  ters  they  are  so  zealous  for,  that  they  have  any  opinion  of 

*  B'rscoirrs  sitr  les  Disputes,  par  M  de  Rulhiere. 


SECT.  II.]  OF    THE   HUMAN   MIND.  215 

"  their  own  :  much  less  would  he  have  reason  to  think  that 
"  they  took  them  upon  the  examination  of  arguments  and  ap- 
"  pearance  of  probability.  They  are  resolved  to  stick  to  a 
"  party  that  education  or  interest  has  engaged  them  in ;  and 
"  there,  like  the  common  soldiers  of  an  army,  shew  their 
"  courage  and  warmth  as  their  leaders  direct,  without  ever 
"  examining,  or  so  much  as  knowing,  the  cause  they  contend 
"  for.  If  a  man's  life  shews  that  he  has  no  serious  regard 
'*  for  religion,  for  what  reason  should  we  think  that  he  beats 
"  his  head  about  the  opinions  of  his  church,  and  troubles  him- 
"  self  to  examine  the  grounds  of  this  or  that  doctrine  ?  'Tis 
"  enough  for  him  to  obey  his  leaders,  to  have  his  hand  and 
"  his  tongue  ready  for  the  support  of  the  common  cause,  and 
"  thereby  approve  himself  to  those  who  can  give  him  credit, 
"  preferment,  and  protection  in  that  society.  Thus  men  be- 
"  come  combatants  for  those  opinions  they  were  never  con- 
"  vinced  of;  no,  nor  ever  had  so  much  as  floating  in  their 
"  heads ;  and  though  one  cannot  say  there  are  teweh 
"  improbable  or  erroneovs  opinions  in  the  world  than 
"  there  are,  yet  this  is  certain,  there  are  fewer 
"  that  actually  assent  to  them,  and  mistake  them 
**  tor  truths,  than  is  imagined."* 

If  these  remarks  of  Locke  were  duly  weighed,  they  would 
have  a  tendency  to  abridge  the  number  of  controversial  wri- 
ters ;  and  to  encourage  philosophers  to  attempt  the  improve- 
ment of  mankind,  rather  by  adding  to  the  stock  of  useful 
knowledge,  than  by  waging  a  direct  war  with  prejudices, 
which  have  less  root  in  the  understandings  than  in  the  inte- 
rests and  passions  of  their  abettors. 

-  Essay  on  Hiujian  Understanding.    Book  iv.  c.  20, 


216  ELEMENTS    OF    THE    PHILOSOPHY        [CHAP.  Uh 


SECTION  HI. 

tti  what  respects  the  study  of  the  Aristotelian  Logic  may  be  useful  to  Disputants.— 
A  general  acquaintance  with  it  justly  regarded  as  an  essential  accomplishment  to 
those  who  are  liberally  educated. — Doubts  suggested  by  some  late  Writers,  con- 
cerning Aristotle's  claims  to  the  invention  of  the  Syllogistic  Theory. 

The  general  result  of  the  foregoing  reflections  is,  That 
neither  the  means  employed  by  the  school  logic  for  the  as- 
sistance of  the  discursive  faculty,  nor  the  accomplishment  of 
that  end,  were  it  really  attained,  are  of  much  consequence 
in  promoting  the  enlargement  of  the  mind,  or  in  guarding  it 
against  the  influence  of  erroneous  opinions.  It  is,  however, 
a  very  different  question,  how  far  this  art  may  be  of  use  to 
such  as  are  led  by  profession  or  inclination  to  try  their 
strength  in  polemical  warfare.  My  own  opinion  is,  that,  in 
the  present  age,  it  would  not  give  to  the  disputant,  in  the 
judgment  of  men  whose  suffrage  is  of  any  value,  the  slight- 
est advantage  over  his  antagonist.  In  earlier  times,  indeed, 
the  case  must  have  been  different.  While  the  scholastic 
forms  continued  to  be  kept  up,  and  while  schoolmen  were 
the  sole  judges  of  the  contest,  an  expert  logician  could  not 
fail  to  obtain  an  easy  victory  over  an  inferior  proficient. 
Mow,  however,  when  the  supreme  tribunal  to  which  all  par- 
ties must  appeal,  is  to  be  found,  not  within  but  without  the 
walls  of  universities  ;  and  when  the  most  learned  dialectician 
must,  for  his  own  credit,  avoid  all  allusion  to  the  technical 
terms  and  technical  forms  of  his  art,  can  it  be  imagined  that 
the  mere  possession  of  its  rules  furnishes  him  with  invisible 
aid  for  annoying  his  adversary,  or  renders  him  invulnerable 
by  some  secret  spell  against  the  weapons  of  his  assailant  ?* 

"An  argument  of  this  sort  in  favour  of  the  Aristotelian  logic,  has,  in  facl,  been  late- 
1  )  allpged,  in  a  treatise  to  which  1  have  already  had  occasion  to  refer. 

"  Mr.  Locke  seems  throughout  to  imagine  that  no  use  can  be  made  of  the  doctrine 
"of  syllogisms,  unless  by  .men  who  deliver  their  reasonings  in  syllogistic  form.  That 
"  would,  indeed,  justly  expose  a  man  to  the  imputation  of  disgusting  pedantry  and 
"  tediousness.  But,  in  fsnet,  he  who  never  uses  an  expression  borrowed  from  the  Arte- 


SECT.  III.]  OP   THE   HUMAN   MIND,  217 

Were  this  really  the  case,  one  might  have  expected  that  the 
advocates  who  have  undertaken  its  defence  (considering  how 
much  their  pride  was  interested  in  the  controversy)  would 
have  given  us  some  better  specimens  of  its  practical  utility,  in 
defending  it  against  the  unscientific  attacks  of  Bacon  and  of 
Locke.  It  is,  however,  not  a  little  remarkable,  that,  in  every 
argument  which  they  have  attempted  in  its  favour,  they  have 
not  only  been  worsted  by  those  very  antagonists  whom  they 
accuse  of  ignorance,  but  fairly  driven  from  the  field  of  battle.* 


*'  toteh'c  logic,  may  yet,  unobserved,  be  availing  himself,  in  the  most  important  man.- 
*  ner  of  its  use,  by  bringing  definitions,  divisions,  and  arguments,  to  the  test  of  its 
11  rules. 

"  In  the  mere  application  of  it  to  the  examining  of  an  argument  which  we  desire 
J4  to  refute, — the  logician  will  be  able  to  bring  the  argument  in  his  own  mind  to  syl» 
'**  logistic  form. — He  will  then  have  before  his  view  every  constituent  part  of  the  ar- 
"  gument ;  some  of  which  may  have  been  wholly  suppressed  by  his  antagonist, 
"  and  others  disguised  by  ambiguity  and  declamation. — He  knows  every  point  in 
"  which  it  is  subject  to  examination. — He  perceives  immediately,  by  the  rules  of  his. 
"  art,  whether  the  premises  may  be  acknowledged,  and  the  conclusion  denied,  for 
w  want  of  a  vis  consequentice. — If  not,  he  knows  where  to  look  for  a  weakness. — He 
"  turns  each  of  the  premises,  and  considers  whether  they  are  false,  dubious,  or  equL- 
"  vocal :  and  is  thus  prepared  and  directed  to  expose  every  weak  point  in  the  argu- 
•"  ment  with  clearness,  precision  and  method  ;  and  this  to  those  who  perhaps  are 
"  wholly  ignorant  of  the  aids  by  which  the  speaker  is  thus  enabled  to  carry  conviction 
»•  with  his  discourse." — Commentary  on  the  Compendium  of  Logic,  used  in  the  Urtiver' 
sity  of  Dublin.    Dublin,  1805. 

*  In  most  of  the  defences  of  the  school  logic  which  I  have  seen,  the  chief  weapon 
employed  has  been  that  kind  o!  argument  which,  in  scholastic  phraseology,  is  called 
the  Argumentum  ad  Hominem  ;  an  argument  in  the  use  of  which  much  regard  to  con- 
sistency is  seldom  to  be  expected. — In  one  sentence,  accordingly,  Bacon  and  Locke 
are  accused  of  having  never  read  Aristotle  ;  and,  in  the  next,  of  having  borrowed  from 
Aristotle  the  most  valuable  part  of  tbeir  writings. 

With  respect  to  Locke,  it  has  been  triumphantly  observed,  that  his  acquaintance 
with  Aristotle's  logic  must  have  been  superficial,  as  he  has,  in  one  of  his  objections, 
manifestly  confounded  particular  with  singular  propositions.  (Commentary  on  the 
Dublin  Compendium.)  The  criticism,  I  have  no  doubt,  is  just ;  but  does  it,  therefore, 
follow,  that  a  greater  familiarity  with  the  technical  niceties  of  an  art  which  he  despised, 
would  have  rendered  this  profound  thinker  more  capable  of  forming  a  just  estimate  of 
Us  scope  and  spirit,  or  of  its,  efficacy  in  aidingthe  human  understanding  ? — Somewhat 
of  the  same  description  are  the  attempts  which  have  been  repeatedly  made  to  discre- 
dit the  strictures  of  Dr.  Reid,  by  appealing  to  his  own  acknowledgment,  that  there 
might  possibly  be  some  parts  of  the  Analytics  and  Topics  which  he  had  never  read. 
The  passage  in  which  this  acknowledgment  is  made,  is  so  chajacteristical  of  the 
modesty  and  candour  of  the  writer,  that  1  am  tempted  to  annex  it  to  this  note; — more 
especially,  as  I  uni  persuaded,  that,  witn  many  readers,  it  will  have  the  effect  of  con- 

VOL.  II.  28 


218  ELEMENTS    OF    THE    PHILOSOPHY        [clfAP.  Ill, 

It  has,  indeed,  been  asserted  by  an  ingenious  and  learned 
writer,  that  "  he  has  never  met  with  a  person  unacquainted 
"  with  logic,  who  could  state  and  maintain  his  argument  with 
"  facility,  clearness,  and  precision  ; — that  he  has  seen  a  man 
"  of  the  acutest  mind  puzzled  by  the  argument  of  his  antago- 
"  nist ;  sensible,  perhaps,  that  it  was  inconclusive,  but  wholly 
"  unable  to  expose  the  fallacy  which  rendered  it  so  :  while  * 
"  logician,  of  perhaps  very  inferior  talents,  would  be  able  at 
"  once  to  discern  and  to  mark  it."* 

I  do  not  deny  that  there  may  be  some  foundation  for  this 
statement.  The  part  of  Aristotle's  Organon  which  seems,  in 
the  design,  to  be  the  most  practically  useful  (although  it  is 
certainly  very  imperfect  in  the  execution)  is  the  book  of 
sophisms  ;  a  book  which  still  supplies  a  very  convenient 
phraseology  for  marking  concisely  some  of  the  principal  fal- 
lacies which  are  apt  to  impose  on  the  understanding  in  the 
heat  of  a  viva  voce  dispute.!     Whether  it  affords  any  aid  in 

firming,  rather  than  of  shaking,  their  confidence  in  the  general  correctness  and  fideli- 
ty of  his  researches. 

"  In  attempting  to  give  some  account  of  the  Analyifcs  and  of  the  Topics  of  Aris- 
"  totle,  ingenuity  requires  me  to  confess,  that  though  I  have  often  purposed  to  read 
"  the  whole  with  care,  and  to  understand  what  is  intelligible,  yet  my  courage  and 
"patience  always  failed  before  I  had  done.  Why  should  I  throw  away  so  much 
"  time  and  painful  attention  upon  a  thing  of  so  little  real  use  ?  If  I  had  lived  in  those 
"ages  when  the  knowledge  of  Aristotle's  Organon  entitled  a  man  to  the  highest  rank 
•''  in  philosophy,  ambition  might  have  induced  me  to  employ  upon  it  some  years  of 
"  painful  study ;  and  less,  1  conceive,  would  not  be  sufficient.  Such  reflections  as 
"  these  always  got  the  better  of  tny  resolution,  when  the  first  ardour  began  to  cool . 
11  All  I  can  say  is,  that  1  have  read  some  parts  of  the  books  with  care,  some  slightly? 
"  and  some  perhaps  not  at  all.  I  have  glanced  over  the  whole  often,  and  when  any 
"  thing  attracted  my  attention,  have  dipped  into  it  till  my  appetite  was  satisfied.  Of 
"  all  reading,  it  is  the  most  dry  and  the  most  painful,  employing  an  infinite  labour  of  de- 
"  monstration,  about  tilings  of  the  most  abstract  nature,  delivered  in  a  laconic  style^ 
"and  often,  1  think,  with  affected  obscurity ;  and  all  to  prove  general  propositions, 
"  which,  when  applied  to  particular  instances,  appear  self-evident."  Chap.  Ill, 
sect.  1. 

*  Mr.  Walker,  author  of  the  Commentary  on  the  Dublin  Compendium  of  Logic. 

t  Such  phrases,  for  example,  as,  1.  Fallacia  Jlccidentis.  2.  A  dicto  secundum  quid,, 
ad  dictum  simpliciler.  3.  Ab  igrwrantia  Elenchi.  4.  A  nan  causa  pro  causa.  5.  Fml- 
lacia  consequents .  6.  Petitio  principii.  7.  Fallacia  plurium  interrogationum,  fyc. 
T  have  mentioned  those  fallacies  alone  which  are  called  by  logicians  Fallacice  extra 
Dictimiem  ;  for  as  to  those  which  are  called  Fallacies-  in  Dictione  (such  as  the  Fallacia 
JEquiuocatioriis,  Fallacia  Amphibolies,  Fallacia  Accentus  velPronunciationis,  Fullacitt 
«  Figura  dictionis,  tyc.)  they  are  too  contemptible  to  he  deserving  of  any  notice. — For 
sonae  remarks  on  this  last  class  of  fallacies,  See  Note  (M.) 


SECT.  III.]  OP    THE    HUMAN   MIND.  219 

detecting  or  discerning  these  fallacies,  may  perhaps  be  doubt- 
ed.   But  it  is  certainly  an  acquisition,  and  an  acquisition  of  no 
contemptible  value,  to  have  always  at  hand  a  set  of  techni- 
cal terms,  by  which  we  can  point  out  to  our  hearers,  without 
circumlocution  or  discussion,  the  vulnerable  parts  of  our  an* 
tagonist's  reasoning.     That  nothing  useful  is  to  be  learned 
from  Aristotle's  logic  I  am  far  from  thinking;  but  I  believe 
that  all  which  is  useful  in  it  might  be  reduced  intp  a  very 
narrow  compass  ;  and  I  am  decidedly  of  opinion,  that  where- 
ver it  becomes  a  serious  and  favourite  object  of  study,  it  is 
infinitely  more  likely  to  do  harm  than  good.     Indeed,  I  can- 
not help  considering  it  as  strongly  symptomatic  of  some  un- 
soundness in  a  man's  judgment,  when  1  find  him  disposed 
(after  all  that  has  been  said  by  Bacon  and  Locke)  to  magnify 
its  importance  either  as  an  inventive  or  as  an  argumentative 
Organ.     Nor  does  this  opinion  rest  upon  theory  alone.     It 
is  confirmed  by  all  that  I  have  observed,  (if,  after  the  exam- 
ple of  the  author  last  quoted,  I  may  presume  to  mention  the 
results  of  my  own  observations,)  with  respect  to  the  intellectu- 
al characters  of  the  most  expert  dialecticians  whom  I  have 
happened  to  know.     Among  these,  I  can  with  great  truth  say, 
that  although  I  recollect  several  possessed  of  much  learning* 
subtlety,  and  ingenuity,  I  can  name  none  who  have  extended 
by  their  discoveries  the  boundaries  of  science ;  or  on  whose 
good  sense  I  should  conceive  that  much  reliance  was  to  be 
placed  in  the  conduct  of  important  affairs. 

Some  very  high  authorities,  I  must,  at  the  same  time,  con- 
fess, may  be  quoted  on  the  opposite  side  of  the  question  ; 
among  others,  that  of  Leibnitz,  unquestionably  one  of  the 
first  names  in  modern  philosophy.  But,  on  this  point,  the 
mind  of  Leibnitz  was  n,ot  altogether  unwarped  ;  for  he  ap- 
pears to  have  early  contracted  a  partiality,  not  only  for  scho-r 
lastic  learning,  but  for  the  projects  of  some  of  the  schoolmen, 
to  reduce,  by  means  of  technical  aids,  the  exercise  of  the 
discursive  faculty  to  a  sort  of  mechanical  operation  ; — a  par- 
tiality which  could  not  fail  to  be  cherished  by  that  strong 
feias  towards  synthetical   reasoning  from  abstract  maxims. 


^220  ELEMENTS    OP    THE   PHILOSOPHY       [CHAP.  III. 

which  characterizes  all  his  philosophical  speculations.     It 
must  be  remembered  too,  that  he   lived  at  a  period,  when 
logical  address   was  still  regarded  in  Germany  as  an  indis- 
pensable accomplishment  to  all  whose   taste  led  them  to  the 
cultivation  of  letters  or  of  science.     Nor  was  this  an  accom- 
plishment of  easy  acquisition  ;   requiring,  as  it  must  have 
done,  for  its  attainment,  a   long  course  of  laborious  study, 
and,  for  its  successful  display,  a  more  than  ordinary  share  of 
acuteness,  promptitude,  and  invention.     To  all  which  it  may 
be  added,  that  while  it  remained  in  vogue,  it  must  have  been 
peculiarly  flattering  to  the  vanity  and  self-love  of  the  posses- 
sor ;   securing  to  him,  in  every  contest  with  the  comparatively 
unskilful,  an  infallible  triumph.    These  considerations  (com- 
bined with  that  attachment   to   the  study  of  jurisprudence 
which  he  retained  through  life)  may,  I  think,  go  far  to  account 
for  the  disposition  which  Leibnitz  sometimes  shews  to  mag- 
nify a  little  too  much  the  value  of  this  art.     It  is,  besides,  ex- 
tremely worthy  of  remark,  with  respect  to  this  eminent  man, 
within  what  narrow  limits  he  circumscribes  the  province  of 
the  school  logic,  notwithstanding  the   favourable  terms   in 
which  he  occasionally  speaks  of  it.     The  following  passage 
in  one  of  his  letters  is  particularly  deserving  of  attention,  as 
it  confines  the  utility  of  syllogism   to   those   controversies 
alone  which  are  carried  on  in  writing,  and  contains  an  ex- 
plicit  acknowledgment,  that,  in  extemporaneous  discussions, 
the  use  of  it  is  equally  nugatory  and  impracticable. 

"  I  have  myself  experienced  the  great  utility  of  the  forms 
f'  of  logic  in  bringing  controversies  to  an  end  ;  and  wonder 
"  how  it  has  happened,  that  they  should  have  been  so  often 
"  applied  to  disputes  where  no  issue  was  to  be  expected, 
"  while  their  real  use  has  been  altogether  overlooked.  In 
"  an  argument  which  is  carried  on  viva  voce,  it  is  scarcely 
$'  possible  that  the  forms  should  continue  to  be  rigorously 
"  observed  ;  not  only  on  account  of  the  tediousness  of  the 
"  process,  but  chiefly  from  the  difficulty  of  retaining  distinct- 
"  ly  in  the  memory  all  the  different  links  of  a  long  chain, 
•s  Accordingly,  it.  commonly  happens,  that  after  ope  prosyllo* 


SECT.  III.]  OP    THE    HUMAN   MIND.  221 

"  gism,  the  disputants  betake  themselves  to  a  freer  mode  of 
"  conference.  But  if,  in  a  controversy  carried  on  in  writing, 
"  the  legitimate  forms  were  strictly  observed,  it  would  nei- 
"  ther  be  difficult  nor  disagreeable,  by  a  mutual  exchange  of 
"  syllogisms  and  answers,  to  keep  up  the  contest,*  till  either 
"  the  point  to  be  proved  was  completely  established,  or  the 
"  disputant  had  nothing  farther  to  allege  in  support  of  it. 
"  For  the  introduction,  however,  of  this  into  practice,  many 
"  rules  remain  to  be  prescribed  ;  the  greater  part  of  which 
"  are  to  be  collected  from  the  practice  of  lawyers."! 

This  concession,  from  so  consummate  a  judge,  I  consider 
as  of  great  consequence  in  the  present  argument.  For  my 
own  part,  if  I  were  called  on  to  plead  the  cause  of  the  school 
logic,  1  should  certainly  choose  to  defend,  as  the  more  tena- 
ble of  the  two  posts,  that  which  Leibnitz  has  voluntarily 
abandoned.  Much  might,  I  think,  on  this  ground  be  plausibly 
alleged  in  its  favour,  in  consequence  of  its  obvious  tendency 
to  cultivate  that  invaluable  talent  to  a  disputant,  which  Aris- 
totle has  so  significantly  expressed  by  the  word  ety%ivota  ;| — 
a  talent  of  which  the  utility  cannot  be  so  forcibly  pictured, 
as  in  the  lively  and  graphical  description  given  by  Johnson, 
of  the  inconveniences  with  which  the  want  of  it  is  attended. 

*'  There  arc  men  whose  powers  operate  only  at  leisure 
"and  in  retirement,  and  whose  intellectual  vigour  deserts  them 
"  in  conversation  ;  whom  merriment  confuses,  and  objection 
"  disconcerts  ;  whose  bashfulness  restrains  their  exertion,  and 

*  The  words  in  the  original  are — "non  ingralum  nee  difficile  foret,  mittendo  re- 
i(  mittendoque  syllogismos  et  responsiones  tamdiu  reciprocare  serram,  donee  ve!  con- 
"  fectuni  sit  quod  probandum  erat>  vel  nihil  ultra  habcat  quod  afferat  argumentator."' 

]  Leibnitz.  Op.  Tom.  VI.  p.  72.  Edit.  Dutens. 

X  Aristotle's  definition  of  wy%ivalc&  turns  upon  owe  only  of  the  many  advanta- 
ges which  presence  of  mind  bestows,  in  the  management  of  a  vivS.  voce  dispute. 
H$'  cty^tvotx  te-Tiv  eve-To%tct  T<$  ev  ccrKevTO)  Xpovui  rn  fierov. 
(Saivacitas  est  bona  qua:dam  medii  conjeetatio  brevissimo  tempore.)  inuiyt.  Post. 
Lib.  i.  cap.  34.  I  use  the  word,  upon  this  occasion,  in  that  extensive  and  o\a  ious 
sense  which  its  etymology  suggests,  and  in  which  the  corresponding  Latin  phrase 
is  employed  by  Quinctilian.  "  In  Altercalione  npus  est  imprimis  insenio  veloci  ac 
"  mobili,  animo  prccsenli  et  acri.  f*jon  enim  cogilandnm,  sed  dicendum  statim  est" 
Quinct.  Lib.  vi.  en  p.  4. 


222  ELEMENTS    OF    THE    PHILOSOPHY         [CHAP.  in. 

"  suffers  them  not  to  speak  till  the  time  of  speaking  is  past  ; 
"  or  whose  attention  to  their  own  character  makes  them  un- 
"  willing  to  utter  at  hazard  what  has  not  been  considered  and 
"  cannot  be  recalled."* 

The  tendency,  however,  of  scholastic  disputations  to  cure 
these  defects,  it  must  not  be  forgotten,  belongs  to  them  only 
in  common  with  all  other  habits  of  extemporaneous  debate  ; 
and  the  question  still  recurs,  Whether  it  would  not  be  wiser 
to  look  for  the  remedy,  in  exercises  more  analogous  to  the 
real  business  of  life  ? 

After  having  said  so  much  in  disparagement  of  the  art  of 
syllogizing,  I  feel  it  incumbent  on  me  to  add,  that  I  would 
not  be  understood  to  represent  a  general  acquaintance  with 
it  as  an  attainment  of  no  value,  even  in  these  times.  The 
technical  language  connected  with  it  is  now  so  incorporated 
with  all  the  higher  departments  of  learning,  that,  independent- 
ly of  any  consideration  of  its  practical  applications,  some 
knowledge  of  its  peculiar  phraseology  may  be  regarded  as 
an  indispensable  preparation  both  for  scientific  and  for  lite- 
rary pursuits.!  To  the  philosopher,  it  must  ever  remain  a 
subject  of  speculation  peculiarly  interesting,  as  one  of  the 
most  singular  facts  in  the  history  of  the  Human  Understand- 
ing.    The  ingenuity  and  subtlety  of  the  invention,  and  the 

J*Life  of  Drydcu. 

t  It  was  with  great  pleasure  I  read  the  concluding  paragraph  of  the  introduction 
prefixed  to  a  Compend  of  Logic,  sanctioned  by  so  learned  a  body  as  the  University 
ofDublin. 

"  Utrum  hfficce  ars  pqj-se  revera  aliquem  praestet  usum,  quidam  dubitavere.  Quo- 
,(:  niam  vero  in  Authorum  insigniorum  scriplis,  saepe  occurant  termini  Logici,  hos 
:(  terminos  explicatos  habere,  ideoque  et  ipsius  artis  partes  praecipuas,  omnino  necessa- 
"  rium  videtur.    Hap.c  itaque  in  sequenti  compendio  efficere  est  propositum." 

(Artis  Logics?  Compendium.    In  usum  JuventutisCollegii  Dubliniensis.) 

The  arrangement  of  this  department  of  academical  study,  proposed  by  M.  Prevost, 
of  Geneva,  seems  to  be  very  judiciously  and  happily  imagined. 

"  Dialecticam,  qua  linguae  philosophies^  usum  tradit,  seorsim  docere  :  et  logicam-, 
i:  quae  rationis  analysin  instituit,  ab  omni  de  verbis  disputatione  sejungere  visum  est. 

"  Logicam  autem  in  tres  partes  dividimus :  de  veritate,  de  errore,  de  methodo  ;  ut 
';  hacc  mentis  medicina,ad  instar  medicinae  corporis,  exhibeat  ordinestatum  natura- 
"  lem,  morbos,  curationem." 

See  the  preface  to  a  short  but  masterly  tract  De  Probabilitate.  printed  at  Geneva, 
in  1791. 


SECT.  HI.]  OP   THE    HUMAN    MIND.  223 

comprehensive  reach  of  thought  displayed  in  the  systematical 
execution  of  so  vast  a  design,  form  a  proud  and  imperisha- 
ble monument  to  the  powers  of  Aristotle's  mind,  and  leave  us 
only  to  regret,  that  they  were  wasted  upon  objects  of  so 
little  utility.  In  no  point  of  view,  however,  does  this  extra- 
ordinary man  appear  to  rise  so  far  above  the  ordinary 
level  of  the  species,  as  when  we  consider  the  dominion  which, 
he  exercised,  during  so  long  a  succession  of  ages,  over  the 
opinions  of  the  most  civilized  nations.  Of  this  dominion  the 
basis  was  chiefly  laid  in  the  syllogistic  theory,  and  in  the 
preparatory  books  on  the  Categories  and  on  Interpretation  ; 
a  part  of  his  works  to  which  he  was  more  indebted  for  his 
authority  in  the  schools  than  to  all  the  rest  put  together.  Is 
it  extravagant  to  conjecture,  that  Aristotle  himself  foresaw 
this  ;  and  that,  knowing  how  prone  the  learned  are  to  ad- 
mire what  they  do  not  comprehend,  and  to  pride  them- 
selves on  the  possession  of  a  mystical  jargon,  unintelligible 
to  the  multitude,  he  resolved  to  adapt  himself  to  their  taste 
in  those  treatises  which  were  destined  to  serve,  in  the  first 
instance,  as  the  foundation  of  his  fame.  If  such  was  really 
his  idea,  the  event  has  shewn  how  soundly  he  judged  of  hu- 
man nature,  in  this  grand  experiment  upon  its  weakness  and 
ductility.* 

*The  following  historical  sketch  from  Ludovicus  Vives  may  serve  to  shew,  that  the 
foregoing  supposition  is  not  altogether  gratuitous.  "  A  temporibus  Platonis  et  Aris- 
"  totelis  usque  ad  Alexandrum  Aphrodiscum,  qui  vixit  Severo  et  ejus  filiis  Principi- 
'*  bus,  Aristoteles  nominabatur  magis,  quam  vel  Iegebatur  a  doctis  vel  intelligebatur. 
"  Primus  ille  aggressus  eum  enarrare,  et  adjuvit  studia  multorum  et  ad  alia  in  co 
"  Philosopho  queerenda  excitavit.  Mansit  tamen  crebrior  in  manibus  hominum  et 
"  nolior  Plato,  usque  ad  scholas  in  Gallia  et  Italia  publice  constitutas,  id  est,  quam- 
"  diu  Greecaet  Latina  lingua  viguerunt.  Postea  vero  quam  theatricse  coeperunt  esse 
"  discipline,  omnisque  earum  fructus  existimatus  est,  posse  disputando  fucum  facere, 
"  et  os  obtmare,  et  pulverem  ob  oculos  jacere,  idque  imperilissima  peritia,  et  nomi- 
"  nibus  ad  lubitum  confictis,  accomodatiores  ad  rein  visi  sunt  libri  logici  Aristotelis 
"  et  physici,  relictis  permultis  pracclaris  ejus  operibus  :  Platone  vero,  et  quod  ab  eis 
"  non  intellegeretur,  quamvis  multo  minus  Aristoteles,  et  quod  artificium  videretur 
"  docere,  ne  nominato  quidem  ;  non  quod  minorem  aut  ineruditiorem  putem  Platone 
"  Aristotelem,  sed  quod  ferendum  non  est,  Platonem  sanclissimum  philosophum 
<:  prseteriri,  et  Aristotelem  ita  legi,  ut  meliore  rejeeta  parte,  qua*  retinetur  id  cogalur 
"  loqui,  quod  ipsijubent"     Ludovic.  Vives  de  Civ.  Dei,  L.  viii:  c.  10. 

A  remark  similar  to  this  is  made  by  Bayle.  "  Ce  qui  doit  etonner  le  plus  les  hom- 
u  ises  sages,  c'est  que  les  professeurs  se  soient  si  furieusement  entgtez  des  hypotheses 


224  ELEMENTS    OF    THE    PHILOSOPHY        [CHAP,  tip 

That  Aristotle's  works  have  of  late  fallen  into  general 
neglect,  is  a  common  subject  of  complaint  among  his  idola- 
ters. It  would  be  nearer  the  truth  to  say,  that  the  number 
of  Aristotle's  rational  and  enlightened  admirers  was  never  so 
great  as  at  the  present  moment.  In  the  same  proportion  in 
which  his  logic  has  lost  its  credit,  his  ethics,  his  politics,  his 
poetics,  his  rhetoric,  and  his  natural  history,  have  risen  in 
the  public  estimation.  No  similar  triumph  of  genius  is  re- 
corded in  the  Annals  of  Philosophy : — To  subjugate,  for  so 
many  centuries,  the  minds  of  men,  by  furnishing  employment 
(unproductive  as  it  was)  to  their  intellectual  faculties,  at  a 
time  when  the  low  state  of  experimental  knowledge  did  not 
supply  more  substantial  materials  for  their  reasonings  ;- — and 
afterwards,  when,  at  the  distance  of  two  thousand  years,  the 
light  of  true  science  began  to  dawn,  to  contribute  so  large  a 
share  to  its  growing  splendour. 

In  the  course  of  the  foregoing  animadversions  on  the  syllo- 
gistic theory,  I  have  proceeded  on  the  supposition,  that  the 
whole  glory  of  the  invention  belongs  to  Aristotle.  It  is  proper, 
however,  before  dismissing  the  subject,  to  take  some  notice 
of  the  doubts  which  have  been  suggested  upon  this  head,  in 
consequence  of  the  lights  recently  thrown  on  the  remains  of 
ancient,  science  still  existing  in  the  East.  Father  Pons,  a 
Jesuit  missionary,  was  (I  believe)  the  first  person  who  com- 
municated to  the  learned  of  Europe,  the  very  interesting  fact, 
that  the  use  of  the  syllogism  is,  at  this  day,  familiarly  known 
to  the  Bramins  of  India  ;*  but  this  information  does  not  seem 
to  have  attracted  much  attention  in  England,  till  it  was  cor- 
roborated by  the  indisputable  testimony  of  Sir  William  Jones, 
in  his  third  discourse  to  the  Asiatic  Society.!  "  It  will  be 
"  sufficient,"  he  observes,  "  in  this  dissertation  to  assume, 

li  philosophiques  d'Aristote.  Si  Ton  avoit  eu  cetle  prevention  pour  sa  pratique,  et 
"  pour  sa  rhetorique,  il  y  auroit  moins  de  sujet  de  s*etonner  ;  mais,  on  s'est  entete 
"  duphts  foible  de  ses  ouvrages,  je  veux  dire,  de  sa  logi<fue  et  de  sa  physique." — 
(Bayle,  Art.  Aristote) 

*  Lettres  Edifiantes  et  Curieuses,  Tome  XXVI.  (old  edition.) — Tome  XIV.  edit,  o T 
4781.    The  letter  is  dated  1740. 

t  Delivered  in  1786. 


SECT.   III.]  DP   THE   HUMAN   MINik  225' 

"  what  might  be  proved  beyond  controversy,  that  we  now 
"  live  among  the  adorers  of  those  very  deities  who  were  wor- 
"  shipped  under  different  names  in  old  Greece  and  Italy,  and 
"  among  the  professors  of  those  philosophical  tenets,  which 
"  the  Ionic  and  Attic  writers  illustrated  with  all  the  beau- 
"  ties  of  their  melodious  language.  On  one  hand  we  see  the 
"  trident  of  Neptune,  the  eagle  of  Jupiter,  the  satyrs  of  Bac- 
"  chus,  the  bow  of  Cupid,  and  the  chariot  of  the  sun ;  on 
"  the  other,  we  hear  the  cymbals  of  Rhea,  the  songs  of  the 
"  Muses,  and  the  pastoral  tales  of  Apollo  Nomius.  In  more 
"  retired  scenes,  in  groves,  and  in  seminaries  of  learning,  we 
"  may  perceive  the  Brahmans  and  the  Sermanes  mentioned 
"  by  Clemens,  disputing  in  the  forms  of  logic,  or  discoursing 
"  on  the  vanity  of  human  enjoyments,  on  the  immortality  of  the 
'"  soul,  her  emanation  from  the  eternal  mind,  her  debasement, 
"  wanderings,  and  final  union  with  her  source.  The  six  phi- 
"  losophical  schools,  whose  principles  are  explained  in  the 
"  Dersana  Sastra,  comprise  all  the  metaphysics  of  the  old 
"  academy,  the  Stoa  and  the  Lyceum  ;  nor  is  it  possible  to 
"  read  the  Vedanta,  or  the  many  fine  compositions  in  illus- 
"  tration  of  it,  without  believing  that  Pythagoras  and  Plato 
"  derived  their  sublime  theories  from  the  same  source  with 
*'  the  sages  of  India."* 

In  a  subsequent  discourse,  the  same  author  mentions  "  a 
"  tradition,  which  prevailed,  according  to  the  well-informed 
"  author  of  the  Dabistdn,  in  the  Punjab,  and  in  several  Per- 
"  sian  provinces,  that,  among  other  Indian  curiosities,  which 
"  Callisthenes  transmitted  to  his  uncle,  was  a  technical  sys- 
"  tern  of  logic,  which  the  Brahmans  had  communicated  to 
"  the  inquisitive  Greek,  and  which  the  Mohammedan  writer 
"  supposes  to  have  been  the  ground-work  of  the  famous  Aris- 
"  totelian  method.  If  this  be  true,"  continues  Sir  W.  Jones,— 
"  and  none  will  dispute  the  justness  of  his  remark,  "it  is  one 

*  Works  of  Sir  William  Jones,  Vol.  I.  p.  23. 

In  the  same  discourse,  we  are  informed,  that  "  the  Hindoos  have  numerous  works 
»  on  grammar,  logic,  rhetoric,  music,  which  are  extant  and  accessible."  An  exami- 
nation of  these  is  certainly  an  object  of  literary  curiosity,  highly  deserving  of  farther 
attention. 

VOL.  II.  1\) 


226  ELEMENTS  OF  THE  PHILOSOPHY  [CHAP.  II'. 

"  of  the   most   interesting   facts   that  I  have  met   with  it: 
"Asia."* 

■Of  the  soundness  of  the  opinion  concerning  the  origin  oX 
the  Greek  philosophy,  to  which  these  quotations  give  the 
sanction  of  an  authority  so  truly  respectable,  our  stock  of 
facts  is  as  yet  too  scanty  to  enable  us  to  form  a  competent 
judgment.  Some  may  perhaps  think,  that  the  knowledge  of 
the  Aristotelian  logic  which  exists  in  India,  may  be  sufficient- 
ly accounted  for  by  the  Mohammedan  conquests  ;  and  by 
the  veneration  in  which  Aristotle  was  held,  from  a  very  early 
period,  by  the  followers  of  the  prophet.!  On  the  other  hand, 
it  must  be  acknowledged,  that  this  part  of  Aristotle's  work 
contains  some  intrinsic  evidence  of  aid  borrowed  from  a 
more  ancient  school.  Besides  that  imposing  appearance 
which  it  exhibits  of  systematical  completeness  in  its  innume- 
rable details  ;  and  which  we  can  scarcely  suppose  that  it 
could  have  received  from  the  original  inventor  of  the  art, 
there  is  a  want  of  harmony  or  unity  in  some  of  its  funda- 

*  Eleventh  discourse,  delivered  in  1794. 

t  "  La  philosophic  PeripatGttque  s'est  tellement  etablie  par  tout,  qu'on  n'en  lit  plu^ 
"  d'autre  par  toutes  les  universitez  Chretiennes.  Celles  memes,  qui  sont  conlrainte..- 
"  de  reqevoir  les  imposture.?  de  Mahomet,  n'enseignent  les  sciences  que  conforme 
"  mentaux  principes  du  Lycee,  auxquels  il<  s'altachent  si  fort,  qu'Averroes,  Alfara- 
"  bius,  Albumassar,  et  assez  d'autres  philosophes  Arahes  se  sont  souvent  eloignes 
•' des  sentiments  de  leur  piophete,  pour  ne  pas  contredire  ceux  d'Aristote,  que  les 
"  Turcs  ont  en  leur  idiome  Turquesqueet  en  Arabe,  comme  Belon  le  rapporte." — 
La  Motte  le  Vayer  ;  quoted  by  Bajle,  Art.  Jlrislote. 

"  L'Auteur,  dont  j'eniprunle  ces  paroles,  dit  dans  un  autre  volume,  que,  selon  fa 
"  relation  d'Olearius.  les  Perses  out  toutes  les  oeuvres  d'Arislote,  expliquees  par 
"  beaucoup  de  commentaires  Arabes.  '  Bergeron  (dit  il)  remarque,  dans  son  Traile 
"  des  Tartares,  qu'ils  possedent  les  livres  d'Aristote,  traduits  en  leur  langue,  enseig- 
<l  nant,  avec  autant  de  soumission  qu'on  peut  laiie  ici,  sa  doctrine  a  samarcand,  unf- 
"  yersite  du   Grand  Moeol,  et  a  present  ville  capitale  du  Royaume  d'Usbec'  " 

In  the  8th  volume  of  the  Asiatic  Researches,  there  is  a  paper  by  Dr.  Balfour,  con- 
taining some  curious  extracts  (accompanied  with  an  English  version)  from  a  Persian 
translation  of  an  Arabic  Treatise,  entitled  the  "  Essence  of  Logic."  In  the  introduc  - 
tion  to  these  extracts,  Dr.  Balfour  mentions  it  as  an  indisputable  fact,  that  "  the  &ys- 
u  tem  of  logic,  generally  ascribed  lo  'Aristotle,  constitutes,  at  this  time,  the  logic  of  all 
u  the  nations  of  Asia  who  prrfiss  the  .Mahometan  faith  ;"  and  it  seems  to  have  been 
with  a  view  of  rendering  this  fact  still  moie  palpable  to  common  readers,  that  tin 
author  has  taken  the  trouble  to  translate,  through  the  medium  of  the  Persian,  thf 
Arabic  original  ;  from  which  language  the  knowledge  of  Aristotle's  logic,  possessed 
by  the  orientals,  is  supposed  to  have  been  derived. 


tiECT.  III.]  OP   THE    HUMAN   MIND.  227 

mental  principles,  which  seems  to  betray  a  combination  of 
different  and  of  discordant  theories.  I  allude  more  particu- 
larly to  the  view  which  it  gives  of  the  nature  of  science  and 
of  demonstration,  compared  with  Aristotle's  well-known 
opinions  concerning  the  natural  progress  of  the  mind  in  the 
acquisition  of  knowledge.  That,  the  author  of  the  Organon 
was  fully  aware  of  an  incongruity  so  obvious,  there  can  be 
little  doubt  ;  and  it  was  not  improbably  with  a  view  to  dis- 
guise or  to  conceal  it,  that  he  was  induced  to  avoid,  as  much 
as  possible,  every  reference  to  examples  ;  and  to  adopt 'that 
abstract  and  symbolical  language,  which  might  divert  the 
attention  from  the  inanity  of  his  demonstrations,  by  occu- 
pying it  in  a  perpetual  effort  to  unriddle  the  terms  in  which  . 
they  are  expressed. 

Nor  does  there  seem  to  be  any  thing  in  these  suggestions 
(which  I  hazard  with  much  diffidence)  inconsistent  with  Aris- 
totle's own  statement,  in  the  concluding  chapter  of  the  book 
of  sophisms.  This  chapter  has  indeed  (as  far  as  I  know) 
been  universally  understood  as  advancing  a  claim  to  the 
whole  art  of  syllogism  ;*  but  I  must  acknowledge,  that  it 
appears  to  me  to  admit  of  a  very  fair  construction,  without 
supposing  the  claim  to  comprehend  all  the  doctrines  deliver- 
ed in  the  books  of  Analytics.  In  support  of  this  idea,  it  may 
be  remarked,  that  while  Aristotle  strongly  contrasts  the  di- 
alectical art,  as  taught  in  the  preceding  treatise,  with  the 
art  of  disputation  as  previously  practised  in  Greece,  he  does 
not  make  the  slightest  reference  to  the  distinction  between 
demonstrative  and  dialectical  syllogisms,  or  to  those  doc- 
trines with  respect  to  demonstration  and  science,  which  ac- 
cord so  ill  with  the  general  spirit  of  his  philosophy.    It  does 

*  "  The  conclusion  of  this  treatise,"  the  hook  of  Sophisms,  "  ou^ht  not  to  be  over- 
"  looked  :  it  manifestly  relates,  not  to  the  present  treatise  only,  but  also  to  the  whole 
•  Analytics  and  Topics  of  the  author." — Raid's  Analysis,  &c.  Chap.  v.  Sect.  iii. 

If  I  were  satisfied  that  this  observation  is  just,  I  should  think  that  nothing  short  of 
the  most  irresistible  evidence  could  be  reasonably  opposed  to  the  direct  assertion  of 
Aristotle.  It  is  quite  inconceivable,  that  he  should  have  wilfully  concealed  or  mis- 
represented the  truth,  at  a  period  when  there  could  not  fail  to  be  many  philosophers 
in  Greece,  boih  able  and  willing  to  expose  the  deception 


228  ELEMENTS    OP   THE   PHILOSOPHY         [CHAP.  III. 

not  seem,  therefore,  to  be  a  very  unreasonable  supposition, 
that  to  these  doctrines  (with  which,  for  many  reasons,  he 
might  judge  it  expedient  to  incorporate  his  own  inventions 
and  innovations)  he  only  gave  that  systematical  and  techni- 
cal form,  which,  by  its  peculiar  phraseology  and  other  im- 
posing appendages,  was  calculated  at  once  to  veil  their  im- 
perfections, and  to  gratify  the  vanity  of  those  who  should 
make  them  objects  of  study.  It  is  surely  not  impossible, 
that  the  syllogistic  theory  may  have  existed  as  a  subject  of 
abstract  speculation,  long  before  any  attempt  was  made  to 
introduce  the  syllogism  intp  the  schools  as  a  weapon  of  con- 
troversy, or  to  prescribe  rules  for  the  skilful  and  scientific 
management  of  a  viva  voce  dispute. 

It  is  true,  that  Aristotle's  language,  upon  this  occasion,  is 
somewhat  loose  and  equivocal  ;  but  it  must  be  remembered, 
that  it  was  addressed  to  his  contemporaries,  who  were  per- 
fectly acquainted  with  the  real  extent  of  his  merits  as  an  in- 
ventor ;  and  to  whom,  accordingly,  it  was  not  necessary  to 
State  his  pretensions  in  terms  more  definite  and  explicit. 

I  shall  only  add,  that  this  conjecture  (supposing  it  for  a 
moment  to  be  sanctioned  by  the  judgment  of  the  learned) 
would  still  leave  Aristotle  in  complete  possession  of  by  far 
tho  most  ingenious  and  practical  part  of  the  scholastic  logic  ;* 
while,  at  the  same  time, — should  future  researches  verify  the 

*This  was  plainly  the  opinion  of  Cicero  :  "  fn  hao  arte,"  he  observes,  speaking 
of  the  dialectical  art,  as  it  was  cultivated  by  the  Stoics, — "  in  hac  arte,  si  modo  est 
c(  hmcars,  nullum  est  pneceptum  quomodo  verum  inveniatur,  sed  tantum  est  quomo- 
"  do  judicetur." — And  in  a  few  sentences  after,  "  Quare  istam  artem  totam  dimit- 
"  tamus,  qua?  in  excogitandis  argumentis  muta  nimium  est,  in  judicandis  nimium 
"  loquax."  (De  Orat.  Lib.  ii.  86,87.)  The  first  sentence  is  literally  applicable  to 
the  doctrine  of  syllogism  considered  theoretically  :  the  second  contrasts  the  inutility 
of  this  doctrine  with  the  importance  of  such  subjects  as  are  treated  of  in  Aristotle's 
Topics.  ^ 

Whether  Cicero  and  Quinctilian  did  not  overrate  the  advantages  to  be  derived 
from  the  study  of  the  Loci  as  an  organ  of  invention,  is  a  question  altogether  foreign  to 
our  present  inquiries.  That  it  was  admirably  adapted  for  those  argumentative  and 
rhetorical  displays  which  were  so  highly  valued  in  ancient  times,  there  can  be  no 
doubt,  after  what  these  great  masters  of  oratory  have  written  on  the  subject ;  but 
it  does  not  follow,  that,  in  the  present  state  of  society,  it  would  reward  the  labours  of 
those  who  wish  to  cultivate  either  the  eloquence  of  the  bar,  or  that  which  leads  to 
/distinction  in  our  popular  assemblies, 


SECT.  III.]  OP   THE   HUMAN   MIND,  229 

suspicions  of  Sir  William  Jones  and  others,  that  the  first  ru- 
diments of  the  art  were  imported  into  Greece  from  the  East, 
, — it  would  contribute  to  vindicate  his  character  against  that 
charge  of  plagiarism,  and  of  unfairness  towards  his  prede- 
cessors, which  has  been  admitted  even  by  some  who  speak 
with  the  most  unbounded  reverence  of  his  intellectual  endow* 
mehts. 

From  the  logic  of  Aristotle,  I  now  proceed  to  that  of  Lord 
Bacon  ;  a  logic  which  professes  to  guide  us  systematically  in 
investigating  the  laws  of  nature,  and  in  applying  the  know- 
ledge thus  acquired,  to  the  enlargement  of  human  power,  and 
the  augmentation  of  human  happiness. 

Of  some  of  the  fundamental  rules  by  which  this  mode  of 
philosophizing  is  more  peculiarly  distinguished,  I  intend  to 
treat  at  considerable  length  ; — directing  my  attention  chiefly 
to  such  questions  as  are  connected  with  the  theory  of  our  in- 
tellectual faculties.  In  this  point  of  view,  the  author  has  left 
much  to  be  supplied  by  his  successors  ;  the  bent  of  his  own 
genius  having  fortunately  determined  him  rather  to  seize,  by 
a  sort  of  intuitive  penetration,  great  practical  results,  than  to 
indulge  a  comparatively  sterile  curiosity,  by  remounting  to 
the  first  sources  of  experimental  knov/ledge  in  the  principles 
and  laws  of  the  human  frame.  It  is  to  this  humbler  task  that 
I  propose  to  confine  myself  in  the  sequel.  To  follow  him 
through  the  details  of  his  Method,  would  be  inconsistent  with 
the  nature  of  my  present  undertaking. 


230 


ELEMENTS   OF.  THE   PHILOSOPHY      [CHAP.  IV 


CHAPTER  FOURTH. 

OP    THE     METHOD    OF     INQUIRY     POINTED    OUT    IN    THE    EXPE- 
RIMENTAL   OR    INDUCTIVE    LOGIC, 


SECTION  I. 

Mistakes  of  the  Ancients  concerning  the  proper  object  of  Philosophy  .^-Ideas  of  Bacoa 
on  the  same  subject. — Inductive  Reasoning. — Analysis  and  Synthesis. — Essentia) 
difference  between  Legitimate  and  Hypothetical  Theories. 

A  HAVE  had  occasion  to  observe  more  than  once,  in  the 
course  of  the  foregoing  speculations,  that  the  object  of  phy- 
sical science  is  not  to  trace  necessary  connexions,  but  to  as- 
certain constant  conjunctions  ;  not  to  investigate  the  nature 
of  those  efficient  causes  on  which  the  phenomena  of  the  uni- 
verse ultimately  depend,  but  to  examine  with  accuracy  what 
the  phenomena  are,  and  what  the  general  laws  by  which  they 
are  regulated. 

In  order  to  save  repetitions,  I  here  beg  leave  to  refer  to 
some  observations  on  this  subject  in  the  first  volume.  I  re- 
quest more  particularly  the  reader's  attention  to  what  I  have 
said,  in  the  second  section  of  the  first  chapter,  on  the  distinc- 
tion between  physical  and  efficient  causes  ;  and  on  the  origin 
of  that  bias  of  the  imagination  which  leads  us  to  confound 
them  under  one  common  name.  That,  when  we  see  two 
events  constantly  conjoined  as  antecedent  and  consequent, 
our  natural  apprehensions  dispose  us  to  associate  the  idea  of 
causation  or  efficiency  with  the  former,  and  to  ascribe  to  it 
that  power  or  energy  by  which  the  change  was  produced,  is 
a  fact  obvious  and  unquestionable  ;  and  hence  it  is.  that  in 


SECT.  I.]  OP   THE   HUMAN  MIND.  231 

all  languages,  the  series  of  physical  causes  and  effects  is 
metaphorically  likened  to  a  chain,  the  links  of  which  are  sup- 
posed to  be  indissolubly  and  necessarily  connected.  The 
slightest  reflection,  at  the  same  time,  must  satisfy  us  that 
these  apprehensions  are  inconsistent,  and  even  absurd ;  our 
knowledge  of  physical  events  reaching  no  farther  than  to  the 
laws  which  regulate  their  succession  ;  and  the  words  power 
and  energy  expressing  attributes  not  of  Matter  but  of  Mind. 
It  is  by  a  natural  bias  or.  association  somewhat  similar  (as 
I  have  remarked  in  the  section  above-mentioned)  that  we 
connect  our  sensations  of  colour,  with  the  primary  qualities 
of  body.* 

This  idea  of  the  object  of  physical  science  (which  may  be 
justly  regarded  as  the  ground-work  of  Bacon's  Novum  Or- 
ganon)  differs  essentially  from  that  which  was  entertained 
by  the  ancients  ;  according  to  whom  "  Philosophy  is  the 
*' science  of  causes."  If,  indeed,  by  causes  they  had  meant 
merely  the  constant  forerunners  or  antecedents  of  events,  the 
definition  would  have  coincided  nearly  with  the  statement 
which  I  have  given.  But  it  is  evident,  that  by  causes  they 
meant  such  antecedents  as  were  necessarily  connected  with 
the  effects,  and  from  a  knowledge  of  which  the  effects  might 
be  foreseen  and  demonstrated  :  And  it  was  owing  to  this 
confusion  between  the  proper  objects  of  physics  and  of  me- 
taphysics, that,  neglecting  the  observation  of  facts  exposed  to 

*  Were  it  not  for  this  bias  of  the  imagination  to  identify  efficient  with  physical 
causes,  the  attention  would  be  continually  diverted  from  the  necessary  business  of  life, 
and  the  useful  exercise  of  our  faculties  suspended,  in  a  fruitless  astonishment  at  that 
hidden  machinery,  over  which  nature  has  drawn  an  impenetrable  veil.  To  prevent 
this  inconvenient  distraction  of  thought,  a  farther  provision  is  made  in  that  gradual  and 
imperceptible  process  by  which  the  changes  in  the  state  of  the  Universe  are,  in  gene- 
ral, accomplished.  If  an  animal  or  a  vegetable  were  brought  into  being  before  our 
eyes,  in  an  instant  of  time, — the  event  would  not  be  in  itself  more  wonderful  than  their 
slow  growth  to  maturity  from  an  embryo, or  from  a  seed.  But,  on  the  former  supposition, 
there  is  no  man  who  would  not  perceive  and  acknowledge  the  immediate  agency  of  an 
intelligent  cause  ;  whereas,  according  to  the  actual  order  of  things,  the  effect  steals 
so  insensibly  on  the  observation,  that  it  excites  little  or  no  curiosity,  excepting  in  those 
who  possess  a  sufficient  degree  of  reflection  to  contrast  the  present  state  of  the. objects 
around  them,  with  their  first  origin,  and  with  the  progressive  stages  of  their  ex- 
istence. 


#32  ELEMENTS    OF    THE    PHILOSOPHY       [CHAP.  IVi 

the  examination  of  their  senses,  they  vainly  attempted,  by 
synthetical  reasoning,  to  deduce  as  necessary  consequences 
from  their  supposed  causes,  the  phenomena  and  laws  of  na- 
ture.— "  Causa  ea  est,"  says  Cicero,  "  quae  id  efficit  cujus 
"  est  causa.  Non  sic  causa  intelligi  debet,  ut  quod  cuique  an- 
w  tecedat,  id  ei  causa  sit ;  sed  quod  cuique  efficienter  ante- 
"  cedat. — Itaque  dicebat  Carneades  ne  Apollinem  quidem 
"  posse  dicere  futura,  nisi  ea,  quorum  causas  natura  ita  con- 
"  tineret,  ut  ea  fieri  necesse  esset.  Causis  enim  efficientibug 
"  quamque  rem  cognitis,  posse  denique  sciri  quid  futurum 
"  e^seti"* 

From  this  disposition  to  confound  efficient  with  physical 
causes,  may  be  traced  the  greater  part  of  the  theories  re- 
corded in  the  history  of  philosophy.  It  is  this  which  has 
given  rise  to  the  attempts,  both  in  ancient  and  modern  times, 
to  account  for  all  the  phenomena  of  moving  bodies  by  means 
of  impulse  ,*t  and  it  is  this  also  which  has  suggested  the  sim- 

*  De  Fato,  48,  49.  The  language  of  Aristotle  is  equally  explicit.  JLTrtarTettr&xi 
3*$  oiotciOct.  eKcto-Tov  cLTrXai;,  ctXXtn  /A,i)  rev  ero@tFTiy,ov  rpo7ro9} 
rov  Kotfct,  crvfifie pyxes,  orav  rqv  t  cciticcv  «iai*,e6ct,  y (va/o-x.eit>} 
&t  w  re  TrgctyfAec  ecrriv,  on  ezetva  ettrta,  em,  ^  ftjj  £v£e%e- 
Tct't  TifT  ccXXwz  £%etv>  "  Sciri  autem  putarnus  unamquamqi.e  rem  simplici- 
"  ter,  non  sophislico  mcdo,  id  est  accidenti,  cum  putarnus  causam  cognoscere 
n  propter  quam  res  est,  ejus  rei  causam  esse,  nee  posse  earn  aliter  se  habere." — 
Analyt.  Poster.    Lib.  i.  cap.  2. 

Nothing,  however,  can  place  in  so  strong  a  light  Aristotle's  idea  of  the  connection 
between  physical  causes  and  effects,  as  the  analogy  which  he  conceived  it  to  bear  t» 
the  connection  between  the  links  of  a  mathematical  chain  of  reasoning.  INor  is  this 
mode  of  speaking  abandoned  by  his  modern  followers.  '•'  To  deny  a  first  cause," 
says  D'\  Gillies,  "  is  to  deny  all  causation  :  to  deny  axioms  is,  for  the  same  reason,  to 
"  deny  all  demonstration."  (Vol.  I.  p.  103.)  And  in  another  passage,  "  We  know 
"  a  mathematical  proposition,  when  we  know  the  causes  that  make  it  true.  In  de- 
:'-  monstration,  the  premises  are  the  causes  of  the  conclusion,  and  therefore  prior  to 
"  i-.  We  cannot,  therefore,  demonstrate  things  in  a  circle,  supporting  the  premises 
<'  by  the  conclusion  ;  because  this  would  be  to  suppose,  that  the  one  proposition  could 
<;  be  both  prior  and  posterior  to  the  other."  (Ibid.  p.  96.)  (Can  one  mathematical 
theorem  be  said  to  be  prior  to  another  in  any  other  sense,  than  in  respect  of  the  order 
in  which  they  are  first  presented  to  our  knowledge  ?) 

I  See  Philosophy  of  the  Human  Mind,  Vol.  I.  Chap.  i.  sect.  2. 

With  respect  to  the  connection  between  impulse  and  motion,  I  have  the  misfortune 
to  differ  from  my  very  learned  and  highly  respected  friend  M.  Frevost  of  Geneva  ; 
v;hose  opinions  on  this  point  may  be  collected   from   the  two  following  sentence's. 


SECT.  I.]  OP    THE    HUMAN   MIND.  233 

pier  expedient  of  explaining  them  by  the  agency  of  minds 
united  with  the  particles  of  matter.*  As  the  communication 
of  motion  by  apparent  impulse,  and  our  own  power  to  pro- 
duce motion  by  a  volition  of  the  mind,  are  two  facts,  of  which, 
from  our  earliest  infancy,  we  have  every  moment  had  expe- 
rience ;  we  are  apt  to  fancy  that  we  understand  perfectly 
the  nexus  by  which  cause  and  effect  are  here  necessarily 
conjoined  ;  and  it  requires  a  good  deal  of  reflection  to  satis- 
fy us  that,  in  both  cases,  we  are  as  completely  in  the  dark, 
as  in  our  guesses  concerning  the  ultimate  causes  of  magnet- 
ism or  of  gravitation.  The  dreams  of  the  Pythagorean 
school,  with  respect  to  analogies  or  harmonies  between  the 
constitution  of  the  universe,  and  the  mathematical  properties 
of  figures  and  of  numbers,  were  suggested  by  the  same  idea 
of  necessary  connections  existing  among  physical  phenome- 
na, analogous  to  those  which  link  together  the  theorems  of 
geometry  or  of  arithmetic  ;  and  by  the  same  fruitless  hope 
of  penetrating,  by  abstract  and  synthetical  reasoning,  into 
the  mysterious  processes  of  nature. 
Beside  this  universal  and  irresistible  bias  of  the  imagina- 

"  La  cause  differe  du  simple  signe  precurseur,  par  sa  force,  ou  son  energie  produc- 
"  (ive. — L'impulsion  est  un  phenomSne  si  eommun,  soumis  a  des  lois  "si  bien  dis- 
"  cutees,  et  si  universelles,  que  toute  cause  qui  s'y  reduit  semble  former  une  classe 
,,;  eminente.  et  mfiriter  settle  le  nom  d'  Agent"  Essais  de  Philosophie,  Tome  II.  pp- 
174,  175. 

1  have  read  with  great  attention  all  that  M.  PreVost  has  so  ingeniously  urged  in 
vindication  of  the  theory  of  his  illustrious  countryman  Le  Sage;  but  without  expe- 
riencing that  conviction  which  I  have  in  general  received  from  his  reasonings.  The 
arguments  of  Locke  and  Hume  on  the  other  side  of  the  question  appear  to  my  judg- 
ment, the  longer  I  refipot  on  them,  the  more  irresistible  ;  not  to  mention  the  pewer- 
fill  support  which  they  derive  from  the  subsequent  speculations  of  Boscovich.  See 
Locke's  Essay,  B.  II.  Chap.  23.  §  23,  29,  and  Hume's  Essay  on  Necessary  Connexion, 
Part  1. 

In  employing  the  word  misfortune,  on  this  occasion,  I  have  no  wish  to  pay  an  un- 
meaning compliment  ;  but  merely  to  express  the  painful  diffidence  which  I  always 
feel  in  my  own  conclusions,  when  they  happen  to  be  at  variance  with  those  of  a  writer 
equally  distinguished  by  the  depth  and  by  the  candour  of  his  philosopical  researches. 

For  some  additional  illustrations  of  M.  Provost's  opinion  on  this  subject,  see  Ap- 
pendix. 

*  To  this  last  class  of  theories  may  also  be  referred  the  explanations  of  physical 
phenomena  by  such  causes  as  sympathies,  antipathies,  N  ature's  horror  of  a  void, 
&c.  and  other  phrases  borrowed  by  analogy  from,  the  attributes  of  animated  beings, 

VOL.  IT.  30 


234  ELEMENTS    OF    THE    PHILOSOPHY        [CHAP.    lt„ 

tion,  there  were  some  peculiarities  in  the  genius  and  scientific 
taste  of  Aristotle,  which  gave  birth  to  various  errors  calcu- 
lated to  mislead  his  followers  in  their  physical  inquiries. 
Among  these  errors  may  be  mentioned,  as  one  of  the  most 
important,  the  distinction  of  causes  (introduced  by  him)  into 
the  efficient,  the  material,  the  formal,  and  the  final  ;-— a  dis- 
tinction which,  as  Dr.  Reid  justly  observes,  amounts  only 
(like  many  other  of  Aristotle's)  to  an  explanation  of  the  dif- 
ferent meanings  of  an  ambiguous  word  ;  and  which,  there- 
fore, was  fitter  for  a  dictionary  of  the  Greek  language,  than 
for  a  philosophical  treatise.*  Of  the  effect  of  this  enumera- 
tion of  causes  in  distracting  the  attention,  some  idea  may  be 
formed,  when  it  is  recollected,  that,  according  to  Aristotle,  it 
is  the  business  of  the  philosopher  to  reason  demonstratively 
from  all  the  four.t 

The  same  predilection  of  Aristotle  for  logical  or  rather 
verbal  subtilties,  encouraged,  for  many  ages,  that  passion  for 
fanciful  and  frivolous  distinctions,  which  is  so  adverse  to  the 
useful  exercise  of  the  intellectual  powers.  Of  its  tendency 
to  check  the  progress  of  physical  knowledge,  the  reader  will 
be  enabled  to  judge  for  himself,  by  perusing  the  16th  and 
17th  chapters  of  Mr.  Harris's  Philosophical  Arrangements  ; 
which  chapters  contain  a  very  elaborate  and  not  inelegant 
view  of  what  the  author  is  pleased  to  call  the  ancient  Theory 
of  Motion.  A  later  writer  of  the  same  school  has  even 
gone  so  far  as  to  assert,  that  it  is  such  researches  alone  which 
merit  the  title  of  the  Philosophy  of  Motion  :  and  that  the 
conclusions  of  Galileo  and  of  Newton,  amounting  (as  they 
unquestionably  do)  to  nothing  more  than  a  classification  and 
generalization  of  facts,  deserve  no  higher  an  appellation 
than  that  of  Natural  History. % 

*  Analysis  of  Aristotle's  Logic.    Chap.  ii.  sect.  ,3. 
t  Nat.  Auscult.  Lib.  ii.  cap.  7. 

\  Ancient  Metaphysics,  passim. — The  censure  bestowed  on  Aristotle's  Physics,  by 
the  authors  of  the  French  Treatise  of  Logic,  entitled  VArt  de  Penser,  is  judicious 
and  discriminating.  "  Le  principal  defaut  qu'on  y  peut  trouver,  n,'est  pas  qu'elie 
"  soit  fausse,  mais  c'est  au  contraire  qu'eile  est  trop  vraie,  et  qu'elie  ne  nous  apprend 
t£  que  des  choses  qu'il  est  impossible  d'ignorer." 


SECT.  I.]  OP    THE    HUMAN   MIND.  235 

In  contrasting,  as  I  have  now  done,  the  spirit  of  Bacon's 
mode  of  philosophizing  with  that  of  the  ancients,  I  do  not 
mean  to  extol  his  own  notions  concerning  the  relation  of 
cause  and  effect  in  physics,  as  peculiarly  correct  and  consis- 
tent. On  the  contrary,  it  seems  to  me  evident,  that  he  was 
led  to  his  logical  conclusions,  not  by  any  metaphysical  analy- 
sis of  his  ideas,  but  by  a  conviction  founded  on  a  review  of 
the  labours  of  his  predecessors,  that  the  plan  of  inquiry  by 
which  they  had  been  guided  must  have  been  erroneous.  If 
he  had  perceived  as  clearly  as  Barrow,  Berkeley,  Hume,  and 
many  others,  have  done  since  his  time,*  that  there  is  not  a 
single  instance  in  which  we  are  able  to  trace  a  necessary 
connection  between  two  successive  events,  or  to  explain  in 
what  manner  the  one  follows  from  the  other  as  an  infallible 
consequence,  he  would  have  been  naturally  led  to  state  his 
principles  in  a  form  far  more  concise  and  methodical,  and  to 
lay  aside  much  of  that  scholastic  jargon  by  which  his  meaning 
is  occasionally  obscured.  Notwithstanding,  however,  this 
vagueness  and  indistinctness  in  his  language,  his  compre- 
hensive and  penetrating  understanding,  enlightened  by  a 
discriminating  survey  of  the  fruitless  inquiries  of  former  ages, 
enabled  him  to  describe,  in  the  strongest  and  happiest  terms, 
the  nature,  the  object,  and  the  limits  of  philosophical  inves- 
tigation. The  most  valuable  part  of  his  works,  at  the  same 
time,  consists,  perhaps,  in  his  reflections  on  the  errors  of  his 
predecessors  ;  and  on  the  various  causes  which  have  retarded 

*  In  alluding  to  the  relation  between  cause  and  effect,  Bacon  sometimes  indulges 
his  fancy  in  adopting  metaphorical  and  popular  expressions.  "  Namque  in  limine 
"  Philosophise,  cum  secundae  causa;,  tanquam  sensibus  proxirna;,  ingerant  se  menti 
"  humanae,  mensque  ipsa  in  illis  hsereat,  atque  commoretur,  pblivio  primes  causae  ob- 
«  repere  possit.  Sin  quis  nlterius  pergat,  cansarumque  dependent iam,  seriem,  et  con- 
"  catenalionem,  atque  opera  providentiae  intueatur,  tunc  secundum  puelarum  mythologi- 
"  am,  facile  credet,  sammum  naluralis  catena:  annulum  pedi  solii  Jovis  affigi." — De 
Aug.  Scient.  Lib.  i.  This  is  very  nearly  the  language  of  Seneca.  "  Cum  fatum  nihil 
"  aliud  sit  cjuam  series  implexa  cansanim,  ille  est  prima  omnium  causa  ex  qua  ceterc* 
"  pendent." 

In  other  instances,  he  speaks  (and,  in  my  opinion,  much  more  philosophically)  of  the 
«  opus  quod  operatur  Deus  a  primordio  usque  ad  finem  ;"  a  branch  of  knowledge 
which  he  expressly  describes  as  placed  beyond  the  examination  of  the  human  facul- 
ties. But  this  speculation,  although  the  most  interesting  that  can  employ  our  thoughts. 
has  no  immediate  connection  with  the  logic  of  physical  science, — See  Note  (N.) 


236  ELEMENTS    OF    THE  PHILOSOPHY  [CHAP.  IV, 

the  progress  of  the  sciences  and  the  improvement  of  the  hu- 
man mind.  That  he  should  have  executed,  with  complete 
success,  a  system  of  logical  precepts  for  the  prosecution  of 
experimental  inquiries,  at  a  period  when  these  were,  for  the 
first  time,  beginning  to  engage  the  attention  of  the  curious, 
was  altogether  impossible  ;  and  yet  in  his  attempt  towards 
this  undertaking,  he  has  displayed  a  reach  of  thought  and  a 
justness  of  anticipation,  which,  when  compared  with  the  dis- 
coveries of  the  two  succeeding  centuries,  seem  frequently  to 
partake  of  the  nature  of  prophecy.  "  Prout  Physica  majo- 
"ra  indies  incremenla  capiet,  et  nova  axiomata  cducet,  eo 
"  mathematics  nova  opera  in  multis  indigebit,  et  plures  de- 
"  mum  fient  mathematics  mixta?.'1*  Had  he  foreseen  all  the 
researches  of  the  Newtonian  school,  his  language  could  not 
have  been  more  precise  or  more  decided. 

"  Bacon,"  it  has  been  observed  by  Mr.  Hume,  "  was  igno- 
"  rant  of  geometry  ;  and  only  pointed  out  at  a  distance  the 
"  road  to  true  philosophy." — "  As  an  author  and  philoso- 
"  pher,"  therefore,  this  historian  pronounces  him,  ';  though 
"  very  estimable,  yet  inferior  to  his  contemporary  Galileo, 
"  perhaps  even  to  Kepler."!  The  parallel  is,  by  no  means, 
happily  imagined  ;  inasmuch  as  the  individuals  whom  it 
brings  into  contrast,  directed  their  attention  to  pursuits  es- 
sentially different,  and  were  characterized  by  mental  powers 
unsusceptible  of  comparison.  As  a  geometer  or  astronomer, 
Bacon  has  certainly  no  claim  whatever  to  distinction  ;  rtor 
can  it  even  be  said,  that,  as  an  experimentalist,  he  has  enriched 
science  by  one  important  discovery  ;  but.  in  just  and  enlarg- 

*  De  Aug.  Scienl.  Lib.  iii.  Cap.  vi. 

By  the  word  Axiom.,  Bacon  means  a  general  principle  obtained  by  induction,  from 
which  we  may  safely  proceed  to  reason  synthetically,  It  is  to  be  regretted,  that  he 
did  not  make  choice  of  a  less  equivocal  term,  as  Newton  has  plainly  been  misled  by 
bis  example,  in  the  very  illogical  application  of  this  name  to  the  laws  of  motion,  and 
to  those  general  facts  which  serve  as  the  basis  of  our  reasonings  in  catoptrics  and  di- 
optrics.    (See  pp.  32,  33  of  this  volume.) 

I  shall  take  this  opportunity  to  remark,  that  Newton  had  evidently  studied  Bacon's 
writings  with  care  ;  and  has  followed  them,  (sometimes  too  implicitly,)  in  his  logical 
phraseology.     Of  this  remark  various  other  proofs  will  occur  afterwards. 

j  History  of  England.    Appendix  to  theYeign  of  James  I. 


SECT.  I.]  OF    THE    HUMAN    MIND.  237 

ed  conceptions  of  the  proper  aim  of  philosophical  researches, 
and  of  the  means  of  conducting  them,  how  far  does  he  rise 
above  the  level  of  his  age  !  Nothing,  indeed,  can  place  this 
in  so  strong  a  light,  as  the  history  of  Kepler  himself;  un- 
questionably one  of  the  most  extraordinary  persons  who 
adorned  that  memorable  period,  but  deeply  infected,  as  his 
writings  shew,  with  prejudices  borrowed  from  the  most  re- 
mote antiquity.  The  mysterious  theories  of  the  Pythagoreans 
which  I  formerly  mentioned,  and  which  professed  to  find  in 
the  mathematical  properties  of  figures  and  numbers,  an  ex- 
planation of  the  system  of  the  universe,  seem,  from  one  of  his 
earlier  publications,  to  have  made  a  strong  impression  on  his 
imagination  ;*  while  at  an  after  period  of  life,  he  indulged 

*  Mysterium  Cosmographicum,  de  aumirabili  proportione  orbium  ccelesiium  deque 
causis  coelorum  numen,  magnitudinis.  rnotuumque  periodicorum  genuinis  et  propriis, 
demoustraium  per  qvinque  regularia  corpora  Geometrica,  1593.  Kepler  informs  us, 
thai  he  sent  a  copy  of'.his  boot:  to  Tyeho  Br'ahe  ;  the  subject  of  whose  answer  he  lias 
had  the  candour  to  record.  "  Argumenlum  lilerarum  Brahei  hoc  erat,  ut  suspensis 
"  speculationibus  a  priori  descendentibus,  animum  potiusadobservationes  quas  simal 
"  offerebat,  consifJerandas  adjieeiem,  inque  lis  prime  giadu  facto,  posted,  demum  ad 
"  causas  ascenderem." — To  this  excellent  advice  the  subsequent  discoveries,  which 
"  have  immortalized  the  name  ol  Kepler,  may  (in  the  opinion  of  Mr.  Maclaurin)  be 
ascribed.    Jlccount  of  Newton's  Discoveries,  Book  I.  Chap.  iii. 

An  aphorism  of  Lord  Bacon,  concerning  the  relation  which  Mathematics  bears  to. 
Natural  Philosophy,  exhibits  a  singular  contrast  to  the  aim  and  spirit  of  the  Myste- 
rium Cosmogro.phicum.  "  In  secunda  schola  Platonis,  Procli  et  aliorum,  Naturalis 
"  Philosophia  infecta  et  corrupta  fuit,  per  Mathematicam  ;  quce  Philosophiam  Natu- 
"  ralem  terminare,  nop,  generare  out  procreare  debet."  (Nov.  Org.  Lib.  1.  Aphor. 
xcvi.) — The  very  slender  knowledge  of  this  science  which  Bacon  probably  possessed, 
renders  it  only  the  more  wonderful,  that  he  should  have  been  so  fortunate  in  seizing, 
or  rather  in  divining,  its  genuine  use  and  application  in  physical  researches. 

The  ignorance  of  geometry  with  which  Mr.  Hume  reproaches  Bacon,  will  not  ap- 
pear surprising,  when  it  is  considered,  that,  sixty  years  after  the  time  when  he  left 
Cambridge,  mathematical  studies  were  scarcely  known  in  that  University.  For  this 
fact  we  have  the  direct  testimony  of  Dr.  Wallis,  (afterwards  Astronomical  Professor 
at  Oxford,)  who  was  admitted  at  Emanuel  College,  Cambridge,  in  1632;  and  who 
informs  us,  that  at  that  time,  "  Mathematics  were  scarce  looked  upon  as  Academical 
"  Studies,  but  rather  Mechanical  ;  as  the  business  of  traders,  merchants,  seamen, 
"  carpenters,  surveyors  of  land,  and  almanack-makers  in  London." — "  Among  more 
"  than  two  hundred  students  in  our  College,  I  do  not  know  of  an}'  two  who  had  more 
"  than  I,  (if  so  much,)  which  was  then  but  little  ;  and  but  very  few  in  that  whole 
"University.  For  the  study  of  Mathematics  was  then  more  cultivated  in  London 
"  than  in  the  Universities." 

(See  an  Account  of  seme  passages  in  the  Life  of  Dr.  Wallis,  written  by  himself  when 


238  ELEMENTS    OP    THE    PHILOSOPHY        [cHAP.  IV, 

himself  in  a  train  of  thinking  about  the  causes  of  the  planeta- 
ry motions,  approaching  to  the  speculations  of  the  late  learn- 
ed author  of  Ancient  Metaphysics. 

"  Nego,"  says  he,  in  his  Commentaries  on  the  planet 
Mars,  "  ullum  motum  perennem  non  rectum  a  Deo  condi- 
"  turn  esse  praesidio  mentali  destitufum. — Hujus  motoris 
"  manifestum  est  duo  fore  munia  ;  alterum  ut  facultate  pol- 
"  leat  transvectandi  corporis  ;  alterum  ut  scientia  praedifus 
"  sit  inveniendi  circularem  limitem  per  illam  puram  auram 
"  setheriam  nullis  hujusmodi  regionibus  distinctam."- — In  an- 
other part  of  his  work,  he  seriously  gives  it  as  his  opinion, 
that  the  minds  of  the  planets  must  have  a  power  of  making 
constant  observations  on  the  sun's  apparent  diameter,  that 
they  may  thereby  be  enabled  so  to  regulate  their  motions,  as 
to  describe  areas  proportional  to  the  times.  "  Credibile  est 
"  itaque,  si  qua  facultate  praedifci  sint  motores  illi  observandae 
"  hujus  diametri,  earn  tanto  esse  argutiorem  quam  sunt  oculi 
"  nostri,  quanto  opus  ejus  et  perennis  motio  nostris  turbulen- 
"  tis  et  confusis  negotiis  est  constantior. 

"  An  ergo  binos  singulis  planetis  tribues  oculos  Keplere  I 
"  Nequaquam.  Neque  est  necesse.  Neque  enim  ut  moveri 
"  possint,  pedes  ipsis  atque  alas  sunt  tribuendae." 

From  such  extravagancies  as  these,  how  wide  the  transi- 
tion to  the  first  sentence  of  the  Novum  Organon  !  "  Homo 
"  Nature  minister  et  interpres  tantum  facit  et  in- 
"  telligit  quantum  de  nature  ordine  re  vel  mente 
"  observaverit,  nec  amplius  scit  aut  potest.1' 

In  calling  man  the  interpreter  of  Nature,  Bacon  had  plain- 
ly  the  same  idea  of  the  object  of  physics,  which  I  attempted 
to  convey,  when  I  said,  that  what  arc  commonly  called  the 

he  was  upwards  of  eighty,  and  published  by  Hearnc,  in  bis  edition  of  Langtoft's 
Chronicle.) 

The  same  writer,  from  whom  this  information  is  derived,  lived  to  see  not  only  the 
institution  of  the  Royal  Society  of  London,  but  the  illustration  which  the  University 
of  Cambridge  derived  from  the  names  of  Barrow  and  of  Newton ;  and  even  survived, 
for  seventeen  years,  the  publication  of  Newton's  Principia. — That  Lo*-d  Bacon's 
writings  contributed,  more  than  any  other  single  canse,  to  give  this  sudden  impulse 
to  science  in  England,  it  is  impossible  to  doubt. 


SECT.  I.]  OP   THE    HUMAN  MIND.  239 

causes  of  phenomena,  are  only  their  established  antecedents 
or  signs  ;  and  the  same  analogy  whirh  this  expression  sug- 
gests to  the  fancy,  has  been  enlarged  upon  at  considerable- 
length,  by  the  inventive  and  philosophical  Bishop  of  Cloyne, 
as  the  best  illustration  which  he  could  give  of  the  doctrine  in 
question.  It  would  be  difficult,  indeed,  to  select  another 
equally  apposite  and  luminous  ;  and  not  less  difficult  to  find 
an  author  equally  qualified  to  avail  himself  of  its  aid.  I  shall 
make  no  apology,  therefore,  for  borrowing  his  words. 

"  There  is  a  certain  analogy,  constancy,  and  uniformity  in 
the  phenomena  or  appearances  of  nature,  which  are  a  founda- 
tion for  general  rules  ;  and  these  are  a  grammar  for  the  un- 
derstanding of  nature,  or  that  series  of  effects  in  the  visible 
world,  whereby  we  are  enabled  to  foresee  what  will  come 
to  pass  in  the  natural  course  of  things.  Plotinus  observes,  in 
his  third  Ennead,  that  the  art  of  presaging  is,  in  some  sort, 
the  reading  of  natural  letters  denoting  order ;  and  that  so  far 
forth  as  analogy  obtains  in  the  universe,  there  may  be  vati- 
cination. And  in  reality,  he  that  foretells  the  motions  of 
the  planets,  or  the  effects  of  medicines,  or  the  results  of 
chemical  or  mechanical  experiments,  may  be  said  to  do  it 
by  natural  vaticination. 

"  We  know  a  thing  when  we  understand  it,  and  we  under- 
stand it  when  we  can  interpret  or  tell  what  it  signifies. 
Strictly  the  sense  knows  nothing.  We  perceive,  indeed, 
sounds  by  hearing,  and  characters  by  sight ;  but  we  are  not 
therefore  said  to  understand  them.  After  the  same  man- 
ner, the  phenomena  of  nature  are  alike  visible  to  all ;  but 
all  have  not  alike  learned  the  connection  of  natural  signs, 
or  understand  what  they  signify,  or  know  how  to  vaticinate 
by  them.  There  is  no  question,  says  Socrates  in  Thecetelo, 
concerning  that  which  is  agreeable  to  each  person,  but 
concerning  what  will  in  time  to  come  be  agreeable,  of 
which  all  men  are  not  equally  judges.  He  that  forekoweth 
what  will  be,  in  every  kind,  is  the  wisest.  'According  to 
Socrates,  you  and  the  cook  may  judge  of  a  dish  on  the  table 
equally  well ;   but  while  the  dish  is  making,  the  cook  can 


240  ELEMENTS    OF    THE    PHILOSOPHY       [CHAP.  Yf. 

"  better  foretell  what  will  ensue  from  this  or  that  manner 
"  of  composing  it.  Nor  is  this  manner  of  reasoning  confi- 
"  ned  only  to  morals  or  politics,  but  extends  also  to  natural 
"  science. 

"  As  the  natural  connection  of  signs  with  the  things  signi- 
"  fied  is  regular  and  constant,  it  forms  a  sort  of  rational  dis- 
"  course,  and  is  therefore  the  immediate  effect  of  an  intelli- 
"  gent  cause."* 

The  same  language  with  respect  to  the  office  and  use  of 
philosophy  has  been  adopted  by  Reid,  and  at  a  much  earlier 
period  by  Hobbes  ;  and  it  was  evidently  by  a  similar  train  of 
thinking  (as  I  already  hinted)  that  Bacon  was  led  to  call  phi- 
losophy the  interpretation  of  nature. 

According  to  the  doctrine  now  stated,  the  highest,  or  rather 
the  only  proper  object  of  Physics,  is  to  ascertain  those  es- 
tablished conjunctions  of  successive  events,  which  constitute 
the  order  of  the  Universe  ;  to  record  the  phenomena  which  it 
exhibits  to  our  observations,  or  which  it  discloses  to  our  ex- 
periments ;  and  to  refer  these  phenomena  to  their  general 
laws.  While  we  are  apt  to.  fancy,  therefore,  (agreeably  to 
popular  conceptions  and  language,)  that  we  are  investigating 
efficient  causes,  we  are,  in  reality,  only  generalizing  effects  ; 
and  when  we  advance  from  discovery  to  discovery,  we  do 
nothing  more  than  resolve  our  former  conclusions  into  others 
still  more  comprehensive.  It  was  thus  that  Galileo  and  Tor- 
ricelli  proceeded  in  proving  that  all  terrestrial  bodies  gravi- 
tate towards  the  earth  ;  and  that  the  apparent  levity  of  some 
of  them  is  merely  owing  to  the  greater  gravity  of  the  atmos- 
phere. In  establishing  this  important  conclusion,  they  only 
generalized  the  law  of  gravity,  by  reconciling  with  it  a  varie- 
ty of  seeming  exceptions  ;  but  they  threw  no  light  whatever 
on  that  mysterious  power,  in  consequence  of  which  all  these 
phenomena  lake  place.  In  like  manner,  when  Newton 
shewed  that  the  same  law  of  gravity  extends  to  the  celestial 
spaces  ;  and  that  the  power  by  which  the  moon  and  planets 

*  Siris  :  or  a  Chain  of  Philosophic?.!  Reflections  and  Inquiries  concerning  the  vir- 
tues ofTar- Water,  §§  252.  253,  254. 


SECT.  I.]  OF    THE    HUMAN    MINI)..  241 

are  retained  in  their  orbits,  is  precisely  similar  in  its  effects 
to  that  which  is  manifested  in  the  fall  of  a  stone, — he  left  the 
efficient  cause  of  gravity  as  much  in  the  dark  as  ever,  and  on- 
ly generalized  still  farther  the  conclusions  of  his  predecessors. 
It  was,  indeed,  the  most  astonishing  and  sublime  discovery 
which  occurs  in  the  history  of  science  ;  a  discovery  not  of  less 
consequence  in  Natural  Religion  than  in  Natural  Philoso- 
phy,—and  which  at  once  demonstrated  (in  direct  contradic- 
tion to  all  the  ancient  systems)  that  the  phenomena  exhibited 
by  the  heavenly  bodies,  are  regulated  by  the  same  laws  which 
fall  under  our  observation  on  the  surface  of  this  globe.  Still, 
however^  it  was  not  the  discovery  of  an  efficient  cause,  but 
only  the  generalization  of  a  fact.* 

From  what  has  been  said,  it  is  sufficiently  evident,  that  the 
ultimate  object  which  the  philosopher  aims  at  in  his  research- 
es, is  precisely  the  same  with  that  which  every  man  of  plain 
understanding,  however  uneducated,  has  in  view,  when  he 
remarks  the  events  which  fall  under  his  observation,  in  order 
to  obtain  rules  for  the  future  regulation  of  his  conduct.  The 
more  knowledge  of  this  kind  we  acquire,  the  better  can  we 
accommodate  our  conduct  to  the  established  course  of  things  5 
and  the  more  are  we  enabled  to  avail  ourselves  of  natural 
agents  as  instruments  for  accomplishing  our  purposes.  It  is 
with  truth,  therefore,  that  Bacon  so  often  repeats,  that  "  eve- 
"  ry  accession  which  Man  gains  to  his  knowledge  is  also  an 

*  "  The  laws  of  attraction  and  repi'Ision  are  to  be  regarded  as  laws  of  motion,  and 
"  these  only  as  rules  or  method--  observed  in  the  production  of  natural  effects,  the  effi- 
"  ient  and  final  causes  whereof  are  not  of  mechanical  consideration.  Certainly'  if 
"  the  explaining  a  phenomenon  be  to  assign  its  proper  efficient  and  final  cause,  it 
"  should  seem  the  mechanical  philosophers  never  explained  any  thing  ;  their  province 
"  being  only  to  discover  the  laws  of  nature  ;  that  is,  the  general  rules  and  methods  of 
"  motion  ;  and  to  account  for  particular  phenomena,  by  reducing  them  under,  or 
"  shewing  their  conformity  to,  such  general  rules." — Berkeley's  Siris. 

"  The  words  attraction  and  repulsion  may,  in  compliance  with  custom,  be  used 
"  where,  accurately  speaking,  motion  alone  is  meant : — Attraction  cannot  produce, 
"  and  in  that  sense  account  for,  the  phenomena;  being  itself  one  of  the  phenomena 
"  produced  and  to  be  accounted  for." — Ibid. 

For  some  very  important  as  well  as  refined  observations  on  the  respective  provinces 
of  physics  and  of  metaphysics  in  the  theory  of  motion,  see  a  Tract  by  Dr.  Berkeley, 
first  published  at  T,<  ndon  in  1721.  The  title  is  De  Molu ;  sive  de  Motus  principie et 
tiatura,  ei  de  causa  communicationis  Motuum. 

VOL.  If.  31 


242  ELEMENTS    OP    THE    PHILOSOPHY         [CHAP.  IY. 

"  accession  to  his  power  ;   and  extends  the  limits  of  his  em- 
"  pire  over  the  world  which  he  inhabits." 

The  knowledge  of  the  philosopher  differs  from  that  infor- 
mation which  is  the  fruit  of  common  experience,  not  in  kind, 
but  in  degree.  The  latter  is,  in  general,  confined  to  such 
facts  as  present  themselves  spontaneously  to  the  eye  :  and 
so  beautifully  is  the  order  of  nature  adapted  to  our  wants 
and  necessities,  that  while  those  laws  in  which  we  are  most 
deeply  interested  are  obtruded  on  our  notice  from  our  ear- 
liest infancy,  others  are  more  or  less  removed  from  the  im- 
mediate examination  of  our  senses,  to  stimulate  curiosity, 
and  to  present  a  reward  to  industry.  That  a  heavy  body, 
when  unsupported,  will  fall  downwards  ;  that  a  painful  sensa- 
tion would  be  felt,  if  the  skin  were  punctured  or  lacerated  ; 
that  life  might  be  destroyed  by  plunging  into  a  rivery  or  by 
throwing  one's  self  headlong  from  a  precipice,  are  facts  as 
well  known  to  the  savage  as  to  the  philosopher,  and  of  which 
the  ignorance  would  be  equally  fatal  to  both.  For  acquir-* 
ing  this,  and  other  information  of  the  same  sort,  little  else  is 
requisite  than  the  use  of  our  perceptive  organs  :  And,  accord- 
ingly, it  is  familiar  to  every  man,  long  before  the  period  that. 
m  his  maturer  years,  falls  under  the  retrospect  of  memory. 

For  acquiring  a  knowledge  of  facts  more  recondite,  obser- 
vation and  experiment  must  be  employed  ;*  and,  according- 

*  To  these  Condorcet  adds  calculation.  "■  Bacon,"  he  observes,  "  has  revealed 
"  the  true  method  of  studying  nature,  by  employing  the  three  instruments  with  which 
"  she  has  furnished  us  lor  the  discovery  of  her  secrets, — observation,  experiment,  and 
1  calculation." — (Tableau  Historique  des  jyrogres  de  V Esprit  HumainJ  In  this  enu- 
meration, it  appears  to  me  that  there  is  a  great  defect,  in  point  of  logical  distinctness.. 
Calculation  is  certainly  not  an  instrument  of  discovery  at  all  analogous  to  experiment 
and  observation  :  it  can  accomplish  nothing  in  the  study  of  nature,  till  they  have 
supplied  the  maierials  ;  and  is,  indeed,  only  one  of  the  many  arts  by  which  we  are 
enabled  to  give  a  greater  degree  of  accuracy  to  their  results.  The  use  of  optical 
glasses  ;  of  the  thermometer  and  barometer ;  of  time-pieces  ;  and  of  all  the  various 
instruments  of  practical  geometry,  might,  with  equal  propriety,  have  been  added  t» 
the  list. 

The  advantages,  at  the  same  time,  which  Natural  Philosophy  has  derived,  i» 
modern  times,  from  the  arithmetical  precision  thus  given  to  scientific  details,  must 
be  allowed  to  be  immense  ;  and  they  would  be  well  entitled  to  an  ample  illustration  in 
a  system  of  inductive  logic.  To  those  who  may  wish  to  prosecute  ihe  subject  in  this 
view,  I  would  beg  leave  to  suggest  the  word  mensuration  as  equally  precise,  and  mor* 
comprehensive,  than  the  word  calculation,  as  employed  by  Cendorcet. 


SECT.  I.]  OF    THE    HUMAN    MIND.  243 

ly,  the  use  of  these  media  forms  one  of  the  characteristical 
circumstances  by  which  the  studies  of  the  philosopher  are 
distinguished  from  the  experience  of  the  multitude.  How 
much  the  stock  of  his  information  must  thereby  be  enlarged 
is  sufficiently  manifest.  By  habits  of  scientific  attention,  his 
accuracy  as  an  observer  is  improved  ;  and  a  precision  is 
given  to  his  judgment,  essentially  different  from  the  vague- 
ness of  ordinary  perception  :  by  a  combination  of  his  own 
observations  with  those  made  by  others,  he  arrives  at  many 
conclusions  unknown  to  those  who  are  prevented,  by  the  ne- 
cessary avocations  of  human  life,  from  indulging  the  impulse 
of  a  speculative  curiosity  ;  while  the  experiments  which  his 
ingenuity  devises,  enable  him  to  place  nature  in  situations 
in  which  she  never  presents  herself  spontaneously  to  view, 
and  to  extort  from  her  secrets  over  which  she  draws  a  veil  to 
the  eyes  of  others.* 

*  Thgse  primary  and  essential  organs  of  accurate  information,  (observation  and 
experiment,)  which  furnish  the  basis  to  the  whole  superstructure  of  physical  science, 
are  very  clearly  and  concisely  described  by  Boscovich,  in  one  of  his  notes  on  Stay's 
poem,  De  Stjstemate  Mundi.  "  Observations  fiunt  spectando  id  quod  natura  per  se 
"  ipsam  sponte  exhibet ;  hujusmodi  sunt  observationes  pertinentes  adastronomiam  et 
"  historian!  naturalem.  Experimenta  fiunt  ponendo  naturam  in  eas  circumstantias, 
"  in  quibus  debeat  agere  et  nobis  ostendere  id  quod  quferimus,  quod  pertinet  ad  phy- 
■i  sicam  experimentalem.  Porro  et  ferro  et  igni  utimur,.  ac  dissolvimus  per  vim  com- 
''•  pagem  corporum,  potissimum  in  ehemia,  et  naturam  quodammodo  velut  torquen- 
•:  tes  cogimus  revelare  s«a  secreta." 

I  have  elsewhere  remarked,  that  the  physical  discoveries  of  the  moderns  have  been 
chiefly  owing  to  the  skilful  contrivance  and  conduct  of  experiments;  and  that  this 
method  of  interrogating  nature  was,  in  a  great  measure,  unknown  to  the  ancients. 
(Philosophical  Essays,  4to.  p.  xxxv.)  Even  Aristotle  himself  is  acknowledged,  by 
one  of  his  most  devoted  admirers,  to  have  confined  himself  chiefly  to  observation; 
and  is,  on  this  very  ground,  proudly  contrasted  wiih  the  empirical  experimentalists 
of  the  present  times,  "Aristotle,"  says  Dr.  Giliies,  "  was  contented  with  catching 
"  nature  in  the  fact,  without  attempting,  after  the  modern  fashion,  to  put  her  to  the 
«'  torture  ;  and  in  rejecting  experiments  operose,  toilsome,  or  painful,  either  to  their 
'•  objects  or  their  authors,  he  was  justified  by  the  habits  of  thinking,  almost  uuiver- 
"  sally  prevalent  in  his  age  and  country.  Educated  in  (ree  and  martial  republics, 
"  careless  of  wealth,  because  uneorrupted  by  luxury,  the  whole  tribe  of  ancient  Phi- 
"  losophers,  dedicated  themselves  to  agreeable  only  and  liberal  pursuits,  with  too 
"proud  a  disdain  of  arts  merely  useful  or  lucrative.  They  ranked  with  the  first 
':  class  of  citizens  ;  and,  as  such,  were  not  to  be  lightly  subjected  to\mwholesome  or 
"  disgusting  employments.  To  bend  over  a  furnace,  inhaling  noxious  steams,  to  tor- 
!l  turc  animals,  or  to  touch  dead  bodies,  appeared  to  them  operations  not  more 
•'  misbecoming  their  humanity,  than  unsuitable  to  their  dignity.     For  «ueh  discove  ■ 


244  ELEMENTS    OF    THE    PHILOSOPHY  [CHAP.  IV. 

But  the  observations  and  experiments  of  the  philosopher  are 
commonly  only  a  step  towards  a  farther  end.  This  end  is,Jirst, 
to  resolve  particular  facts  into  other  facts  more  simple  and 
comprehensive  ;  and,  secondly,  to  apply  these  general  facts  (or, 
as  they  are  usually  called,  these  laws  of  nature)  to  a  synthetical 
explanation  of  particular  phenomena.  These  two  processes 
of  the  mind,  together  with  that  judicious  employment  of  ob- 
servation and  experiment  which  they  presuppose,  exhaust 
the  whole  business  of  philosophical  investigation  ;  and  the 
great  object  of  the  rules  of  philosophising  is,  to  shew  in  what 
manner  they  ought  to  be  conducted. 

I.  For  the  more  complete  illustration  of  this  fundamental 
doctrine,  it  is  necessary  for  me  to  recur  to  what  has  been 

P  lies  as  the  heating  and  mixing  of  bodies  offers  to  inquisitive  curiosity,  the  natur- 
P  alists  of  Greere  trusted  to  slaves  and  mercenary  mechanics,  whose  poverty  or  ava- 
"  rice  templed  them  to  work  in  metals  and  minerals  ;  and  to  produce,  by  unwearied 
P  labour,  those  coloured  and  sculptured  ornaments,  those  gems,  rings,  cups,  and 
P  vases,  and  other  admired  but  frivolous  elegancies,  of  which  (in  the  opinion  ^f  good 
"judges  of  art)  our  boasted  chemistry  cannot  produce  the  materials;  nor,  we/e  the 
"  materials  at  hand,  supply  us  with  instruments  fit  to  shape.  The  work-shops  of 
P  tradesmen  then  revealed  those  mysteries  which  are  now  sought  for  in  colleges  and 
P  laboratories  ;  and  useful  knowledge,  perhaps,  was  not  the  less  likely  to  be  ad  van - 
s  ced,  while  the  arts  were  confined  to  artists  only  ;  nor  facts  the  more  likely  to  be 
P  perverted,  in  order  to  support  favourite  theories,  before  the  empiric  had  yet  as- 
sumed the  name,  and  usurped  the  functions,  of  the  philosopher." — Translation  of 
Aristotle's  Ethics  and  Politics,  Vol  I.  p.  161,  2d  Ed. 

In  another  passage,  we  are  told  by  the  same  author,  that  "  the  learning  of  Greece 
"  properly  terminates  in  the  Stagirile;  by  whom  it  was  finally  embodied  into  one 
"  great  work  ;  a  work,  rather  impaired  than  improved  by  the  labours  of  succeeding 
'•<■  ages:'  '. — Ibid  p.  x.  of  the  Preface. 

Notwithstanding  the  length  of  this  note,  1  must  beg  leave  to  add  to  it  a  short  ex- 
tract from  one  of  the  aphorisms  of  Lord  B  neon — "Of  the  criteria  for  guiding  our 
-'  judgment  among  so  many  different  and  discordant  schools,  there  is  none  more  to  be 
"  relied  on,  than  that  which  is  exhibited  by  their  fruits  ;  for  the  fruits  of  any  spccula- 
"  tive  doctrine,  or  the  inventions  which  it  has  really  produced,  are,  as  it  were,  spon- 
"  sors  or  vouchers  for  the  truths  which  it  contains.  Now,  it  is  well  known,  that 
"  from  the  philosophy  of  the  Greeks,  with  its  numerous  derivative  schools,  hardly 
'"'  ne  experimental  discovery  can  be  collected  which  his  any  tendency  to  aid  or  to 
f*  ameliorate  the  condition  of  man,  of  which  is  entitled  to  rank  with  the  acknowledged 
•■  principles  of  genuine  science.''—*"  Wherefore,  as  in  religion,  faith  is  proved  by  its 
"  works,  so  in  philosophy,  it  were  to  be  wished,  that  those  theories  should  be  ac- 
"  counted  vain,  which,  when  tried  by  their  fruits,  are  barren; — much  more  those, 
:•'  which,  instead  of  grapes  and  olives,  have  produced  cn'v  the  thorns  and  thistle?  of 
•'■  controversy." — JVtftt  Org.  L"     >.  Aph.  lxiii. 


SECT.  I.]  OF    THE   HUMAN   MIND.  215 

already  slated  with  respect  to  our  ignorance  of  efficient  causes. 
As  we  can,  in  no  instance,  perceive  the  link  by  which  two 
successive  events  are  connected,  so  as  to  deduce,  by  any  rea- 
soning a  priori,  the  one  from  the  other  as  a  consequence  or 
effect,  it  follows,  that  when  we  see  an  event  take  place  which 
has  been  preceded  by  a  combination  of  different  circumstan- 
ces, it  is  impossible  for  human  sagacity  to  ascertain  whether 
the  effect  is  connected  with  all  the  circumstances,  or  only 
with  apart  of  them  ;  and  (on  the  latter  supposition)  which 
of  the  circumstances  is  essential  to  the  result,  and  which  are 
merely  accidental  accessories  or  concomitants.  The  only 
way,  in  such  a  case,  of  coming  at  the  truth,  is  to  repeat  over 
the  experiment  again  and  again,  leaving  out  all  the  different 
circumstances  successively,  and  observing  with  what  particu- 
lar combinations  of  them  the  effect  is  conjoined.  If  there  be 
no  possibility  of  making  this  separation,  and  if,  at  the  same 
time,  we  wish  to  obtain  the  same  result,  the  only  method  of 
ensuring  success  is  to  combine  together  all  the  various  cir- 
cumstances which  were  united  in  our  former  trials.  It  is  on 
this  principle,  that  I  have  attempted,  in  a  former  chapter  of 
this  work,  to  account  for  the  superstitious  observances  which 
always  accompany  the  practice  of  medicine  among  rude 
nations.  These  are  commonly  ascribed  to  the  influence  of 
imagination,  and  the  low  state  of  reason  in  the  earlier  pe- 
riods of  society  ;  but  the  truth  is,  that  they  are  the  necessa- 
ry and  unavoidable  consequences  of  a  limited  experience, 
and  are  to  be  corrected,  not  by  mere  force  of  intellect,  but  by 
a  more  enlarged  acquaintance  with  the  established  order  of 
nature.* 

Observations  perfectly  similar  to  those  which  I  made  with 
respect  to  medicine,  are  applicable  to  all  the  other  branches 
of  philosophy.  Wherever  an  interesting  change  is  preceded 
by  a  combination  of  different  circumstances,  it  is  of  impor- 
tance to  vary  our  experiments  in  such  a  manner  as  to  dis- 
tinguish what  is  essential  from  what  is  accessory  ;  and  when 

''  Elements  of  the  Philosophy  of  the  Unman  Mind.  Vol.  I.  Cfiap,  v.  Part  ii.  Sect.  i. 


246  ELEMENTS    OP    THE    PHILOSOPHY        [CHAP.  IV. 

we  have  carried  the  decomposition  as  far  as  we  can,  we  are 
entitled  to  consider  this  simplest  combination  of  indispensa- 
ble conditions,  as  the  physical  cause  of  the  event. 

When,  by  thus  comparing  a  number  of  cases,  agreeing  in 
some  circumstances,  but  differing  in  others,  and  all  attended 
with  the  same  result,  a  philosopher  connects,  as  a  general 
law  of  nature,  the  event  with  its  physical  cause,  he  is  said  to 
proceed  according  to  the  method  of  induction.  This,  at  least, 
appears  to  me  to  be  the  idea  which,  in  general,  Bacon 
himself  annexes  to  the  phrase  ;*  although  I  will  not  venture 
to  affirm,  that  he  has  always  employed  it  with  uniform  preci- 
sion. I  acknowledge,  also,  that  it  is  often  used  by  very  ac- 
curate writers,  to  denote  the  whole  of  that  system  of  rules,  of 
which  the  process  just  mentioned  forms  the  most  essential 
and  characteristical  part. 

The  same  word  induction  is  employed  by  mathematicians 
in  a  sense  not  altogether  different.  In  that  general  formula 
(for  instance)  known  by  the  name  of  the  Binomial  Theorem, 
having  found  that  it  corresponds  with  the  table  of  powers 
raised  from  a  Binomial  root,  as  far  as  it  is  carried  by  actual 
multiplication,  we  have  no  scruple  to  conclude,  that  it  holds 
universally.  Such  a  proof  of  a  mathematical  theorem  is  called 
a  proof  by  induction  ; — a  mode  of  speaking  obviously  sug- 
gested by  the  previous  application  of  this  term  to  our  infer- 
ences concerning  the  laws  of  nature.  There  is,  at  the  same 
time,  notwithstanding  the  obvious  analogy  between  the  two 
cases,  one  very  essential  circumstance  by  which  they  are 
discriminated  ; — that,  in  mathematical  induction,  we  are  led 
to  our  conclusion  (as  I  shall  afterwards  endeavour  to  shew) 
by  a  process  of  thought,  which,  although  not  conformable  to 
the  rules  of  legitimate  demonstration,  involves,  nevertheless, 
a  logical  inference  of  the  understanding  with  respect  to  an 
universal  truth  or  theorem  5  whereas,  in  drawing  a  general 
physical   conclusion  from  particular  facts,    we  are  guided 

*  "  Indnctio,  quce  ad  inventionem  et  demonstralionem  scientiarum  et  artium  erit 
"  utilis,  naturam  separare  debet,  per  rejecliones  et.  exclnsiones  debita:?,"  &c.  &c. — 
Nov.  Org.  Lib.  i.  Apb.  cv. 


SECT.  I.]  OP    THE   HUMAN   MIND.  247 

merely  by  our  instinctive  expectation  of  the  continuance  of 
the  laws  of  nature  ;  an  expectation  which,  implying  little,  if 
any,  exercise  of  the  reasoning  powers,  operates  alike  on  the 
philosopher  and  on  the  savage. 

To  this  belief  in  the  permanent  uniformity  of  physical  laws, 
Dr.  Reid  long  ago  gave  the  name  of  the  inductive  principle. 
"  It  is  from  the  force  of  this  principle,"  he  observed,  "  that 
"  we  immediately  assent  to  that  axiom  upon  which  all  our 
"  knowledge  of  nature  is  built,  That  effects  of  the  same  kind 
"  must  have  the  same  cause.  For  effects  and  causes,  in  the 
"  operations  of  nature,  mean  nothing  but  signs,  and  the  things 
"  signified  by  them.  We  perceive  no  proper  causality  or  ef- 
"  ficiency  in  any  natural  cause  ;  but  only  a  connection  es- 
"  tablished  by  the  course  of  nature  between  it  and  what  is 
"  called  its  effects."* 

A  late  celebrated  writer,  more  distinguished  by  the  singu- 
lar variety  and  versatility  of  his  talents,  than  by  the  depth  or 
soundness  of  his  understanding,  was  pleased  to  consider 
Reid's  inductive  principle  as  a  fit  subject  of  ridicule ;  assert- 
ing that  the  phenomenon  in  question  was  easily  explicable 
by  the  common  principles  of  experience,  and  the  association 
of  ideas.  "  Though  no  man,"  says  he,  "  has  had  any  expe- 
"  rience  of  what  is  future,  every  man  has  had  experience  of 
"  what  -was  future."!  Of  the  shallowness  of  this  solution 
philosophers  are,  I  believe,  now  very  generally  convinced; 
but  even  if  the  case  were  otherwise,  the  fact  remarked  by 
Reid  would  be  equally  entitled  to  the  attention  of  logicians 
as  the  basis  of  all  physical  science,  nor  would  it  be  easy  to 
distinguish  it  by  a  name  less  liable  to  objection  than  that 
which  he  has  selected. 

In  all  Bacon's  logical  rules,  the  authority  of  this  law  of  be- 
lief is  virtually  recognized,  although  it  is  no  where  formally 
stated  in  his  writings  ;  and  although  the  doctrines  connected 

*  Inquiry  into  the  Human  Mind,  Chap.  vi.  Sect.  24. 

t  Priestley's  Examination  of  Reid,  Beatlie,  and  Oswald,  p.  85.  Some  very  judicioua 
and  decisive  strictures  on  this  theory  of  Priestley  may  be  found  in  Dr.  Campbell'* 
Philosophy  of  Rhetoric.     See  note  at  the  end  of  the  sixth  Chapter  of  Book  , 


248  ELEMENTS    OF    THE    PHILOSOPHY        [CHAP.  IV. 

with  it  do  not  seem  to  be  easily  reconc.ileable  with  some  of 
his  occasional  expressions.  It  is,  indeed,  only  of  late  that 
natural  philosophers  have  been  fully  aware  of  its  importance 
as  the  ground-work  of  the  inductive  logic ;  the  earlier  writers 
under  whose  review  it  fell  having  been  led  to  consider  it 
chiefly  by  its  supposed  subserviency  to  their  metaphysical 
or  to  their  theological  speculations.  Dr.  Reid  and  M.  Turgot 
were,  so  far  as  I  know,  the  first  who  recognized  its  existence 
as  an  original  and  ultimate  law  of  the  understanding  ; — the 
source  of  all  that  experimental  knowledge  which  we  begin 
to  acquire  from  the  moment  of  our  birth,  as  well  as  of  those 
more  recondite  discoveries  which  are  dignified  by  the  name 
of  science.  It  is  but  justice  to  Mr.  Hume  to  acknowledge, 
that  his  Treatise  of  Human  Nature  furnished  to  Dr.  Reid  all 
the  premises  from  which  his  conclusions  were  drawn  ;  and 
that  he  is  therefore  fairly  entitled  to  the  honour  of  having  re- 
duced logicians  to  the  alternative  of  either  acquiescing  in  his 
sceptical  inferences,  or  of  acknowledging  the  authority  of 
some  instinctive  principles  of  belief,  overlooked  in  Locke's 
Analysis."* 

II.  There  is  another  circumstance  which  frequently  adds 
to  the  difficulty  of  tracing  the  laws  of  nature  ;  and  which  im- 
poses on  the  philosopher,  while  carrying  on  the  process  of 
induction,  the  necessity  of  following  a  still  more  refined  logic 
than  has  been  hitherto  described. — When  a  uniformity  is  ob- 
served in  a  number  of  different  events,  the  curiosity  is  roused 
by  the  coincidence,  and  is  sometimes  led  insensibly  to  a 
general  conclusion.  In  a  few  other  cases,  a  multiplicity  of 
events,  which  appear  to  common  observers  to  be  altogether 
anomalous,  are  found,  upon  a  more  accurate  and  continued 
examination  of  them,  to  be  subjected  to  a  regular  law.f  The 
cycles  by  which  the  ancients  predicted  eclipses  of  the  sun 
and  moon  ;  the  two  laws  inferred  by  Kepler  from  the  obser- 
vations of  Tycho  Brahe  ;  the  law  of  refraction  inferred  by 
Snellius  from  the  tables  of  Kircher  and  Scheiner,  are  instan- 
ces of  very  comprehensive  and  most  important  rules  obtained 

*  Note  (O.)        i  Philosophy  of  the  Human  Mind,  Vol.  I.  Chap.  vi.  Sect.  iv. 


SECT.  I.]  OF   THE   HUMAN   MIND;  240 

by  the  mere  examination  and  comparison  of  particulars* 
Such  purely  empirical  discoveries,  however,  are  confined  al- 
most entirely  to  optics -and  astronomy,  in  which  the  physical 
laws  combined  together  are  comparatively  few,  and  are  in- 
sulated from  the  influence  of  those  incalculable  accidents 
which,  in  general,  disturb  the  regularity  of  terrestrial  phe- 
nomena.    In  by  far  the  greater  number  of  instances,  the  ap- 
pearances of  nature  depend  on  a  variety  of  different  laws,  all 
of  which  are  often  combined  together  in  producing  one  sin- 
gle evmt :  And,  wherever  such  a  combination  happens,  al- 
though each  law  may  take  place  with  the  most  complete  uni- 
formity, it  is  likely  that  nothing  but  confusion  will  strike  the 
mere  observer.     A  collection  of  such  results,  therefore,  would 
not  advance  us  one  step  in  the  knowledge  of  nature ;  nor 
would  it  enable  us  to  anticipate  the  issue  of  one  new  experi- 
ment.    In  cases  of  this  description,  before  we  can  avail  our- 
selves of  our  past  experience,  we  must  employ  our  reasoning 
powers  in  comparing  a  variety  of  instances  together,  in  order 
to  discover,  by  a  sort  of  analysis  or  decomposition,  the  simple 
laws  which  are  concerned  in  the  phenomenon  under  conside- 
ration ; — after  which,  we  may  proceed  safely,  in  determining 
a  priori  what  the  resulf  will  be  of  any  hypothetical  combina- 
tion of  them,  whether  total  or  partial.* 

These  observations  have  led  us  to  the  same  conclusion 
with  that  which  forms  the  great  outline  of  Bacon's  plan  of 
philosophising;  and  which  Newton  has  so  successfully  ex- 
emplified in  his  inquiries  concerning  gravitation  and  the  pro- 

*  n  Itaque  naturae  facienda  est  prorsus  solulio  et  separatio  ;  non  per  ignem  certe, 
"  sed  per  mentem,  lanquam  ignem  divinum."  Nov.  Organ..  Lib.  II.  Aphor.  xvi. 
The  remainder  oi  the  aphorism  is  equally  worthy  of  attention  ;  in  reading  which, 
however,  as  well  as  the  rest  of  Bacon's  philosophical  works,  I  mast  request,  for  a 
reason  afterwards  to  be  mentioned,  that  the  word  Law  may  be  substituted  for  Form, 
wherever  it  may  occur. — An  attention  to  this  circumstance. will  be  found  of  much  use 
in  studving  the  Novum  Organon. 

A  similar  idea,  under  other  metaphorical  disguises,  often  occurs  in  Bacon.  Consi- 
dering the  circumstances  in  which  he  wrote,  logical  precision  was  altogether  impossi- 
ble ;  yet  it  is  astonishing  with  what  force  he  conveys  the  spirit  of  the.  soundest  philo* 
sophy  of  the  eighteenth  centurj'.  "  Neque  enim  in  piano  via  sita  est,  sed  asceridendo 
1 '  et  de.scew.kndo  ;  ascendendo  primoad  axiomata.  descendendo  ad  opera."  .Nov.  Org. 
Lib  I.  Aphor.  ciii. 

VOL.    IT.  32 


259  ELEMENTS    OF    THE    PHILOSOPHY       [CHAP.  IY, 

perties  of  light.  While  they  point  out,  too,  the  respective 
provinces  and  uses  of  the  analytic  and  the  synthetic  methods, 
they  illustrate  the  etymological  propriety  of  the  names  by 
which,  in  the  Newtonian  School,  they  are  contradistinguish- 
ed from  each  other. 

In  fact,  the  meaning  of  the  words  analysis  and  synthesis, 
when  applied  to  the  two  opposite  modes  of  investigation  in 
physics,  is  extremely  analogous  to  their  use  in  the  practice 
of  chemistry.  The  chief  difference  lies  in  this,  that,  in  the 
former  case,  they  refer  to  the  logical  processes  of  the  un- 
derstanding in  the  study  of  physical  laws  ;  in  the  latter,  to 
the  operative  processes  of  the  laboratory  in  the  examination 
of  material  substances. 

If  the  foregoing  remarks  are  well  founded,  they  lead  to 
the  correction  of  an  oversight  which  occurs  in  the  ingenious 
and  elegant  sketch  of  the  History  of  Astronomy,  lately  pub- 
lished among  the  posthumous  works  of  Mr.  Smith  ;  and 
which  seems  calculated  to  keep  out  of  view,  if  not  entirely  to 
explode,  that  essential  distinction  which  I  have  been  endea- 
vouring to  establish,  between  the  inductive  logic  of  Bacon's 
followers,  and  the  hypothetical  theories  of  their  predeces- 
sors. 

"  Philosophy,"  says  Mr.  Smith,  "  is  the  science  of  the  con- 
"  necting  principles  of  nature.  Nature,  after  the  largest 
"  experience  that  common  observation  can  acquire,  seems  to 
"  abound  with  events  which  appear  solitary  and  incoherent 
"  With  all  that  go  before  them :  which,  therefore,  disturb  the 
"  easy  movement  of  the  imagination  ;  which  make  its  ideas 
"  succeed  each  other,  if  one  may  say  so,  by  irregular  starts 
"  and  sallies  ;  and  which  thus  tend,  in  some  measure,  to  in- 
"  troduce  a  confusion,  and  distraction,  and  giddiness  of  mind. 
"  Philosophy,  by  representing  the  invisible  chains  which 
"  bind  together  all  these  disjointed  objects,  endeavours-  to 
"  introduce  order  into  this  chaos  of  jarring  and  discordant 
"  appearances  ;  to  allay  this  tumult  of  the  imagination  j 
"  and  to  restore  it,  when  it  surveys  the  great  revolutions  of 
"  the  universe,  to  that  tone  of  tranquillity  and  composure, 


SECT.  I.]  OP    THE    HUMAN   MIND.  251 

'*  which  is  both  most  agreeable  in  itself,  and  most  suitable  to 
'-*  its  nature.  Philosophy,  therefore,  may  be  regards  J  as 
"  one  of  those  arts  which  address  themselves  to  thp  imagina- 
"  tion,  by  rendering  the  theatre  of  nature  a  more  coherent, 
M  and,  therefore,  a  more  magnificent  spectacle,  than  olher- 
"  wise  it  would  have  appeared  to  be." 

That  this  is  one  of  the  objects  of  philosophy,  and  one  of 
the  advantages  resulting  from  it,  I  very  readily  admit. — But, 
surely,  it  is  not  the  leading  object  of  that  plan  of  inductive 
investigation  which  was  recommended  by  Bacon,  and  which 
has  been  so  skilfully  pursued  by  Newton.  Of  all  philoso- 
phical systems,  indeed,  hypothetical  or  legitimate,  it  must  be 
allowed,  that  to  a  certain  degree,  they  both  please  the  imagina- 
tion and  assist  the  memory,  by  introducing  order  and  arrange- 
ment among  facts,  which  had  the  appearance,  before,  of  be- 
ing altogether  unconnected  and  isolated.  But  it  is  the  pe- 
culiar and  exclusive  prerogative  of  a  system  fairly  obtained 
by  the  method  of  induction,  that,  while  it  enables  us  to  ar- 
range facts  already  known,  it  furnishes  the  means  of  ascer- 
taining, by  synthetic  reasoning,  those  which  we  have  no  ac- 
cess to  examine  by  direct  observation.  The  difference,  be- 
sides, among  hypothetical  theories,  is  merely  a  difference  of 
degree,  arising  from  the  greater  or  less  ingenuity  of  their 
authors  ;  whereas  legitimate  theories  are  distinguished  from 
all  others  radically  and  essentially  ;  and,  accordingly,  while 
the  former  are  liable  to  perpetual  vicissitudes,  the  latter  are 
as  permanent  as  the  laws  which  regulate  the  order  of  the 
universe. 

Mr.  Smith  himself  has  been  led,  by!this  view  of  the  object 
of  philosophy,  into  expressions  concerning  the  Newtonian 
discoveries,  which  seem  to  intimate,  that,  although  he  thought 
them  far  superior,  in  point  of  ingenuity,  to  any  thing  the 
world  had  seen  before,  yet  that  he  did  not  consider  them  as 
so  completely  exclusive  of  a  still  happier  system  in  time  to 
come,  as  the  Newtonians  are  apt  to  imagine.  ".The  system 
"  of  Newton,"  he  observes,  (C  now  prevails  over  all  opposi* 
;t  tion,  and  has  advanced  to  the  acquisition  of  the  most  uni- 


252  ELEMENTS    OP    THE    PHILOSOPHY       [CHAP.  IV. 

"  versal  empire  that  was  ever  established  in  philosophy, 
"  His  principles,  it  must  be  acknowledged,  have  a  degree  of 
"  firmness  and  solidity  that  we  should  in  vain  look  for  in 
"  any  other  system.  The  most  sceptical  cannot  avoid  feel- 
<?  ing  this.  They  not  only  connect  together  most  perfectly 
"  all  the  phenomena  of  the  heavens  which  had  been  observ- 
"  ed  before  his  time  ;  but  those  also  which  the  persevering 
"  industry  and  more  perfect  instruments  of  later  astrono- 
"  mers  have  made  known  to  us,  have  been  either  easily  and 
"  immediately  explained  by  the  application  of  his  principles, 
"  or  have  been  explained  in  consequence  of  more  laborious 
*'  and  accurate  calculations  from  these  principles,  than  had 
been  instituted  before.  And  even  we,  while  we  have  been 
"  endeavouring  to  represent  all  philosophical  systems  as  mere 
li  inventions  of  the  imagination,  to  connect  together  the  other- 
*'  wise  disjointed  and  discordant  phenomena  of  nature,  have 
"  insensibly  been  drawn  in  to  make  use  of  language  express- 
*'  ing  the  connecting  principles  of  this  one,  as  if  they  were 
"  the  real  chains  which  nature  makes  use  of,  to  bind  to- 
"  gether  her  several  operations.'' 

If  the  view  which  I  have  given  of  Lord  Bacon's  plan  of 
investigation  be  just,  it  will  follow,  That  the  Newtonian  theo- 
ry of  gravitation  can,  in  no  respect  whatever,  admit  of  a 
comparison  with  those  systems  which  are,  in  ihe  slightest  de- 
gree, the  offspring  of  imagination  ;  inasmuch  as  the  principle 
employed  to  explain  the  phenomena  is  not  a  hypothesis,  but 
a  general  fact  established  by  induction  ;  for  which  fact  we 
have  the  very  same  evidence  as  for  the  various  particulars 
comprehended  under  it.  The  Newtonian  theory  of  gravita- 
tion, therefore,  and  every  other  theory  which  rests  on  a  simi- 
lar basis,  is  as  little  liable  to  be  supplanted  by  the  labours 
of  future  ages,  as  the  mathematical  conclusions  of  Euclid  and 
Archimedes.  The  doctrines  which  it  involves  may  be  deli- 
vered in  different,  and  perhaps  less  exceptionable  forms  ;  but, 
till  the  order  of  the  universe  shall  be  regulated  by  new  phy- 
sical laws,  their  substance  must  for  ever  remain  essentially 
the  same.     On  the  chains,  indeed,  zohich  nature  makes  use  of 


SECT.  II*]  OP   THE    HUMAN   MIND.  253 

to  bind  together  her  several  operations,  Newton  has  thrown  no 
light  whatever  ;  nor  was  it  the  aim  of  his  researches  to  do 
so.  The  subjects  of  his  reasonings  were  not  occult  connec- 
tions, but  particular  phenomena,  and  general  laws  ;  both  of 
them  possessing  all  the  evidence  which  can  belong  to  facts 
ascertained  by  observation  and  experiment.  From  the  one 
or  the  other  of  these  all  his  inferences,  whether  analytical 
or  synthetical,  are  deduced  :  Nor  is  a  single  hypothesis  in- 
volved in  his  data,  excepting  the  authority  of  that  Law  of 
Belief  which  is  tacitly  and  necessarily  assumed  in  all  our 
physical  conclusions, — The  stability  of  the  order  of  nature. 


SECTION  II. 

Continuation  of  the  Subject. — The  Induction  of  Aristotle  compared  with  that  of 

Bacon. 


In  this  section  I  intend  to  offer  a  few  slight  remarks  upon 
an  assertion  which  has  been  hazarded  with  some  confidence 
in  various  late  publications,  that  the  method  of  investiga- 
tion, so  much  extolled  by  the  admirers  of  Lord  Bacon,  was 
not  unknown  to  Aristotle.— It  is  thus  very  strongly  stated  by 
the  ingenious  author  of  a  memoir  in  the  Asiatic  Researches.* 

"From  some  of  the  extracts  contained  in  this  paper,  it 
"  will  appear,  1st,  That  the  mode  of  reasoning  by  induction* 
"  illustrated  and  improved  by  the  great  Lord  Verulam  in  his 
"  Organum  Novum,  and  generally  considered  as  the  cause  of 
"  the  rapid  progress  of  science  in  later  times,  was  perfectly 
"  known  to  Aristotle,  and  was  distinctly  delineated  by  him, 
"  as  a  method  of  investigation  that  leads  to  certainty  or 
M  truth:  and  2dly,  That  Aristotle  was  likewise  perfectly  ac- 
"  quainted,  not  merely  with  the  form  of  induction,  but  with 
"  the  proper  materials  to  be  employed  in  carrying  it  on — 
M  facts  and  experiments.  We  are  therefore  led  to  conclude, 
"  that  all  the  blame  of  confining  the  human  mind  for  so  long 
"  a  time  in  chains,  by  the  force  of  syllogism,  cannot  be  fair- 

*  Asiatic  Researches,  Vol,  VIII.  p.  89,  90.    London  Edition. 


254  ELEMENTS    OF    THE    PHILOSOPHY       [CHAP.  IT. 

"  ly  imputed  to  Aristotle  ;  nor  all  the  merit  of  enlarging  it, 
"  and  setting  it  free,  ascribed  to  Lord  Verulam." 

The  memoir  from  which  this  passage  is  copied,  consists  of 
extracts  translated  (through  the  medium  of  the  Persian)  from 
an  Arabic  treatise  entitled  the  Essence  of  Logic,  When  it 
was  first  presented  to  the  Asiatic  Society,  the  author  informs 
us,  that  he  was  altogether  ignorant  of  the  coincidence  of  his 
own  conclusions  with  those  of  Dr.  Gillies  ;  and  he  seems  to 
have  received  much  satisfaction  from  the  subsequent  perusal 
of  the  proofs  alleged  in  support  of  their  common  opinion  by 
that  learned  writer.  "  From  the  perusal  of  this  wonderful 
11  book,"  Dr.  Gillies's  exposition  of  the  Ethics  and  Politics 
of  Aristotle,  "  1  have  now  the  satisfaction  to  discover,  that 
"  the  conjectures  I  had  been  led  to  draw  from  these  scanty 
"  materials,  are  completely  confirmed  by  the  opinion  of  an 
"  author,  who  is  probably  better  qualified  than  any  preced- 
"  ing  commentator  on  Aristotle's  works,  to  decide  on  this 
"  subject."* 

It  is  observed  by  Bailly,  in  his  History  of  Astronomy,  that, 
although  frequent  mention  is  made  of  attraction  in  the  wri- 
tings of  the  ancients,  we  must  not  therefore  "  conclude  that 
"  they  had  any  precise  or  just  idea  of  that  law  into  which 
"  Newton  has  resolved  the  phenomena  of  the  planetary  revo- 
"  lutions.  To  their  conceptions,  this  word  presented  the 
"  notion  of  an  occult  sympathy  between  different  objects  ; 
"  and  if  any  of  them  extended  it  from  the  descent  of  terres- 
"  trial  bodies  to  explain  the  manner  in  which  the  moon  was 
"  retained  in  her  orbit,  it  was  only  an  exhibition  upon  a 
"  larger  scale  of  the  popular  error."t  The  same  author  has 
remarked,  on  a  different  occasion,  that,  in  order  to  judge  of 
the  philosophical  ideas  entertained  at  a  particular  period,  it 
would  be  necessary  to  possess  the  dictionary  of  the  age,  ex- 
hibiting the  various  shades  of  meaning  derived  from  fashion 
or  from  tradition.  "  The  import  of  words,"  he  adds,  "  chan- 
"  ges  with  the  times  :  their  signification  enlarging  with  the 

*  Ibid.  T  Hist,  de  l'Astronomie  Mederne,  Tome  II.  p.  555, 556. 


SECT.  II.]  OP   THE   HUMAN   MIND.  255 

**  progress  of  knowledge.  Languages  are  every  moment 
"  perishing  in  detail  from  the  variations  introduced  by  cus- 
"  torn  :  they  grow  old  like  those  that  speak  them,  and,  like 
"  them,  gradually  alter  their  features  and  their  form."* 

If  this  observation  be  just,  with  respect  to  the  attraction 
of  the  ancients,  when  compared  with  the  attraction  of  New- 
ton, it  will  be  found  to  apply  with  still  greater  force  to  the 
induction  of  Aristotle,!  considered  in  contrast  with  the  induc- 
tion of  Bacon. 

It  is  well  known  to  those  who  are  at  all  conversant  with 
Bacon's  writings,  that,  although  he  borrowed  many  expres- 
sions from  the  scholastic  phraseology  then  in  vogue,  he  has, 
in  general,  not  only  employed  them  in  new  acceptations, 
consonant  to  the  general  spirit  of  his  own  logic,  but  has,  by 
definitions  or  explanations,  endeavoured  to  guard  his  readers 
against  the  mistakes  to  which  they  might  be  exposed,  from  a 
want  of  attention  to  the  innovations  thus  introduced  in  the 
use  of  consecrated  terms.  How  far  he  judged  wisely  in 
adopting  this  plan,  (which  has  certainly  much  injured  his 
Style  in  point  of  perspicuity,)  I  do  not  presume  to  decide  ;  I 
wish  only  to  state  the  fact  : — his  motives  may  be  judged  of 
from  his  own  words. 

"  Nobis  vero  ex  altera  parte  (quibus,  quantum  calamo  va- 
"  lemus,  inter  velera  et  nova  in  Uteris  foedus  et  commercium 
"  contrahere,  cordi  est)  decretum  manet,  antiquitatem  comi- 

tari  usque  ad  aras  ;  atque  vocabula  antiqua  retinere,  quan- 
"  quam  sensum  eorum  et  definitiones  saepius  immutemus; 
f*  secundum  moderatum  ilium  et  laudatum,  in  Civilibus,  no- 
"  vandi  modum,  quo  rerum  statu  novato,  verborum  tamen 
"  solennia  durent  ;  quod  notat  Tacitus  ;  eadem  magistratuum 
"  vocabula.  "J 

*  Ibid,  p  184. 

t  Erctywyi).    Translated  Inductio  by  Cicero. 

X  i)»  Aug.  ticient.  Lib.  iii.  cap.  iv. 

The  necessity  under  which  the  anti-Aristotelians  found  themselves,  in  the  earlier 
part  of  the  I7lh  century,  of  disguising  their  attack  on  the  prevailing  tenets,  is  strongly 
illustrated  in  a  letter  from  Des  Cartes  to  Regius.  "  Pourquoi  rejettez-vous  publi- 
"  quement  les  quahtfs  rSetles  et  les  formes  substantielles,  si  cheres  aux  scholastique? ; 
"  J'ai  declare,  que  je  ne  pretendois  pas  les  nier,  mais  que  je  n'en  avois  pas  besoin 
"  pour  expliquer  mes  pensees," 


m 


250  ELEMENTS    OF    THE    PHILOSOPHY  [CHAP.    IV* 

Of  these  double  significations,  so  common  in  Bacon's 
phraseology,  a  remarkable  instance  occurs  in  the  use  Which 
he  makes  of  the  scholastic  word  forms.  In  one  passage, 
he  approves  of  the  opinion  of  Plato,  that  the  investigation  of 
forms  is.  the  proper  object  of  science  5  adding,  however, 
that  this  is  not  true  of  the  forms  which  Plato  had  in  view,  but 
of  a  different  sort  of  forms,  more  suited  to  the  grasp  of  our 
faculties.*  In  another  passage,  he  observes,  that  when  he 
employs  the  word  forms,  in  speaking  of  natural  philosophy, 
he  is  always  to  be  understood  as  meaning  the  laws  of  na- 
ture.} Whether  so  accurate  a  reasoner  as  Locke  would 
have  admitted  Bacon's  general  apology  for  so  glaring  an 
abuse  of  words,  may  perhaps  be  doubted  :  but,  after  compar- 
ing the  two  foregoing  sentences,  would  Locke  (notwithstand- 
ing his  ignorance  of  the  syllogistic  art)  have  inferred,  that 
Bacon's  opinion  of  the  proper  object  of  science  was  the 
same  with  that  of  Plato  ?  The  attempt  to  identify  Bacon's 
induction  with  the  induction  of  Aristotle,  is  (as  I  trust  will 
immediately  appear)  infinitely  more  extravagant.  It  is  like 
confounding  the  Christian  Graces  with  the  Graces  of  Heathen 
Mythology. 

The  passages  in  which  Bacon  has  been  at  pains  to  guard 
against  the  possibility  of  such  a  mistake  are  so  numerous, 
that  it  is  surprising  how  any  person,  who  had  ever  turned 
over  the  pages  of  the  Novum  Organon,  should  have  been  so 
unlucky  as  not  to  have  lighted  upon  some  one  of  them.  The 
two  following  will  suffice  for  my  present  purpose. 

*  "  Manifesttim  est.  Flatonem,  vinim  sublitnis  ingenii  (quique  veluli ex  rupe  excelsa 
"  omnia  circurrispiciebal)  in  sua  de  ideis  doctr'ma,  for  mas  esse  vetum  scienlice  objectum, 
"  vidisse  ;  utcunque  sententiae  hujus  verissimee  fructum  amiseri:,/or»mpenitus  a  ma- 
"  teria  abstractas,  non  in  materia  delerininatas  eonlemplandoet  prensando.  Quod  si 
<<  diligenter,  serio,  et  sincere,  ad  actionem,  et  nsum,  et  oculos  convertamus  ;  non  diffi- 
*'  ci!e  erit  disquirere,  et  notitiam  assequi,  quae  sint  Uleeformce,  quarum  cognitio  res  hu- 
{!  manas  mens  modis  locupietare  et  beare  possit."- — De  Augment.  Sclent.  Lib.  iii. 
Cap.  iv. 

t  '•  Nos  quitm  de  formis  loqutmur,  nil  aliud  inteliigimus,  quam  leges  illas,  quae  natu- 
"  ram  aliquant  simplicem  ordinant  et  constituunt ;  ut  calorem,  lumen,  pondus,  in  om- 
"  nimoda  materia  et  subjecto  susceptibili.  Itaque  eadem  res  est  forma  calidi,  aut 
" forma  luminis,  et  lex  calidi,  sive  lex  luminis." — JVov.  Org.  Lib.  ii.  Aph.  xvii, 


SECT.  II.]  OP    THE   HUMAN   MIND.  257 

"  In  constituendo  autem  axiotnate,  forma  inductionis  alia 
"  quam  adhuc  in  usu  fuit,  excogitaada  est.  Inductio  enim 
"  qua?  procedit  per  enumerationem  simplicem  res  puerilis  est, 
"  et  precario  concludit.  At  inductio,  quae  ad  inventionem 
"  et  demonstrationem  scientiarura  et  artium  erit  utilis,  natu- 
"  ram  se  parare  debet,  per  rejectiones  et  exclusiones  debitas ; 
"  ac  deinde  post  negativas  tot  quot  sufficiunt,  super  affirma- 
"  tivas  concludere  ;  quod  adhuc  factum  non  est,  nee  tenta- 
"  turn  certe^  nisi  tantummodo  a  Platone,  qui  ad  excutiendas 
11  definitiones  et  idaeas,  hac  certe  forma  inductionis  aliqua- 
iC  tenus  utitur.  Verum  ad  h-uj-us  inductionis,  sive  demonstra- 
"  tionis  instructionem  bonam  et  legitimam,  quamplurima 
"  adhibenda  sunt,  quas  adhuc  nullius  mortalium  cogitationem 
a  subiere  ;  adeo  ut  in  ea  major  sit  consumenda  opera,  quam 
"  adhuc  consumpta  est  in  syllogismo.  Jltque  in  hac  certe 
"  inductione,  spes  maxima  sita  est.1'* 

"  Cogitavit   et   illud — Restare  inductionem,  tanquam 

"  ultimum  et  unicum  rebus  subsidiumet  perfugium.  Verum 
"  et  hujus  nomen  tantummodo  notum  esse  ;  vim  et  usum  ho- 
"  mines  hactenus  latuisse."t 

That  I  may  not,  however,  be  accused  of  resting  my  judg- 
ment entirely  upon  evidence  derived  from  Bacon's  writings, 
it  may  be  proper  to  consider  more  particularly  to  what  the 
induction  of  Aristotle  really  amounted,  and  in  what  respects 
it  coincided  with  that  to  which  Bacon  has  extended  the  same 
name. 

"  Our  belief,"  says  Aristotle  in  one  passage,  "  is,  in  every 
"  instance,  founded  either  on  syllogism  or  induction."  To 
which  observation  he  adds,  in  the  course  of  the  same  chap- 
ter, that  "  induction  is  an  inference  drawn  from  all  the  par- 

*  Nov.  Org.  Lib.  i.  Aph.  cv. 

t  Cogitata  et  Visa.  The  short  tract  to  which  Bacon  has  prefixed  this  title,  con« 
tains  a  summary  of  what  he  seems  to  have  considered  as  the  leading  tenets  of  hi* 
philosophical  works.  It  is  one  of  the  most  highly  finished  of  all  his  pieces,  and  is 
marked  throughout  with  an  impressive  brevity  and  solemnity,  which  commands  and 
concentrates  the  attention.  Nor  does  it  affect  to  disguise  that  consciousness  of  intel- 
lectual force,  which  might  be  expected  from  a  man  destined  to  fix  a  new  era  in  the 
history  of  human  reason. — Franciscus  Baconus  sic  couitavit,  Sic.  &c. 

VOL.  II.  33 


258  ELEMENTS   OP   THE    PHILOSOPHY        fcHAP.  IV. 

"  ticulars  which  it  comprehends."*  It  is  manifest,  that  upon 
this  occasion,  Aristotle  speaks  of  that  induction  which  Bacon, 
in  one  of  the  extracts  quoted  above,  describes  as  proceeding 
by  simple  enumeration  ;  and  which  he,  therefore,  pronounces 
to  be  "  a  puerile  employment  of  the  mind,  and  a  mode  of 
"  reasoning  leading  to  uncertain  conclusions."  In  confirma- 
tion of  Bacon's  remark,  it  is  sufficient  to  mention,  by  way  of 
illustration,  a  single  example  ;  which  example,  to  prevent 
cavils,  I  shall  borrow  from  one  of  the  highest  logical  authori- 
ties,— Dr.  Wall  is  of  Oxford. 

"  In  an  inference  from  induction,"  says  this  learned  writer, 
"  if  the  enumeration  be  complete,  the  evidence  will  be  equal 
"  to  that  of  a  perfect  syllogism  ;  as  if  a  person  should  argue, 
"  that  ail  the*  planets  (the  Sun  excepted)  borrow  their  light 
"  from  the  Sun,  by  proving  this  separately,  of  Saturn,  Jupiter, 
"  Mars.  Venus,  Mercury,  and  the  Moon.  It  is,  in  fact,  asyl- 
"  logism  in  Darapti,  of  which  this  is  the  form  : 

"  Saturn,  Jupiter,  Mars,  Venus,  Mercury,  and  the  Moon^ 

'.'  each  borrow  their  light  from  the  Sun  : 
"  But  this  enumeration  comprehends  all  the  Planets,  the  Sun 

"  excepted : 
"  Therefore  all  the  Planets,  (the  Sun  excepted,)  borrow  their 

"  light  from  the  Sun."t 

*■  First  Analytics,  Chap,  xxiii.  Vol.  I.  p.  126.    Edit.  Du  Val. 

t  Jnstitulio  Logica,  Lib.  iii.  Cap.  15.  The  reasoning;  employed  by  Wallis  to  shew- 
that  the  above  is  a  legitimate  syllogism  in  Darapti,  affords  a  specimen  of  the  facility 
with  which  a  logical  conjuror  can  transform  the  same  argument  into  the  most  different 
shapes.  "  Siquis  ohjiciat,  hnnc  non  esse  legitimum  in  Darapti  syllogismum,  eo  quod 
"  conclusionem  habeat  universalem  ;  dicendum  erit,  hanc  universalem  (qualis  qualis 
"  est)  es«e  universalem  colkctivam  ;  qua?  singularis  est.  Estqne  vox  omnis  hie  loci  (quae 
"  dici  solet)  pars  Categorematica ;  utpote  pars  termini  minoris  (ut  ex  minori  proposi- 
"  tione  liquet)  qui  hie  est  (non  Planetoe  sed)  omnes  Planetm  (excepto  sole,)  sea  tota  col- 
"  lectio  reliquorum  (excepto  sole)  Planetarum,  quae  collectio  unica  est;  adeoque  con- 
"  clusio  singularis.  Qutequidem  (utsingulares  alise)  quamvissit  propositio  Univer- 
u  salis,  vi  matpria? ;  non  tamen  talis  est  ut  non  possit  esse  conclusio  in  tertia  figura. 
"  Quippe  in  tertia  figura,  quoties  minor  terminus,  seu  prsdicatum  minoris  proposi- 
"  tionis  (adeoque  subjectum  conclusionis)  est  quid  singulare,  necesse  estut  conclusio 
"  ea  sit  (vi  materise,  non  formse)  ejusmodi  universalis." 

In  justice  to  Dr  Wallis,  it  is  proper  to  subjoin  to  these  quotations,  a  short  extract 
from  the  dedication  prefixed  to  this  treatise. — "  Exempla  retineo,  quee  apud  logicos 
"  trita  sunt ;  ex  philosophia  quam  vocant  Veterem  et  Peripateticam  petita :  quia  logi- 


SECT.  II.]  OP   THE    HUMAN   MIND.  259 

If  the  object  of  Wallis  had  been  to  expose  the  puerility 
and  the  precariousness  of  such  an  argument,  he  could  not  pos- 
sibly have  selected  a  happier  illustration.  The  induction  of 
Aristotle,  when  considered  in  this  light,  is  indeed  a  fit  com- 
panion for  his  syllogism  ;  inasmuch  as  neither  can  possibly 
advance  us  a  single  step  in  the  acquisition  of  new  knowledge. 
How  different  from  both  is  the  induction  of  Bacon,  which,  in- 
stead of  carrying  the  mind  round  in  the  same  circle  of  words, 
leads  it  from  the  past  to  the  future,  from  the  known  to  the  un- 
known ?* 

Dr.  Wallis  afterwards  very  justly  remarks,  "  that  induc- 
•••  tions  of  this  sort  are  of  frequent  use  in  mathematical  de- 
"  monstrations ;  in  which,  after  enumerating  all  the  possible 
"  cases,  it  is  proved,  that  the  proposition  in  question  is  true 
"of  each  of  these  considered  separately;  and  the  general 
"  conclusion  is  thence  drawn,  that  the  theorem  holds  univer- 
"  sally.  Thus,  if  it  were  shewn,  that,  in  all  right-angled  tri- 
"  angles,  the  three  angles  are  equal  to  two  right  angles,  and 
li  that  the  same  thing  is  true  in  all  acute-angled,  and  also  in 
"  all  obtuse-angled  triangles ;  it  would  necessarily  follow, 
il  that  in  every  triangle  the  three  angles  are  equal  to  two 
"  right  angles ;  these  three  cases  manifestly  exhausting  all 
(£  the  possible  varieties  of  which  the  hypothesis  is  suscep- 
«  tible," 

My  chief  motive  for  introducing  this  last  passage,  was  to 
correct  an  idea,  which,  it  is  not  impossible,  may  have  con* 
trjbuted  to  mislead  some  of  Wallis's  readers.  As  the  profes- 
sed design  of  the  treatise  in  question,  was  to  expound  the 
logic  of  Aristotle,  agreeably  to  the  views  of  its  original  au- 

11  cam  hie  trado,  et  quidem  Peripateticam  ;  non  naturalem  philosophiam.  Adeoque, 
"  de  quatuor  dementis ;  de  telluris  quiete  in  universi  medio ;  de  gravium  motu  deor- 
(l  sum,  leviumque  sursum  ;  de  septenario  planetarum  numero;  aliisque ;  sic  Ioquor,  ut 
"  loqui  solent  Peripatetici." 

*  "  In  arte  judicandi  (ut  etiam  viilgo  reeeptum  est)  aut  per  Inductionem,  aut  per  Syl- 
*!  logismum  concluditur.  At  quatenus  ad  judicium,  quod  fit  per  inductionem,  nihil 
f  est,  quod  nos  detinere  debeat :  vno  siquidem  eodemque  mentis  opere  lllud  quod  quasri- 
11  tur,  et  invenitur  etjudicatur. — At  inductionis  formam  viliosam  prorsus  valerejube- 
ft  mus ;  legitimam  ad  Novum  Organum  remittimus." — De  Aug.  Scient,  Lib.  v. 
Cap.  iv. 


260  ELEMENTS    OF    THE    PHILOSOPHY  [CHAP.  IV. 

the;  and  as  all  its  examples  and  illustrations  assume  as 
truths  the  Peripatetic  tenets,  it  was  not  unnatural  to  refer  to 
the  same  venerated  soun  e,  the  few  incidental  reflections 
with  which  Wallis  has  enriched  his  work.  Of  this  number 
is  the  foregoing  remark,  which  differs  so  very  widely  from 
Aristotle's  account  of  mathematical  induction,  that  I  was 
anxious  to  bring  the  two  opinions  into  immediate  contrast. 
The  following  is  a  faithful  translation  from  Aristotle's  own 
words  : 

"  If  any  person  were  to  shew,  by  particular  demonstrations, 
"  that  every  triangle,  separately  considered,  the  equilateral, 
"  the  scalene,  and  the  isosceles,  has  its  three  angles  equal  to 
"  two  right  angles,  he  would  not,  therefore,  know  that  the 
"  three  angles  of  a  triangle  are  equal  to  two  right  angles,  ex- 
"  cept  after  a  sophistical  manner.  Nor  would  he  know  this 
"  as  an  universal  property  of  a  triangle,  although,  beside 
"  these,  no  other  triangle  can  be  conceived  to  exist :  for  he 
"  does  not  know  that  it  belongs  to  it  qua  triangle  :  Nor  that 
"  it  belongs  to  every  triangle,  excepting  in  regard  to  number  : 
"  his  knowledge  not  extending  to  it  as  a  property  of  the 
"  genus,  although  it  is  impossible  that  there  should  be  an 
"  individual  which  that  genus  does  not  include."* 

For  what  reason  Aristotle  should  have  thought  of  applying, 
10  such  an  induction  as  this  the  epithet  sophistical,  it  is  diffi-   ' 
cult  to  conjecture.   'That  it   is  more   tedious,  and  therefore 
less  elegant,  than  a  general  demonstration  of  the  same  theo- 

*  Aicc  txto  ofj1'  ccv  t<5  e>ei<z'f,  y-otf  Ikxttov  to  Tpiyuvov  uirodei^zt 
j)  [lice,  jj  eregu,  art  ovo  op6o&s  £#«  execs-rov,  to  i(ro7rXevpov  X,aPis, 
^  to  FKctXyvov,  ;£  To  to-ocDtsXef  owxro)  otds  to  Tpiyavov  oti  $vo 
op8xt$  <o-ov,  «  fA.vi  to  v  <ro<pio~Tix.ov  tpottov  ovSt  kxSoXx  TPtyavov, 
ovo  «  iMiffev  ec-Ti  7rapoz  tavtx  TPty&voy  CTepov  ov  ycce,  »)  TPiyu- 
vav  oidtv  ov$s   nav   TPiyavov    a.XX'  y    xxt     api6/*.or  xoct'  etdos  $s 

ov7nstv,x}   «  ftydiv    ea-Ttv  o   ovk   oise A nalyl.  Poster.  Lib.  i.  Cap.  v. 

I  have  rendered  tbe  last  clause  accouting  to  the  bast  of  ruy  judgment ;  but,  in  case 
of  any  misapprehension  on  my  pari,  I  have  transcribed  the  author's  words.    It  may 
be  proper  to  mention,  tliat  this  iflusiration  is  not  produced  by  Aristotle  as  au  instance 
of  induction;  but  it  obviously  falls  under  his  own  definition  of  v:  ami  is  accon'  I 
considered  in  that  light  by  Dr.  Wal'k 


SECT.    II.]  OF    THE    HUMAN   MIND.  261 

rem,  is  undoubtedly  true  ;  but  it  is  not  on  that  aecount  the  less 
logical,  nor,  in  point  of  form,  the  less  rigorously  geometrical. 
jU  is,  indeed,  precisely  on  the  same  footing  with  the  proof  of 
every  mathematical  proposition  which  has  not  yet  been 
pushed  to  the  utmost  possible  limit  of  generalization. 

It  is  somewhat  curious,  that  this  hypothetical  example  of 
Aristotle  is  recorded  as  a  historical  fact  by  Proclus,  in  his 
commentary  on  Euclid.  "  One  person,  we  are'told,"  (I  quote 
the  words  of  Mr.  Maclaurin)  "  discovered,  that  the  three  an- 
"  gles  of  an  equilateral  triangle  are  equal  to  two  right  angles  ; 
"  another  went  farther,  and  shewed  the  same  thing  of  those 
"  that  have  two  sides  equal,  and  are  called  isosceles  trian- 
"  gles :  and  it  was  a  third  that  found  that  the  theorem  was 
"  general,  and  extended  to  triangles  of  all  sorts.  In  like  man- 
"  ner,  when  the  science  was  farther  advanced,  and  they  came 
•"  to  treat  of  the  conic  sections,  the  plane  of  the  section  was 
"  always  supposed  perpendicular  to  the  side  of  the  cone  ; 
"  the  parabola  was  the  only  section  that  was  considered  in 
"the  right  angled  cone,  the  ellipse  in  the  acute-angled  cone, 
"  and  the  hyperbola  in  the  obtuse-angled.  From  these  three 
"  sorts  of  cones,  the  figures  of  the  sections  had  their  names 
V  for  a  considerable  time,  till,  at  length,  Apollonius  shewed 
u  that  they  might  all  be  cut  out  of  any  one  cone,  and,  by  this 
"discovery  merited  in  those  days  the  appellation  of  the 
i*  Great  Geometrician."* 

It  would  appear,  therefore,  that,  in  mathematics,  an  induc- 
tive inference  may  not  only  be  demonstratively  certain,  but 
that  it  is  a  natural,  and  sometimes  perhaps  a  necessary  step 
in  the  generalization  of  our  knowledge.  And  yet  it  is  of 
one  of  the  most  unexceptionable  inductive  conclusions  in  this 
science  (the  only  science  in  which  it  is  easy  to  conceive  an 
enumeration  which  excludes  the  possibility  of  any  addition) 
that  Aristotle  has  spoken, — as  a  conclusion  resting  on  so- 
phistical evidence. 

So  much  with  respect  to  Aristotle's  induction,  on  the  sup- 
position that  the  enumeration  is  complete. 

*  Account  of  Sir  Isaac  Newton's  Phil.  Discoveries,  Book  i.  Chap.  v. 


262  ELEMENTS    OP    THE    PHILOSOPHY       [CHAP.    IV. 

In  cases  where  the  enumeration  is  imperfect,  Dr.  Wallis 
afterwards  observes,  "  That  our  conclusion  can  only  amount 
"  to  a  probability  or  to  a  conjecture  ;  and  is  always  liable  to 
*'  be  overturned  by  an  instance  to  the  contrary."  He  ob- 
serves also,  "  That  this  sort  of  reasoning  is  the  principal  in- 
"  strument  of  investigation  in  what  is  now  called  experimental 
"philosophy ;  in  which,  by  observing  and  examining  parti- 
"  culars,  we  arrive  at  the  knowledge  of  universal  truths."* 
All  this  is  clearly  and  correctly  expressed  ;  but  it  must  not  be 
forgotten,  that  it  is  the  language  of  a  writer  trained  in  the 
schools  of  Bacon  and  of  Newton. 

Even,  however,  the  induction  here  described  by  Dr.  WaU 
lis,  falls  greatly  short  of  the  method  ot  philosophising  pointed 
out  in  the  Novum  Organon.  It  coincides  exactly  with  those 
empirical  inferences  from  mere  experience,  of  which  Bacon 
entertained  such  slender  hopes  for  the  advancement  of  science. 
"  Restat  experientia  mera  ;  quae  si  occurrat,  casus  ;  si  quaesi- 
"  ta  sit,  experimentum  nominatur.  Hoc  autem  experientiaa 
"  genus  nihil  aliud  est,  quam  mera  palpatio,  quali  homines 
"  noctu  utuntur,  omnia  pertentando,  si  forte  in  rectam  viam 
"  incidere  detur  ;  quibus  muho  satius  et  consultiiis  foret,  diem 
"  prasstolari  aut  lumen  accendere,  deinceps  viam  inire.  At 
"  contra,  verus,  experientia?  ordo  primo  lumen  accendit,  de- 
"  inde  per  lumen  iter  demonstrat,  incipiendo  ab  experientia 
"  ordinata  et  digesta,  et  minime  praepostera  aut  erratica,  atque 
"  ex  ea  educendo  axiomata,  atque  ex  axiomatibus  constitutis 
"  rursus  experimenta  nova,  quum  nee  verbum  divinum  in  re-, 
('  rum  massam  absque  ordine  operatum  sit."t 

It  is  a  common  mistake,  in  the  logical  phraseology  of  the 
present  times,  to  confound  the  words  experience  and  induction 
as  controvertible  terms.!     There  is,  indeed,  between  them  a 

*  Inslitutio  Logica. — See  the  Chapter  De  Induetione  etExemplo. 

t  Nov.  Org.  Aph.  lxxxii. 

%  "  Let  it  always  be  remembered,  that  the  author  who  first  taught  this  doctrine 
"  (llwt  the  true  art  of  reasoning  is  nothing  but  a  language  accurately  defined  and  ski!- 
"fully  arranged,)  had  previously  endeavoured  to  prove,  that  all  our  notions,  as  well 
"  as  the  signs  by  which  they  are  expressed,  originate  in  perceptions  of  sense  ;  and 
l'1  that  the  principles  on  which  languages  are  first  constructed,  as  well  as  every  step 


SECT.  II.]  OF    THE    HUMAN    MIND.  263 

very  close  affinity ;  inasmuch  a»  it  is  on  experience  alone 
that  every  legitimate  induction  must  be  raised.  The  process 
of  induction  therefore  presupposes  that  of  experience;  but 
according  to  Bacon's  views,  the  process  of  experience  does 
by  no  means  imply  any  idea  of  induction.  Of  this  method 
Bacon  has  repeatedly  said,  that  it  proceeds  "  by  means  of 
"  rejections  and  exclusions"  (that  is,  to  adopt  the  phraseolo- 
gy of  the  Newtonians,  in  the  way  of  analysis)  to  separate  or 
decompose  nature ;  so  as  to  arrive  at  those  axioms  or  general 
laws,  from  which  we  may  infer  (in  the  way  of  synthesis)  other 
particulars  formerly  unknown  to  us,  and  perhaps  placed 
beyond  the  reach  of  our  direct  examination.* 

But  enough,  and  more  than  enough,  has  been  already  said 
to  enable  my  readers  to  judge,  how  far  the  assertion  is  cor- 
rect, that  the  induction  of  Bacon  was  well  known  to  Aristotle. 
Whether  it  be  yet  well  known  to  all  his  commentators,  is  a 
different  question ;  with  the  discussion  of  which  I  do  not 
think  it  necessary  to  interrupt  any  longer  the  progress  of  my 
work. 

"  in  their  progress  to  perfection,  all  ultimately  depend  on  inductions  from  observation  ; 
"  in  one  word,  on  experience  merely." — Aristotle's  Ethics  and  Politics  by  Gillies,  Vol.  I, 
pp.  94,  95. 

In  the  latter  of  these  pages,  L  observe  the  following  sentence,  which  is  of  itself  suf- 
ficient to  shew  what  notion  the  Aristotelians  still  annex  to  the  word  under  considera- 
tion. "  Every  kind  of  reasoning  i?  carried  on  either  by  syllogism  or  by  induction  ; 
"  the  former  proving  to  us,  that  a  particular  proposition  is  true,  because  it  is  deduci- 
"  ble  from  a  general  one,  already  known  to  us  ;  and  the  latter  demonstrating  a  gene- 
"  ral  truth,  because  it  holds  in  all  particular  cases." 

It  is  obvious,  that  this  species  of  induction  never  can  be  of  the  slightest  use  in  the 
study  of  nature,  where  the  phenomena  which  it  is  our  aim  to  classify  under  their 
general  laws,  are,  in  respect  of  number,  if  not  infinite;  at  least  incalculable  and 
incomprehensible  by  our  faculties. 

*  Nov.  Org.  Aph.  cv.  ciii. 


ELEMENTS    OF    THE   PHILOSOPHY  [CHAP.  IV. 


SECTION  III. 

Of  the  Import  of  the  Words  Analysis  and  Synthesis,  in  the  Language  of  Modern 

Philosophy. 

As  the  words  Analysis  and  Synthesis  are  now  become  of 
constant  and  necessary  use  in  all  the  different  departments 
of  knowledge  ;,  and  as  there  is  reason  to  suspect^  that  they 
are  often  employed  without  due  attention  to  the  various  modi- 
fications of  their  import,  which  must  be  the  consequence  of 
this  variety  in  their  application, — it  may  be  proper,  before 
proceeding  farther,  to  illustrate,  by  a  few  examples,  their 
true  logical  meaning  in  those  branches  of  science,  to  which 
I  have  the  most  frequent  occasions  to  refer  in  the  course  of 
these  inquiries.  I  begin  with  some  remarks  on  their  prima- 
ry signification  in  that  science,  from  which  they  have  been 
transferred  by  the  moderns  to  Physics,  to  Chemistry,  and  to 
the  Philosophy  of  the  Human  Mind. 

h 

Preliminary  Observations  on  the  Analysis  and  Synthesis  of  the  Greek  Geometricians. 

It  appears  from  a  very  interesting  relic  of  an  ancient  wri- 
ter,* that,  among  the  Greek  geometricians,  two  different 
sorts  of  analysis  were  employed  as  aids  or  guides  to  the  in- 
ventive powers  ;  the  one  adapted  to  the  solution  of  pro- 
blems ;  the  other  to  the  demonstration  of  theorems.  Of  the 
former  of  these,  many  beautiful  exemplifications  have  been 
long  in  the  hands  of  mathematical  students  ;  and  of  the  lat- 
ter, (which  has  drawn  much  less  attention  in  modern  times,) 
a  satisfactory  idea  may  be  formed  from  a  series  of  proposi- 
tions published  at  Edinburgh  about  fifty  years  ago.t     I  do 

*  Preface  to  the  seventh  book  of  the  Mathematical  Collections  of  Pappus  Alexan- 
drinus.    An  extract  from  the  Latin  version  of  it  by  Dr.  Halley  may  be  found  in  Note 

(P-) 

t  Propositiones  Geometries  More    Velerum    Demonstrate.       Auctore  Matthoeo 
Stewart,  S.  T.  P.  Maiheseos  in  Academia  Edinensi  Professore,  1763. 


SECT.  III.]  OP   THE   HUMAN   MIND.  265 

not,  however,  know  that  any  person  has  yet  turned  his 
thoughts  to  an  examination  of  the  deep  and  subtle  logic  dis- 
played in  these  analytical  investigations  ;  although  it  is  a 
subject  well  worth  the  study  of  those  who  delight  in  tracing 
the  steps  by  which  the  mind  proceeds  in  pursuit  of  scientific 
discoveries.  This  desideratum  it  is  not  my  present  purpose 
to  make  any  attempt  to  supply ;  but  only  to  convey  such  ge- 
neral notions  as  may  prevent  my  readers  from  falling  into 
the  common  error  of  confounding  the  analysis  and  synthesis 
of  the  Greek  Geometry^  with  the  analysis  and  synthesis  of 
the  Inductive  Philosophy* 

In  the  arrangement  of  the  following  hints,  I  shall  consider, 
in  the  first  place,  the  nature  and  use  of  analysis  in  investi- 
gating the  demonstration  of  theorems.  For  such  an  applica- 
tion of  it,  various  occasions  must  be  constantly  presenting 
themselves  to  every  geometer  ; — when  engaged,  for  example, 
in  the  search  of  more  elegant  modes  of  demonstrating  propo- 
sitions previously  brought  to  light  ;  or  in  ascertaining  the 
truth  of  dubious  theorems,  which,  from  analogy,  or  other  ac- 
cidental circumstances,  possess  a  degree  of  verisimilitude 
sufficient  to  rouse  the  curiosity* 

In  order  to  make  myself  intelligible  to  those  who  are  ac- 
quainted only  with  that  form  of  reasoning  which  is  used  by 
Euclid,  it  is  necessary  to  remind  them,  that  the  enunciation 
of  every  mathematical  proposition  consists  of  two  parts.  In 
the  first  place,  certain  suppositions  are  made>  and  secondly, 
a  certain  consequence  is  affirmed  to  follow  from  these  suppo- 
sitions. In  all  the  demonstrations  which  are  to  be  found  in 
Euclid's  Elements,  (with  the  exception  of  the  small  number 
of  indirect  demonstrations,)  the  particulars  involved  in  the 
hypothetical  part  of  the  enunciation  are  assumed  as  the  prin- 
ciples of  our  reasoning  ;  and  from  these  principles  a  series 
or  chain  of  consequences  is,  link  by  link,  deduced,  till  we  at 
last  arrive  at  the  conclusion  which  the  enunciation  of  the 
proposition  asserted  as  a  truth.  A  demonstration  of  this 
kind  is  called  a  Synthetical  demonstration. 

Vol*  ii.  34 


266  ELEMENTS    OF    THE    PHILOSOPHY        [CHAP.  IT. 

Suppose  now,  that  T  arrange  the  steps  of  my  reasoning  in 
the  reverse  order  ;  that  I  assume  hypothetically  the  truth  of 
the  proposition  which  I  wish  to  demonstrate,  and  proceed  to 
deduce  from  this  assumption,  as  a  principle,  the  different 
consequences  to  which  it  leads.  If,  in  this  deduction,  I  ar- 
rive at  a  consequence  which  I  already  know  to  be  true,  I 
conclude  with  confidence,  that  the  principle  from  which  it 
was  deduced  is  likewise  true.  But  if,  on  the  other  hand,  I 
arrive  at  a  consequence  which  I  know  to  be  false,  1  conclude, 
that  the  principle  or  assumption  on  which  my  reasoning  has 
proceeded  is  false  also. — Such  a  demonstration  of  the  truth 
or  falsity  of  a  proposition  is  called  an  Analytical  demonstra- 
tion. 

According  to  these  definitions  of  Analysis  and  Synthesis, 
those  demonstrations  in  Euclid  which  prove  a  proposition  to 
be  true,  by  shewing,  that  the  contrary  supposition  leads  to 
some  absurd  inference,  are,  properly  speaking,  analytical 
processes  of  reasoning.  In  every  case,  the  conclusiveness  of 
an  analytical  proof  rests  on  this  general  maxim,  That  truth 
is  always  consistent  with  itself ;  that  a  supposition  which 
leads,  by  a  concatenation  of  mathematical  deductions,  to  a 
consequence  which  is  true,  must  itself  be  true  ;  and  that  which 
necessarily  involves  a  consequence  which  is  absurd  or  im- 
possible, must  itself  be  false. 

It  is  evident,  that,  when  we  are  demonstrating  a  proposi- 
tion with  a  view  to  convince  another  of  its  truth,  the  syn- 
thetic form  of  reasoning  is  the  more  natural  and  pleasing  of 
the  two  ;  as  it  leads  the  understanding  directly  from  known 
truths  to  such  as  are  unknown.  When  a  proposition,  how- 
ever, is  doubtful,  and  we  wish  to  satisfy  our  own  minds  with 
respect  to  it  ;  or  when  we  wish  to  discover  a  new  method  of 
demonstrating  a  theorem  previously  ascertained  to  be  true  ; 
it  will  be  found  (as  I  already  hinted)  far  more  convenient  to 
conduct  the  investigation  analytically.  The  justness  of  this 
remark  is  universally  acknowledged  by  all  who  have  ever 
exercised  their  ingenuity  in  mathematical  inquiries  ;  and 
must  be  obvious  to  every  one  who  has  the  curiosity  to  make 


SECT.  III.]  OP    THE    HUMAN   MIND.  267 

the  experiment.  It  is  not,  however,  so  easy  to  point  out  the 
principle  on  which  this  remarkable  difference  between  these 
two  opposite  intellectual  processes  depends.  The  sugges- 
tions which  I  am  now  to  offer  appear  to  myself  to  touch  upon 
the  most  essential  circumstance  ;  but  I  am  perfectly  aware 
that  they  by  no  means  amount  to  a  complete  solution  of  th.6 
difficulty. 

Let  it  be  supposed,  then,  either  that  a  new  demonstration 
is  required  of  an  old  theorem  ;  or,  that  a  new  and  doubtful 
theorem  is  proposed  as  a  subject  of  examination.  In  what 
manner  shall  I  set  to  work,  in  order  to  discover  the  neces- 
sary media  of  proof?  From  the  hypothetical  part  of  the 
enunciation,  it  is  probable,  that  a  great  variety  of  different 
consequences  may  be  immediately  deducible  ;  from  each 
of  which  consequences  a  series  of  other  consequences  will 
follow  :  At  the  same  time,  it  is  possible,  that  only  one  or 
two  of  these  trains  of  reasoning  may  lead  the  way  to  the 
truth  which  I  wish  to  demonstrate.  By  what  rule  am  I  to 
be  guided  in  selecting  the  line  of  deduction  which  I  am  here 
to  pursue  ?  The  only  expedient  which  seems  to  present 
itself,  is  merely  tentative  or  experimental  ;  to  assume  suc- 
cessively all  the  different  proximate  consequences  as  the  first 
link  of  the  chain,  and  to  follow  out  the  deduction  from  each, 
of  them,  till  I,  at  last,  find  myself  conducted  to  the  truth 
which  I  am  anxious  to  reach.  According  to  this  supposi- 
tion, I  merely  grope  my  way  in  the  dark,  without  rule  or 
method  :  the  object  I  am  in  quest  of  may,  after  all  my  la- 
bour, elude  my  search  ;  and  even,  if  I  should  be  so  fortunate 
as  to  attain  it,  my  success  affords  me  no  lights  whatever  to 
guide  me  in  future  on  a  similar  occasion. 

Suppose  now  that  I  reverse  this  order,  and  prosecute  the 
investigation  analytically  ;  assuming  (agreeably  to  the  ex- 
planation already  given)  the  proposition  to  be  true,  and  at- 
tempting, from  this  supposition,  to  deduce  some  acknow- 
ledged truth  as  a  necessary  consequence.  ,1  have  here  one 
fixed  point  from  which  I  am  to  set  out ;  or,  in  other  words, 
one  specific  principle  or  datum  from  which  all  my  consequen- 


268  ELEMENTS    OP    THE    PHILOSOPHY        [CHAP.  IV. 

ces  are  to  be  deduced  ;  while  it  is  perfectly  immaterial  in 
what  particular  conclusion  my  deduction  terminates,  provi- 
ded this  conclusion  be  previously  known  to  be  true.  Instead, 
therefore,  of  being  limited,  as  before,  to  one  conclusion  ex* 
clusively,  and  left  in  a  state  of  uncertainty  where  to  begin  the 
investigation,  I  have  one  single  supposition  marked  out  to 
me,  from  which  my  departure  must  necessarily  be  taken  ; 
while,  at  the  same  time,  the  path  which  I  follow,  may  termi- 
nate with  equal  advantage  in  a  variety  of  different  conclu- 
sions. In  the  former  case,  the  procedure  of  the  understand- 
ing bears  some  analogy  to  that  of  a  foreign  spy,  landed  in  a 
remote  corner  of  this  island,  and  left  to  explore,  by  his  own 
sagacity,  the  road  to  London.  In  the  latter  case,  it  may  be 
compared  to  that  of  an  inhabitant  of  the  metropolis,  who 
wished  to  effect  an  escape,  by  any  one  of  our  sea-ports,  to  the 
continent.  It  is  scarcely  necessary  to  add,  that  as  this  fugi- 
tive,— should  he  happen  after  reaching  the  coast,  to  alter  his 
intentions, — would  easily  retrace  the  way  to  his  own  home  ; 
so  the  geometer,  when  he  has  once  obtained  a  conclusion  in 
manifest  harmony  with  the  known  principles  of  his  science, 
has  only  to  return  upon  his  own  steps  (cceca  regens  Jilo  ves* 
tigia)  in  order  to  convert  his  analysis  into  a  direct  synthetical 
proof. 

A  palpable  and  familiar  illustration  (at  least  in  some  of  the 
most  essential  points)  of  the  relation  in  which  the  two  methods 
now  described  stand  to  each  other,  is  presented  to  us  by  the 
operation  of  unloosing  a  difficult  knot,  in  order  to  ascertain 
the  exact  process  by  which  it  was  formed.  The  illustration 
appears  to  me  to  be  the  more  apposite,  that  I  have  no  doubt  it 
was  this  very  analogy,  which  suggested  to  the  Greek  geome- 
ters the  metaphorical  expressions  of  analysis  and  of  solution, 
which  they  have  transmitted  to  the  philosophical  language  of 
modern  times. 

Suppose  a  knot,  of  a  very  artifical  construction,  to  be  put 
into  my  hands  as  an  exercise  for  my  ingenuity,  and  that  I  was 
required  to  investigate  a  rule,  which  others,  as  well  as  my- 
self, might  be  able  to  follow  in  practice,  for  making  knots  of 


SECT.  III.]  OF    THE    HUMAN    MIND.  269 

the  same  sort.  If  I  were  to  proceed  in  this  attempt,  accord- 
ing to  the  spirit  of  a  geometrical  synthesis,  I  should  have  to 
try,  one  after  another,  all  the  various  experiments  which  my 
fancy  could  devise,  till  I  had,  at  last,  hit  upon  the  particular 
knot  I  was  anxious  to  tie.  Such  a  process,  however,  would 
evidently  be  so  completely  tentative,  and  its  final  success 
would,  after  all,  be  so  extremely  doubtful,  that  common  sense 
could  not  fail  to  suggest  immediately  the  idea,  of  tracing  the 
knot  through  all  the  various  complications  of  its  progress,  by 
cautiously  undoing  or  unknitting  each  successive  turn  of  the 
thread  in  a  retrograde  order,  from  the  last  to  ihe  first.  After 
gaining  this  first  step,  were  all  the  former  complications  re- 
stored again,  by  an  inverse  repetition  of  the  same  operations 
which  I  had  performed  in  undoing  them,  an  infallible  rule 
would  be  obtained  for  solving  the  problem  originally  propo- 
sed ;  and,  at  the  same  time,  some  address  or  dexterity,  in  the 
practice  of  the  general  method,  probably  gained,  which  would 
encourage  me  to  undertake,  upon  future  occasions,  still  more 
arduous  tasks  of  a  similar  description.  The  parallel  between 
this  obvious  suggestion  of  reason,  and  the  refined  logic  of  the 
Greek  analysis,  undoubtedly  fails  in  several  particulars  ;  but 
both  proceed  so  much  on  the  same  cardinal  principle,  as  to 
account  sufficiently  for  a  tranference  of  the  same  expressions 
from  the  one  to  the  other.  That  this  transference  has  actu- 
ally taken  place  in  the  instance  now  under  consideration,  the 
literal  and  primitive  import  of  the  words  *»*  and  ivo-ig,  af- 
fords as  strong  presumptive  evidence  as  can  well  be  expect- 
ed in  any  etymological  speculation. 

In  applying  the  method  of  analysis  to  geometrical  pro- 
blems, the  investigation  begins  by  supposing  the  problem  to 
be  solved;  after  which,  a  chain  of  consequences  is  deduced 
from  this  supposition,  terminating  at  last  in  a  conclusion, 
which  either  resolves  into  another  problem,  previously  known 
to  be  within  the  reach  of  our  resources  ;  or  which  involves 
an  operation  known  to  be  impracticable.  In  the  former  case, 
all  that  remains  to  be  done,  is  to  refer  to  the'  construction  of 
the  problem  in  which  the  analysis  terminates ;  and  then,  by 


270  ELEMENTS    OP    THE    PHILOSOPHY         [CHAP.  IV. 

reversing  our  steps,  to  demonstrate  synthetically,  that  this 
construction  fulfils  all  the  conditions  of  the  problem  in  ques- 
tion. If  it  should  appear,  in  the  course  of  the  composition, 
that  in  certain  cases  the  problem  is  possible,  and  in  others 
not,  the  specification  of  these  different  cases  (railed  by  the 
Greek  geometers  the  ft»pirp,e  or  determination)  becomes  an 
indispensable  requisite  towards  a  complete  solution. 

The  utility  of  the  ancient  analysis  in  facilitating  the  solu- 
tion of  problems,  is  still  more  manifest  than  in  facilitating  the 
demonstration  of  theorems  ;  and,  in  all  probability,  was  per- 
ceived by  mathematicians  at  an  earlier  period.  The  steps 
by  which  it  proceeds  in  quest  of  the  thing  sought,  are  faith- 
fully copied  (as  might  be  easily  shewn)  from  that  natural  lo- 
gic which  a  sagacious  mind  would  employ  in  similar  circum- 
stances; and  are,  in  fact,  but  a  scientific  application  of  certain 
rules  of  method,  collected  from  the  successful  investigations 
of  men  who  were  guided  merely  by  the  light  of  common 
sense.  The  same  observation  may  be  applied  to  the  ana- 
lytical processes  of  the  algebraical  art. 

In  order  to  increase,  as  far  as  the  state  of  mathematical 
science  then  permitted,  the  powers  of  their  analysis,  the  an- 
cients, as  appears  from  Pappus,  wrote  thirty-three  different 
treatises,  (known  among  mathematicians  by  the  name  of 
tow«s  aicc^vof^itoi^  of  which  number  there  are  twenty-four 
books,  whereof  Pappus  has  particularly  described  the  sub- 
jects and  the  contents.  Tn  what  manner  some  of  these  were 
instrumental  in  accomplishing  their  purpose,  has  been  fully 
explained  by  different  modern  writers ;  particularly  by  the 
late  very  learned  Dr.  Simson  of  Glasgow.  Of  Euclid's 
Data,  (for  example,)  the  first  in  order  of  those  enumerated 
by  Pappus,  he  observes,  that  "  it  is  of  the  most  general  and 
"necessary  use  in  the  solution  of  problems  of  every  kind: 
11  and  that  whoever  tries  to  investigate  the  solutions  of  pro- 
"  blems  geometrically,  will  soon  find  this  to  be  true ;  for  the 
;:  analysis  of  a  problem  requires,  that  consequences  be  drawn 
"  from  the  things  that  are  given,  until  the  thing  that  is  sought 
"  be  shewn  to  be  given  also.     Now,  supposing  that  the  Data 


/ 


SECT.  III.]  OP    THE    HUMAN    MIND.  271 

"  were  not  extant,  these  consequences  must,  in  every  particu- 
lar instance,  be  found  out  and  demonstrated  from  the  things 
"  given  in  the  enunciation  of  the  problem  ;  whereas  the  pos- 
"  session  of  this  elementary  book  supersedes  the  necessity  of 
"  any  thing  more  than  a  reference  to  the  propositions  which 
"  it  contains."* 

With  respect  to  some  of  the  other  books  mentioned  by  Pappus 
it  is  remarked  by  Dr.  Simson's  biographer,  that  "  they  relate 
"  to  general  problems  of  frequent  recurrence  in  geometrical  in- 
"  vestigations  :  and  that  their  use  was  for  the  more  immediate 
"  resolution  of  any  proposed  geometrical  problem,  which 
"  could  be  easily  reduced  to  a  particular  case  of  any  one  of 
"them.  By  such  a  reduction  the  problem  was  considered  as 
"  fully  resolved  ;  because  it  was  then  necessary  only  to  apply 
"  the  analysis,  composition,  and  determination  of  that  case  of 
"  the  general  problem,  to  this  particular,  problem  which  it 
"was  shewn  to  comprehend.  15t 

From  these  quotations  it  manifestly  appears,  that  the  great- 
er part  of  what  was  formerly  said  of  the  utility  of  analysis  in 
investigating  the  demonstration  of  theorems,  is  applicable, 
mutatis  mutandis,  to  its  employment  in  the  solution  of  pro- 
blems. It  appears  farther,  that  one  great  aim  of  the  subsi- 
diary books,  comprehended  under  the  title  ofroirog  cciaXvopevor 
was  to  multiply  the  number  of  such  conclusions  as  might 
secure  to  the  geometer  a  legitimate  synthetical  demonstra- 
tion, by  returning  backwards,  step  by  step,  from  a  known  or 
elementary  construction.  The  obvious  effect  of  this  was,  at 
once  to  abridge  the  analytical  process,  and  to  enlarge  its  re- 
sources ;  on  a  principle  somewhat  analogous  to  the  increased 
facilities  which  a  fugitive  from  Great  Britain  would  gain,  in 
consequence  of  the  multiplication  of  our  sea-ports. 

Notwithstanding,  however,  the  immense  aids  afforded  to 
the  geometer  by  the  ancient  analysis,  it  must  not  be  imagined 
that  it  altogether  supersedes  the  necessity  of  ingenuity  and 

*  Letter  from  Dr.  Simson  to  George  Lewis  Scolt,  Esq.  published  by  Dr.  Trail). 
See  his  Account  of  Dr.  Simson's  Life  and  Writings,  page  118. 
t  Ibid.  pp.  159,  160. 


272 


ELEMENTS    OF    THE    PHILOSOPHY         [CHAP,  IV, 


invention.  It  diminishes,  indeed,  to  a  wonderful  degree,  the 
number  of  his  tentative  experiments,  and  of  the  paths  by 
which  he  might  go  astray  :*  but  (not  to  mention  the  prosper 
tive  address  which  it  supposes,  in  preparing  the  way  for  the 
subsequent  investigation,  by  a  suitable  construction  of  the  dia- 
gram) it  leaves  much  to  be  supplied  at  every  step,  by  saga- 
city and  practical  skill ;  nor  does  the  knowledge  of  it  till  dis- 
ciplined and  perfected  by  long  habit,  fall  under  the  descrip- 
tion of  that  2vvtx.ft.ts  ctvxXvTtxn  which  is  justly  represented  by 
an  old  Greek  writer,t  as  an  acquisition  of  greater  value 
than  the  most  extensive  acquaintance  with  particular  mathe- 
matical truths. 

According  to  the  opinion  of  a  modern  geometer  and  philo- 
sopher of  the  first  eminence,  the  genius  thus  displayed  in 
conducting  the  approaches  to  a  preconceived  mathematical 
conclusion,  is  of  a  far  higher  order  than  that  which  is  evinced 
by  the  discovery  of  new  theorems.  "  Longe  sublimioris  in- 
"  genii  est,"  says  Galileo,  "  alieni  Problematis  enodatio,  aut 
"  ostensio  Theorematis,  quam  novi  cujuspiam  inventio  :  haec 
"  quippe  fortunae  in  incertucn  vagantibus  obviae  plerumque 
"  esse  solenl ;  tota  vero  ilia,  quanta  est,  studiosissimam 
"  attenlas  mentis,  in  unutn  aliquem  scopum  collimantis,  ralio- 
"  nem  exposcit."|  Of  the  justness  of  this  observation,  on 
the  whole,  I  have  no  doubt  ;  and  have  only  to  add  to  it,  by 
way  of  comment,  that  it  is  chiefly  while  engaged  in  the  steady 
pursuit  of  a  particular  object,  that  those  discoveries  which 
are  commonly  considered  as  entirely  accidental,  are  most 
likely  to  present  themselves  to  the  geometer.     It  is  the  me- 

*  "  Nihil  a  vera  et  genuiua.  analysi  mag-is  distal,  nihil  magis  abhorret,  quam  ten- 
"  tandi  melhodiis  ;  hanc  enim  amovere  et  certissima  v. a  ad  quEesilum  perducere, 
"  praecipuos  est  ana'.yseos  finis." 

Extract  from  a  MS.  of  Dr.  Simson,  published  by  Dr.  Traill.  See  his  Account? 
Sic.  p.  127. 

+  See  the  preface  of  Marinus  to  Euclid's  Data.  In  the  preface  to  the  7lU  book 
of  Pappus,  the  same  idea  is  expressed  by  the  phrase  Swotf^tq  IvpeTiKij. 

t  Not  having  the  works  o(  Galileo  at  hand,  I  quote  this  passage  on  the  authority 
of  Guido  Grandi,  who  has  introduced  it  in  the  preface  to  his  demonstration  of  Huyg- 
hens's  Tneorems  concerning  the  L  •gurithmic  Line. — Vid,  Hugenii  Opeia  Reliqua, 
Tom.  I.  p.  43. 


SECT.  III.]  OP   THE   HUMAN  MIND.  273 

thodical  inquirer  alone  who  is  entitled  to  expect  such  fortu- 
nate occurrences  as  Galileo  speaks  of;  and  wherever  inven- 
tion appears  as  a  characteristical  quality  of  the  mind,  we  may 
be  assured,  that  something  more  than  chance  has  contributed 
to  its  success.  On  this  occasion,  the  fine  and  deep  reflection 
of  Fontenelle  will  be  found  to  apply  with  peculiar  force : 
"Ces  hazards  ne  sont  que  pour  ceux  quijouent  bien." 


II. 

Critical  Remarks  on  the  vague  Use,  among  Modern  Writers,  of  the  Terms  Analysis 
and  Synthesis. 

The  foregoing  observations  on  the  Analysis  and  Synthesis, 
of  the  Greek  Geometers  may,  at  first  sight,  appear  somewhat 
out  of  place,  in  a  disquisition  concerning  the  principles  and 
rules  of  the  Inductive  Logic.  As  it  was,  however,  from  the 
Mathematical  Sciences,  that  these  words  were  confessedly 
borrowed  by  the  experimental  inquirers  of  the  Newtonian, 
School,  an  attempt  to  illustrate  their  original  technical  im- 
port seemed  to  form  a  necessary  introduction  to  the  strictures 
which  I  am  about  to  offer,  on  the  loose  and  inconsistent  appli- 
cations of  them,  so  frequent  in  the  logical  phraseology  of  the 
present  times. 

Sir  Isaac  Newton  himself  has,  in  one  of  his  Queries  fairly 
brought  into  comparison  the  Mathematical  and  the  Physical 
Analysis,  as  if  the  word,  in  both  cases,  conveyed  the  same 
idea.  "  As  in  Mathematics,  so  in  Natural  Philosophy,  the  in- 
"  vesligalion  of  difficult  things,  by  the  method  of  Analysis,  ought 
"  ever  to  precede  the  method  of  Composition.  This  analysis 
"  consists  in  making  experiments  and  observations,  and  in, 
"  drawing  conclusions  from  them  by  induction,  and  admitting 
"  of  no  objections  against  the  conclusions,  but  such  as  are 
"  taken  from  experiments,  or  other  certain  truths.  For  hy- 
"  potheses  are  not  to  be  regarded  in  experimental  philosophy. 
"  And  although  the  arguing  from  experiments  and  observa- 
"  tions  by  induction  be  no  demonstration  of  general  conclu- 
(f  sions  ;  yet  it  is  the  best  way  of  arguing  which  the  nature  of 

VOL.  II.  3$ 


274  ELEMENTS    OP    THE    PHILOSOPHY       [CHAP.  IV- 

"  things  admits  of,  and  may  bo  looked  upon  as  so  much  the 
"  stronger,  by  how  much  the  induction  is  mon  general.  Andif 
"  n  exception  occur  from  phenomena,  the  conclusion  may  be 
"  pronounced  generally.  But  if,  at  any  time  afterwards,  any 
"  exception  shall  occur  from  experiments  ;  it  may  then  begin 
<(  to  he  pronounced,  with  such  exceptions  as  occur.  By  this 
"  w«j  of  analysis  we  may  proceed  from  compounds  to  ingre- 
"  dients  ;  and  from  motions  to  the  forces  producing  them  ; 
"  and,  in  general,  from  effects  to  their  causes  ;  and  from  par- 
"  ficular  causes  to  more  general  ones,  till  the  argument  end 
"  in  the  most  general.  This  is  the  method  of  analysis.  And 
"  I  je  synthesis  consists  in  assuming  the  causes  discovered, 
"  and  established  as  principles,  and  by  them  explaining  the 
^phenomena  proceeding  from  them,  and  proving  the  expla- 
"  nations."* 

It  is  to  the  first  sentence  of  this  extract  (which  has  been 
rep  'ted  over  and  over  by  subsequent  writers)  that  I  would 
me  particularly  request  the  attention  of  my  readers.  Mr. 
]\laclaurin,  one  of  the  most  illustrious  of  Newton's  followers, 
bis  not  only  .-auctioned  it  by  transcribing  it  in  the  words  of 
the  author,  but  has  endeavoured  to  illustrate  and  enforce  the 
observation  which  it  contains.  "  It  is  evident,  that  as  in  Mathe- 
"  m  -.tics,  so  in  Natural  Philosophy,  the  investigation  of  difficult 
"  things  by  the  method  of  analysis  ought  ever  to  precede  the 
"  method  of  composition,  or  the  synthesis.  For,  in  any  other 
"  way,  we  can  never  be  sure  that  we  assume  the  princi- 
"  pies  which  really  obtain  in  nature  ;  and  that  our  system, 
"  after  we  have  composed  it  with  great  labour,  is  not  mere 
"  dream  or  illusion."!  The  very  reason  here  stated  by  Mr. 
Maclaurin,  one  should  have  thought,  might  have  convinced 
him,  that  the  parallel  between  the  two  kinds  of  analysis  was 
not  strictly  correct :  inasmuch  as  this  reason  ought,  according 
to  ihe  logical  interpretation  of  his  words,  to  be  applicable. to 
the  one  science  as  well  as  to  the  other,  instead  of  exclusively 

*  See  thai  condndinp:  paragraphs  of  Newton's  Optics. 
\  Acceunt  of  Newton's  Discoveries, 


SECT.  III.]  OP   THE   HUMAN   MIND.  275 

applying  (as  is  obviously  the  case)  to  inquiries  in  Natural 
Philosophy. 

After  the  explanation  which  has  been  already  given  of 
geometrical  and  also  of  physical  analysis,  it  is  almost  super- 
fluous to  remark,  that  there  is  Utile,  if  any  thing,  in  which 
they  resemble  each  other,  excepting  this,  that  bo'h  of  them 
are  methods  of  investigation  and  discovery  ;  and  that  both 
happen  to  be  called  by  the  same  name.  This  name  is,  in- 
deed, from  its  literal  or  etymological  import,  very  happsly 
significant  of  the  notions  conveyed  by  it  in  both  instances  ; 
but,  notwithstanding  this  accidental  coincidence,  the  wide  and 
essential  difference  between  the  subjects  to  which  the  two 
kinds  of  analysis  are  applied,  must  render  it  extremely  evi- 
dent, that  the  analogy  of  the  rules  which  are  adapted  to  the 
one  can  be  of  no  use  in  illustrating  those  which  aie  suited  to 
the  other. 

Nor  is  this  all  :  The  meaning  conveyed  by  the  word 
Analysis,  in  Physics,  in  Chemistry,  and  in  the  Philosophy  of 
the  Human  Mind,  Is  radically  different  from  that  which  ivas 
annexed  to  it  by  the  Greek  Geometers,  or  winch  ever  has 
been  annexed  to  it,  by  any  class  of  modern  Mathematicians. 
In  all  the  former  sciences,  it  naturally  suggest?  the  idea  or' a 
decomposition  of  what  is  complex  into  Us  constituent  ele- 
ments. It  is  defined  by  Johnson,  "  a  separation  of  a  cotri- 
"  pound  body  into  the  several  parts  of  which  it  consists." — 
He  afterwards  mentions,  as  another  signification  of  the  same 
word,  "  a  solution  of  any  thing  whether  corporeal  or  mental^ 
"  to  its  first  elements  ;  as  of  a  sentence  to  the  single  words  ; 
"  of  a  compound  word  to  the  particles  and  words  which  form 
"  it  ;  of  a  tune  to  single  notes  ;  of  an  argument:  to  single 
"  propositions."  In  the  following  sentence,  quoted  by  the 
same  author  from  Glanville,  the  word  Analysis  seems  to  be 
used  in  a  sense  precisely  coincident  with  what  I  have  said  of 
its  import,  when  applied  to  the  Baconian  method  of  investi- 
gation. "  We  cannot  know  any  thing  of  nature  but  by  an 
'*  analysis  of  its  true  initial  causes."* 

*  By  the  true  initial  causes  of  a  phenomenon,  Glanville  means  (as  might  be  easily 
shewn  by  a  comparison  with  other  parts  »f  his  works)  the  simple  laws  from  the  com- 


276  ELEMENTS    OP   THE   PHILOSOPHY       [CHAP.  IV. 

In  the  Greek  geometry,  on  the  other  hand,  the  same  word 
evidently  had  its  chief  reference  to  the  retrograde  direction 
of  this  method,  when  compared  with  the  natural  order  of 
didactic  demonstration,  Tvt  Tptavr^i  ep«^«»  (says  Pappus) 
aitiXva-ti  xaxxpt?,  o<e»  *»«*■**<»  Xv<nr  ;  a  passage  which 
Hailey  thus  translates  :  hie  processus  Analysis  vocatur,  quasi 
dicas,  inversa  solutio.  That  this  is  the  primitive  and  genuine 
import  of  the  preposition  «»#,  is  very  generally  admitted  hy 
Grammarians  ;  and  it  accords,  in  the  present  instance,  so 
happily  wjth  the  sense  of  the  context,  as  to  throw  a  new  and 
strong  light  on  the  justness  of  their  opinion.* 

In  farther  proof  of  what  I  have  here  stated  with  respect  to 
the  double  meaning  of  the  words  analysis  and  synthesis,  as 
employed  in  physics  and  in  mathematics,  it  may  not  be  su- 
perfluous to  add  the  following  consideration.  In  mathemati- 
cal analysis,  we  always  set  out  from  a  hypothetical  assump- 
tion, and  our  object  is  to  arrive  at  some  known  truth,  or  some 
datum,  by  reasoning  synthetically  from  which  we  may  after- 
wan  Is  return,  on  our  own  footsteps,  to  the  point  where  onr 
investigation  began.  In  all  such  cases,  the  synthesis  is  in- 
fallibly obtained  by  reversing  the  analytical  process  ;  and 
as  boih  of  them  have  in  view  the  demonstration  of  the  same 
theorem,  or  the  solution  ot  the  same  problem,  they  form,  in 

■initiation  of  which  it  results,  and  from  a  previous  knowledge  of  which,  it  might 
have  been  synthetically  deduced  as  a  consequence. 

That  Bacon,  when  he  speaks  of  (hose  separations  of  nature,  by  means  of comparisons , 
•exclusions,  and  rejections,  which  form  essential  steps  in  the  inductive  process,  had  a 
view  to  the  analytical  operations  of  the  chemical  laboratory,  appears  sufficiently 
from  the  following  words,  before  quoted  :  "  Jtaque  natural  facienda  est  prorsus  so- 
"  lutio  et  separatio  ;  non  per  ignem  eerie,  sed  per  menlem,  tanquam  ignem  divinum." 

*  The  force  of  this  preposition,  in  its  primitive  sense,  may  perhaps,  without  any 
false  refinement,  be  traced  more  or  less  palpably,  in  every  instance  to  which  the  word 
analysis  is  with  any  propriety  applied.  In  what  Johnson  calls  (for  example)  "the 
u  separation  of  a  compound  body  into  the  several  parts  of  which  it  consists," — we 
■proceed  on  the  supposition,  that  these  parts  have  previously  been  combined,  or  pm 
together,  so  as  to  make  up  the  aggregate  whole,  submitted  to  the  examination  of  the 
chemist;  and,  consequently,  that  the  analytic  process  follows  an  inverted  or  retro- 
grade direction,  in  respect  of  that  in  which  the  compound  is  conceived  to  have  been 
originally  formed- — A  similar  remark  will  be  found  to  apply  (mutatis  mutandis)  to 
other  cases,  however  apparently  different. 


SECT.  III.]  OP    THE    HUMAN    MIND.  277 

reality,  but  different  parts  of  one  and  the  same  investigation. 
But  in  natural  philosophy,  a  synthesis  which  merely  rever- 
sed the  analysis  would  be  absurd.  On  the  contrary,  our 
analysis  necessarily  sets  out  from  known  fads  ;  and  after  it 
has  conducted  us  to  a  general  principle,  the  synthetical  rea- 
soning which  follows,  consists  always  of  an  application  of 
this  principle  to  phenomena  different  from  those  compre- 
hended in  the  original  induction. 

In  some  cases,  the  natural  philosopher  uses  the  word 
Analysis,  where  it  is  probable  that  a  Greek  geometer  would 
have  used  the  word  Synthesis.  Thus,  in  astronomy,  when 
we  attempt  from  the  known  phenomena  to  establish  the  truth 
©f  the  Copernican  system,  we  are  said  to  proceed  analyti- 
cally. But  the  analogy  of  ancient  geometry  would  apply  this 
word  to  a  process  directly  the  reverse  ;  a  process  which,  as- 
suming the  system  as  true,  should  reason  from  it  to  the  known 
phenomena  :  after  which,  if  the  process  could  be  so  reversed 
as  to  prove  that  this  system,  and  this  system  alone,  is  con- 
sistent with  these  facts,  it  would  bear  some  analogy  to  a  ge- 
ometrical synthesis. 

These  observations  had  occurred  to  me,  long  before  I  had 
remarked,  that  the  celebrated  Dr.  Hooke  (guided  also  by 
what  he  conceived  to  be  the  analogy  of  the  Greek  geometry) 
Uses  the  words  analysis  and  synthesis  in  physics,  precisely 
in  the  contrary  acceptations  to  those  assigned  to  them  in  the 
definitions  of  Sir  Isaac  Newton.  "  The  methods,"  he  ob- 
serves, "  of  attaining  a  knowledge  in  nature  may  be  two ; 
°  either  the  analytic  or  the  synthetic.  The  first  is  the  pro- 
"  ceeding  from  the  causes  to  the  effects.  The  second,  from 
il  the  effects  to  the  causes.  The  former  is  the  more  difficult, 
"  and  supposes  the  thing  to  be  already  done  and  known, 
"  which  is  the  thing  sought  and  to  be  found  out.  This  be- 
"  gins  from  the  highest,  most  general,  and  universal  princi- 
9  pies  or  causes  of  things,  and  branches  itself  out  into  the 
rt  more  particular  and  subordinate.  The  second  is  the  more 
"  proper  for  experimental  inquiry,  which,  from  a  true  infor- 
'"  mation  of  the  effect  by  a  due  process,  finds  out  the  imme- 


278  ELEMENTS    OP    THE    PHILOSOPHY  [CHAP.    IV. 

"  diate  cause  thereof,  and  so  proceeds  gradually  to  higher 
"  and  more  remote  causes  and  powers  effective,  founding  its 
*'  steps  upon  the  lowest  and  more  immediate  conclusions.'5* 

That  Hooke  was  led  into  this  mode  of  speaking  by  the 
phraseology  of  the  ancient  mathematicians,  may,  I  think,  be 
safely  inferred  from  the  following  very  sagacious  and  fortu- 
nate conjecture  with  respect  to  the  nature  of  their  analytical 
investigations,  which  occurs  in  a  different  part  of  the  same 
volume.  I  do  not  know  that  any  thing  approaching  to  it  is 
to  be  found  in  the  works  of  any  other  English  author  prior 
to  Dr.  Ilalley. 

"  What  ways  the  ancients  had  for  finding  out  these  me- 

*  Hooke's  Posthumous  Works,  p.  330. 

As  this  volume  is  now  become  extremely  rare,  I  shall  transcribe  the  paragraph 
which  immediately  follows  the  above  quotation. 

"  An  inquisition  by  the  forme)-  (or  analytic)  method,  is  resembled  fitly  enough  by 
11  the  example  of  an  architect,  who  hath  a  full  comprehension  of  what  he  designs  to 
"  do,  and  acts  accordingly  :  But  the  latter  (or  synthetic)  is  more  properly  resembled 
"  to  that  of  a  husbandman  or  gardener,  who  prepares  his  ground,  and  sows  his  seed, 
IC  and  diligently  cherishes  the  growing  vegetable,  supplying  it  continually  with  filling 
"  moisture,  food,  and  shelter, — observing  and  cherishing  its  continual  progression, 
M  till  it  comes  to  its  perfect  ripeness  and  maturity,  and  yields  him  the  fruit  of  his  la- 
"  bour.  iNor  is  it  to  be  expected,  that  a  production  of  such  perfection  as  this  is  de- 
<(  signed,  should  be  brought  to  its  complete  ripeness  in  an  instant  ;  but  as  all  the 
M  works  of  nature,  if  it  be  naturally  proceeded  with,  it  must  have  its  due  time  to  ac- 
"  quire  its  due  form  and  full  maturity,  by  gradual  growth  and  a  natural  progression  ; 
u.  not  but  that  the  other  method  is  also  of  excellent  and  necessary  use,  and  will  very 
''■  often  facilitate  and  hasten  the  progress.  An  instance  of  which  kind  I  designed, 
"  some  years  since,  to  have  given  this  honourable  society,  in  some  of  my  lectures 
'•'  upon  the  motions  and  influences  of  the  celestial  bodies,  if  it  had  been  then  fit  ;  but 
"  I  understand,  the  same  thing  will  now  be  shortly  done  by  Mr.  Newton,  in  a  Trea- 
"  tise  of  his,  now  in  the  press  :  But  that  will  not  be  the  only  instance  of  that  kind 
"  which  T  design  to  produce,  for  that  I  have  diverse  instances  of  the  like  nature, 
"  wherein,  from  a  bj'pothesis  being  supposed,  on  a*premeditaled  design,  all  the  phe- 
"  nomena  of  the  subject  will  be  a  priori  foretold,  and  the  effects  naturally  follow,  as 
"  proceeding  from  a  cause  so  and  so  qualified  and  limited.  And-,  in  truth,  tlie  syn- 
"  thetic  way,  by  experiments  and  observations,  will  be  very  slow,  if  it  be  not  often  as- 
':  sisted  by  tlie  analytic,  which  proves  of  excellent  use,  even  though  it  proceed  by  a  false 
"  position  ;  for  that  the  discovery  of  a  negative  is  one  way  of  restraining  and  limiting 
'■'  an  affirmative." 

Change  the  places  of  the  words  analytic  and  synthetic  in  this  last  sentence  ;  and 
the  remark  coincides  exactly  with  what  Boscovich.  Hartley,  Le  Sage,  and  many  other 
authors,  have  advanced  in  favour  of  synthetical  explanations  from  hypothetical  theo- 
ries. I  shall  have  occasion  afterwards  to  offer  some  additional  suggestions  in  sup- 
port of  their  opinion,  and  to  point  out  the  limitations  which  it  seems  to  require. 


SECT.  lib]  ©F    THE    HUMAN    MINB.  279 

"  diums,  or  means  of  performing  the  thing  required,  we  are 
"  much  in  the  dark  ;  nor  do  any  of  them  shew  the  way,  or  so 
"  much  as  relate  that  they  had  such  a  one  :  Yet  'tis  believ- 
"  ed  they  were  not  ignorant  of  some  kind  of  algebra,  by 
"  which  they  had  a  certain  way  to  h-.  lp  themselves  in  their 
"•inquiries,  though  that  we  now  use  be  much  confined  and 
"  limited  to  a  few  media.  But  I  do  rather  conceive,  that 
"  they  had  another  kind  of  analytics,  which  went  backwards 
"  through  almost  all  the  same  steps  by  which  their  demon- 
"  strations  went  forwards,  though  of  this  we  have  no  certain 
"  account,  their  writings  being  altogether  silent  on  that  par- 
"  ticular.  However,  that  such  a  way  is  practicable,  I  may 
"  hereafter,  upon  some  other  occasion,  shew  by  some  exam- 
"  pies  ;  whereby  it  will  plainly  appear,  how  much  more 
"  useful  it  is  for  the  finding  out  the  ways  for  the  solution  of 
"  problems  than  that  which  is  now  generally  known  and  prac- 
"  tised  by  species.* 

The  foregoing  remarks,  although  rather  of  a  critical  than 
of  a  philosophical  nature,  may,  I  hope,  be  of  some  use  in 
giving  a  little  more  precision  to  our  notions  on  this  impor- 
tant subject.  They  are  introduced  here,  not  with  the  most 
distant  view  to  any  alteration  in  our  established  language, 
(which,  in  the  present  instance,  appears  to  me  to  be  not  on- 
ly unexceptionable,  but  very  happily  significant  of  its  true 
logical  import,)  but  merely  to  illustrate  the  occasional  influ- 
ence of  words  over  the  most  powerful  understandings  ;  and 
the  vagueness  of  the  reasonings  into  which  they  may  insen- 
sibly be  betrayed,  by  a  careless  employment  of  indefinite 
and  ambiguous  terms. 

If  the  task  were  not  ungrateful,  it  would  be  easy  to  pro- 
duce numerous  examples  of  this  from  writers  of  the  highest 

*  Hooke's  Post." Works,  p.  68. 

Of  the  illustrations  here  promised  by  Hooke  of  the  utility  of  the  analytical  method 
in  geometrical  investigations,  no  traces  as  far  as  I  have  observed,  occur  in  his  writ- 
ings. And  it  would  appear  from  the  following  note  by  the  editor,  on  the  passage  last 
quoted,  that  nothing  important  on  the  subject  had  been  discovered  among  his  papers. 

"  I  do  not  any  where  find,  that  this  was  ever  done  by  Dr.  Hooke,  and  leave  the 
a  usefulness  therefore  to  be  considered  by  the  learned." 


28(5  ELEMENTS    OP    THE    PHILOSOPHY       [CHAP.  IV. 

and  most  deserved  reputation  in  the  present  times.  I  must 
not,  however,  pass  over  in  silence  the  name  of  Condillac, 
who  has  certainly  contributed,  more  than  any  other  indivi- 
dual, to  the  prevalence  of  the  logical  errors  now  under  con- 
sideration. "  I  know  well,"  says  he  on  one  occasion,  "  that 
"  it  is  customary  to  distinguish  different  kinds  of  analysis  ; 
"  the  logical  analysis,  the  metaphysical,  and  the  mathemati- 
"  cal  ;  but  there  is,  in  fact,  only  one  analysis  ;  and  it  is  the 
M  same  in  all  the  sciences/'*  On  another  occasion,  after  quot- 
ing from  the  logic  of  Port  Royal  a  passage  in  which  it  is  said 
"  That  analysis  and  synthesis  differ  from  each  other  only,  as 
u  the  road  we  follow  in  ascending  from  the  valley  to  the  moun- 
"  tain,  differs  from  the  road  by  which  we  descend  from  the 
"  mountain  into  the  valley." — Condillac  proceeds  thus : "  Front 
"  this  comparison,  all  I  learn  is,  That  the  two  methods  are 
"  contrary  to  one  another,  and  consequently,  that  if  the  one 
"  be  good,  the  other  must  be  bad.  In  truth,  we  cannot  pro- 
11  ceed  otherwise  than  from  the  known  to  (he  unknown.  Now, 
"  if  the  thing  unknown  be  upon  the  mountain,  it  will  never 
"  be  found  by  descending  into  the  valley  ;  and  if  it  be  in 
"  the  valley,  it  will  not  be  found  by  ascending  the  mountain. 
"  There  cannot,  therefore,  be  two  contrary  roads  by  which 
"  it  is  to  be  reached.  Such  opinions,"  Condillac  adds,"  d® 
A<  not  deserve  a  more  serious  criticism. "t 

To  this  very  extraordinary  argument,  it  is  unnecessary  to 
•ffer  any  reply,  after  the  observations  already  made  on  the 
analysis  and  synthesis  of  the  Greek  geometers.  In  the  ap-^ 
plication  of  these  two  opposite  methods  to  their  respective 
functions,  the  theoretical  reasoning  of  Condillac  is  contra- 
dicted by  the  universal  experience  of  mathematicians,  both 
ancient  and  modern  ;  and  is,  indeed,  so  palpably  absurd,  as 
to  carry  along  with  it  its  own  refutation,  to  the  conviction  of 
every  person  capable  of  comprehending  the  terms  of  the 
question.  Nor  would  it  be  found  more  conclusive  or  more 
intelligible,  if  applied  to  the  analysis  and  synthesis  of  natu- 

*  La  Logiqne,  Seconde  Partie,  Chap.  Tii.  \  Ibid.  Chap,  vi.- 


SECT.  III.]  OF    THE   HUMAN    MIND.  281 

ral  philosophers ;  or  indeed  to  these  words,  in  any  of  the  vari- 
ous acceptations  in  which  they  have  ever  hitherto  been  under- 
stood. As  it  is  affirmed,  however,  by  Condillac,  that  "  there 
"  neither  is,  nor  can  be,  more  than  one  analysis,"  a  refuta- 
tion of  his  reasoning,  drawn  from  any  particular  science,  is, 
upon  his  own  principle,  not  less  conclusive,  than  if  founded 
on  a  detailed  examination  of  the  whole  circle  of  human  know- 
ledge. I  shall  content  myself,  therefore,  on  the  present  oc- 
casion, with  a  reference  to  the  mathematical  illustrations 
contained  in  the  former  part  of  this  section. 

With  regard  to  the  notion  annexed  to  this  word  by  Condil- 
lac himself,  I  am  not  certain,  if,  after  all  that  he  has  written 
in  explanation  of  it,  I  have  perfectly  seized  his  meaning. 
"  To  analyze,"  he  tells  us,  in  the  beginning  of  his  Logic, 
"is  nothing  more  than  to  observe  in  a  successive  order  the 
"qualities  of  an  object  with  the  view  of  giving  them  in  the 
"  mind  that  simultaneous  order  in  which  they  co-exist."*  In 
illustration  of  this  definition,  he  proceeds  to  remark,  That 
"  although  with  a  single  glance  of  the  eye  a  person  may  dis- 
cover a  multitude  of  objects  in  an  open  champaign  which 
"  he  has  previously  surveyed  with  attention,  yet  that  the 
"  prospect  is  never  more  distinct,  than  when  it  is  circum- 
"  scribed  within  narrow  bounds,  and  only  a  small  number  of 
"  objects  is  taken  in  at  once.  We  always  discern  with  accu- 
"  racy  but  a  part  of  what  we  see." 

"  The  case,"  he  continues,  "  is  similar  with  the  intellectual 
"  eye.  I  have,  at  the  same  moment,  present  to  it,  a  great 
"  number  of  the  familiar  objects  of  my  knowledge.  I  see 
"  the  whole  group,  but  am  unable  to  mark  the  discriminating 
"qualities  of  individuals.  To  comprehend  with  distinctness 
"  all  that  offers  itself  simultaneously  to  my  view,  it  is  neces- 
"  sary  that  I-should,  in  the  first  place,  decompose  the  mass  ;  — 
"  in  a  manner  analogous  to  that  in  which  a  curious  observer 
"  would  proceed  in  decomposing,  by  successive  steps,  the 
"  co-existent  parts  of  a  landscape. — It  is  necessary  for  me,  in 
"  other  words,  to  analyze  my  thoughts."! 

*  La  Logique,  Premiere  Partie,  Chap.  ii. 

t  ISid.    la 'his  last  paragraph,  I  have  introduced  one  or  two  additional  clauses, 

voir.  II.  36 


282  ELEMENTS    OP    THE    PHILOSOPHY  [CHAP.  IV. 

The  same  author  afterwards  endeavours  still  farther  to  un- 
fold his  notion  of  analysis,  by  comparing  it  to  the  natural 
procedure  of  the  mind  in  the  examination  of  a  machine. 
"  If  I  wish,"  says  he,  "  to  understand  a  machine,  I  decompose 
"  it,  in  order  to  study  separately  each  of  its  parts.  As  soon 
"  as  I  have  an  exact  idea  of  them  all,  and  am  in  a  conditioa 
"  to  replace  them  as  they  were  formerly,  I  have  a  perfect 
"  conception  of  the  machine,  having  both  decomposed  and 
"  recomposed  it."* 

In  all  this,  I  must  confess,  there  seems  to  me  to  be  much  both 
of  vagueness  and  of  confusion.  In  the  two  first  quotations, 
the  word  analysis  is  employed  to  denote  nothing  more  tha» 
that  separation  into  parts,  which  is  necessary  to  bring  a  very 
extensive  or  a  very  complicated  subject  within  the  grasp  of 
our  faculties  ; — a  description,  certainly,  which  conveys  but  a 
very  partial  and  imperfect  conception  of  that  analysis  which  is 
represented  as  the  great  organ  of  invention  in  all  the  sciences 
and  arts. t  In  the  example  of  the  machine,  Condillac's  language 
is  somewhat  more  precise  and  unequivocal ;  but  when  exa- 
mined with  attention,  will  be  found  to  present  an  illustration 
equally  foreign  to  his  purpose.  This  is  the  more  surprising, 
as  th£:  instance  here  appealed  to  might  have  been  expected 
to  suggest  a  juster  idea  of  the  method  in  question,  than  that 
which  resolves  into  a  literal  tZe-com position  and  re-composi- 
tion of  the  thing  to  be  analyzed.  That  a  man  may  be  able 
to  execute  both  of  these  manual  operations  on  a  machine, 
without  acquiring  any  clear  comprehension  of  the  manner  in 
which  it  performs  its  work,  must  appear  manifest  on  the 
slightest  reflection;  nor  is  it  less  indisputable,  that  another 
person,  without  disengaging  a  single  wheel,  may  gain  by  a 
process  purely  intellectual,  a  complete  knowledge  of  the 

which  seemed  to  me  necessary  for  conveying  clearly  the  author's  idsa.  Those  who 
take  the  liouble  to  compare  it  with  the  original,  will  be  satisfied,  that,  in  venturing  on 
the?e  slight  interpolations,  I  had  no  wish  to  misrepresent  his  opinion. 

*  Ibid     Chap.  iii. 

t  Ce  qu'on  nomme  melliocle  d'invention,  n'est  autre  chose  que  l'analyse.  C'est 
elle  qui  a  fait  toutes  les  d^couvertes ;  c'est  par  elle  que  nous  retrouverons  tout  ce 
qui  a  etc  trouve.    Ibid. 


SECT.    III.]  OP    THE   HUMAN   MINI>.  283 

whole  contrivance.  Indeed,  I  apprehend,  that  it  is  in  this 
way  alone  that  the  theory  of  any  complicated  machine  can 
be  studied ;  for  it  is  not  the  parts,  separately  considered, 
but  the  due  combination  of  these  parts,  which  constitutes  the 
mechanism.*  An  observer,  accordingly,  of  common  saga- 
city, is  here  guided  by  the  logic  of  nature,  to  a  species  of 
analysis,  bearing  as  much  resemblance  to  those  of  mathema- 
ticians and  of  natural  philosophers,  as  the  very  different  na- 
ture of  the  cases  admits  of.  Instead  of  allowing  his  eye 
to  wander  at  large  over  the  perplexing  mazes  of  such  a 
labyrinth,  he  begins  by  remarking  the  ultimate  effect;  and 
thence  proceeds  to  trace  backwards,  step  by  step,  the  series 
of  intermediate  movements  by  which  it  is  connected  with  the 
xis  matrix.  In  doing  so,  there  is  undoubtedly  a  sort  of  mental 
decomposition  of  the  machine,  inasmuch  as  all  its  parts  are 
successively  considered  in  detail ;  but  it  is  not  this  decompo- 
sition which  constitutes  the  analysis.  It  is  the  methodical 
retro  gradation  from  the  mechanical  effect  to  the  mechanical 
power.t 

The  passages  in  Condillac  to  which  these  criticisms  refer^ 
are  all  selected  from  his  treatise  on  Logic,  written  purposely 
to  establish  his  favourite  doctrine  with  respect  to  the  influence 
of  language  upon  thought.  The  paradoxical  conclusions  into 
which  he  himself  has  been  led  by  an  unwarrantable  use  of  the 

*  If  on  any  occasion,  a  literal  decomposition  of  a  machine  should  be  found  necessa- 
ry, it  can  only  be  to  obtain  a  view  of  some  of  its  parts,  which  in  their  combined  state, 
are  concealed  from  observation. 

t  That  this  circumstance  of  relrogradution  or  inversion,  figured  more  than  any 
other  in  the  imagination  of  Pappus,  as  the  characteristical  feature  of  geometrical 
analysis,  appears  indisputably  from  a  clause  already  quoted  from  the  preface  to  his 
7th  Book  ; — Tjjv  toixvthv  £0$^ey  xvx^vriv  xuXui-tiv,  otov  uixvetXlv 
Aiiriv.  To  say,  therefore,  as  many  writers  have  done,  that  the  analysis  ot  a  geo- 
metrical problem  consists  in  decomposing  or  resolving  it  in  such  a  manner  as  may 
iead  to  the  discovery  of  the  composition  or  synthesis, — is  at  once  to  speak  vaguely 
and  to  keep  out  of  view  the  cardinal  principle  on  which  the  utility  of  the  method 
hinges.  There  is,  indeed,  one  species  of  decomposition  exemplified  in  the  Greek  geo- 
metry ; — that  which  has  for  its  object  to  distinguish  all  the  various  cases  of  a  genera! 
problem  ;  but  this  part  of  the  investigation  was  so  far  from  being  included  by  the  an- 
cients in  their  idea  of  analysis,  that  they  bestowed  upon  it  an  appropriate  name  of  its 
own ; — the   three  requisites  to  a  complete   solution    being    (acording  to  Pappus) 


284  ELEMENTS    OF    THE    PHILOSOPHY       [CHAP.  IV. 

words  Analysis  and  Synthesis,  is  one  of  the  most  remarkable 
instances  which  the  history  of  modern  literature  furnishes  of 
the  truth  of  his  general  principle. 

Nor  does  this  observation  apply  merely  to  the  productions 
of  his  more  advanced  years.  In  early  life,  he  distinguished 
himself  by  an  ingenious  work,  in  which  he  professed  to  trace 
analytically  the  history  of  our  sensations  and  perceptions  ; 
and  yet,  it  has  been  very  justly  remarked  of  late,  that  all  the 
reasonings  contained  in  it  are  purely  synthetical.  A  very 
eminent  mathematician  of  the  present  times  has  even  gone  so 
far  as  to  mention  it  "  as  a  model  of  geometrical  synthesis.'1* 
He  would,  I  apprehend,  have  expressed  his  idea  more  cor- 
rectly, if,  instead  of  the  epithet  geometrical,  he  had  employ- 
ed, on  this  occasion,  logical  or  metaphysical  ;  in  both  of 
which  sciences,  as  was  formerly  observed,  the  analytical  and 
synthetical  methods  bear  a  much  closer  analogy  to  the  ex- 
perimental inductions  of  chemistry  and  of  physics,  than  to 
the  abstract  and  hypothetical  investigations  of  the  geometer. 

The  abuses  of  language  which  have  been  now  under  our 
review,  will  appear  the  less  wonderful,  when  it  is  considered 
that  mathematicians  themselves  do  not  always  speak  of  ana- 
lysis and  synthesis  with  their  characteristical  precision  of 
expression  ;  the  former  word  being  frequently  employed  to 
denote  the  modern  calculus,  and  the  latter,  the  pure  geometry 
of  the  ancients.  This  phraseology,  although  it  has  been 
repeatedly  censured  by  foreign  writers,  whose  opinions 
might  have  been  expected  to  have  some  weight,  still  conti- 
nues to  prevail  very  generally  upon  the  Continent.  The 
learned  and  judicious  author  of  the  History  of  Mathematics 
complained  of  it  more  than  fifty  years  ago  ;  remarking  the 
impropriety  "  of  calling  by  the  name  of  the  synthetic  method, 
"  that  which  employs  no  algebraical  calculus,  and  which  ad- 
"  dresses  itself  to  the  mind  and  to  the  eyes,  by  means  of  di- 
"  agrams,  and  of  reasonings  expressed  at  full  length  in  ordi- 
"  nary  language.     It  would  be  more  exact,"  he  observes 

*  M.  Lacrois.     See  the  Introduction  fc  bis  Elements  of  Geometry. 


SECT.  III.]  OF    THE    HUMAN    MIND.  2<\5 

farther,  "  to  call  it  the  method  of  the  ancients,  which  (as  is 
"  now  universally  known)  virtually  supposes,  in  all  its  syn- 
"  thetical  demonstrations,  the  previous  use  of  analysis.  As 
"  to  the  algebraical  calculus,  it  is  only  an  abridged  manner 
"  of  expressing  a  process  of  mathematical  reasoning  ; — 
"  which  process  may,  according  to  circumstances,  be  either 
"  analytical  or  synthetical.  Of  the  latter,  an  elementary  ex- 
"  ample  occurs  in  the  algebraical  demonstrations  given  by 
"  some  editors  of  Euclid,  of  the  propositions  in  his  second 
"  Book."* 

This  misapplication  of  the  words  analysis  and  synthesis,  is 
not,  indeed,  attended  with  any  serious  inconveniences,  simi- 
lar to  the  errors  occasioned  by  the  loose  phraseology  of  Con- 
dillac.  It  were  surely  better,  however,  that  mathematicians 
should  cease  to  give  it  the  sanction  of  their  authority,  as  it 
has  an  obvious  tendency, — beside  the  injustice  which  it  in- 
volves to  the  inestimable  remains  of  Greek  geometry, — to 
suggest  a  totally  erroneous  theory,  with  respect  to  the  real 
grounds  of  the  unrivalled  and  transcendant  powers  possess- 
ed by  the  modern  calculus,  when  applied  to  the  more  com- 
plicated researches  of  physics.t 

*  Histoire  des  Maihematiques,  par  Montucla,  Tome  Premier,  pp.  175,  176. 

t  In  the  ingenious  and  profound  work  of  M.  De  Gerando,  entitled,  Des  Signes  et  de 
VArt  de  Penser,  consideres  dans  lew  rapports  mutuels,  there  is  a  very  valuable  chap- 
ter on  the  Analysis  and  Synthesis  of  metaphysicians  and  of  geometers.  (See  Vol.  IV. 
p.  172.)  The  view  of  the  subject  which  I  have  taken  in  the  foregoing  section,  has 
but  little  in  common  with  that  given  by  this  excellent  philosopher  ;  but  in  one  or  two 
instances,  where  we  have  both  touched  upon  the  same  points,  (particularly  in  the 
strictures  upon  the  logic  of  Condillac,)  there  is  a  general  coincidence  between  our 
criticisms,  which  adds  mueh  to  my  confidence  in  my  own  conclusions. 


286  ELEMENTS    OF    THE    PHILOSOPHY       [CHAP.    IV, 

SECTION  IV. 
THE    CONSIDERATION    OF    THE    INDUCTIVE    LOGIC    RESUMED* 

I. 

Additional  Remarks  on  the  distinction  between  Experience  end  Analogy. — Of  the 
grounds  afforded  by  the  latter  for  Scientific  Inference  and  Conjecture. 

In  the  same  manner  in  which  our  external  senses  are  struck 
with  that  resemblance  between  different  individuals  which 
gives  rise  to  a  common  appellation,  our  superior  faculties 
of  observation  and  reasoning,  enable  us  to  trace  those  more 
distant  and  refined  similitudes  which  lead  us  to  comprehend 
different  species  under  one  common  genus.  Here,  too,  the 
principles  of  our  nature,  already  pointed  out,  dispose  us  to 
extend  our  conclusions  from  what  is  familiar  to  what  is  com- 
paratively unknown  ;  and  to  reason  from  species  to  species, 
as  from  individual  to  individual.  In  both  instances,  the  logi- 
cal process  of  thought  is  nearly,  if  not  exactly,  the  same ; 
but  the  common  use  of  language  has  established  a  verbal 
distinction  between  them  ;  our  most  correct  writers  being 
accustomed  (as  far  as  1  have  been  able  to  observe)  to  refer 
the  evidence  of  our  conclusions,  in  the  one  case,  to  experi- 
ence, and  in  the  other  to  analogy.  The  truth  is,  that  the  differ- 
ence between  these  two  denominations  of  evidence,  when 
they  are  accurately  analyzed,  appears  manifestly  to  be  a  dif- 
ference, not  in  kind,  but  merely  in  degree  ;  the  discrimina- 
tive peculiarities  of  individuals  invalidating  the  inference,  as 
far  as  it  rests  on  experience  solely,  as  much  as  the  charac- 
teristical  circumstances  which  draw  the  line  between  differ- 
ent species  and  different  genera.* 

*  In  these  observations  on  the  import  of  the  word  analogy,  as  employed  in  philoso- 
phical discussions,  it  gives  me  great  pleasure  to  find,  that  I  have  struck  nearly  into  the 
same  train  of  thinking  with  M.  Prevost.  I  allude  more  particularly  to  the  following 
passage  in  his  Essais  de  Philosophie. 

*l  Le  mot  Jlnalogie,  dans  l'origine,  n'exprime  que  la  ressemblance.  Mais  l'usage 
"  1'applique  a  une  ressemblance  eloignee  :  d'ou  vient  que  les  conclusions  analogiques 


SECT.  IV.]  OP   THE   HUMAN    MIND.  287 

This  difference  in  point  of  degree  (it  must  at  the  same 
time  be  remembered)  leads,  where  it  is  great,  to  important 
consequences.  In  proportion  as  the  resemblance  between 
two  cases  diminishes  in  the  palpable  marks  which  they  exhi- 
bit to  our  senses,  our  inferences  from  the  one  to  the  other  are 
made  with  less  and  less  confidence  ;  and,  therefore,  it  is  per- 
fectly right,  that  we  should  reason  with  more  caution  from 
species  to  species,  than  from  individual  to  individual  of  the 
same  kind.  In  what  follows,  accordingly,  I  shall  avail  my- 
self of  the  received  distinction  between  the  words  experience 
and  analogy  ;  a  distinction  which  I  have  hitherto  endeavoured 
to  keep  out  of  view,  till  I  should  have  an  opportunity  of  ex- 
plaining the  precise  notion  which  I  annex  to  it.  It  would,  in 
truth,  be  a  distinction  of  important  use  in  our  reasonings,  if 
the  common  arrangements,  instead  of  originating,  as  they 
have  often  done,  in  ignorance  or  caprice,  had  been  really  the 
result  of  an  accurate  observation  and  comparison  of  particu- 
lars. With  all  the  imperfections  of  these  arrangements,  how- 
ever, a  judicious  inquirer  will  pay  so  much  regard  to  prevail- 
ing habits  of  thinking,  as  to  distinguish  very  scrupulously 
what  common  language  refers  to  experience  from  what  it  re- 

"  sotrt  souvent  hasardees,  et  ont  besoin  d'etre  deduites  avec  art.  Toutes  les  fois 
"  done  que  dans  nos  raisonnemens,  nous  portons  des  jugemens  semblables  sur  des 
"  objets  qui  n'ont  qu'une  ressemblance  eloignee,  nous  raisonnons  analogiquement. 
*i  La  ressemblance  prochaine  est  celle  qui  fonde  la  premiere  generalisation,  celle 
"  qu'on  nomme  I'espice  On  nomme  eloignee  la  ressemblance  qui  fonde  les  genera- 
"  ligations  su,  erieitres,  e'est-st-dire,  le  genre  et  ses  divers  degres.  Mais  cette  defini- 
"  tion  n'est  pas  rigoureusement  suivie. 

"  Quoiqu'il  en  soit,  on  conqoit  des  cas,  entre  lesquels  la  ressemblance  est  si  parfaite, 
U  qu'il  ne  s'y  trouve  aucune  difference  sensible,  si  ce  n'est  celle  du  terns  et  du  lieu.  Et 
"  il  est  des  cas  dans  lesquels  on  apperc/iit  beaucoup  dc  ressemblance,  mais  ou  Ton 
"  decouvreaussi  quelques  differences  hidependanles  de  la  diversile  du  temps  et  du  lieu. 
"  Lorsque  nous  ferons  un  jugement  general,  fonde  sur  la  premiere  espece  de  ressem- 
"  blanre,  nous  dirons  que  nous  usons  de  la  mithode  d'induclion.  Lorsque  la  seconds 
"  espece  de  ressemblance  autorisera  nos  raisonnemens,  nous  dirons  que  e'est  de  la 
"  m£thode  d'analogie  que  nous  faisons  usage.  On  dit  ordinairement  que  la  irethode 
"  d'mduction  eonclut  du  particulier  au  general,  et  que  la  methode  d'analogie  conclut 
"  du  semblable  au  semblable.  Si  Ton  analyse  ces  definitions,  on  verra  que  nous 
"  n'avons  fait  autre  chose  que  leur  donner  de  la  precision."  (Eseais  de  Philosophie, 
Tome  II.  p  202.) 

See  also  the  remarks  on  induction  and  analogy  in  the  four  following  articles  of  M. 
Prfivost's  wok. 


288  ELEMENTS    OF    THE    PHILOSOPHY        [CHAP.  IV. 

fers  to  analogy,  till  he  has  satisfied  himself,  by  a  diligent  ex- 
amination, that  the  distinction  has^  in  the  instance  before  him, 
no  foundation  in  truth.  On  the  other  hand,  as  mankind  are 
much  more  disposed  to  confound  things  which  ought  to  be  dis- 
tinguished, than  to  distinguish  things  which  are  exactly  or 
nearly  similar,  he  will  be  doubly  cautious  in  concluding,  that 
all  the  knowledge  which  common  language  ascribes  to  ex- 
perience is  equally  solid  ;  or  that  all  the  conjectures  which  it 
places  to  the  account  of  analogy  are  equally  suspicious. 

A  different  idea  of  the  nature  of  analogy  has  been  given 
by  some  writers  of  note  ;  and  it  cannot  be  denied,  that,  in 
certain  instances,  it  seems  to  apply  still  better  than  that  pro- 
posed above.  The  two  accounts,  however,  if  accurately 
analyzed,  would  be  found  to  approach  much  more  nearly, 
than  they  appear  to  do  at  first  sight ;  or  rather,  T  am  inclined 
to  think,  that  the  one  might  be  resolved  into  the  other,  without 
much  straining  or  over  refinement.  But  this  is  a  question 
chiefly  of  speculative  curiosity,  as  the  general  remarks  which 
I  have  now  to  offer,  will  be  found  to  hold  with  respect  to 
analogy,  considered  as  a  ground  of  philosophical  reasoning, 
in  whatever  manner  the  word  is  defined  ;  provided  only  it 
be  understood  to  express  some  sort  of  correspondence  or  af- 
finity between  two  subjects,  which  serves,  as  a  principle  of 
association  or  of  arrangement,  to  unite  them  together  in  the 
mind. 

According  to  Dr.  Johnson,  (to  whose  definition  I  allude 
more  particularly  at  present,)  analogy  properly  means  "  a  re- 
"  semblance  between  things  with  regard  to  some  circumstances 
"  or  effects  ;  as  when  learning  is  said  to  enlighten  the  mind  ; — 
';  that  is,  to  be  to  the  mind  what  light  is  to  the  eye,  by  ena- 
"  bling  it  to  discover  that  which  was  hidden  before."  The 
statement  is  expressed  with  a  precision  and  justness  not  al- 
ways to  be  found  in  the  definitions  of  this  author;  and  it 
agrees  very  nearly  with  the  notion  of  analogy  adopted  by 
Dr.  Ferguson, — that  "  things  which  have  no  resemblance  to 
"  each  other  may  nevertheless  be  analogous  ;  analogy  con- 


SECT.  IV.}  OF    THE    HUMAN    MIND.  289 

"  sisting  in  a  resemblance  or  correspondence  of  relations.'1* 
As  an  illustration  of  this,  Dr.  Ferguson  mentions  the  analogy 
between  the  fin  of  a  fish  and  the  wing  of  a  bird  ;  the  fin  bear- 
ing the  same  relation  to  the  water,  which  the  wing  does  to 
the  air.  This  definition  is  more  particularly  luminous,  when 
applied  to  the  analogies  which  are  the  foundation  of  the 
rhetorical  figures  of  metaphor  and  allusion  ;  and  it  applies 
also  very  happily  to  those  which  the  fancy  delights  to  trace 
between  the  material  and  the  intellectual  worlds ;  and  which 
(as  I  have  repeatedly  observed)  are  so  apt  to  warp  the 
judgment  in  speculating  concerning  the  phenomena  of  the  hu- 
man mind. 

The  pleasure  which  the  fancy  receives  from  the  contem- 
plation of  such  correspondences,  real  or  supposed,  obviously 
presupposes  a  certain  disparity  or  contrast  in  the  natures  of 
the  two  subjects  compared  ;  and,  therefore,  analogy  forms  an 
associating  principle,  specifically  different  from  resemblance, 
into  which  Mr.  Hume^s  theory  would  lead  us  to  resolve  it. 
An  additional  proof  of  this  is  furnished  by  the  following  con- 
sideration, That  a  resemblance  of  objects  or  events  is  per- 
ceived by  seniie,  and,  accordingly,  has  some  effect  even  on  the 
lower  animals  ;  a  correspondence  (or,  as  it  is  frequently  called, 
a  resemblance)  of  relations,  is  not  the  object  of  sense,  but  of 
intellect,  and,  consequently,  the  perception  of  it  implies  the 
exercise  of  reason. 

Notwithstanding,  however,  the  radical  distinction  between 
the  notions  expressed  by  the  words  resemblance  and  analogy, 
they  may  often  approach  very  nearly  to  each  other  in  their 
meaning  ;  and  cases  may  even  be  conceived,  in  which  they 
exactly  agree.  In  proof  of  this,  it  is  sufficient  to  remark, 
that  in  objects,  the  parts  of  which  respectively  exhibit  that 
correspondence  which  is  usually  distinguished  by  the  epithet 
analogous,  this  correspondence  always  deviates,  less  or  more, 
from  an  exact  conformity  or  identity  ;  insomuch,  that  it  some- 
times requires  a  good  deal  of  consideration  to  trace  in  de- 
tail the  parallel  circumstances,  under  the  disguises  which 

*  Principles  of  Moral  and  Political  Science.    Vol.  I.  p.  IO7. 

vol.  11.  37 


290  ELEMENTS    OP    THE  PHILOSOPHY  [CHAP.  IV- 

they  borrow  from  their  diversified  combinations.  An  obvi- 
ous instance  of  this  occurs  when  we  attempt  to  compare  the 
bones  and  joints  in  the  leg  and  foot  of  a  man  with  those  in 
the  leg  and  foot  of  a  horse.  Were  the  correspondence  in  all 
the  relations  perfectly  exact,  the  resemblance  between  the  two 
objects  would  be  manifest  even  to  sense ;  in  the  very  same 
manner  that,  in  geometry,  the  similitude  of  two  triangles  is  a 
necessary  consequence  of  a  precise  correspondence  in  the 
relations  of  their  homologous  sides.* 

This  last  observation  may  serve,  in  some  measure,  to  jus- 
tify an  assertion  which  was  already  hazarded, — That  the  two 
definitions  of  analogy  formerly  mentioned,  are  very  nearly 
allied  to  each  other  ; — inasmuch  as  it  shews  by  a  more  care- 
ful analysis  than  has  commonly  been  applied  to  this  subject, 
that  the  sensible  dissimilitude  between  things  of  different  species 
arises  chiefly  from  the  want  of  a  palpable  conformity  in  the 
relations  of  their  constituent  parts.  Conceive  that  more  remote 
correspondence  which  reason  or  fancy  traces  between  the 
parts  of  the  one  and  the  parts  of  the  other,  gradually  to  ap- 
proach nearer  and  nearer  to  the  same  standard  ;  and  it  is  evi- 
dent, that,  in  the  course  of  the  approximation,  you  will  ar- 
rive at  that  degree  of  manifest  resemblance,  which  will  bring 
them  under  the  same  generic  name  ;  till  at  last,  by  continu- 
ing this  process  of  the  imagination,  the  one  will  become  a 
correct  picture  or  image  of  the  other,  not  only  in  its  great 
outlines,  but  in  its  minutest  details. 

From  this  view  of  the  subject,  too,  as  well  as  from  the 
former,  it  appears,  how  vague  and  ill  defined  the  metaphy- 
sical limits  are  which  separate  the  evidence  of  analogy  from 
that  of  experience  ;  and  how  much  room  is  left  for  the  opera- 
tion of  good  sense,  and  of  habits  of  scientific  research,  in  ap- 
preciating the  justness  of  that  authority  which,  in  particular 
instances,  the  popular  forms  of  speech  may  assign  to  either. 

The  illustrations  which  I  have  to  offer  of  this  last  remark, 
in  so  far  as  it  relates  to  experience,  may,  I  think,  be  introdu- 
ced more  usefully  afterwards  ;   but  the  vague  conceptions 

'  See  Note  (Q.) 


SECT.  IV.]  OF    THE    HUMAN   MIND.  291 

which  are  generally  annexed  to  the  word  analogy,  together 
with  the  prevailing  prejudices  against  it,  as  a  ground  of  philo- 
sophical reasoning,  render  it  proper  for  me,  before  proceed- 
ing any  farther,  to  attempt  the  correction  of  some  popular 
mistakes  connected  with  the  use  of  this  obnoxious  term. 

It  is  not  necessary,  for  the  purposes  which  I  have  at  pre- 
sent in  view,  to  investigate  very  curiously  the  principles 
which,  in  the  first  instance,  dispose  the  mind  to  indulge  in. 
analogical  conjectures  from  the  known  to  the  unknown.  It 
is  sufficient  to  observe,  that  this  disposition,  so  far  from  be- 
ing checked,  receives  additional  encouragement  from  habits 
of  philosophical  study  ; — the  natural  tendency  of  these  ha- 
bits being  only  to  guide  it  into  the  right  path,  and,  to  teach  it 
to  proceed  cautiously,  according  to  certain  general  rulesj 
warranted  by  experience. 

The  encouragement  which  philosophical  pursuits  give  to 
this  natural  disposition,  arises  chiefly  from  the  innumerable 
proofs  they  afford  of  that  systematical  unity  and  harmony  of 
design  which  are  every  where  conspicuous  in  the  universe. 
On  this  unity  of  design  is  founded  the  most  solid  argument 
which  the  light  of  reason  supplies  for  the  unity  of  God  ; 
but  the  knowledge  of  the  general  fact  on  which  that  argu- 
ment proceeds  is  not  confined  to  the  student  of  theology.  It 
forces  itself  irresistibly  on  the  thoughts  of  all  who  are  fami- 
liarly conversant  with  the  phenomena,  either  of  the  material 
or  of  the  moral  world  ;  and  is  recognized  as  a  principle  of 
reasoning,  even  by  those  who  pay  little  or  no  attention  to  its 
most  sublime  and  important  application. 

It  is  well  known  to  all  who  have  the  slightest  acquaintance 
with  the  history  of  medicine,  that  the  anatomical  knowledge 
of  the  ancients  was  derived  almost  entirely  from  analogical 
conjectures,  founded  on  the  dissection  of  the  lower  animals  ;* 

*  "  If  we  read  the  works  of  Hippocrates  with  impartiality,  and  apply  his  accounts 
'•'  of  the  parts  to  what  we  now  know  of  the  humnn  body,  we  must  allow  his  descrip- 
•'  lions  to  be  imperfect,  incorrect,  sometimes  extravagant,  and  often  unintelligible, 
'' that  of  the  bones  only  excepted.  He  seems  to  Have  studied  these  with  more  suc- 
:'  cess  than  the  other  parts,  and  tells  us,  that  he  had  an  opportunity  of  seeing  a  human 
u  skeleton." 


292  ELEMENTS    OF    THE    PHILOSOPHY        [CHAP.  IV. 

and  that,  in  consequence  of  this,  many  misrepresentations  of 
facts,  and  many  erroneous  theories,  (blended,  however,  with 
various  important  truths,)  were  transmitted  to  the  physiolo- 
gists of  modern  Europe.  What  is  the  legitimate  inference 
to  be  deduced  from  these  premises  ?  Not,  surely,  that  analogy 
is  an  organ  of  no  use  in  the  study  of  nature  ;  but  that,  al- 
though it  may  furnish  a  rational  ground  of  conjecture  and 
inquiry,  it  ought  not  to  be  received  as  direct  evidence, 
where  the  fact  itself  lies  open  to  examination  ;  and  that  the 
conclusions  to  which  it  leads  ought,  in  every  case,  to  be  dis* 
trusted,  in  proportion  as  the  subjects  compared  depart  from 
an  exact  coincidence  in  all  their  circumstances. 

As  our  knowledge  of  nature  enlarges,  we  gradually  learn, 
to  combine  the  presumptions  arising  from  analogy,  with  other 
general  principles  by  which  they  are  limited  and  corrected. 
In  comparing,  for  example,  the  anatomy  of  different  tribes  of 
animals,  we  invariably  find,  that  the  differences  in  their 
structure  have  a  reference  to  their  way  of  life,  and  to  the 
habits  for  which  they  are  destined  ;  so  that,  from  knowing 
the  latter,  we  might  be  able,  on  some  occasions,  to  frame 
conjectures  a  priori  concerning  the  former.  It  is  thus,  that 
the  form  of  the  teeth,  together  with  the  length  and  capacity 
of  the  intestines,  vary  in  different  species,  according  to  the 

"  Erasistratus  and  Herophilus,  two  distinguished  anatomists  at  Alexandria,  were 
"  probably  the  first  who  were  authorized  to  direct  human  bodies.  Their  voluminous 
"  works  are  all  lost  :  but  they  are  quoted  by  Galen,  almost  in  every  page."     .     .     .' 

"  What  Galen  principally  wanted  was  opportunities  of  disserting  human  bodies, 
"  for  his  subject  was  mosi  commonly  some  quadruped,  whose  structure  was  supposed 
"  to  come  nearest  to  the  human." 

"About  the  year  1540,  the  great  Vesalius  appeared.  He  was  equally  laborious  in 
"  reading  the  ancients,  and  in  dissecting  bodies  ;  and  in  making  the  comparison)  he 
"  could  not  but  see,  that  many  of  Galen's  descriptions  were  erroneous. — The  spirit  of 
"opposition  and  emulation  was  presently  roused,  and  many  of  his  contemporaries 
'E  endeavoured  to  defend  Galen,  at  the  expense  of  Vesalius.  In  their  disputes  they 
"  made  their  appeals  to  the  human  body  ;  and  thus  in  a  few  years  our  art  was  greatly 
"improved.  And  Vesulius  being  detected  in  the  very  fault  which  he  condemns  in 
"  Galen,  to  wit,  describing  from  the  dissections  of  brutes,  and  not  of  the  human  body 
"  it  exposed  so  fully  that  blunder  of  the  older  anatomists,  that,  in  succeeding  limes, 
iC  there  has  been  little  reason  for  such  complaint." 

Introductory  Lectures,  delivered  by  Dr.  William  Hunter  to  his  last  course  of  ana. 
iomy,  (London,  1784,)  pp.  13, 19.  25,  40, 


SECT.  IV.]  OF    THE    HUMAN    MIND.  296 

quality  of  the  food  on  which  the  animal  is  to  subsist.  Simi- 
lar remarks  have  been  made  on  the  different  situation  and 
disposition  of  the  mammce,  according  as  the  animal  is  unipa- 
rous,  or  produces  many  at  a  birth  ;  on  the  structure  and  di- 
rection of  the  external  ear,  according  as  the  animal  is  rapa- 
cious, or  depends  for  security  on  his  speed  ; — on  the  me- 
chanism of  the  pupil  of  the  eye,  according  as  the  animal  has 
to  search  for  his  food  by  day  or  by  night, — and  on  various 
other  organs  in  the  bodily  economy,  when  compared  with 
the  functions  which  they  are  intended  to  perform.  If,  with- 
out attending  to  circumstances  of  this  sort,  a  person  should 
reason  confidently  from  the  anatomy  of  one  species  to  that 
of  another,  it  cannot  be  justly  said,  that  analogy  is  a  deceit- 
ful guide,  but  that  he  does  not  know  how  to  apply  analogy 
to  its  proper  purpose.  In  truth,  the  very  consideration 
which  gives  to  the  argument  from  analogy  its  chief  force, 
points  here  manifestly  to  the  necessity  of  some  modification 
of  the  original  conclusion,  suited  to  the  diversity  of  the  case 
to  which  it  is  to  be  applied. 

It  is  remarked  by  Cuvier,  that  "  a  canine  tooth,  adapted 
"  to  tear  flesh,  was  never  found  combined  in  the  same  animal 
"  with  a  hoof,  fit  for  supporting  the  weight  of  the  body,  but 
"  totally  useless  as  a  weapon  to  a  beast  of  prey." — "  Hence," 
he  observes,  "  the  rule  that  every  hoofed  animal  is  herbivo- 
"  rous  ;r— and  hence  (as  corollaries  from  this  general  princi- 
*'  pie)  the  maxims,  that  a  hoofed  foot  indicates  grinding  teeth 
"  with  flat  surfaces,  a  long  alimentary  canal,  a  large  stomach, 
"  and  often  more  stomachs  than  one,  with  many  other  simi- 
"  lar  consequences. 

"  The  laws  which  regulate  the  relations  between  different 
u  systems  of  organs,"  continues  this  very  ingenious  and  sound 
k<  philosopher,  "  have  the  same  influence  on  the  different  parts 
"  of  the  same  system,  and  connect  together  its  different  mo- 
*:  difications,  by  the  same  necessary  principles.  In  the  ali- 
"  mentary  system,  especially,  where  the  parts  are  large  and 
"  numerous,  these  rules  have  their  most  striking  applications. 


294  ELEMENTS    OP    THE    PHILOSOPHY  [CHAP.  IV. 

"  The  form  of  the  teeth,  the  length,  the  convolutions,  the  di- 
"  latations  of  the  alimentary  canal,  the  number  and  abun- 
"  dance  of  the  gastric  liquors,  are  in  the  most  exact  adapta- 
"  tion  to  one  another,  and  have  similar  fixed  relations  to  the 
"  chemical  composition,  to  the  solid  aggregation,  and  to  the 
"  solubility  of  the  aliment  ;  insomuch  that,  from  seeing  one 
"  of  the  parts  by  itself,  an  experienced  observer  could  form 
"  conclusions  tolerably  accurate,  with  respect  to  the  confor- 
"  mation  of  the  other  parts  of  the  same  system,  and  might 
"  even  hazard  more  than  random  conjectures  with  respect  to 
"  the  organs  of  other  functions. 

"  The  same  harmony  subsists  among  the  different  parts  of 
"  the  system  of  organs  of  motion.  As  all  the  parts  of  this 
"  system  act  mutually,  and  are  acted  upon,  especially  when 
"  the  whole  body  of  the  animal  is  in  motion,  the  forms  of  all 
"  the  different  parts  are  strictly  related.  There  is  hardly  a 
"  bone  that  can  vary  in  its  surfaces,  in  its  curvatures,  in  its 
{{  protuberances,  without  corresponding  variations  in  other 
"  bones  ;  and  in  this  way,  a  skilful  naturalist,  from  the  ap- 
"  pearance  of  a  single  bone,  will  be  often  able  to  conclude, 
"  to  a  certain  extent,  with  respect  to  the  form  of  the  whole 
"  skeleton  to  which  it  belonged. 

"  These  laws  of  co-existence,"  Cuvier  adds,  "  which  have 
"  just  been  indicated,  are  deduced  by  reasoning  from  our 
•l  knowledge  of  the  reciprocal  influence  of  the  functions, 
"  and  of  the  uses  of  the  different  organs  of  the  body.  Hav- 
"  ing  confirmed  them  by  observation,  we  are  enabled,  in 
"  other  circumstances,  to  follow  a  contrary  route ;  and,  when 
"  we  discover  constant  relations  of  form  between  particular 
"  organs,  we  may  safely  conclude,  that  they  exercise  some 
"  action  upon  one  another  ;  and  we  may  thus  be  frequently 
"  led  to  form  just  conjectures  with  respect  to  their  uses. — It 
"  is,  indeed,  chiefly  from  the  attentive  study  of  these  relations, 
<£  and  from  the  discovery  of  relations  which  have  hitherto 
"  escaped  our  notice,  that  physiology  has  reason  to  hope 
"  for  the  extension  of  her  limits  ;  and,  accordingly,  the  com- 


SECT.  IV.]  OP   THE    HUMAN    MIND.  295* 

"  parative  anatomy  of  animals  is  to  her  one  of  the  most 
'•'  fruitful  sources  of  valuable  discovery."* 

The  general  result  of  these  excellent  observations  is,  that 
the  improvement  of  physiology  is  to  be  expected  chiefly 
from  lights  furnished  by  analogy  ;  but  that,  in  order  to  fol« 
low  this  guide  with  safety,  a  cautious  and  refined  logic  is 
still  more  necessary  than  in  conducting  those  reasonings 
which  rest  on  the  direct  evidence  of  experience.  When  the 
ancient  anatomists,  without  any  examination  of  the  facts 
within  their  reach,  or  any  consideration  of  the  peculiar 
functions  likely  to  be  connected  with  man's  erect  form  and 
rational  faculties,  drew  inferences  concerning  his  internal 
frame,  merely  from  the  structure  of  the  quadrupeds  ;  the  er. 
rors  into  which  they  fell, — so  far  from  affording  any  solid 
argument  against  the  use  of  analogy  when  judiciously  em- 
ployed,— have  only  pointed  out  to  their  successors  the  ne- 
cessity of  a  more  discriminating  and  enlightened  application 
of  it  in  future  ;  and  have  ultimately  led  to  the  discovery  of 
those  comprehensive  Laws  of  the  Animal  Economy,  which, 
by  reconciling  apparent  anomalies  with  the  consistency  and 
harmony  of  one  grand  desig?i,  open,  at  every  successive  step 
of  our  progress,  more  enlarged  and  pleasing  views  of  the 
beneficent  wisdom  of  nature. 

This  speculation  might  be  carried  farther,  by  extending 
it  to  the  various  analogies  which  exist  between  the  Animal 
and  the  Vegetable  kingdoms,  contrasted  with  those  charac- 
teristical  peculiarities  by  which  they  are  respectively  adapt- 
ed to  the  purposes  for  which  they  are  destined.  It  is,  how- 
ever, of  more  consequence,  on  the  present  occasion,  to  turn 
our  attention  to  the  analogies  observable  among  many  of 
the  physical  processes  by  which  different  effects  are  accom- 
plished, or  different  phenomena  produced,  in  the  system  of 
inanimate  and  unorganized  matter.  Of  the  existence  of  such 
analogies,  a  satisfactory  proof  may  be  derived,  from  the  ac- 

*  See  the  Introduction  to  the  Lefons  d'Anatomie  co'mparee  de  G.  Cuvier.  The  abov« 
translation  is  taken  lrom  a  very  interesting  tract,  entitled.  An  Introduction  to  the 
Study  of  the  Animal  Economy.    (Edinburgh,  1301. ) 


236  ELEMENTS    OP    THE    PHILOSOPHY         [CHAP.  IV. 

k^iowledged  tendency  Of  philosophical  habits  and  scientific 
pursuits,  to  familiarize  the  mind  with  the  order  of  nature, 
and  to  improve  its  penetration  in  anticipating  future  disco- 
veries. A  man  conversant  with  physics  and  chemistry  is 
much  more  likely  than  a  stranger  to  these  studies  to  form 
probable  conjectures  concerning  those  laws  of  nature  which 
still  remain  to  be  examined.  There  is  a  certain  character 
or  style  (if  I  may  use  the  expression)  in  the  operations  of 
Divine  Wisdom  ; — something  which  every  where  announces, 
amidst  an  infinite  variety  of  detail,  an  inimitable  unity  and 
harmony  of  design  ;  and  in  the  perception  of  which  philoso- 
phical sagacity  and  genius  seem  chiefly  to  consist.  It  is  this 
which  bestows  a  value  so  inestimable  on  the  Queries  of  New- 
ton.* 

This  view  of  the  numberless  analogies  displayed  in  that 
part  of  the  universe  which  falls  under  our  immediate  notice, 
becomes  more  particularly  impressive,  when  it  is  considered, 
that  the  same  unity  of  design  may  bo  distinctly  traced,  as  far 
as  the  physical  researches  of  astronomers  have  extended. 
In  the  knowledge  of  this  fact,  we  possess  important  moral 
lights,  for  which  we  are  entirely  indebted  to  the  Newtonian 
school ;  the  universal  crr>ed  of  antiquity  having  assumed  as  a 
principle,  that  the  celestial  phenomena  are,  in  their  nature 
and  laws,  essentially  different  from  the  terrestrial.  The  Per- 
sian Magi,  indeed,  are  said  to  have  laid  down,  as  one  of  their 

'How  very  deeply  Newton's  mind  was  impressed  with  those  ideas  of  analogy 
which  I  have  here  ventured  to  ascribe  to  him,  appears  from  his  own  words.  "  Have 
"  not  the  same  particles  of  bodies  certain  powers,  virtues,  or  forces,  by  which  they 
u  act  at  a  distance,  not  only  upon  the  rays  of  light  for  reflecting,  refracting,  and  inflect- 
"  ing  them,  but  also  upon  one  another,  for  producing  a  great  part  of  the  phenomena 
"  of  nature  ?  For  it  is  well  known  that  bodies  act  one  upon  another,  by  the  attrac- 
"  lions  of  gravity,  magnetism,  and  electricity;  and  these  instances  shew  the  tenor 
u  and  course  of  nature,  and  make  it  not  improbable  but  that  therematj  be  more  attractive 
u  powers  than  tJiese.  For  nature  is  very  consonaiU  and  conformable  to  herself."  See 
the  31st  Quer}',  at  the  end  of  his  Optics. 

I,i  a  subsequent  part  of  this  Query,  he  recurs  to  the  same  principle.  "  And  thus 
"  Nature  will  be  very  conformable  to  herself  and  very  simple  ;  performing  all  the  great 
"  motions  of  the  heavenly  bodies  by  the  attraction  of  gravity,  which  intercedes  those 
"  bodies  ;  and  almost  all  the  small  ones  of  their  particles,  some  other  attractive 
ei  and  repelling  powers,  which  intercede  the  particles." 


SECT.  1V.J  OF   THE    HUMAN    MIND.  29? 

maxims, — ^v/An-eeiti  eivui  rauva  Ton  *.**u  5 — but  that  no  max- 
im could  stand  in  more  direct  opposition  to  the  tenets  of  the 
Grecian  philosophers,  appears  sufficiently  from  the  general 
strain  of  their  physical  and  astronomical  theories.  The  mo- 
dern discoveries  have  shewn,  with  demonstrative  evidence, 
how  widely,  in  this  fundamental  assumption,  these  philoso- 
phers erred  from  the  truth  ;  and,  indeed,  it  was  a  conjecture 
a  priori^  originating  in  some  degree  of  scepticism  with  respect 
to  it,  that  led  the  way  to  the  doctrine  of  gravitation.  Every 
subsequent  step  which  has  been  gained  in  astronomical  sci= 
ence  has  tended  more  and  more  to  illustrate,  the  sagacity  of 
those  views  by  which  Newton  was  guided  to  this  fortunate 
anticipation  of  the  truth  ;  as  well  as  to  confirm,  upon  a  scale 
which  continually  grows  in  its  magnitude,  the  justness  of  that 
magnificent  conception  of  uniform  design,  which  emboldened 
him  to  connect  the  physics  of  the  Earth  with  the  hitherto 
unexplored  mysteries  of  the  Heavens. 

Instructive  and  interesting,  however,  as  these  physical  spe- 
culations may  be,  it  is  still  more  pleasing  to  trace  the  uni- 
formity oi  design  which  is  displayed  in  the  economy  of  sensi- 
tive beings  ;  to  compare  the  arts  of  human  life  with  the  in- 
stincts of  the  brutes,  and  the  instincts  of  the  different  tribes  of 
brutes  with  each  other;  and  to  remark,  amidst  the  astonish- 
ing variety  of  means  which  are  employed  to  accomplish  the 
same  ends,  a  certain  analogy  characterize  them  all; — or  to 
observe,  in  the  minds  of  different  individuals  of  our  own  spe- 
cies, the  workings  of  the  same  affections  and  passions,  ma- 
nifesting, among  men  of  every  age  and  of  every  country,  the 
kindred  features  of  humanity.  It  is  this  which  gives  the  great 
charm  to  what  we  call  Nature  in  epic  and  dramatic  composi- 
tion,— when  the  poet  speaks  a  language  "  to  which  every 
"  heart  is  an  echo,"  and  which,  amidst  the  manifold  effects  of 
education  and  fashion,  in  modifying  and  disguising  the  prin- 
ciples of  our  constitution,  reminds  all  the  various  classes  of 
readers  or  of  spectators,  of  the  existence  of  those  moral  ties 
which  unite  them  to  each  other,  and  to  their  common  parent.* 

*  Outlines  of  Moral  Philosophy,  pp,  198, 199,  3d.  Edit. 
vol.  11.  38 


298  ELEMENTS    OP    THE    PHILOSOPHY         [CHAP.  1YV 

Nor  is  it  only  in  the  material  and  moral  worlds,  when  con- 
sidered as  separate  and  independent  systems,  that  this  unity 
of  design  is  perceptible.  They  mutually  bear  to  each  other 
numberless  relations,  which  are  more  particularly  remarkable, 
when  we  consider  both,  in  their  combined  tendencies  with 
respect  to  human  happiness  and  improvement.  There  is 
also  a  more  general  analogy,  which  these  two  grand  depart- 
ments of  nature  exhibit,  in  the  laws  by  which  their  pheno- 
mena are  regulated,  and  a  consequent  analogy  between  the 
methods  of  investigation  peculiarly  applicable  to  each.  I 
have  already  repeatedly  taken  notice  of  the  erroneous  con- 
clusions to  which  we  are  liable,  when  we  reason  directly  from 
the  one  to  the  other ;  or  substitute  the  fanciful  analogies  be- 
tween them,  which  la nguagf  occasionally  suggests,  as  a  philo- 
sophical explanation  of  the  phenomena  of  either.  But  it 
does  not  follow  from  this,  that  there  is  no  analogy  between 
the  rules  of  inquiry,  according  to  which  they  are  to  be  studi- 
ed. On  the  contrary,  it  is  from  the  principles  of  inductive 
philosophising,  which  are  applicable  to  both  in  common,  that 
we  infer  the  necessity  of  resting  our  conclusions  in  each,  upon 
its  own  appropriate  phenomena. 

1  shall  only  add,  to  what  has  been  now  stated  on  the  head 
of  analogy,  that  the  numberless  references  and  dependencies 
between  the  material  and  the  moral  worlds,  exhibited  within 
the  narrow  sphere  of  our  observation  on  this  globe,  encou- 
rage, and  even  authorize  us  to  conclude,  that  they  both  form 
parts  of  one  and  the  same  plan  ; — a  conclusion  congenial  to 
the  best  and  noblest  principles  of  our  nature,  and  which  all 
the  discoveries  of  genuine  science  unite  in  confirming.  No- 
thing, indeed,  could  be  more  inconsistent  with  that  irresisti- 
ble disposition  which  prompts  every  philosophical  inquirer 
to  argue  from  the  known  to  the  unknown,  than  to  suppose 
that,  while  all  the  different  bodies  which  compose  the  mate- 
rial universe  are  manifestly  related  to  each  other,  as  parts 
of  a  connected  whole,  the  moral  events  which  happen  on 
our  planet  are  quite  insulated  ;  and  that  the  rational  beings 
who  inhabit  it,  and  for  whom  we  may  reasonably  presume 


SECT.  IV.]  OF   THE    HUMAN   MIND.  299 

it  was  brought  into  existence,  have  no  relation  whatever  to 
other  intelligent  and  moral  natures.     The  presumption  un- 
questionably  is,  that  there  is  one  great  moral  system,  corre- 
sponding to  the  material  system  :  and  that  the  connections 
which  we  at  present  trace  so  distinctly  among  the  sensible 
objects  composing  the  one,  are  exhibited  as  so  many  intima- 
tions of  some  vast  scheme,  comprehending  all  the  intelligent 
beings  who  compose  the  other.     In  this  argument,  as  well  as 
in  numberless  others,  which  analogy  suggests  in  favour  of 
our  future  prospects,  the  evidence  is  precisely  of  the  same 
sort  with  that  which  first   encouraged  Newton   to  extend  his 
physical  speculations  beyond  the  limits  of  the  Earth.     The 
sole  difference   is,  that   he  had  an   opportunity  of  verifying 
the  results  of  his  conjectures  bv  an  appeal  to  sensible  facts  : 
but  this  accidental  circumstance  (although  it  certainly  affords 
peculiar  satisfaction  and  conviction  to  the  astronomer's  mind) 
does  not  affect  the  grounds  on  which  the  conjecture  was  ori- 
ginally formed,  and  only  furnishes  an  experimental  proof  of 
the  justness  of  the  principles  on  which  it  proceeded.     Were 
it  not,  however,  for  the  palpable  confirmation  thus  obtained 
of  the  Theory  of  Gravity,  it  would  be  difficult  to  vindicate 
against  the  charge  of  presumption,  the  mathematical  accura- 
cy with  which  the  Newtonians  pretend  to  compute  the  mo- 
tions, distances,  and  magnitudes  of  worlds,  apparency  so  far 
removed  beyond  the  examination  of  our  faculties.* 

*  "  I  know  no  author,"  says  Dr.  Reid,  u  who  has  made  a  more  just  and  a  more 
f<  happy  use  of  analogical  reasoning,  than  Bishop  Butler,  in  his  analogy  of  Religion, 
"  Natural  and  Revealed,  to  the  Constitution  and  Course  of  Nature.  In  that  excellent 
"  work,  the  author  does  not  ground  any  of  the  truths  of  religion  upon  Analogy,  as 
"  their  proper  evidence.  He  only  makes  use  of  Analogy  to  answer  objections  against 
"  them.  When  objections  are  made  against  the  truths  of  religion,  which  may  be 
"  made  with  equal  strength  against  what  we  know  to  be  true  in  the  course  of  nature, 
"  such  objections  can  have  no  weight." — Essays  on  the  Intel/.  Powers,  p.  54. 

To  the  same  purpose  it  is  observed  by  Dr.  Campbell,  that  "  analogical  evidence  is 
"  generally  more  successful  in  silencing  objection?  than  in  evincing  truth.  Though 
"  it  rarely  refutes,  it  frequently  repels  refutation  ;  like  those  weapons  which,  though 
"they  cannot  kill  the  enemy,  will  ward  his  blows." — Phil.  ofRhet.  Vol.  1.  p.  145. 

This  estimate  of  the  force  of  analogical  reasoning,  considered  as  a  weapon  of  con- 
traversy,  is  discriminating  and  judicious.  Tha  occasion  on  which  the  logician 
wields  it  to  the  best  advantage  is,  undoubtedly,  in  repelling  the  objections  of  an  ad« 


300  ELEMENTS    OF    THE    PHILOSOfHY  [CHAP.    IV, 

The  foregoing  observations  have  a  close  connection  with 
some  reasonings  hereafter  to  be  offered  in  defence  of  the  doc- 
trine of  final  causes.  They  also  throw  additional  light  on 
what  was  remarked  in  a  former  chapter  concerning  the  unity 
of  truth  : — a  most  important  fact  in  the  theory  of  the  human 
mind,  and  a  fact  which  must  strike  every  candid  inquirer 
with  increasing  evidence,  in  proportion  to  the  progress  which 
he  makes  in  the  interpretation  of  Nature.  Hence  the  effect 
of  philosophical  habits  in  animating  the  curiosity,  and  ia 
guiding  the  inventive  powers  ;  and  hence  the  growing  con- 
fidence which  they  inspire  in  the  ever-consistent  and  harmo- 
nious conclusions  of  inductive  science.  It  is  chiefly  (as 
Bacon  has  observed)  from  partial  and  desultory  researches 
that  scepticism  arises  ;  not  only  as  such  researches  suggests 
doubts  which  a  more  enlarged  acquaintance  with  the  universe 
would  dispel,  but  as  they  withdraw  the  attention  from  those 
comprehensive  views  which  combine  into  a  symmetrical 
fabric- — all  whose  parts  mutually  lend  to  each  other  support 
and  stability — the  most  remote,  and  seemingly  the  most  un- 
connected discoveries.  "  Etenim  symmetria  scienlice,  singulis 
"  scilicet  partibns  se  invicem  sustinentibus,  est,  et  esse  debet, 
"  vera  atque  expedita  ratio  refellendi  objectiones  minorum 
"  gentium  :  Contra,  si  singula  axiomata,  tanquam  baculos 
"  fascis  seorsim  extrahas,  facile  erit  ea  infirmare,  et  pro  libi- 
"  to,  aut  flectere,  aut  frangere.  Num  non  in  aula  spatiosa 
"  consultius.  foret,  unum  accendere  cereum,  aut  lychnuchum 
"  suspendere,  variis  luminibns  instructum,  quo  omnia  simul 
"  perluslrentur,  quam  in  singulos  angulos  qua  qua  versus  exi- 
"  guam  circumfevre  lucernam  ?"* 

versar}'.  But  after  the  foregoing  observation?,  I  may  he  permitted  to  express  my 
doubts,  whether  both  of  tlwse  ingenious  writers  have  not  spmewhat  underrated  the 
importance  of  analogy  as  a  ivcdium  of  proof,  and  as  a  source. of  new  information. — 
I  acknowledge,  at  the  same  time,  that  between  the  positive  and  the  negative  applica- 
tions of  this  species  of  evidence,  there  is  an  essential  difference.  When  emph^ed  to 
refute  an  objection,  it  may  often  furnish  an  argument  irresistibly  and  unanswerably 
convincing  :  when  employed  as  a  medium  of  proof,  it  can  never  authorize  more  than 
a  probable  conjecture,  inviting  and  encouraging  farther  examination.  In  some  in- 
stances, however,  the  probability  resulting  from  a  concurrence  of  different  analogies 
may  rise  so  high,  as  to  produce  an  effect  rn  the  belief  scarcely  distinguishable  from 
moral  certainty. 
*  De  Augment,  Scient.  Lib  i 


SECT.  IV.]  OF    THE    HUMAN    MIND.  301 

II. 

-Use  and  Abuse  of  Hj'potheses  in  Philosophical  Inquiries.  Difference  between  Gra- 
tuitous Hypotheses,  and  those  which  are  supported  by  presumptions  suggested  by 
Analogy. — Indirect  Evidence  which  a  Hypothesis  may  derive  from  its  agreement 
with  the  Phenomena. — Cautions  against  extending  some  of  these  conclusions  to 
the  Philosophy  of  the  Human  Mind. 

As  some  of  the  reasonings  in  the  former  part  of  this  Sec- 
tion may,  at  first  sight,  a'ppear  more  favourable  to  the  use  of 
Hypotheses  than  is  consistent  with  the  severe  rules  of  the 
Inductive  Logic,  it  may  not  be  superfluous  to  guard  against 
.any  such  misapprehensions  of  my  meaning,  by  subjoining  a 
few  miscellaneous  remarks  and  illustrations. 

The  indiscriminate  zeal  against  hypotheses,  so  generally 
avowed  at  present  by  the  professed  followers  of  Bacon,  has 
been  much  encouraged  by  the  strong  and  decided  terms  in 
which,  on  various  occasions,  they  are  reprobated  by  New- 
ton.* But  the  language  of  this  great  man,  when  he  happens 
to  touch  upon  logical  questions,  must  not  always  be  too  lite- 
rally interpreted.  It  must  be  qualified  and  limited,  so  as  to 
accord  with  the  exemplifications  which  he  himself  has  given 
of  his  general  rules.  Of  the  truth  of  this  remark,  the  passa- 
ges now  alluded  to  afford  a  satisfactory  proof;  for,  while 
they  are  expressed  in  the  most  unconditional  and  absolute 
terms,  so  many  exceptions  to  them  occur  in  his  own  writings, 
as  to  authorize  the  conclusion,  that  he  expected  his  readers 
would  of  themselves  be  able  to  supply  the  obvious  and  ne- 
cessary comments.  It  is  probable  that,  in  these  passages, 
he  had  more  particularly  in  his  eye  the  Vortices  of  Des 
Cartes. 

"  The  votaries  of  hypotheses,"  says  Dr.  Reid,  "  have  of- 
-"  ten  been  challenged  to  shew  one  useful  discovery  in  the 
"  works  of  nature  that  was  ever  made  in  that  way."t     In  re- 

*  "  Hypotheses  non  fingo.  Quiequid  enim  exphcnomenis  non  deducitur  hypothesis 
f  vocanda  est,  et  hypotheses,  sen  metaphysics,  seu  physica?,  seu  qualitatum  occultn- 
"  rum,  sou  mechanicre,  in  philosopher  experimental!  locum  non  habent."  Seethe 
general  Scholium  at  the  end  of  the  Principia. 

t  Essays  on  the  Intellectual  Powers  of  Man,  p.  88,  4to  Edit.  In  another  part  of  the 
same  volume,  the  following  assertion  occurs.     "  Of  all  the  discoveries  that  have  been 


382  ELEMENTS    OF    THE    PHILOSOPHY       [CHAP.  IV. 

ply  to  this  challenge,  it  is  sufficient,  on  the  present  occasion, 
to  mention  the  theory  of  Gravitation,  and  the  Copernican 
system.*     Of  the  former  we  have  the  testimony  of  Dr.  Pem- 
berton,  that  it  took  its  first  rise  from  a  conjecture  or  hypothe- 
sis suggested  by  analogy  ;  nor,  indeed,  could  it  be  considered 
in  any  other  light,  lili  that  period  in  Newton's  life,  when,  by 
a  calculation  founded  on  the  accurate  measurement  of  the 
earth  by  Picard,  he  evinced  the  coincidence  between  the  law 
which  regulates  the  fall  of  heavy  bodies,  and  the  power  which 
retains  the  Moon  in   her  orbit.     The  Copernican   system, 
however,  furnishes  a   case  still   stronger,  and  still  more  di- 
rectly applicable  to  our  purpose  ;  inasmuch  as  the  only  evi- 
dence which  the  author  was  able  to  offer  in  its  favour,  was 
the  advantage  which  it  possessed  over  every  other  hypothesis, 
in  explaining,  with  simplicity  and  beauty,  all  the  phenomena  of 
the  heavens.     In  the  mind  of  Copernicus,  therefore,  this  sys- 
tem was  nothing  more  than  a  hypothesis  ; — but  it  was  a  hy- 
pothesis conformable  to  the  universal  analogy  of  nature,  al- 
ways accomplishing  her  ends  by  the  simplest  means.     "  C'est 
"  pour  la  simplicite ,"  says  Bailly,  "  que  Copernic  replapa  Je 
"  soleil  au  centre  du  monde;  c'est  pour  elle  que  Kepler  va 
4C  detruire  tous  les  epicycles  que  Copernic  avoit  laisses  sub- 
"  sister :  peu  de  principes,  de  grands  moyens  en  petit  nom- 
"  bre,  des  phenomenes  infinis  ct  varies,  voila  le  tableau  de 
"  Punivcrs.t 

"  made  concerning  the  inward  structure  ot  the  human  body,  never  one  was  made  by 
"  con iectui-e. — The  same  thing  may  be  said,  with  justice;  of  every  other  part  of  the 
"  works  ol  God,  wherein  any  real  discovery  lias  been  made.  Such  discoveries  have 
"  always  been  made  by  patient  observation,  by  accurate  experiments,  or  by  conclu- 
"  sions  drawn  by  strict  reasoning  from  observations  and  experiments  ;  and  such  di.-- 
»  coveries  have  always  tended  to  refute,  but  not  to  confirm;  the  iheories  and  hypothe- 
"  ses  which  ingenious  men  had  invented."    Ibid.  p.  40. 

*  See  Note  (R.) 

t  Histoire  de  TAstronomie  Moderne,  Tome  II.  p.  2. 

From  this  anticipation  of  simplicity  in  the  laws  of  nature,  (a  logical  principle  not 
less  universally  recognized  among  ancient  than  among  modern  philosophers,)  Bailly 
has  drawn  an  argument  in  support  of  his  favourite  hypothesis  concerning  the  origin 
of  the  sciences.  His  words  are  ihese  :  "  La  simplicite  n'est  pas  essentiellement  un 
s:  principe,  un  axiome,  c'est  le  residtat  des  travaux;  ce  n'est  pas  une  idee  de  1'enfance 
"  du  monde..  elle  appnrtier.t  a  la  maturit©  des  hommes :  c'est  la  plus  grande  des  verite- 


SECT.  IV.]  OP    THE    HUMAN   MIND,  303 

According  to  this  view  of  the  subject,  the  confidence  which 
we  repose  in  Analogy  rests  ultimately  on  the  evidence  of 
Experience  ;  and  hence,  an  additional  argument  in  favour  of 
the  former  method  of  investigation,  when  cautiously  follow- 
ed ;  as  well  as  an  additional  proof  of  the  imperceptible  shades 
by  which  Experience  and  Analogy  run  into  each  other. 

Nor  is  the  utility  of  hypothetical  theories  confined  to  those 
cases  in  which  they  have  been  confirmed  by  subsequent  re- 
searches :  it  may  be  equally  great,  where  they  have  com- 
pletely disappointed  the  expectations  of  their  authors.  No- 
thing, 1  think,  can  be  juster  than  Hartley's  remark,  that "  any 
"  hypothesis  which  possesses  a  sufficient  degree  of  plausibi- 
"  lity  to  account  for  a  number  of  facts,  helps  us  to  digest 
"  these  facts  in  proper  order,  to  bring  new  ones  to  light,  and 
"  to  make  experimenta  cruris  for  the  sake  of  future  inqui- 
"  rers."*  Indeed,  it  has  probably  been  in  this  way  that 
most  discoveries  have  been  made  ;  for  although  a  knowledge 

H  que  ^observation  constante  arrache  a  l'illusion  des  effets :  ce  ne  peut  etre  qu'un  resle 
"  de  la  science  primitive.  Lorsque  chez  un  peuple,  possesseur  d'une  mythologie  com- 
"  pliquee,  et  qui  n'a  d'autfe  physique  que  ces  fables,  les  philosophes,  voulant  reduire 
"  Ja  nature  a  un  seul  principe,  annonceront  que  l'eau  est  la  source  de  toutes  choses,  ou 
"  le  feu  l'agent  universel,  nous  dirons  a  ces  philosophes :  vous  parlez  une  langue  que 
"  n'est  pas  la  votre ;  vous  avez  saisi  par  un  instinct  philosophique  ces  verites  au-des- 
"  sus  de  votre  siecle,  de  votre  nation,  et  de  vous-metnes ;  c'est  la  sagesse  des  anciens 
"  qui  vous  a  ete  transmise  par  tradition,"  &c.  &c.  &.c. — Ibid.  p.  4. 

To  the  general  remark  which  introduces  this  passage  I  readily  subscribe.  The  con- 
fidence with  which  philosophers  anticipate  the  simplicity  of  Nature's  laws  is  unques- 
tionably the  result  of  experience,  and  of  experience  alone  ;  and  implies  a  far  more  ex- 
tensive knowledge  of  her  operations  than  can  be  expected  from  the  uninformed  mul- 
titude. The  inference,  however,  deduced  from  this,  by  the  ingenious  and  eloquent, 
but  sometimes  too  fanciful  historian,  is  not  a  little  precipitate.  The  passion  for  exces- 
sive simplification,  so  remarkably  exemplified  in  the  physical  systems  of  the  Greeks, 
seems  to  be  sufficiently  accounted  for  by  their  scanty  stock  of  facts,  combined  with 
that  ambition  to  explain  every  thing  from  the  smallest  possible  number  of  data,  which, 
in  all  ages  of  the  world,  has  been  one  of  the  most  common  infirmities  of  genius.  On 
the  other  hand,  the  principle  in  question,  when  stated  in  the  form  of  a  proposition,  is 
of  so  abstract  and  metaphysical  a  nature,  that  it  is  highly  improbable  it  should  have 
survived  the  shock  of  revolutions  which  had  proved  fatal  to  the  memory  of  par- 
ticular discoveries.  The  arts,  it  has  been  frequently  observed,  are  more  easily  trans- 
mitted by  mere  tradition,  from  one  generation  to  another,  than  the  speculative  scien- 
ces ;and,  for  a  similar  reason,  physical  systems  are  far  less  likely  to  sink  into  oblivion, 
than  abstract  maxims,  which  have  no  immediate  reference  to  objects  of  sense,  or  to 
the  ordinary  concerns  of  life. 

*  Observations  on  Man,  Chap.  i.  Prop.  v. 


304  ELEMENTS    OF    THE    PHILOSOPHY       [CHAP.  IV, 

of  facts  must  be  prior  to  the  formation  of  a  legitimate  theory  • 
yet  a  hypothetical  theory  is  generally  the  best  guide  to  the 
knowledge  of  connected  and  of  useful  facts. 

The  first  conception  of  a  hypothetical  theory,  it  must  al- 
ways be  remembered,  (if  the  theory  possesses  any  plausibi- 
lity whatever,)  presupposes  a  general  acquaintance  with  the 
phenomena  which  it  aims  lo  account  for  ;  and  it  is  by  rea- 
soning synthetically  from  the  hypothesis,  and  comparing  the 
deductions  with  observation  and  experiment,  that  the  cau- 
tious inquirer,  is  gradually  l^d,  either  to  correct  it  in  such 
a  manner  as  to  reconcile  it  with  facts,  or  finally  to  abandon 
it  as  an  unfounded  conjecture.  Even  in  this  latter  case,  an 
approach  is  made  to  the  truth  in  the  way  of  exclusion  ;  while, 
at  the  same  time,  an  accession  is  gained  lo  that  class  of  as- 
sociated and  kindred  phenomena,  which  it  is  his  object  to 
trace  to  their  parent  stock.! 

In  thus  apologizing  for  the  use  of  hypotheses,  I  only  repeat 
in  a  different  form  the  precepts  of  Bacon,  and  the  comments 
of  some  of  his  most  enlightened  followers.  "  The  prejudice 
"  against  hypotheses  which  many  people  entertain,"  says 
the  late  Dr.  Gregory,  "  is  founded  on  the  equivocal  signift- 
"  cation  of  a  word.  It  is  commonly  confounded  with  theo- 
"  ry ; — but  a  hypothesis  properly  means  the  supposition  of 
"  a  principle,  of  whose  existence  there  is  no  proof  from  ex- 
"  perience,  but  which  may  be  rendered  more  or  less  proba- 
"  ble  by  facts  which  are  neither  numerous  enough,  nor  ade- 
gi  quate  to  infer  its  existence.  When  such  hypotheses  are 
':  proposed  in  the  modest  and  diffident  manner  that  becomes 
"  mere  suppositions  or  conjectures,  the}'  are  not  only  harm- 
"  less,  but  even  necessary  for  establishing  a  just  theory. 
"  They  are  the  first  rudiments  or  anticipations  of  Principles. 

t  •''  Iliad  interim  monemus  ;  ut  nemo  aniino  concidat,  aut  quasi  eonfundatur,  si  ex- 
':  perimenta,  quibus  incumbit,  expectationi  suae  non  respondeam.  Etenim  quod  succe- 
'•'  dit,  macis  compluceat  ;  at  quod  non  succedit,  saepenumero  non  minus  informat. 
'■'•  Aique  ilkid  semper  in  anirao  tenendum,  experimenta  lucifera  etiam  adhuc  magis, 
"  quam  fruelifera  ambienda  esse.  Atque  de  literata  expefimer.tia  hfec  dicta  sint  ;  qua; 
"  sagaciljLS  potius  est,  et  odoralio  qufedam  venatica,  quam  scicniia.'"  De  Augm. 
Scient.  Lib.  v.  Cap.  ii. 


SECT.  IV.]  OP   THE    HUMAN   MIND.  305 

"  Without  these,  there  could  not  be  useful  observation,  nor 
"  experiment,  nor  arrangement,  because  there  could  be  no 
"  motive  or  principle  in  the  mind  to  form  them.  Hypothe- 
u  ses  then  only  become  dangerous  and  censurable,  when  they 
"  are  imposed  on  us  for  just  principles  ;  because,  in  that 
"  case,  they  put  a  slop  to  further  inquiry,  by  leading  the 
"  mind  to  acquiesce  in  principles  which  may  as  probably  be 
"  ill  as  well  founded."* 

Another  eminent  writer  has  apologized  very  ingeniously, 
and  1  think  very  philosophically,  for  the  hypotheses  and  con- 
jectures which  are  occasionally  to  be  found  in  his  own  works. 
The  author  I  mean  is  Dr.  Stephen  Hales,  who,  in  the  pre- 
face to  the  second  volume  of  his  Vegetable  Statics,  has  ex- 
pressed himself  thus  : 

"  In  natural  philosophy  we  cannot  depend  on  any  mere 
"  speculations  of  the  mind  ;  we  can  only  reason  with  any 
"  tolerable  certainty  from  proper  data,  such  as  arise  from 
"  the  united  testimony  of  many  good  and  credible  experi- 
"  ments. 

"  Yet  it  seems  not  unreasonable,  on  the  other  hand,  though 
"  not  far  to  indulge,  to  carry  our  reasonings  a  little  farther 
"  than  the  plain  evidence  of  experiments  will  warrant  ;  for 
"  since  at  the  utmost  boundaries  of  those  things  which  we 
"  clearly  know,  a  kind  of  twilight  is  cast  on  the  adjoining 
"  borders  of  Terra  Incognita^  it  seems  reasonable,  in  some 
"  degree,  to  indulge  conjecture  there  ;  otherwise  we  should 
"  make  but  very  slow  advances,  either  by  experiments  or 
"  reasoning.  For  new  experiments  and  discoveries  usually 
"  owe  their  first  rise  only  to  lucky  guesses  and  probable 
"  conjectures  ;  and  even  disappointments  in  these  conjec- 
"  tures  often  lead  to  the  things  sought  for." 

To  these  quotations  I  shall  add  two  short  extracts  from 
Dr.  Hooke,  (the  contemporary,  or  rather  the  predecessor  of 
Newton,)  whose  acute  and  original  remarks  on  this  subject 
reflect  the  greater  credit  on  his  talents,  that  they  were  pub- 

*  Lecture?  on  the  Duties  and  the  Qualifications  of  a  Physician. 

vol.  ii.  39 


306  ELEMENTS    OF    THE    PHILOSOPHY       [CHAP.  I\V 

lished  at  a  period,  when  the  learned  body  of  which  he  was 
so  illustrious  an  ornament,  seem  plainly  to  have  been  more 
disposed  to  follow  the  letter  of  some  detached  sentences,  than 
to  imbibe  the  general  spirit  of  Bacon's  logic. 

"  There  may  be  use  of  method  in  the  collecting  of  mate- 
"  rials,  as  well  as  in  the  employment  of  them  ;  for  there 
"  ought  to  be  some  end  and  aim  ;  some  predesigned  module 
<?  and  theory  ;  some  purpose  in  our  experiments.  And 
"  though  this  Society  have  hitherto  seemed  to  avoid  and 
"  prohibit  preconceived  theories  and  deductions  from  par- 
"  ticular  and  seemingly  accidental  experiments  ;  yet  1  hum- 
"  bly  conceive,  that  such,  if  knowingly  and  judiciously  made, 
"  are  matters  of  the  greatest  importance  ;  as  giving  a  cha- 
"  racteristic  of  the  aim,  use,  and  signification  thereof;  and 
"  without  which  many,  and  possibly  the  most  considerable 
"  particulars,  are  passed  over  without  regard  and  observa- 
"  tion.* 

"  Where  the  data  on  which  our  ratiocinations  are  founded 
"  are  uncertain  and  only  conjectural,  the  conclusions  or  de- 
(i  ductions  therefrom  can  at  best  be  no  other  than  probable, 
"  but  still  they  become  more  and  more  probable,  as  the  con- 
"  spquenc.es  deduced  from  them  appear,  upon  examinations 
"  by  trials  and  designed  observations,  to  be  confirmed  by 
<:  fact  or  effect.  So  that  the  effect  is  that  which  consuru- 
tl  mates  the  demonstration  of  the  invention  ;  and  the  theory 
"  is  only  an  assistant  to  direct  such  an  inquisition,  as  may 
«'  procure  the  demonstration  of  its  existence  or  non-exis- 
"  tence."t 

As  an  illustration  of  this  last  remark,  Hooke  mentions  his 
anticipation  of  Jupiter's  motion  upon  his  axis,  long  before  he 
was  able,  by  means  of  a  good  telescope,  to  ascertain  the 
fact.  A  much  more  remarkable  instance,  however,  of  his 
philosophical  sagacity,  occurs  in  his  anticipation  of  that  theo- 
ry of  the  planetary  motions,  which,  soon  after,  was  to  pre- 
sent itself,  with  increased  and  at  length  demonstrative  evi- 
dence, to  a  still  more   inventive  and  powerful  mind.     This 

*  Hooke's  Posthumous  Works,  p.  280. 

t  Ibid,  p.  537.    For  another  extract  from  the  same  work,  see  Note  (S.) 


SECT.    IV.]  OP    THE    HUMAN   MIND.  307 

conjecture  (which  I  shall  state  in  his  own  words)  affords,  of 
itself,  a  decisive  reply  to  theundistinguishing  censures  which 
have  so  often  been  bestowed  on  the  presumptuous  vanity  of 
attempting,  by  means  of  hypotheses,  to  penetrate  into  the 
secrets  of  nature. 

"  I  will  explain  (says  Hooke,  in  a  communication  to  the 
"  Royal  Society  in  1666)  a  system  of  the  world  very  dilfer- 
"  ent  from  any  yet  received.  It  is  founded  on  the  three  fol- 
"  lowing  positions. 

"  1.  That  all  the  heavenly  bodies  have  not  only  a  gravi- 
"  tation  of  their  parts  to  their  own  proper  centre,  but  that 
"  they  also  mutually  attract  each  other  within  their  spheres 
"  of  action. 

"  2.  That  all  bodies  having  a  simple  motion,  will  continue 
iS  to  move  in  a  straight  line,  unless  continually  deflected  from 
"  it  by  some  extraneous  force,  causing  them  to  describe  a 
"  circle,  an  ellipse,  or  some  other  curve. 

"  .3.  That  this  attraction  is  so  much  the  greater  as  the  bo- 
"  dies  are  nearer.  As  to  the  proportion  in  which  those  for- 
"  ces  diminish  by  an  increase  of  distance,  I  own  I  have  not 
"  discovered  it,  although  1  have  made  some  experiments  to 
H  this  purpose.  I  leave  this  to  others,  who  have  time  and 
"  knowledge  sufficient  for  the  task." 

The  argument  in  favour  of  Hypotheses  might  be  pushed 
much  farther,  by  considering  the  tentative  or  hypothetical 
steps  by  which  the  most  cautious  philosophers  are  often  un- 
der the  necessity  of  proceeding,  in  conducting  inquiries 
Strictly  experimental.  These  cannot  be  belter  described 
than  in  the  words  of  Boscovich,  the  slightest  of  whose  logical 
hints  are  entitled  to  peculiar  attention. — M  In  some  instan- 
*'  ces,  observations  and  experiments  at  once  reveal  to  us  all 
"  that  we  wish  to  know.  In  other  cases,  we  avail  ourselves 
"  of  the  aid  of  hypotheses  ; — by  which  word,  however,  is  to  be 
*'  understood,  not  fictions  altogether  arbitrary,  but  suppositions 
"  conformable  to  experience  or  to  analogy.  By  means  of 
'*  these,  we  are  enabled  to  supply  the  defects  of  our  data, 
"  and  to   conjecture  or   divine  the  path  to  truth  ;    always 


308  ELEMENTS    OP    THE    PHILOSOPHY       [CHAP.    IV, 

"  ready  to  abandon  our  hypothesis,  when  found  to  involve 
"  consequences  inconsistent  with  fact.  And  indeed,  in 
ci  most  cases,  I  conceive  this  to  be  the  method  best  adapted 
"  to  physics  ;  a  science  in  which  the  procedure  of  the  in- 
"  quirer  may  be  compared  to  that  of  a  person  attempting  to 
"  decipher  a  letter  written  in  a  secret  character  ;  and  in 
"  which,  legitimate  theories  are  generally  the  slow  result  of 
"  disappointed  essays,  and  of  errors  which  have  led  the  way 
"  to  their  own  detection."* 

Nor  is  it  solely  by  the  erroneous  results  of  his  own  hy- 
pothesis, that  the  philosopher  is  assisted  in  the  investigation 
of  truth.     Similar  lights  are  often  to  be  collected  from  the  er- 

*  De  So'is  ac  Lunae  Defectibus.  Lond.  1760,  pp.  211,  212.  For  the  continuation 
of  the  above  passage,  see  Note  (T.) 

Many  remarks  to  the  same  purpose  may  be  found  in  Bacon.  The  following  hap- 
pen at  present  to  occur  to  my  memory  : 

"  Deo  (formarum  inditori  et  opifici)  et  fortasse  angelis  competit,  formas  per  affirr 
"  mationem  immediate  nosse,  atque  ab  initio  contemplationis.  Sed  certe  supra  ho- 
'{  minem  est ;  cui  tantum  conceditur,  prpcedere  primo  per  negatiias,  et  postremo  loco 

"  desinere  in  affixmaiivas.  post  omnimodam  exclusionem Post  rejec- 

u  tionem  et  exclusionem  debitis  modis  factam,  secundo  loco  (tanquam  in  fundo)  mane- 
"  bit  (abeuntibus  in  fumum  opinionibus  volalilibus)/or»jfl  affirmativa,  solida,  et  vera. 
**  Atque  hoc  brevi  dictu  est,  sed  per  multas  ambages  ad  hoc  pervenitur." — Nov.  Org. 
Lib.U.  Aphor.XV.XVI. 

"  Prudens  interrogate,  quasi  dimidium  scientise.  Idcirco  quo  amplior  et  cerlior 
"  fuerit  anticipatio  nostra  ;  eo  magis  tlirecta  et  ccmpendiosa  erit  investigatio." — De 
Aug.  Scient  Lib.  V.  Cap.  3. 

"  Vaga  experientia  et  se  tantum  sequcns  mera  palpatio  est,  el  homines  polius  stupe- 
<l  facit,  quam  iiiforiiiat.'' — Nov.  Org.  Lib.  I.  Aphor.  C. 

The  reader  who  wishes  to  prosecute  farther  this  speculation  concerning  the  use  of- 
hypotheses,  may  consult  with  advantage  three  short  but  interesting  memoirs  upon 
Method,  by  the  late  M.  Le  Sage  of  Geneva,  which  M.  Prevost  has  annexed  as  a 
supplement  to  his  Essais  de  Philosophie.  That  I  may  not  be  supposed,  however,  to 
acquiesce  in  all  this  author's  views,  1  shall  mention  two  strong  objections  to  which 
some  of  them  appear  to  me  to  be  liable. 

1.  In  treating  of  the  method  of  Hypothesis,  Le  Sage  uniformly  contrasts  it  with 
that  of  Analogy,  as  if  the  two  were  radically  distinct,  and  even  opposite  in  their 
spirit  ;  whereas  it  seems  evident,  that  some  perception  of  analogy  must  have  given 
birth  to  every  hypothesis  which  possesses  a  sufficient  degree  of  plausibility  to  deserve- 
farther  examination. 

2,  In  apptying  the  rules  of  mathematical  Method  to  Physics,  he  makes  far  too  little 
allowance  for  the  essential  difference  between  the  two  sciences.  This  is  more  parti- 
cularly remarkable  in  his  observations  on  the  aid  to  be  derived,  in  investigating  the 
laws  of  nature,  from  the  method  of  Exclusions, — so  happily  employed  by  Frenicle  de 
Bessy  (a  French  mathematician  of  the  17th  century)  in  the  solution  of  some  very 
difficult  problems  relating  to  numbers. — See  Note  (U/> 


SECT.  IV.]  OP    THE    HUMAN    MIND.  309 

rors  of  his  predecessors  ;  and  hence  it  is,  that  accurate  histo- 
ries of  the  different  sciences  may  justly  be  ranked  among  the 
most  effectual  means  of  accelerating  their  future  advance- 
ment. It  was  from  a  review  of  the  endless  and  hopeless  wan- 
derings of  preceding  inquirers,  that  Bacon  inferred  the  neces- 
sity of  avoiding  every  beaten  tract ;  and  it  was  this  which  en- 
couraged him, — with  a  confidence  in  his  own  powers  amply 
justified  by  the  event — to  explore  and  to  open  a  new  path  to 
the  mysteries  of  nature  :  Inveniam  viam,  aut  faciam.  In  this 
respect,  the  maturity  of  reason  in  the  species  is  analogous  to 
that  in  the  individual ;  not  the  consequence  of  any  sudden  or 
accidental  cause,  but  the  fruit  of  reiterated  disappointments 
correcting  the  mistakes  of  youth  and  inexperience.  "  There 
"  is  no  subject,"  says  Fontenelle,  "  on  which  men  ever  come 
"  to  form  a  reasonable  opinion,  till  they  have  once  exhausted 
"  all  the  absurd  views  which  it  is  possible  to  take  of  it.  What 
"  follies,"  he  adds,  "  should  we  not  be  repeating  at  this  day, 
"  if  we  had  not  been  anticipated  in  so  many  of  them  by  the 
^ancient  philosophers!"  Those  systems,  therefore,  which 
are  falsf>,  are  by  no  means  to  be  regarded  as  altogether  use- 
less. That  of  Ptolemy  (for  example)  as  Bailly  has  well  ob- 
served, is  founded  on  a  prejudice  so  natural  and  so  unavoida- 
ble, that  it  may  be  considered  as  a  necessary  stpp  in  the 
progress  of  .astronomical  science  ;  and  if  it  had  not  been  pro- 
posed in  ancient  times,  it  would  infallibly  have  preceded, 
among  the  moderns,  the  system  of  Copernicus,  and  retarded 
the  period  of  its  discovery. 

In  what  I  have  hitherto  said  in  defence  of  the  method  of 
Hypothesis,  I  have  confined  myself  entirely  to  its  utility  as 
an  organ  of  investigation  ;  taking  all  along  for  granted,  that, 
till  the  principle  assumed  has  been  fairly  inferred  as  a  law  of 
nature,  from  undoubted  facts,  none  of  the  explanations  which  it 
affords  are  to  be  admitted  as  legitimate  theories.  Some  of  the 
advocates  for  this  method  have  however  gone  much  farther ; 
asserting,  that  if  a  hypothesis  be  sufficient  to  account  for  all 
the  phenomena  in  question,*  no  other  proof  of  its  conformity 
to  truth  is  necessary.     "  Supposing,"  says  Dr.  Hartley,  "  the 


310  ELEMENTS    OF    THE    PHILOSOPHY       [CHAP.  IV. 

"  existence  of  the  aether  to  be  destitute  of  all  direct  evi- 
"  dence,  still,  if  it  serves  to  explain  and  account  for  a  great 
"  variety  of  phenomena,  it  will,  by  this  means,  have  an  indi- 
"  rect  argument  in  its  favour.  Thus,  we  admit  the  key  of  a 
"  cipher  to  be  a  true  one,  when  it  explains  the  cipher  com- 
"  pletely  ;  and  the  decipherer  judges  himself  to  approach  to 
"  the  true  key,  in  proportion  as  he  advances  in  the  explana- 
"  tion  of  the  cipher;  and  this  without  any  direct  evidence  at 
u  all."*  On  another  occasion,  he  observes,  that  "  Philoso- 
"  phy  is  the  art  of  deciphering  the  mysteries  of  nature  ;  and 
"  that  every  theory  which  can  explain  all  the  phenomena,  has 
"  the  same  evidence  in  its  favour,  that  it  is  possible  the  key  of 
"  a  cipher  can  have  from  its  explaining  that  cipher."! 

The  same  very  ingenious  and  plausible  reasoning  is  urged 
by  Le  Sage  in  one  of  his  posthumous  fragments  ;l  and,  long 
before  the  publication  of  Hartley's  work,  it  had  struck 
Gravesande  so  strongly,  that,  in  his  Introductio  ad  Philoso- 
phiam,  he  has  subjoined  to  his  chapter  on  the  Use  of  Hypo- 
theses, another  on  the  Art  of  Deciphering.  Of  the  merit  of 
the  latter  it  is  no  slight  proof,  that  D'Alembert  has  inserted 
the  substance  of  it  in  one  of  the  articles  of  the  Encyclopedic^ 

In  reply  to  Hartley's  comparison  between  the  business  of 
the  philosopher  and  that  of  the  decipherer,  Dr.  Reid  ob- 
serves, that  "  to  find  the  key  requires  an  understanding  equal 
"  or  superior  to  that  which  made  the  cipher.  This  instance, 
"  therefore,"  he  adds,  "  will  then  be  in  point,  when  he  who 
"  attempts  to  decipher  the  works  of  nature  by  a  hypothesis,. 

»  Observation  on  Man,  Vol.  I.  pp.  lj,  16.  (4th  Edit.) 

f  Ibid.  p.  550.  The  section  from  which  this  quotation  is  taken  (entitled  "  Of  pro- 
'■  positions  and  the  nature  of  Assent")  contains  various  ingenious  and  just  observa- 
tions, blended  with  others  strongly  marked  with  the  author's  peculiar  turn  of  thinking . 
Among  these  last  may  be  mentioned  his  Theory  of  Mathematical  Evidence,  coinciding 
exactly  with  that  which  has  since  been  proposed  by  Dr.  Beddoes.  Compare  Hariln;. 
with  pp  140.  and  141.  of  this  volume. 

|  «  S'admettons-nous  pas  pour  vraie,  la  clef  d'une  lettre  ecrite  en  chiffres,  ou  celle 
"  d'une  logogryphe  ;  quand  cette  clef  ^'applique  exactment  a  tous  les  caracteresdont 
«  il  faut  rendre  raison  ?"  Opuscules  de  G.  L.  Le  Sage,  relatifs  a  la  Methode.  See  M. 
Prevost's  Essais  de  Philosophies 

§  Article  Dechiffrer.    See  Also  D'Alembert's  Oeuvres  Posthumes.    Tome  II.  p 
177. — Gr&vcsaiule's  Logic  was  published  in  1736 


SECT*  IV.]  OF    THE    HUMAN  MIND.  311 

"  has  an  understanding  equal  or  superior  to  that  which  made 
"  them."* 

This  argument  is  not  stated  with  the  author's  usual  cor- 
rectness in  point  of  logic  ;  inasmuch  as  the  first  proposition 
contrasts  the  sagacity  of  the  decipherer  with  that  of  the  con- 
triver of  the  cipher  ;  and  the  second,  with  that  of  the  author  of 
the  composition  deciphered.  Nor  is  this  all.  The  argument 
proceeds  on  the  supposition,  that,  if  the  task  of  the  scientific 
inquirer  be  compared  to  that  of  the  decypherer,  the  views  of 
the  author  of  nature  may,  with  equal  propriety,  be  compared 
to  those  of  the  inventor  of  the  cipher.  It  Us  impossible  to 
imagine  that  this  was  Hartley's  idea.  The  object  of  true 
philosophy  is,  in  no  case  presumptuously  to  divine  an  al- 
phabet of  secret  characters  or  ciphers,  purposely  employed 
by  infinite  Wisdom  to  conceal  its  operations  ;  but,  by  the  dili- 
gent study  of  facts  and  analogies  legible  to  all,  to  discover 
the  key  which  infinite  Wisdom  has  itself  prepared  for  the  in- 
terpretation of  its  own  laws.  In  other  words,  its  object  is, 
to  concentrate  and  to  cast  on  the  unknown  parts  of  the  uni- 
verse, the  lights  which  are  reflected  from  those  which  are 
known. 

In  this  instance,  as  well  as  in  others,  where  Reid  repro- 
bates hypotheses,  his  reasoning  uniformly  takes  for  granted, 
that  they  are  wholly  arbitrary  and  gratuitous.  "  If  a  thou- 
"  sand  of  the  greatest  wits,"  says  he,  "  that  ever  the  world 
"  produced,  were,  without  any  previous  knowledge  in  anatomy, 
"  to  sit  down  and  contrive  how,  and  by  what  internal  organs, 
"  the  various  functions  of  the  human  body  are  carried  on — 
"  how  the  blood  is  made  to  circulate,  and  the  limbs  to  move — 
"  they  would  not,  in  a  thousand  years,  hit  upon  any  thing 
"  like  the  truth."!  Nothing  can  be  juster  than  this  remark  ; 
but  does  it  authorize  the  conclusion,  that,  to  an  experienced 
and  skilful  anatomist,  conjectures  founded  on  analogy,  and 
en  the  consideration  onuses,  are  of  no  avail  as  media  of  dis- 
covery ?  The  logical  inference,  indeed,  from  Dr.  Reid's  own 

*  Essays  on  the  Intel!.  Powers,  p.  88. 
\  Ibid.  p.  49. 


312  ELEMENTS    OF    THE    PHILOSOPHY  [CHAP.  IV, 

statement,  is  not  against  anatomical  conjectures  in  general, 
but  against  the  anatomical  conjectures  of  those  who  are  ig- 
norant of  anatomy. 

The  same  reply  may  be  made  to  the  following  assertion  of 
D'Alembert  ;  another  writer,  who,  in  my  opinion,  has,  on 
various  occasions,  spoken  much  too  lightly  Of  analogical  con- 
jectures. "  It  may  be  safely  affirmed,  that  a  mere  theorist 
"  (un  Physicien  de  Cabinet)  who,  by  means  of  reasonings  and 
"  calculations,  should  attempt  to  divine  the  phenomena  of 
"  nature,  and  who  should  afterwards  compare  his  anticipa- 
M  tions  with  facts,  would  be  astonished  to  find  how  wide  of 
"  the  truth  almost  all  of  them  had  been.1'*  If  this  observa- 
tion be  confined  to  those  system-builders,  who,  without  any 
knowledge  of  facts,  have  presumed  to  form  conclusions  a 
priori  concerning  the  universe,  its  truth  is  so  obvious  and  in- 
disputable, that  it  was  hardly  worth  the  while  of  this  profound 
philosopher  so  formally  to  announce  it.  If  extended  to  such 
men  as  Copernicus,  Kepler,  and  Newton,  and  to  the  illustri- 
ous train  who  have  issued  from  the  Newtonian  school,  it  is 
contradicted  by  numberless  examples,  of  which  D'Alembert 
could  not  fail  to  be  perfectly  aware. t 

The  sagacity  which  guides  the  Philosopher  in  conjectur- 
ing the  laws  of  nature  has,  in  its  metaphysical  origin,  a 
very  near  affinity  to  that  acquired  perception  of  human  cha- 
racter, which  is  possessed  by  Men  of  the  World.  The  con- 
clusions of  one  individual  with  respect  to  the  springs  of  ac- 
tion in  the  breast  of  another,  can  never,  on  the  most  favour- 
able supposition,  amount  to  more  than  to  a  Hypothesis  sup- 
ported by  strong  analogies  ;  yet  how  different  is  the  value  of 
the  Hypothesis,  according  to  the  intellectual  habits  of  him 
by  whom  it  is  formed !  What  more  absurd  and  presumptuous 
than  the  theories  of  the  cloistered  schoolman  concerning  the 

*  Melanges  de  LiUerature,  &.c.  Tome  V.  §  6.  (entitled  Eclaircissement  sur  ce  qui  a 
e  e  dit,  &e.  de  l'art  de  conjecturer.) 

t  Accordingly,  in  another  part  of  the  same  article,  he  has  said  :  «  L'analogie,  e'est- 
"  a-dire,  la  resscmblance  plus  on  moins  grande  des  faits,  le  rapport  plus  ou  moins 
"  sensible  qjj'ils  out  entr'eux,  est  l'unique  regie  des  physiciens,  soit  pour  expliquer  les 
"  fails  conn  us,  soit  pom-  en  decouvrir  de  nouveaux." 


SECT.  IV.]  OP   THE   HUMAN   MIND.  313 

moral  or  the  political  phenomena  of  active  life  !  What  more 
interesting  and  instructive  than  the  slightest  characteristical 
sketches  from  the  hand  of  a  Sully  or  of  a  Clarendon  ! 

To  these  suggestions  in  vindication  of  hypotheses  it  may 
be  added,  that  some  of  the  reasonings  which,  with  propriety, 
were  urged  against  them  a  century  ago,  have  already,  in 
consequence  of  the  rapid  progress  of  knowledge,  lost  much 
of  their  force.  It  is  very  justly  remarked  by  M.  Prevost, 
that  "  at  a  period  when  science  has  advanced  so  far  as  to 
"  have  accumulated  an  immense  treasure  of  facts,  the  danger 
"  of  hypotheses  is  less,  and  their  advantages  greater,  than  in 
"  times  of  comparative  ignorance."  For  this  he  assigns 
three  reasons.  "  1.  The  multitude  of  facts  restrains  Imagi- 
"  nation,  by  presenting,  in  every  direction,  obstacles  to  her 
'*  wanderings  ;  and  by  overturning  her  frail  edifices.  2.  In 
"  proportion  as  facts  multiply,  the  memory  stands  in  greater 
"  need  of  the  aid  of  connecting  or  associating  principles.* 
u  3.  The  chance  of  discovering  interesting  and  luminous 
"  relations  among  the  objects  of  our  knowledge  increases 
"  with  the  growing  number  of  the  objects  compared. "t— * 
The  considerations  already  stated  suggest  a  4th  reason  in 
confirmation  of  the  same  general  proposition  : — That,  by  the 
extension  of  human  knowledge,  the  scale  upon  which  the 
Analogies  of  Nature  may  be  studied,  is  so  augmented  as  to 
strike  the  most  heedless  eye  ;  while,  by  its  diffusion,  the  per- 
ception of  these  analogies  (so  essential  an  element  in  the 
composition  of  inventive  genius)  is  insensibly  communicated 
to  all  who  enjoy  the  advantages  of  a  liberal  education.  Just- 
ly, therefore,  might  Bacon  say,  "  Certo  sciant  homines,  artes 
"  inveniendi  solidas  et  veras  adolescere  et  incrementa  sume- 
"  re  cum  ipsis  inventis." 

But  although  I  do  not  think  that  Reid  has  been  successful 
in  his  attempt  to  refute  Hartley's  argument,  I  am  far  from 

*  With  respect  to  the  utility  of  hypothetical  theories,  as  adminicles  to  the  natural 
powers  of  memory ,  see  the  former  volume  of  this  work,  Chap.  vi.  Sections  3  and  4. 
t  See  Note  (X.) 

vol.  II.  40 


314  ELEMENTS    OF    THE    PHILOSOPHY        [CHAP.  IV<r 

considering  that  argument  as  sound  or  conclusive.    My  chief 
objections  to  it  are  the  two  following. 

1.  The  cases  compared  are  by  no  means  parallel.  la 
that  of  the  cipher,  we  have  all  the  facts  before  us  ;  and,  if  the 
key  explains  them,  we  may  be  certain,  that  nothing  can  di- 
rectly contradict  the  justness  of  our  interpretation.  In  our 
physical  researches,  on  the  other  hand,  we  are  admitted  to  see 
only  a  few  detached  sentences  extracted  from  a  volume,  of 
the  size  of  which  we  are  entirely  ignorant.  No  hypothesis, 
therefore,  how  numerous  soever  the  facts  may  be  with  which 
it  tallies,  can  completely  exclude  the  possibility  of  excep- 
tions or  limitations  hitherto  undiscovered. 

It  must,  at  the  samt  time,  be  granted,  that  the  probability 
of  a  hypothesis  increases  in  proportion  to  the  number  of  phe- 
nomena for  which  it  accounts,  and  to  the  simplicity  of  the 
theory  by  which  it  explains  them  ; — and  that,  in  some  in- 
stanees,  this  probability  may  amount  to  a  moral  certainty. 
The  most  remarkable  example  of  this  which  occurs  in  the 
history  of  science  is,  undoubtedly,  the  Copernican  system. 
1  before  observed,  that  at  the  period  when  it  was  first  pro- 
posed, it  was  nothing  more  than  a  hypothesis  ;  and  that  its 
only  proof  rested  on  its  conformity,  in  point  of  simplicity,  to 
the  general  economy  of  the  Universe.  "  When  Coperni- 
"  cus,"  says  Mr.  Maclaurin,  "  considered  the  form,  disposi- 
"  tion,  and  motions  of  the  system,  as  they  were  then  repre- 
"  sented  after  Ptolemy,  he  found  the  whole  void  of  order. 
*'  symmetry,  and  proportion  ;  like  a  piece  (as  he  expresses 
"  himself)  made  up  of  parts  copied  from  different  originals^ 
u  which,  not  fitting  each  other,  should  rather  represent  a 
"  monster  than  a  man.  He  therefore  perused  the  writings 
"  of  the  ancient  philosophers,  to  see  whether  any  more  ra- 
"  tional  account  had  ever  been  proposed  of  the  motions  of 
"  the  Heavens.  The  first  hint  he  had  was  from  Cicero,  who 
"  tells  us,  in  his  Academical  Questions,  that  Nicetas,  a  Syra- 
"  cusian,  had  taught  that  the  earth  turns  round  on  its  axis, 
"  which  made  the  whole  heavens  appear  to  a  spectator  on  the 
"  earth  to  turn  round  it  daily.     Afterwards,  from  Plutarch  he 


SECT.  IV.]  OP   THE    HUMAN   MIND.  315 

i;  found  that  Philolaus,  the  Pythagorean,  had  taught  that  the 
"  earth  moved  annually  round  the  sun.  He  immediately 
"  perceived,  that,  by  allowing  these  two  motions,  all  the  per- 
"  plexity,  disorder,  and  confusion  he  had  complained  of  in. 
"  the  celestial  motions,  vanished  ;  and  that,  instead  of  these, 
"  a  simple  regular  disposition  of  the  orbits,  and  a  harmony 
"  of  the  motions  appeared,  worthy  of  the  great  Author  of  the 
"  world."* 

Of  the  truth  of  this  hypothesis,  the  discoveries  of  the  last 
century  have  afforded  many  new  proofs  of  a  direct  and  even 
demonstrative  nature  ;  and  yet,  it  may  be  fairly  questioned, 
whether  to  Copernicus  and  Galileo,  the  analogical  reasoning 
stated  in  the  preceding  quotation,  did  not,  of  itself,  appear  so 
conclusive,  as  to  supersede  the  necessity  of  any  farther  evi- 
dence.    The  ecclesiastical  persecutions  which  the  latter  en- 
countered  in  defence  of  his    supposed  heresy,  sufficiently 
evinces  the  faith  which  he  reposed  in  his  astronomical  creed. 
It  is,  however,  extremely  worthy  of  remark,  with  respect 
to   the   Copernican  system,  that   it  affords   no   illustration 
whatever  of  the  justness  of  Hartley's  logical  maxim.     The 
Ptolemaic  system  was  not  demonstrably  inconsistent  with  any 
phenomena  known  in  the  sixteenth  century :  and,  consequent- 
ly, the  presumption  for  the  new  hypothesis  did  not  arise  from 
its  exclusive  coincidence  writh  the  facts,  but  from  the  simpli- 
city and  beauty  which  it  possessed  as  a   theory.     The  infe- 
rence to  be  deduced  from  it  is,  therefore,  not  in  favour  of  hy- 
potheses in  general,  but  of  hypotheses  sanctioned  by  analogy. 
The  fortunate  hypothesis  of  a  Ring  encircling  the  body  of 
Saturn,  by  which  Huyghens  accounted,  in  a  manner  equally 
simple  and  satisfactory,  for  a  set  of  appearances  which,  for 
forty  years,  had  puzzled  all  the  astronomers  of  Europe,  bears, 
in  all  its  circumstances,  a  closer  resemblance  than  any  other 

*  Accoun'  of  Newton's  Philosophical  Discoveries,  p.  45.  (2d  Edit.) 
This  presumptive  argument,  as  it  presented  itself  to  the  mind  of  Copernicus,  is  thus 
stated  by  Bailly  :  "  Les  hommes  sentent  que  la  nature  est  simple  ;  les  stations  et  les 
"  i€;  (-gradations  desplaneles  offroient  des  apparences  bizarres  ;  le  priacipe,  qui  les 
u  rainenoii  a  hip  marche  simple,  et  naitirellp.  nepoitooit  iVre  qu'utie  vO'iti,"  Hist, 
de  l'Astron.  Mod.  Tom.  I.  p.  3.51. 


316  ELEMENTS    OF   THE   PHILOSOPHY         [CHAP.  IV. 

instance  I  know  of,  to  the  key  of  a  cipher.  Of  its  truth  it  is 
impossible  for  the  most  sceptical  mind  to  entertain  any  doubt, 
when  it  is  considered,  that  it  not  only  enabled  Huyghens  to 
explain  all  the  known  phenomena,  but  to  predict  those  which 
were  afterwards  to  be  observed.  This  instance,  accordingly, 
has  had  much  stress  laid  upon  it  by  different  writers,  particu- 
larly by  Gravesande  and  Le  Sage.*  I  must  own,  I  am 
somewhat  doubtful,  if  the  discovery  of  a  key  to  so  limited 
and  insulated  a  class  of  optical  facts,  authorizes  any  valid 
argument  for  the  employment  of  mere  hypotheses,  to  de- 
cipher the  complicated  phenomena  resulting  from  the  general 
laws  of  nature.  It  is,  indeed,  an  example  most  ingeniously 
and  happily  selected :  but  would  not  perhaps  have  been  so 
often  resorted  to,  if  it  had  been  easy  to  find  others  of  a  simi? 
Iar  description, 

2.  The  chief  objection,  however,  to  Hartley's  comparison 
of  the  theorist  to  the  decipherer  is,  that  there  are  few,  if  any, 
physical  hypotheses,  which  afford  the  only  way  of  explain- 
ing the  phenomena  to  which  they  are  applied  ;  and  there- 
fore, admitting  them  to  be  perfectly  consistent  with  all  the 
known  facts,  they  leave  us  in  the  same  state  of  uncertainty, 
in  which  the  decipherer  would  find  himself,  if  he  should 
discover  a  variety  of  keys  to  the  same  cipher,  Des  Cartes 
acknowledges,  that  the  same  effect  might,  upon  the  principles 
of  his  philosophy,  admit  of  manifold  explanations ;  and  that 
nothing  perplexed  him  more  than  to  know  which  he  ought 
to  adopt  in  preference  to  the  others.  "  The  powers  of  na- 
**  ture,"  says  he,  "  I  must  confess,  are  so  ample,  that  no 
"  sooner  do  I  observe  any  particular  effect,  than  I  immedi- 
"  ately  perceive  that  it  may  be  deduced  from  my  prin- 
ciples, in  a  variety  of  different  ways  ;  and  nothing,  in  ge- 
"  neral,  appears  to  me  more  difficult,  than  to  ascertain  by 
"  which  of  these  processes  it  is  really  produced."!     The 

*  Gravesande,  Introd.  ad.  Philosoph.  §$  979,  985.  Opuscules  de  Le  Sage,  Pre- 
mier Memoire,  §  25.  The  latter  writer  mentions  the  theory  in  question,  as  a  hy- 
pothesis which  received  no  countenance  whatever  from  the  analogy  of  any  prece- 
ding astronomical  discovery. 

t  Dissertatio  de  Methodo.    In  the  sentence  immediately  following,  Des  Cartes 


SECT.  IV.]  OF    THE    HUMAN   MIND.  317 

same  remark  may  (with  a  very  few  exceptions)  be  ex- 
tended to  every  hypothetical  theory  which  is  unsupported 
by  any  collateral  probabilities  arising  from  experience  or 
analogy ;  and  it  sufficiently  shews,  how  infinitely  inferior 
such  theories  are,  in  point  of  evidence,  to  the  conclusions 
obtained  by  the  art  of  the  decipherer.  The  principles,  in- 
deed, on  which  this  last  art  proceeds,  may  be  safely  pro- 
nounced to  be  nearly  infallible. 

In  these  strictures  upon  Hartley,  I  have  endeavoured  to  do 
as  much  justice  as  possible  to  his  general  argument,  by 
keeping  entirely  out  of  sight  the  particular  purpose  which  it 
was  intended  to  serve.  By  confining  too  much  his  attention 
to  this,  Dr.  Reid  has  been  led  to  carry,  farther  than  was 
necessary  or  reasonable,  an  indiscriminate  zeal  against  every 
speculation  to  which  the  epithet  hypothetical  can,  in  any  de- 
gree, be  applied.  He  has  been  also  led  to  overlook  the 
essential  distinction  between  hypothetical  inferences  from 
one  department  of  the  Material  World  to  another,  and  hypo- 
thetical inferences  from  the  Material  World  to  the  Intel- 
lectual. Jt  was  with  the  view  of  apologizing  for  inferences 
of  the  latter  description,  that  Hartley  advanced  the  logical 
principle  which  gave  occasion  to  the  foregoing  discussion  ;  * 
and,  therefore,  I  apprehend,  the  proper  answer  to  his  argu- 
ment is  this  : — Granting  your  principle  to  be  true  in  all  its 
extent,  it  furnishes  no  apology  whatever  for  the  Theory  of 
Vibrations.  If  the  science  of  mind  admit  of  any  illustra- 
tion from  the  aid  of  hypotheses,  it  must  be  from  such  hy- 
potheses alone  as  are  consonant  to  the  analogy  of  its  ozon  phe- 
7iomena.  To  assume,  as  a  fact,  the  existence  of  analogies 
between  these  phenomena  and  those  of  matter,  is  to  sanction 
that  very  prejudice  which  it  is  the  great  object  of  the  induc- 
tive science  of  mind  to  eradicate. 

mentions  the  general  rule  which  he  followed,  when  such  an  embarrassment  occurred. 
?*  Hinc  aliter  me  extricare  non  possum,  quam  si  rursus  aliqua  experimenta  quseram  ; 
"quae  talia  sint,  ut  eorum  idem  non  sit  futurus  eventus,  si  hoc  modo  quam  si  illo 
"  explicetur."'  The  rule  is  excellent ;  and  it  is  only  to  he  regretted)  that  so  few  ex- 
emplifications of  it  are  to  be  found  in  his  writings. 


318  ELEMENTS    ©P    THE    PHILOSOPHY        [cHAP.  IT. 

I  have  repeatedly  had  occasion,  in  some  of  my  former 
publications,  to  observe,  that  the  names  of  almost  all  our 
mental  powers  and  operations  are  borrowed  from  sensible 
images.  Of  this  number  are  intuition  ;  the  discursive  facul- 
ty ;  attention  ;  reflection  ;  conception  ;  imagination ;  appre- 
hension ;  comprehension  ;  abstraction  ;  invention  ;  capacity ; 
penetration  ;  acuteness.  The  case  is  precisely  similar  with 
the  following  terms  and  phrases,  relative  to  a  different  class 
of  mental  phenomena  ; — inclination  ;  aversion  ;  delibera- 
tion ;  pondering  ;  weighing  the  motives  of  our  actions  ;  yield- 
ing to  that  motive  which  is  the  strongest ; — expressions  (it  may 
be  remarked  in  passing)  which,  when  employed,  without  a 
very  careful  analysis  of  their  import,  in  the  discussion  con- 
cerning the  liberty  of  the  will,  gratuitously  prejudge  the  very 
point  in  dispute ;  and  give  the  sembMnce  of  demonstration, 
to  what  is,  in  fact,  only  a  series  of  identical  propositions,  or 
a  sophistical  circle  of  words.* 

That  to  the  apprehensions  of  uneducated  men  such  meta- 
phorical or  analogical  expressions  should  present  the  images 
and  the  things  typified,  inseparably  combined  and  blended 
together,  is  not  wonderful ;  but  it  is  the  business  of  the  phi- 
losopher to  conquer  these  casual  associations,  and,  by  vary- 
ing his  metaphors,  when  he  cannot  completely  lay  them  aside, 
to  accustom  himself  to  view  the  phenomena  of  thought  in 
that  naked  and  undisguised  state  in  which  they  unveil  them- 
selves to  the  powers  of  consciousness  and  reflection.  To 
have  recourse,  therefore,  to  the  analogies  suggested  by  popu- 
lar language,  for  the  purpose  of  explaining  the  operations  of 
the  mind,  instead  of  advancing  knowledge,  is  to  confirm  and 
to  extend  the  influence  of  vulgar  errors. 

*  "  Nothing,"  says  Berkeley,  <•'  seems  more  to  have  contributed  towards  engaging 
"  men  in  controversies  and  mistakes  with  regard  to  the  nature  and  operations  of  the 
"  mind,  than  the  being  used  to  speak  of  those  things  in  terms  borrowed  from  sensible 
'■  ideas.  For  example,  the  will  is  termed  the  motion  of  the  soul.  This  infuses  a 
(i  belief,  that  the  mind  of  man  is  as  a  ball  in  motion,  impelled  and  determined  by 
"  the  objects  of  sense,  as  necessarily  as  that  is  by  the  stroke  of  a  racket.'1 — Princi- 
ples of  Human  Knowledge. 


SECT.  IV.]  OP   THE   HUMAN   MIND.  319 

After  having  said  so  much  in  vindication  of  analogical  con- 
jectures  as  steps  towards  physical  discoveries,  I  thought  it 
right  to  caution  my  readers  against  supposing,  that  what  I 
have  stated  admits  of  any  application  to  analogical  theories 
of  the  human  mind.  Upon  this  head,  however,  I  must  not 
enlarge  farther  at  present.  In  treating  of  the  inductive  logic, 
J  have  studiously  confined  my  illustrations  to  (hose  branches 
of  knowledge  in  which  it  has  already  been  exemplified  with 
indisputable  success  ;  avoiding,  for  obvious  reasons,  any 
reference  to  sciences  in  which  its  utility  still  remains  to  be 
ascertained. 

III. 


Supplemental  Observations  on  the   words  Induction  and  Analogy,  as  used  in 
Mathematics. 


Before  dismissing  the  subjects  of  induction  and  analogy, 
feonsidered  as  methods  of  reasoning  in  Physics,  it  remains  for 
me  to  take  some  slight  notice  of  the  use  occasionally  made 
of  the  same  terms  in  pure  Mathematics.  Although,  in  con- 
sequence of  the  very  different  natures  of  these  sciences,  the 
induction  and  analogy  of  the  one  cannot  fail  to  differ  widely 
from  the  induction  and  analogy  of  the  other,  yet,  from  the 
general  history  of  language,  it  may  be  safely  presumed,  that 
this  application  to  both  of  a  common  phraseology,  has  been 
suggested  by  certain  supposed  points  of  coincidence  between 
the  two  cases  thus  brought  into  immediate  comparison.* 

It  has  been  hitherto,  with  a  very  few  if  any  exceptions, 
the  universal  doctrine  of  modern  as  well  as  of  ancient  logi- 
cians, that  "  no  mathematical  proposition  can  be  proved  by 
induction.*9'  To  this  opinion  Dr.  Reid  has  given  his  sanc- 
tion in  the  strongest  terms  ;   observing,  that  "  although  in  a 

*I  have  already  observed  (seep.  259  of  ihis  volume)  that  mathematicians  fre- 
quently avail  themselves  of  that  sort  of  induction  which  Bacon  describes  "  as  pro- 
"  ceeding  by  simple  enumeration."  The  induction,  of  which  I  am  now  to  treat,  has 
very  little  in  common  with  the  .other,  and  bears  a  much  closer  resemblance  to  that 
recommended  in  the  Novum  Organon. 


320  ELEMENTS    OP    THE    PHILOSOPHY  [CHAP.  IV, 

"  thousand  cases,  it  should  be  found  by  experience,  that  the 
"  area  of  a  plane  triangle  is  equal  to  the  rectangle  under  the 
"  base  and  half  the  altitude,  this  would  not  prove  that  it  must 
"  be  so  in  all  cases,  and  cannot  be  otherwise,  which  is  what 
"  the  mathematician  affirms."* 

That  some  limitation  of  this  general  assertion  is  necessary  $ 
appears  plainly  from  the  well-known  fact,  that  induction  is  a 
species  of  evidence  on  which  the  most  scrupulous  reasoners 
are  accustomed,  in  their  mathematical  inquiries,  to  rely  with 
implicit  confidence  ;  and  which,  although  it  may  not  of  itself 
demonstrate  that  the  theorems  derived  from  it  are  necessarily 
true,  is  yet  abundantly  sufficient  to  satisfy  any  reasonable 
mind  that  they  hold  universally.  It  was  by  induction  (for  ex- 
ample) that  Newton  discovered  the  algebraical  formula  by 
which  we  are  enabled  to  determine  any  power  wha  ever, 
raised  from  a  binomial  root,  without  performing  the  progres- 
sive multiplications.  The  formula  expresses  a  relation  be- 
tween the  exponents  and  the  co-efficients  of  the  different 
terms,  which  is  found  to  hold  in  all  cases,  as  far  as  the  table 
of  powers  is  carried  by  actual  calculation  ; — from  which 
Newton  inferred,  that  if  this  table  were  to  be  continued  in 
infinitum,  the  same  formula  would  correspond  equally  with 
every  successive  power.  There  is  no  reason  to  suppose 
that  he  ever  attempted  to  prove  the  theorem  in  any  other 
way  ;  and  yet,  there  cannot  be  a  doubt,  that  he  was  as  firm- 
ly satisfied  of  its  being  universally  true,  as  if  he  had  examin- 
ed all  the  different  demonstrations  of  it  which  have  since 
been  given.!  Numberless  other  illustrations  of  the  same 
thing  might  be  borrowed,  both  from  arithmetic  and  geometry.]: 

"  E-ays  on  the  Intel).  Powers,  p.  G15,  4to.  edit. 

t  "  The  truth  of  this  theorem  was  long  known  only  by  trial  in  particular  cases, 
"  and  by  induction  from  analogy;  nor  does  it  appear  that  even  Newton  himself 
u  ever  attempted  an)'  direct  proof  of  it."  (Hutton's  Mathematical  Dictionary,  Art, 
Binomial  Theorem.)  For  some  interesting  information  with  respect  to  the  history 
of  this  discovery,  see  the  very  learned  Introduction  prefixed  by  Dr.  Hutton  to  his 
edition  of  Sherwin's  Mathematical  Tables  ;  and  the  second  volume  (p.  165)  of  the 
Scriptores  Logarithmici  edited  by  Mr.  Baron  Maseres. 

\  In  the  Jirithmetica  Infinitarum  of  Dr.  Wallis,  considerable  use  is  made  of  the 
Method  of  Induction.     "  A  l'aide  d'une  induction  habilement  menagee,"  says  Mon- 


SECT.  IV.]  OP    THE   HUMAN   MIND.  321 

Into  what  principles,  it  may  be  asked,  is  the  validity  of 
such  a  proof  in  mathematics  ultimately  resolvable  ? — To  me 
it  appears  to  take  for  granted  certain  general  logical  maxims  ; 
and  to  imply  a  secret  process  of  legitimate  and  conclusive 
reasoning,  though  not  conducted  agreeably  to  the  rules  of 
mathematical  demonstration,  nor  perhaps  formally  expressed 
in  words.  Thus  in  the  instance  mentioned  by  Dr.  Reid,  I 
shall  suppose,  that  I  have  first  ascertained  experimentally 
the  truth  of  the  proposition  in  the  case  of  an  equilateral  tri- 
angle ;  and  that  I  afterwards  find  it  to  hold  in  all  the  other 
kinds  of  triangles,  whether  isosceles  or  scalene,  right-angled, 
obtuse-angled,  or  acute-angled.  It  is  impossible  for  me  not  to 
perceive,  that  this  property,  having  no  connection  with  any  of 
the  particular  circumstances,  which  discriminate  different  tri- 
angles from  each  other,  must  arise  from  something  common  to 
all  triangles,  and  must  therefore  be  a  universal  property  of  that 
figure.  In  like  manner,  in  the  binomial  theorem,  if  the  formula 
correspond  with  the  table  of  powers  in  a  variety  of  particular 
instances^  (which  instances  agree  in  no  other  respect,  but  in. 

lucla,  "  et  du  fil  de  Vanalogie  dont  il  s91.1t  toujours  s'aider  avec  succSs,  il  soumit  a  la 
"  geometrie  une  multiiude  d'objets  qui  lui  avoient  §chapp6  jusqu'  alors."  (Hist. 
des  Maihem.  Tome  II.  p.  299.)  This  innovation  in  the  established  forms  of  mathe- 
matical reasoning  gave  offence  to  some  of  his  contemporaries  ",  in  particular,  to  M. 
de  Fermat,  one  of  the  most  distinguished  geometers  of  the  seventeenth  century.  The 
ground  of  his  objection,  however,  (it  is  worth}'  of  notice,)  was  not  any  doubt  of  the 
conclusions  obtained  by  Wallis  ;  but  because  lie  thought  that  their  truth  might  have 
been  established  by  a  more  legitimate  and  elegant  process.  "  Sa  faqon  de  demon- 
"  trer,  qui  est  fondee  sur  induction  plulot  que  sur  un  raisonnement  a  la  mode  d'Archi- 
"  mede,  fera  quelque  peine  aux  novices,  qui  veulent  des  syllogismes  demonstratifs 
"  depuis  le  commencement  jusqu'  a  la  fin.  Ce  n'est  pas  que  je  ne  l'approuve,  mais 
"  toutes  ses  propositions  pouvant  etre  demontrees  via  ordinarid,  legilima,  et  Ar chime- 
"  deca,  en  beaucoup  moins  de  paroles,  que  n'en  contient  son  livre,  je  ne  sqai  pas 
"  pourquoi  il  a  prefere  cette  maniere  a  l'ancienne,  qui  est  plus  convainquante  et  plus 
"  elegante,  ainsi  que  j'espere  lui  faire  voir  anion  premier  loisir."  LettredeM.de 
Fermat  a  M.  le  Chcv.  Kenelme  Digby.  (See  Fermat's  Varia  Opera  Matliematica, 
p.  191.)  For  Wal'.is's  leply  10  these  strictures,  see  his  Algebra,  Cap.  Ixxix  ;  and  his 
Commercivm  Epistolicum. 

In  the  Opuscules  of  M.  Le  Sage,  I  find  the  following  sentence  quoted  from  a  work 
of  La  Place,  which  I  have  not  had  an  opportunity  of  seeing  The  judgment  of  so 
great  a  master,  on  a  logical  question  relative  to  his  own  studies,  is  of  peculi  ir  value. 
"  La  methode  d'induclion,  quoique  excellenle  pour  decouvrir  des  veriles  generates,  ne 
"  doit  pas  dispenser  de  les  demontrer  avec  rigueur." — Lefons  donnees  aux  Ecoles 
Kormales,  Frem.  Vol.  p.  380. 

VOL.  II.  41 


322  ELEMENTS    OF    THE    PHILOSOPHY  [CHAP.  -IVV 

being  powers  raised  from  the  same  binomial  root,)  we  must 
conclude — and,  I  apprehend  that  our  conclusion  is  perfectly 
warranted  by  the  soundest  logic, — that  it  is  this  common 
property  which  renders  the  theorem  true  in  all  these  cases, 
and  consequently,  that  it  must  necessarily  hold  in  every  other. 
Whether,  on  the  supposition  that  we  had  never  had  any  pre- 
vious experience  of  demonstrative  evidence,  we  should  have 
been  led,  by  the  mere  inductive  process,  to  form  the  idea  of 
necessary  truth,  nvy  perhaps  be  questioned  ;  but  the  slightest 
acquaintance  with  mathematics  is  sufficient  to  produce  the 
most  complete  conviction,  that  whatever  is  universally  true  in 
that  science,  must  be  true  of necessity  /  and,  therefore,  that  a 
universal,  and  a  necessary  truth,  are,  in  the  language  of 
mathematicians,  synonymous  expressions.  If  this  view  of 
the  matter  be  just,  the  evidence  atlorded  by  mathematical  in- 
duction must  be  allowed  to  differ  radically  irom  that  of  physi- 
cal ;  the  latter  resolving  ultimately  into  our  instinctive  expec- 
tation of  the  laws  of  nature,  and  consequently,  never  amount- 
ing to  that  demons! rative  certainty,  which  excludes  the  pos- 
sibility of  anomalous  exceptions. 

1  have  been  led  into  this  train  of  thinking  by  a  remark 
whi^h  La  Place  appears  to  me  to  have  stated  in  terms  much 
too  unqualified  \ — ''  Que  la  marche  de  Newton,  dans  la  de- 
"cou\erte  de  la  gravitation  universelle,  a  ete  exactement  la 
"  meme,  que  dans  celle  de  la  formule  du  binome.1'  When 
it  is  recollected,  that,  in  the  one  case,  Newton's  conclusion 
related  to  a  contingent,  and  in  the  other  to  a  necessary  truth3 
it  seems  difficult  to  conceive,  how  the  logical  procedure  which 
conducted  him  to  both  should  have  been  exactly  the  same. 
In  one  of  his  queries,  he  has  (in  perfect  conformity  to  the 
principles  of  Bacon's  logic)  admitted  the  possibility,  that 
"  God  may  vary  the  laws  of  nature,  and  make  worlds  of  seve- 
"  ral  sorts,  in  several  parts  of  the  universe."  "  At  least,"  he 
adds,  "  I  see  nothing  of  contradiction  in  all  this."*  Would 
Newton  have  expressed  himself  with  equal  scepticism  con- 
cerning the  universality  of  his  binomial  theorem  ;  or  admil- 

*  Query  31. 


SECT.  IV.]  OP    THE    HUMAN    MIND.  323 

ted  the  possibility  of  a  single  exception  to  it,  in  the  indefinite 
progress  of  actual  involution  ?  In  short,  did  there  exist  the 
slightest  shade  of  difference  between  the  degree  of  his  assent 
to  this  inductive  result,  and  that  extorted  from  him  by  a  de- 
monstration of  Euclid  ? 

Although,  therefore,  the  mathematician,  as  well  as  the 
natural  philosopher,  may,  without  any  blameable  latitude  of 
expression,  be  said  to  reason  by  induction,  when  he  draws 
an  inference  from  the  known  to  the  unknown,  yet  it  seems  in- 
dixpuiable,  that,  in  ail  such  cases,  he  rests  his  conclusions  on 
grounds  essentially  distinct  from  those  which  form  the  basis 
of  experimental  science. 

The  word  analogy,  too,  as  well  as  induction,  is  common  to 
physics  and  to  pure  mathematics.  It  is  thus  we  speak  of 
the  analogy  running  through  the  general  properties  of  the 
different  conic  sections,  with  no  less  propriety  than  of  the 
analogy  running  through  the  anatomical  structure  of  different 
tribes  of  animals.  In  some  instances,  these  mathematical 
analogies  are  collected  by  a  species  of  induction  ;  in  others, 
they  are  inferred  as  consequences  from  more  general  truths, 
in  which  they  are  included  as  particular  cases.  Thus,  in  the 
curves  which  have  just  been  mentioned,  while  we  content 
ourselves  (as  many  elementary  writers  have  done)*  with  de- 
ducing their  properties  from  mechanical  descriptions  on  a 
plane,  we  rise  experimentally  from  a  comparison  of  the  pro- 
positions which  have  been  separately  demonstrated  with  re- 
spect to  each  curve,  to  more  comprehensive  theorems,  appli- 
cable to  all  of  them  ;  whereas,  when  we  begin  with  consider- 
ing them  in  their  common  origin,  we  have  it  in  our  power  to 
trace  from  the  source,  both  their  generic  properties,  and  their 
specific  peculiarities.  The  satisfaction  arising  from  this  last 
view  of  the  subject  can  be  conceived  by  those  alone  who 
have  experienced  it ;  although  I  am  somewhat  doubtful 
whether  it  be  not  felt  in  the  greatest  degree  by  such  as,  after 
having  risen  from  the  contemplation  of  particular  truths  to 
other  truths  more  general,  have  been  at  last  conducted  to 

s  JL'Hospitalj  Simsop,  &c. 


324  ELEMENTS    OP    THE    PHILOSOPHY  [CHAP.    IY, 

some  commanding  station,  where  the  mutual  connections  and 
affinities  of  the  whole  system  are  brought,  at  once,  under  the 
range  of  the  eye.  Even,  however,  before  we  have  reached 
this  vantage-ground,  the  contemplation  of  the  analogy,  con- 
sidered merely  as  a  fact,  is  pleasing  to  the  mind  ;  partly, 
from  the  mysterious  wonder  it  excites,  and  partly  from  the 
convenient  generalization  of  knowledge  it  affords.  To  the 
experienced  mathematician  this  pleasure  is  farther  enhanced, 
by  the  assurance  which  the  analogy  conveys,  of  the  exis- 
tence of  yet  undiscovered  theorems,  far  more  extensive  and 
luminous  than  those  which  have  led  him  by  a  process  so  in- 
direct, so  tedious,  and  comparatively  so  unsatisfactory,  tohig 
general  conclusions. 

In  this  last  respect,  the  pleasure  derived  from  analogy  in 
mathematics,  resolves  into  the  same  principle  with  that  which 
seems  to  have  the  chief  share  in  rendering  the  analogies, 
among  the  different  departments  of  nature  so  interesting  a 
subject  of  speculation.     In  both  cases,  a  powerful  and  agreea- 
ble stimulus  is  applied  to  the  curiosity,  by  the  encouragement 
given  to  the  exercise  of  the  inventive  faculties,  and  by  the 
hope  of  future  discovery,  which  is  awakened  and  cherished. 
As  the  analogous  properties  (for  instance)  of  the  conic  sec- 
tions, point  to  some  general  theorems  of  which  they  are  co- 
rollaries ;  so  the  analogy  between  the  phenomena  of  Electri- 
city and  those  of  Galvanism  irresistibly  suggests  a  confident, 
though  vague,  anticipation  of  some  general  physical  law  com- 
prehending the  phenomena  of  both,  but  differently  modified 
in  its  sensible  results  by  a  diversity  of  circumstances.*     In- 
deed, it  is  by  no  means  impossible,  that  the  pleasure  we  re- 
ceiye  even  from  those  analogies  which  are  the  foundation  of 
poetical  metaphor  and  simile,  may  be  found  resolvable,  in 
part,  into  the  satisfaction  connected  with  the  supposed  dis- 
covery of  truth,  or  the  supposed  acquisition  of  knowledge  : 
the  faculty  of  imagination  giving  to  these  illusions  a  momen- 
tary ascendant  over  the  sober  conclusions  of  experience  : 

*  See  Note  (T.) 


SECT.  IV.]  OP    THE    HUMAN    MIND.  325 

and  gratifying  the  understanding  with  a  flattering  conscious- 
ness of  its  own  force,  or  at  least  with  a  consolatory  forgetful- 
ness  of  its  own  weakness. 

SECTION  V. 

Of  certain  misapplications  of  the  words  Experience  and  Induction  in  the  Phraseology 
of  Modern  Science.    Illustrations  from  Medicine  and  from  Political  Economy. 

In  the  first  section  of  this  Chapter,  I  endeavoured  to  point 
out  the  characteristical  peculiarities  by  which  the  Inductive 
Philosophy  of  the  Newtonians  is  distinguished  from  the  hy- 
pothetical systems  of  their  predecessors  ;  and  which  entitle 
us  to  indulge  hopes  with  respect  to  the  permanent  stability 
of  their  doctrines,  which  might  be  regarded  as  chimerical,  if, 
in  anticipating  the  future  history  of  science,  we  were  to  be 
guided  merely  by  the  analogy  of  its  revolutions  in  the  ages 
that  are  past. 

In  order,  however,  to  do  complete  justice  to  this  argument, 
as  well  as  to  prevent  an  undue  extension  of  the  foregoing 
conclusions,  it  is  necessary  to  guard  the  reader  against  a 
vague  application  of  the  appropriate  terms  of  inductive  sci- 
ence to  inquiries  which  have  not  been  rigorously  conducted, 
according  to  the  rules  of  the  inductive  logic.  From  a  want 
of  attention  to  this  consideration,  there  is  a  danger,  on  the  one 
hand,  of  lending  to  sophistry  or  to  ignorance  the  authority 
of  those  illustrious  names  whose  steps  they  profess  to  follow  ; 
and,  on  the  other,  of  bringing  discredit  on  that  method  of  in- 
vestigation, of  which  the  language  and  other  technical  ar- 
rangements have  been  thus  perverted. 

Among  the  distinguishing  features  of  the  new  logic,  when 
considered  in  contrast  with  that  of  the  schoolmen,  the  most 
prominent  is  the  regard  which  it  professes  to  pay  to  experi- 
ence, as  the  only  solid  foundation  of  human  knowledge.  It 
may  be  worth  while,  therefore,  to  consider,  how  far  the  no- 
tion commonly  annexed  to  this  word  is  definite  and  precise  ; 
and  whether  there  may  trot  sometimes  be  a  possibility  of  its 
being  employed  in  a  sense  more  general  and  loose,  than  the, 


326  ELEMENTS    OP    THE    PHILOSOPHY       [CHAP.  ftr. 

authors  who  are  looked  up  (o  as  the  great  models  of  inductive 
investigation  understood  it  to  convey.* 

Tn  the  course  of  the  abstract  speculations  contained  in  the 
preceding  section,  I  have  remarked,  that  although  the  differ- 
ence between  the  two  sorts  of  evidence,  which  are  commonly 
referred  to  the  separate  heads  of  experience,  and  of  analogy, 
be  rather  a  difference  in  degree  than  in  kind,  >et  that  it  is 
useful  to  keep  these  terms  in  view,  in  order  to  mark  the  con- 
trast between  cases  which  are  separated  from  each  other  by 
a  very  wide  and  palpable  interval ;  more  especially,  to  mark 
the  difference  between  an  argument  from  individual  to  in- 
dividual of  the  same  species,  and  an  argument  from  species 

*  As  the  reflections  which  follow  are  entirely  of  a  practical  nature,  I  shall  express 
myself  (as  far  as  is  consistent  with  a  Hue  regard  to  precision)  agreeably  to  the  modes 
of  speaking  in  common  use  ;  without  affecting  a  scrupulous  ailenlion  to  some  specula- 
tive distinctions,  which,  however  curious  and  interesting,  when  considered  in  connec- 
tion with  the  Theory'  of  the  Mind,  do  not  lead  to  any  logical  conclusions  of  esential 
importance  in  the  conduct  of  the  Understanding.  In  such  sciences,  for  example,  as 
Astronomy,  Natural  Philosophy,  and  Chemistry,  which  rest  upon  phenomena  open 
to  the  scrutiny  of  every  inquirer,  it  would  obviously  be  puerile  in  the  extreme  to  at- 
tempt drawing  the  line  between  facts  which  have  been  ascertained  by  our  own  per- 
sonal observation,  and  those  which  wre  have  implicitly  adopted  upon  our  faith  in  the 
universal  consent  of  the  scientific  world.  The  evidence,  in  both  cases,  may  be  equally 
irresistible-;  and  sometimes  the  most  cautious  reasoners  may  justly  be  disposed  to 
consider  that  of  testimony  as  the  least  fallible  of  the  two. 

By  far  the  greater  part,  indeed,  of  what  is  commonly  called  experimental  know- 
ledge, will  be  found,  when  traced  to  its  origin,  to  resolve  entirely  into  our  confidence 
in  the  judgment  and  the  veracity  of  our  fellow -creatures  ;  nor  (in  the  sciences  already 
mentioned)  has  this  identification  of  the  evidence  of  testimony  with  that  of  experience, 
the  slightest  tendency  to  affect  the  legitimacy  of  our  inductive  conclusions. 

In  some  other  branches  of  knowledge,  (more  particularly  in  those  political  doc- 
trines which  assume  as  incontrovertible  data  the  details  of  ancient  history,)  the  autho- 
rity of  testimony  is,  for  obvious  reasons,  much  more  questionable  ;  and  to  dignify  it, 
in  these,  with  the  imposing  character  of  experience,  is  to  strengthen  one  of  the  chief 
bulwarks  of  popular  prejudices.  This  view  of  the  subject,  however,  although  well 
entitled  to  the  attention  of  the  logician,  has  no  immediate  connection  with  my  present 
argument  ;  and  accordingly,  I  shall  make  no  scruple,  in  the  sequel,  to  comprehend, 
under  the  name  of  experience,  the  grounds  of  our  assent  to  all  ihe  facts  on  which  our 
reasonings  proceed,  provided  only  that  the  certainty  of  these  facts  be,  on  either  suppo- 
sition, equally  indisputable. 

The  logical  errors  which  it  is  the  aim  of  this  section  to  correct,  turn  upon  a  still 
mere  dangerous  latitude  in  the  use  of  this  word  ;  in  consequence  of  which,  the  autho- 
rity of  experience  comes  insensibly  to  be  extended  to  innumerable  opinions  resting 
solely  on  supposed  analogies;  while,  not  unfrequently,  the  language  of  Bacon  is  quoted 
in  bar  of  any  theoretical  argument  on  the  other  side  of  the  question. 

I  have  added  this  note,  partly  to  obviate  some  eiiticisms,  to  which  my  own 
phraseology  may,  at  first  sight,  appear  liable  ;  and  partly  to  point  out  the  connection 
between  the  following  discussion,  and  some  of  the  foregoing  speculations. 


S£CT.  V.]  OP    THE   HUMAN    MIND.  32? 

to  species  of  the  same  genus.  As  this  distinction,  however, 
when  accurately  examined,  turns  out  to  be  of  a  more  vague 
and  popular  nature  than  at  first  sight  appears,  it  is  not  sur- 
prising that  instances  should  occasionally  present  themselves, 
in  which  it  is  difficult  to  say,  of  the  evidence  before  us,  to 
which  of  these  descriptions  it  ought  to  be  referred.  Nor  does 
this  doubt  lead  merely  to  a  question  concerning  phraseolo- 
gy :  it  produces  a  hesitation  which  must  have  some  effect 
even  on  the  judgment  of  a  philosopher;  the  maxims  to  which 
we  have  been  accustomed,  in  the  course  of  our  early  studies, 
leading  us  to  magnify  the  evidence  of  experience  as  the  sole 
test  of  truth  ;  and  to  depreciate  that  of  analogy,  as  one  of  the 
most  fertile  sources  of  error.  As  these  maxims  proceed  on 
the  supposition,  that  the  respective  provinces  of  both  are 
very  precisely  defined,  it  is  evident,  that,  admitting  them  to 
be  perfectly  just  in  themselves,  much  danger  may  still  be 
conceivable  from  their  injudicious  application.  I  shall  en- 
deavour to  illustrate  this  remark  by  some  familiar  instances  ; 
which,  I  trust,  will  be  sufficient  to  recommend  it  to  the  far- 
ther consideration  of  future  logicians.  To  treat  of  the  sub- 
ject with  that  minuteness  of  detail  which  is  suited  to  its  im- 
portance, is  incompatible  with  the  subordinate  place  which 
belongs  to  it  in  my  general  design. 

It  is  observed  by  Dr.  Reid,*  that,  "  in  medicine,  physi- 
"  cians  must,  for  the  most  part,  be  directed  in  their  prescrip- 
tions by  analog!/.  The  constitution  of  one  human  body  is 
"  so  like  to  that  of  another,  that  it  is  reasonable  to  think, 
"  that  what  is  the  cause  of  health  or  sickness  to  one,  may 
"  have  the  same  effect  on  another.  And  this,"  he  adds,  "  is 
"generally  found  true,  though  not  without  some  exceptions.'' 

I  am  doubtful  if  this  observation  be  justified  by  the  com- 
mon use  of  language  ;  which,  as  far  as  I  am  able  to  judge, 
uniformly  refers  the  evidence  on  which  a  cautious  physician 
proceeds,  not  to  analogy  but  to  experience.  The  German 
monk,  who  (according  to  the  popular  tradition)  having  ob- 
served the  salutary  effects  of  antimony  upon  some  of  the 

*  Essays  on  the  Intellect.  Powers,  p.  53. 


328  ELEMENTS  OF  THE  PHILOSOPHY  [CHAP.  IV. 

lower  animals,  ventured  to  prescribe  the  use  of  it  to  his 
own  fraternity,  might  be  justly  said  to  reason  analogically; 
inasmuch  as  his  experience  related  to  one  species,  and  his 
inference  to  another.  But  if,  after  having  thus  poisoned  all 
the  monks  of  his  own  convent,  he  had  persevered  in  recom- 
mending the  same  mineral  to  the  monks  of  another,  the  ex- 
ample of  our  most  correct  writers  would  have  authorized  us  to 
say,  (how  far  justly  is  a  different  question,)  that  he  proceeded 
in  direct  opposition  to  the  evidence  of  experience. 

In  offering  this  slight  criticism  on  Dr.  Reid,  I  would  be 
very  far  from  being  understood  to  say,  that  the  common  phra- 
seology is  more  unexceptionable  than  his.  I  would  only- 
remark,  that  his  phraseology  on  this  occasion  is  almost  pecu- 
liar to  himself;  and  that  the  prevailing  opinions,  both  of  phi- 
losophers and  of  the  multitude,  incline  them  to  rank  the 
grounds  of  our  reasoning  in  the  medical  art,  at  a  much  high- 
er point  in  the  scale  of  evidence,  than  what  is  marked  by  the 
Word  analogy.  Indeed,  1  should  be  glad  to  know,  if  there 
be  any  one  branch  of  human  knowledge,  in  which  men  are, 
in  general,  more  disposed  to  boast  of  the  lights  of  experience^ 
than  in  the  practice  of  medicine. 

It  would,  perhaps,  have  been  better  for  the  world,  if  the 
general  habits  of  thinking  and  of  speaking,  had,  in  this  in- 
stance, been  more  agreeable  than  they  seem  to  be  in  fact,  to 
Dr.  Reid's  ideas  ; — or,  at  least,  if  some  qualifying  epithet  had 
been  invariably  added  to  the  word  experience,  to  shew  with 
how  very  great  latitude  it  is  to  be  understood,  when  applied 
to  the  evidence  on  which  the  physician  proceeds  in  the  ex- 
ercise of  his  art.  The  truth  is,  that,  even  on  the  most  favour- 
able supposition,  this  evidence,  so  far  as  it  rests  on  experi- 
ence, is  weakened  or  destroyed  by  the  uncertain  conditions 
of  every  new  case  to  which  his  former  results  are  to  be  appli- 
ed 5  and  that,  without  a  peculiar  sagacity  and  discrimination 
in  marking,  not  only  the  resembling,  but  the  characterislical 
features  of  disorders,  classed  under  the  same  technical  name, 
his  practice  cannot,  with  propriety,  be  said  to  be  guided  by 
any  one  rational  principle  of  decision,  but  merely  by  blind 


SECT.  V.]  OP   THE    HUMAN   MIND.  32& 

and  random  conjecture.  The  more  successfully  this  sagacity 
and  discrimination  are  exercised,  the  more  nearly  does  the 
evidence  of  medical  practice  approach  to  that  of  experience  ; 
but,  in  every  instance,  without  exception,  so  immense  is  the 
distance  between  them,  as  to  render  the  meaning  of  the  word 
experience,  when  applied  to  medicine,  essentially  different 
from  its  import  in  those  sciences  where  it  is  possible  for  us, 
in  all  cases,  by  due  attention  to  the  circumstances  of  an  ex- 
periment, to  predict  its  result  with  an  almost  infallible 
certainty."* 

Notwithstanding  this  very  obvious  consideration,  it  has 
become  fashionable  among  a  certain  class  of  medical  practi- 
tioners, since  the  lustre  thrown  on  the  inductive  logic  of 
Bacon  by  the  discoveries  of  Newton  and  the  researches  of 
Boyle,  to  number  their  art  with  the  other  branches  of  expe- 
rimental philosophy  ;  and  to  speak  of  the  difference  between 
the  empiric  and  the  scientific  physician,  as  if  it  were  exactly 
analogous  to  that  between  the  cautious  experimenter  and  the 
hypothetical  theorist  in  physics.  Experience,  (we  are  told,) 
and  experience  alone,  must  be  our  guide  in  medicine,  as  in 
all  the  other  departments  of  physical  knowledge : — Nor  is 
any  innovation,  however  rational,  proposed  in  the  established 
routine  of  practice,  but  an  accumulation  of  alleged  cases  is 
immediately  brought  forward  as  an  experimental  proof  of 
the  dangers  which  it  threatens. 

*  L'art  de  conjeeturer  en  Medeeine  ne  sauroit  consister  dans  une  suite  de  raison- 
nemens  appuyes  snr  un  vain  systeme.  C'est  uniquement  l'art  de  comparer  une  ma- 
ladie  i,u'on  doit  gnerir,  avec  les  maladies  semblables  qu'on  a  deja  connues  par  son 
experience  ou  par  celle  dcs  autres.  Cet  art  eonsiste  rneme  quelquefois  a  appercevoir 
un  rapp  rt  entre  des  maladies  qui  paroissent  n'en  point  avoir,  comme  aussi  des  diffe- 
rences essentielles,  quoique  fugitives,  entre  celles  qui  paroissent  seressembler  le  plus. 
Plus  on  aura  rassemble  de  faits,  plus  on  sera  en  eiat  de  conjeeturer  heureusement  j 
suppose  neanmoins  qu'on  ait  d'ailleurs  cetle  justesse  d'esprit  que  la  nature  seule  peut 
donner. 

"  Aiusi  Je  meilleur  medecin  n'est  pas  (comme  le  prejuge  le  suppose)  celui  qui  aecu- 
u  mule  en  aveugle  et  en  courant  beaucoup  de  pratique,  mais  celui  qui  ne  fait  que  des 
"  observations  bien  approfondies,  et  qui  joint  a  ces  observations  le  nombre  beau- 
"  coup  plus  grand  des  observations  faites  dans  trus  les  siecles  par  des  homines  an i - 
"  mes  du  ineme  e*piit  que  lui.  Oes  observations  sont  la  veritable  experience  du  mfi- 
"  decin."     D'Akmbei  t,  Eelaircissemens  sur  les  Elemens  de  Philosophic,  §  vi. 

VOL.  II.  42 


330  ELEMENTS    OF    THE    PHILOSOPHY        [CHAP.  IV. 

It  was  a  frequent  and  favourite  remark  of  the  late  Dra 
Cullen, — that  there  are  more  false  facts  current  in  the  world 
than  false  theories  ;  and  a  similar  observation  occurs  more 
than  once,  in  the  Novum  Organon.  "  Mt-n  of  learning,'1  says 
Bacon  in  one  passage,  "  are  too  often  led,  from  indolence  or 
"  credulity,  to  avail  themselves  of  mere  rumours  or  whispers 
"  of  experience,  as  confirmations,  and  sometimes  as  the  very 
"  ground-work  of  their  philosophy  ;  ascribing  to  them  the 
"  same  authority  as  if  they  rested  on  legitimate  testimony. 
"  Like  to  a  government  which  should  regulate  its  measures, 
*'  not  by  the  official  information  received  from  its  own  accre- 
"  dited  ambassadors,  but  by  the  gossipings  of  newsmongers 
"  in  the  streets.  Such  in  truth,  is  the  manner  in  which  the 
"  interests  of  philosophy,  as  far  as  experience  is  concerned, 
"  have  been  hitherto  administered.  Nothing  is  to  be  found 
"which  has  been  duly  investigated;  nothing  which  has  been 
"  verified  by  a  careiul  examination  of  proofs;  nothing  which 
"  has  been  reduced  to  the  standard  of  number,  weight,  or 
"  measure."* 

This  very  important  aphorism  deserves  the  serious  atten- 
tion oi  those  who,  while  they  are  perpetually  declaiming 
against  the  uncertainty  and  fallacy  of  systems,  are  them- 
selves employed  in  amassing  a  chaos  of  insulated  particulars, 
which  they  admit  upon  the  slenderest  evidence.  Such  men, 
sensible  of  their  own  incapacity  for  scientific  investigation, 
have  often  a  malicious  pleasure  in  destroying  the  fabrics  of 
their  predecessors  :  or,  if  they  should  be  actuated  by  less 
unworthy  motives,  they  may  yet  feel  a  certain  gratification 
to  their  vanit),  in  astonishing  the  world  with  anomalous  and 
unlooked-for  phenomena  ; — a  weakness  which  results  not  less 
naturally  from  ignorance  and  folly,  than  a  bias  to  premature 
generalization  from  the  consciousness  of  genius. — Both  of 
these  weaknesses  are  undoubtedly  adverse  to  the  progress 
of  science  ;  but,  in  the  actual  state  of  human  knowledge,  the 
former  is  perhaps  the  more  dangerous  of  the  two. 

'*■  Nor.  Org.  Lib.  I.  Aph.  scviii, 


SECT.  V.]  OF    THE    HUMAN    MIND.  331 

In  the  practice  of  medicine,  (to  which  topic  T  wish  to  con- 
fine myself  more  particularly  at  present,)  there  are  a  variety 
of  other  circumstances,  which,  abstracting  fron  any  suspicion 
of  bad  faith  in  those  on  whose  testimony  the  credibility  of 
facts  depends,  have  a  tendency  to  vitiate  the  most  candid 
accounts  of  what  is  commonly  dignified  with  the  title  of  ex- 
perience. So  deeply  rooted  in  the  constitution  of  the  mind  is 
that  disposition  on  which  philosophy  is  grafted,  that  the  sim- 
plest narrative  of  the  most  illiterate  observer  involves  more 
or  less  of  hypothesis  ;  nay,  in  general,  it  will  be  found,  that, 
in  proportion  to  his  ignorance,  the  greater  is  the  number  of 
conjectural  principles  involved  in  his  statements. 

A  village-apothecary  (and,  if  possible,  in  a  still  greater  de- 
gree, an  experienced  nurse)  is  seldom  able   to  describe  the 
plainest  case,  without    employing  a    phraseology  of  which 
every  word  is  a  theory  ;   whereas  a  simple  and  genuine  spe- 
cification of  the  phenomena  which  mark  a  particular  disease  5 
— a  specification    unsophisticated   by  fancy,  or  by  precon- 
ceived opinions,  may  be  regarded  as   unequivocal  evidence 
of  a  mind  trained   by  long  and  successful   study  to  the  most 
difficult  of  all  arts,  that  of  the  faithful  interpretation  of  nature. 
Independently,  however,  of  all  these  circumstances,  which 
tend  so  powerfully  to  vitiate  the  data  whence  the  physician 
has  to  reason  ;  and  supposing  his  assumed  facts  to  be  stated, 
not  only  with  the  most  scrupulous  regard  to   truth,  but  with 
the  most  jealous  exclusion  of  theoretical   expressions,  still 
the  evidence  upon  which  he  proceeds  is,  at  best,  conjectural 
and  dubious,  when  compared  with    what  is  required    in  che- 
mistry or  in  mechanics.    It  is  seldom,  ifever,  possible,  that  the 
description  of  any  medical  case  can  include  all  the  circum- 
stances with  which  the  result  was  connected  ;  and,  therefore, 
how  true  soever  the  facts  described  may   be,  yet   when  the 
conclusion  t6  which  they  lead  comes  to  be  applied  as  a  ge- 
neral rule  in  practice,  it  is  not  only  a  rule  rashly  drawn  from 
one  single  experiment,  but  a  rule  transferred  from  a  case  im- 
perfectly known,  to  another  of  which  we  are  equally  igno- 
rant.    Here,  too,  it  will^e  found,  that  the  evidence  of  expc- 


332  ELEMENTS    OP    THE    PHILOSOPHY       [cHAP.  IV. 

rierice  is  incomparably  less  in  favour  of  the  empiric,  than  of 
the  cautious  theorist ;  or  rather,  that  it  is  by  cautious  theory 
alone,  that  experience  can  be  rendered  of  any  value.  No- 
thing, indeed,  can  be  more  absurd  than  to  contrast,  as  is  com- 
monly done,  experience  with  theory,  as  if  they  stood  in  op- 
position to  each  other.  Without  theory,  (or,  in  other  words, 
without  general  principles,  inferred  from  a  sagacious  compa- 
rison of  a  variety  of  phenomena,)  experience  is  a  blind  and 
useless  guide  ;  while,  on  the  other  hand,  a  legitimate  theory 
(and  the  same  observation  may  be  extended  to  hypothetical 
theories,  supported  by  numerous  analogies)  necessarily  pre- 
supposes a  knowledge  of  connected  and  well  ascertained 
facts,  more  comprehensive,  by  far,  than  any  mere  empiric  is 
likely  to  possess.  When  a  scientific  practitioner,  according 
ly,  quits  the  empirical  routine  of  his  profession,  in  quest  of  a 
higher  and  more  commanding  ground,  he  does  not  proceed 
on  the  supposition  that  it  is  possible  to  supersede  the  neces- 
sity of  experience  by  the  most  accurate  reasonings  a  priori ; 
but,  distrusting  conclusions  which  rest  on  the  observation  of 
this  or  that  individual,  he  is  anxious,  by  combining  those  of 
an  immense  multitude,  to  separate  accidental  conjunctions 
from  established  connections,  and  to  ascertain  those  laws  of 
the  human  frame  which  rest  on  the  universal  experience  of 
mankind.  The  idea  of  following  nature  in  the  treatment  of 
diseases  ; — an  idea  which,  I  believe,  prevails  more  and  more 
in  the  practice  of  every  physician,  in  proportion  as  his  views 
are  enlarged  by  science,  is  founded,  not  on  hypothesis,  but 
on  one  of  the  most  general  laws  yet  known  with  respect  to 
the  animal  economy  ;  and  it  implies  an  acknowledgment, 
not  only  of  the  vanity  of  abstract  theories,  but  of  the  limited 
province  of  human  art.* 


*  "  Gaudet  corpus  vi  prorsus  mirabili,  qua  contra  morbos  se  tucatur ;  mulios 
il  arceat ;  multos jam  inchoalos  quam  optime  et  citissime  solvat ;  aliosque  suo  modo, 
"  ad  fielicem  exitum  lentius  perducat. 

"  Ha;c,  Autocrateia,  vis  Naturce  medicutrix,  vocatur  ;  medicis,  philosophis,  notis- 
"sima,et  jure  celeberrima.  Hapc  sola  ad  mulios  morbos  sanahdos  suffieit,  in  om- 
'>  nibus  fere  prode?t :  Quin  et  medicamcnta  sua  natura  optima,  tantum  solummod© 


SECT.  V.]  OF    THE    HUMAN   MIND.  333 

These  slight  remarks  are  sufficient  to  shew,  how  vague 
and  indeterminate  the  notion  is,  which  is  commonly  annexed 
to  the  word  experience  by  the  most  zealous  advocates  for  its 
paramount  authority  in  medicine.  They  seem  farther  to 
shew,  that  the  question  between  them  and  their  adversaries 
amounts  to  little  more  than  a  dispute  about  the  comparative 
advantages  of  an  experience  guided  by  penetration  and  judg- 
ment, or  of  an  experience  which  is  to  supersede  all  exercise 
of  our  rational  faculties  ;  of  an  experience  accurate,  various, 
and  discriminating,  or  of  one  which  is  gross  and  undistin- 
guishing,  like  the  perceptions  of  the  lower  animals. 

Another  department  of  knowledge  in  which  constant  ap- 
peals are  made  to  experience,  is  the  science  of  politics  ;  and, 
in  this  science  also,  I  apprehend,  as  well  as  in  the  former, 
that  word  is  used  with  a  far  greater  degree  of  latitude  than  is 
generally  suspected.  Indeed,  most  of  the  remarks  which 
have  been  already  offered  on  the  one  subject,  may  be  ex- 
tended (mutatis  mutandis)  to  the  other.  I  shall  confine  my 
attention,  therefore,  in  what  follows,  to  one  or  two  peculiari- 
ties by  which  politics  is  specifically  and  exclusively  charac- 
terized as  an  object  of  study  ;  and  which  seem  to  remove  the 
species  of  evidence  it  admits  of,  to  a  still  greater  distance 
than  that  of  medicine  itself,  from  what  the  word  experience  na- 
turally suggests  to  a  careless  inquirer. 

The  science  of  politics  may  be  divided  into  two  parts  ; 
the  first  having  for  its  object  the  theory  of  government ;  the 
second,  the  general  principles  of  legislation.  That  I  may 
not  lose  myself  in  too  wide  a  field,  I  shall,  on  the  present 
occasion,  wave  all  consideration  of  the  former  ;  and,  for  the 
sake  of  still  greater  precision,  shall  restrict  my  remarks  to 
those  branches  of  the  latter,  which  are  comprehended  under 
the  general  title  of  Political  Economy  ; — a  phrase,  however, 
which  I  wish  to  be  here  understood  in  its  most  extensive 
meaning.* 

"  prosunt,  quantum  hujus  vires  insitas  excitent,  dirigant,  gubernent.  Medicina  enim 
"  neque  agitin  cadaver,  neque  repugnanle  natura  aliquid  proficit." 

Conspectus  Medicinop  Theoretic*.  Auctore  Tacobo  Gregory,  M.  D.  §§.  59,  60. 
(Edin.  1782.) 

*  See  Note  (Z.) 


334  ELEMENTS    OP    THE    PHILOSOPHY       [CHAP.    IV. 

They  who  have  turned  their  attention,  during  the  last  cen- 
tury, to  inquiries  connected  with  population,  national  wealth, 
and  other  collateral  subjects,  may  be  divided  into  two  class- 
es ;  to  the  one  of  which  we  may,  for  the  sake  of  distinction, 
give  the  title  of  political  arithmeticians,  or  statistical  collec' 
tors  ;  to  the  other,  that  of  political  economists,  or  political 
philosophers.  The  former  are  generally  supposed  to  have 
the  evidence  of  experience  in  their  favour,  and  seldom  fail  to 
arrogate  to  themselves  exclusively,  the  merit  of  treading 
closely  in  the  footsteps  of  Bacon.  In  comparison  with  them, 
the  latter  are  considered  as  little  better  than  visionaries,  or, 
at  least,  as  entitled  to  no  credit  whatever,  when  their  conclu- 
sions are  at  variance  with  the  details  of  statistics. 

In  opposition  to  this  prevailing  prejudice,   it  may,  with 
confidence,  be  asserted,  that,  in   so  lar  as  either  of  these 
branches  of  knowledge  has  any  real  value,  it  must  rest  on 
a  basis  of  well-ascertained  facts  ;  and  that  the  difference  be- 
tween them  consists  only  in  the  different  nature  of  the  facts 
with  which  they  are  respectively  conversant.     The  facts  ac- 
cumulated  by  the  statistical  collector  are  merely  particular 
results,  which  other  men  have  seldom  an  opportunity  of  ve- 
rifying or  of  disproving  ;  and  which,  to  those  who  consider 
thorn  in  an  insulated  state,  can  never  afford  any  important 
information.     The  facts  which  the  political  philosopher  pro- 
fesses to  investigate  are  exposed  to  the  examination  of  all 
mankind  ;  and  while  they  enable  him,  like  the  general  laws 
of  physics,  to  ascertain  numberless   particulars  by  synthetic 
reasoning,  they  furnish  the  means  of  estimating  the  credibility 
of  evidence  resting  on  the  testimony  of  individual  observers. 
It  is  acknowledged  by  Mr.  Smith,  with  respect  to  himself, 
that  he  had  "  no  great  faith  in  political  arithmetic  ;"*  and  I 
agree  with  him  so  far  as  to  think,  that  little,  if  any,  regard  is 
due  to  a  particular  phenomenon,  when  stated  as  an  objection 
to  a  conclusion  resting  on  the  general  laws  which  regulate 
the  course  of  human  affairs.     Even  admitting  the  phenome- 

*  Wealth  of  Nation?,  Vol.  II.  p.  310.  9th  Edh. 


SECT.  V.}  OP   THE    HUMAN   MIND.  335 

non  in  question  to  have  been  accurately  observed,  and  faith- 
fully described,  it  is  yet  possible  that  we  may  be  imperfectly 
acquainted  with  that  combination  of  circumstances  whereby 
the  effect  is  modified  ;  and  that,  if  these  circumstances  were 
fully  before  us,  this  apparent  exception  would  turn  out  an 
additional  illustration  of  the  very  truth  which  it  was  brought 
to  invalidate. 

If  these  observations  be  just,  instead  of  appealing  to  po- 
litical arithmetic  as  a  check  on  the  conclusions  of  political 
economy,  it  would  often  be  more  reasonable  to  have  recourse 
to  political  economy  as  a  check  on  the  extravagancies  of  po- 
litical arithmetic.  Nor  will  this  assertion  appear  paradoxi- 
cal to  those  who  consider,  that  the  object  of  the  political  arith- 
metician is  too  frequently  to  record  apparent  exceptions  to 
rules  sanctioned  by  the  general  experience  of  mankind  ;  and, 
consequently,  that  in  cases  where  there  is  an  obvious  or  a 
demonstrative  incompatibility  between  the  alleged  exception 
and  the  general  principle,  the  fair  logical  inference  is  not 
against  the  truth  of  the  latter,  but  against  the  possibility  of 
the  former. 

Tt  has  long  been  an  established  opinion  among  the  most 
judicious  and  enlightened  philosophprs, — that  as  the  desire  of 
bettering  our  condition  appears  equally  from  a  careful  review 
of  the,  motives  which  habitually  influence  our  own  conduct,  and 
from  a  general  survey  of  the  history  of  our  species,  to  be  the 
master-spring  of  human  industry,  the  labour  of  slaves  never 
can  be  so  productive  as  that  of  freemen.  Not  many  years 
have  elapsed,  since  it  was  customary  to  stigmatize  this  rea- 
soning as  visionary  and  metaphysical ;  and  to  oppose  to  it 
that  species  of  evidence  to  which  we  were  often  reminded 
that  all  theories  must  bend  ; — the  evidence  of  experimental 
calculations,  furnished  by  intelligent  and  credible  observers 
on  the  other  side  of  the  Atlantic.  An  accurate  examination 
of  the  fact  has  shewn  how  wide  of  the  truth  these  calculations 
were  ; — but,  independently  of  any  such  detection  of  their 
fallacy,  might  it  not  have  been  justly  affirmed,  that  the  argu- 
ment from  experience  was  decidedly  against  their  crcdibili- 


336  ELEMENTS    OF    THE    PHILOSOPHY       [CHAP.  IV* 

ty  ; — the  facts  appealed  to  resting  solely  upon  the  good  sense 
and  good  faith  of  individual  witnesses  ;  while  the  opposite 
argument,  drawn  from  the  principles  of  the  human  frame, 
was  supported  by  the  united  voice  of  all  nations  and  ages  ? 

If  we  examine  the  leading  principles  which  run  through 
Mr.  Smith's  Inquiry  into  the  Nature  and  Causes  of  the 
Wealth  of  Nations,  we  shall  find,  that  all  of  them  are  general 
facts  or  general  results,  analogous  to  that  which  has  been 
just  mentioned.  Of  this  kind,  for  instance,  are  the  following 
propositions, — from  which  a  very  large  proportion  of  his 
characteristical  doctrines  follow,  as  necessary  and  almost 
manifest  corollaries  :  That  what  we  call  the  Political  Or- 
der, is  much  less  the  effect  of  human  contrivance  than  is  com- 
monly imagined  : — That  every  man  is  a  better  judge  of  his 
own  interest  than  any  legislator  can  be  for  him  ;  and  that 
this  regard  to  private  interest  (or,  in  other  words,  this  desire 
of  bettering  our  condition)  may  be  safely  trusted  to  as  a 
principle  of  action  universal  among  men  in  its  operation  ; — 
a  principle  stronger,  indeed,  in  some  than  in  others,  but  con- 
stant in  its  habitual  influence  upon  all  : — That,  where  the 
rights  of  individuals  are  completely  protected  by  the  magi- 
strate, there  is  a  strong  tendency  in  human  affairs,  arising 
from  what  we  are  apt  to  consider  as  the  selfish  passions  of 
our  nature,  to  a  progressive  and  rapid  improvement  in  the 
state  of  society  : — That  this  tendency  to  improvement  in 
human  affairs  is  often  so  very  powerful,  as  to  correct  the  in- 
conveniences threatened  by  the  errors  of  the  statesman  : — 
And  that,  therefore,  the  reasonable  presumption  is  in  favour 
of  every  measure  which  is  calculated  to  afford  to  its  farther 
developemenl,  a  scope  still  freer  than  what  it  at  present  en- 
joys ;  or,  which  amounts  very  nearly  to  the  same  thing,  in 
favour  of  as  great  a  liberty  in  the  employment  of  industry, 
of  capital,  and  of  talents,  as  is  consistent  with  the  security  of 
property,  and  of  the  other  rights  of  our  fellow-citizens. — 
The  premises,  it  is  perfectly  obvious,  from  which  these  con- 
clusions are  deduced,  are  neither  hypothetical  assumptions, 
nor  metaphysical  abstractions.     They  are  practical  maxims 


SECT.  V.]  OF   THE   HUMAN   MIND.  337 

of  good  sense,  approved  by  the  experience  of  men  in  all  ages 
of  the  world  ;  and  of  which,  if  we  wish  for  any  additional 
confirmations,  we  have  only  to  retire  within  our  own  bosoms, 
or  to  open  our  eyes  on  what  is  passing  around  us. 

From  these  considerations  it  would  appear,  that  in  politics, 
as  well  as  in  many  of  the  other  sciences,  the  loudest  advo- 
cates  for  experience  are  the  least  entitled  to  appeal  to  its 
authority  in  favour  of  their  dogmas  ;  and  that  the  charge  of 
a  presumptuous  confidence  in  human  wisdom  and  foresight, 
which  they  are  perpetually  urging  against  political  philoso- 
phers, may,  with  far  greater  justice,  be  retorted  on  them- 
selves. An  additional  illustration  of  this  is  presented  by  the 
strikingly  contrasted  effects  of  statistical  and  of  philosophical 
studies  on  the  intellectual  habits  in  general ; — the  former  in- 
variably encouraging  a  predilection  for  restraints  and  checks, 
and  all  the  other  technical  combinations  of  an  antiquated  and 
scholastic  policy  ; — the  latter,  by  inspiring,  on  the  one  hand, 
a  distrust  of  the  human  powers,  when  they  attempt  to  em- 
brace in  detail,  interests  at  once  so  complicated  and  so  mo- 
mentous ;  and,  on  the  other,  a  religious  attention  to  the  de- 
signs of  Nature,  as  displayed  in  the  general  laws  which  regu- 
late her  economy  ; — leading,  no  less  irresistibly,  to  a  gradual 
and  progressive  simplification  of  the  political  mechanism.  It 
is,  indeed,  the  never-lailing  result  of  all  sound  philosophy,  to 
humble,  more  and  more,  the  pride  of  science  before  that 
Wisdom  which  is  infinite  and  divine  ; — whereas,  the  farther 
back  we  carry  our  researches  into  those  ages,  the  institutions 
of  which  have  been  credulously  regarded  as  monuments  of 
the  superiority  of  unsophisticated  good  sense,  over  the  false 
refinements  of  modern  arrogance,  we  are  the  more  struck 
with  the  numberless  insults  offered  to  the  most  obvious  sug- 
gestions of  nature  and  of  reason.  We  may  remark  this,  not 
only  in  the  moral  depravity  of  rude  tribes,  but  in  the  univer- 
sal disposition  which  they  discover  to  disfigure  and  distort 
the  bodies  of  their  infants  ; — in  one  case,  new-modelling  the 
form  of  the  eye-lids  ; — irt  a  second,  lengthening  the  ears  ; — 
in  a  third,  checking  the  growth  of  the  feet ; — in  a  fourth,  by 

vol.  n.  43 


338  ELEMENTS    OP   THE    PHILOSOPHY       [CHAP,  IV, 

mechanical  pressures  applied  to  the  head,  attacking  the  seat 
of  thought  and  intelligence.  To  allow  the  human  form  to  at- 
tain, in  perfection,  its  fair  proportions,  is  one  of  the  latest 
improvements  of  civilized  society ;  and  the  case  is  perfectly 
analogous  in  those  sciences  which  have  for  their  object  to  as- 
sist nature  in  the  cure  of  diseases  ;  in  the  developement  and 
improvement  of  the  intellectual  faculties  ;  in  the  correction  of 
bad  morals ;  and  in  the  regulations  of  political  economy. 


SECTION  VI. 
OP    THE    SPECULATION    CONCERNING    FINAL    CAUSES'. 

I. 

Opinion  of  Lord  Bacon  on  the  Subject. — Final  Causes  rejected  by  Des  Cartes,  an<S 
by  the  majority  of  French  Philosophers. — Recognized  as  legitimate  Objects  of  re- 
search by  Newton. — Tacitly  acknowledged  by  all  as  a  useful  logical  Guide,  ever* 
in  Sciences  which  have  no  immediate  relation  to  Theology. 

The  study  of  Final  Causes  may  be  considered  in  two  dif- 
ferent points  of  view  ;  first,  as  subservient  to  the  evidences 
of  natural  religion  ;  and,  secondly,  as  a  guide  and  auxiliary  in 
the  investigation  of  physical  laws.  Of  these  views  it  is  the 
latter  alone  which  is  immediately  connected  with  the  princi- 
ples of  the  inductive  logic  ;  and  it  is  to  this,  accordingly,  that 
I  shall  chiefly  direct  my  attention  in  the  following  observa- 
tions. I  shall  not,  however,  adhere  so  scrupulously  to  a 
strict  arrangement,  as  to  avoid  all  reference  to  the  former, 
where  the  train  of  my  reflections  may  naturally  lead  to  it. 
The  truth  is,  that  the  two  speculations  will,  on  examination,  be 
found  much  more  nearly  allied,  than  might  at  first  sight  be 
apprehended. 

I  before  observed,  that  the  phrase  Final  Cause  was  first  in- 
troduced by  Aristotle  ;  and  that  the  extension  thus  given  to 
the  notion  of  causation  contributed  powerfully  to  divert  the 
inquiries  of  his  followers  from  the  proper  objects  of  physical 
science.  In  reading  the  strictures  of  Bacon  on  this  mode  of 
philosophizing,  it  is  necessary  always  to  bear  in  mind,  that 


SECT.  VI.]  OP    THE    HUMAN  MIND.  339 

they  have  a  particular  reference  to  the  theories  of  the  school- 
men ;  and,  if  they  should  sometimes  appear  to  be  expressed 
in  terms  too  unqualified,  due  allowances  ought  to  be  made  for 
the  undistinguishing  zeal  of  a  reformer,  in  attacking  preju- 
dices consecrated  by  long  and  undisturbed  prescription. 
"  Causarum  jinalium  inquisitio  sterilis  est,  et  tanquam  Virg9 
u  Deo  consecrate,  nihil  parit."  Had  a  similar  remark  occurred 
in  any  philosophical  work  of  the  eighteenth  century,  it  might, 
perhaps,  have  been  fairly  suspected  to  savour  of  the  school 
of  Epicurus  ;  although,  even  in  such  a  casp,  the  quaintness 
and  levity  of  the  conceit  would  probably  have  inclined  a  cau- 
tious and  candid  reader  to  interpret  the  author's  meaning 
with  an  indulgent  latitude.  On  the  present  occasion,  how- 
ever, Bacon  is  his  own  best  commentator ;  and  I  shall  there- 
fore quote,  in  a  faithful,  though  abridged. translation,  the  pre- 
paratory passage  by  which  this  allusion  is  introduced. 

"  The  second  part  of  metaphysics  is  the  investigation  of  final 
"  causes  ;  which  I  object  to,  not  as  a  speculation  which  ought 
"to  be  neglected,  but  as  one  which  has,  in  general,  been 
"  very  improperly  regarded  as  a  branch  of  physics.  If  this 
"  were  merely  a  fault  of  arrangement,  I  should  not  be  dis- 
K  posed  to  lay  great  stress  upon  it ;  for  arrangement  is  useful 
"  chiefly  as  a  help  to  perspicuity,  and  does  not  affect  the 
"  substantial  matter  of  science  :  But,  in  this  instance,  a  dis- 
"  regard  of  method  has  occasioned  the  most  fatal  consequent 
"  ces  to  philosophy  ;  inasmuch  as  the  consideration  of  final 
*?  causes  in  physics  has  supplanted  and  banished  the  study  of 
"'■physical  causes  ;  the  fancy  amusing  itself  with  illusory  ex- 
n  planations  derived  from  the  former,  and  misleading  the  cu- 
*  riosity  from  a  steady  prosecution  of  the  latter."  After  il- 
lustrating this  remark  by  various  examples,  Bacon  adds  :  "  I 
84  would  not,  however,  be  understood,  by  these  observations, 
"  to  insinuate,  that  the  final  causes  just  mentioned  may  not  be 
"  founded  in  truth,  and,  in  a  metaphysical  view,  extremely  wor- 
*'  thy  of  attention  ;  but  only,  that  when  such  disquisitions  in* 
"  vade  and  overrun  the  appropriate  province  of  physics,  they 
"  are  likely  to  lay  waste  and  ruin  that  department  of  know- 


340  ELEMENTS    OP   THE   PHILOSOPHY        [CHAP.  IV. 

*'  ledge."  The  passage  concludes  with  these  words  :  "  And 
"  so  much  concerning  metaphysics;  the  part  of  which  rela- 
"  ting  to  final  causes,  I  do  not  deny,  has  been  often  enlarged 
*'  upon  in  physical,  as  well  as  in  metaphysical  treatises.  But 
"  while,  in  the  latter  of  these  it  is  treated  of  with  propriety,  in 
V.  the  former,  it  is  altogether  misplaced  ;  and  that,  not  merely 
"  because  it  violates  the  rules  of  a  logical  order,  but  because 
*'  it  operates  as  a  powerful  obstacle  to  the  progress  of  induc- 
**  live  science."* 

The  epigrammatic  maxim  which  gave  occasion  to  these 
extracts  has,  I  believe,  been  oftener  quoted  (particularly  by 
French  writers)  than  any  other  sentence  in  Bacon's  works  ; 
and,  as  it  has  in  general  been  stated,  without  any  reference 
to  the  context,  in  the  form  of  a  detached  aphorism,  it  has 
been  commonly  supposed  to  convey  a  meaning  widely  diffe- 
rent from  what  appears  to  have  been  annexed  to  it  by  the 
author.  The  remarks  with  which  he  has  prefaced  it,  and 
which  I  have  here  submitted  to  the  consideration  of  my 
readers,  sufficiently  shew,  not  only  that  he  meant  his  propo- 
sition to  be  restricted  to  the  abuse  of  final  causes  in  the  phy- 
sics of  Aristotle,  but  that  he  was  anxious  to  guard  against 
the  possibility  of  any  misapprehension  or  misrepresentation 
of  his  opinion.  A  farther  proof  of  this  is  afforded  by  the 
censure  which,  in  the  same  paragraph,  he  bestows  on  Aris- 
totle, for  "  substituting  Nature,  instead  of  God,  as  the  foun- 
tain of  final  causes;  and  for  treating  of  them  rather  as  sub- 
"  servient  to  logic  than  to  theology." 

A  similar  observation  may  be  made  on  another  sentence  in 
Bacon,  in  the  interpretation  of  which  a  very  learned  writer, 
Dr.  Cudworth,  seems  to  have  altogether  lost  sight  of  his 
usual  candour.  "  Incredibile  est  quantum  agmen  idolorum 
^  philosophies  immiserit,  naturalium  operationum  ad  simili- 
"  tudinem  actionum  humanarum  reductio."  "  If,"  says  Cud- 
worth,  "  the  Advancer  of  Learning  here  speaks  of  those  who 
unskilfully  attribute  their  own  properties  to  inanimate  bo- 
"dies,  (as  when  they  say,  that  matter  desires  forms  as  the 

*  De  Augm.  Scient.  Lib.  111.  Cap.  iv.  v.    See  Note  (A A.) 


SECT.  VI.]  OP    THE    HUMAN    MIND.  341 

"  female  does  the  male,  and  that  heavy  bodies  descend  down 
"  by  appetite  towards  the  centre,  that  they  may  rest  therein,) 
"  there  is  nothing  to  be  reprehended  in  the  passage.  But, 
"  if  his  meaning  be  extended  further  to  take  away  all  final 
"  causes  from  the  things  of  nature,  then  is  it  the  very  spirit 
"  of  atheism  and  infidelity.  It  is  no  idol  of  the  cave  or  den, 
"  (to  use  that  affected  language,)  that  is,  no  prejudice  or  falla- 
"  cy  imposed  on  ourselves,  from  the  attributing  our  own  ani- 
"  malish  properties  to  things  without  us,  to  think  that  the 
"  frame  and  system  of  this  whole  world  was  contrived  by  a 
"perfect  understanding  and  mind." 

It  is  difficult  to  conceive  that  any  person  who  had  read 
Bacon's  works,  and  who,  at  the  same  time,  Was  acquainted 
with  the  theories  which  it  was  their  great  object  to  explode, 
could,  for  a  moment,  have  hesitated  about  rejecting  the  latter 
interpretation  as  altogether  absurd ;  and  yet  the  splenetic 
tone  which  marks  the  conclusion  of  Cudworth's  strictures, 
plainly  shews,  that  he  had  a  decided  leaning  to  it,  in  prefe- 
rence to  the  former.*  The  comment  does  no  honour  to  his 
liberality  ;  and,  on  the  most  favourable  supposition,  must  be 
imputed  to  a  superstitious  reverence  for  the  remains  of  Gre- 
cian wisdom,  accompanied  with  a  corresponding  dread  of  the 
vnknown  dangers  to  be  apprehended  from  philosophical  in- 
novations. Little  was  he  aware,  that,  in  turning  the  atten- 
tion of  men  from  the  history  of  opinions  and  systems,  to  the 

*  Even  the  former  interpretation  is  not  agreeable  (as  appears  manifestly  from  the 
context)  to  Bacon's  idea.  The  prejudices  which  he  has  here  more  partieulai'y  in 
view,  are  those  which  take  their  rise  from  a  bias  in  the  mind  to  imagine  a  greater 
equality  and  uniformity  in  nature  than  really  exists.  As  an  instance  ol  this,  he  men- 
lions  the  universal  assumption  among  the  ancient  astronomers,  that  all  the  cele.tial 
motions  are  performed  in  orbits  perfectly  circular  ; — an  assumption,  which,  a  few- 
years  before  Bacon  wrote,  had  been  completely  disproved  by  Kep'er.  To  this  he 
adds  some  other  examples  from  physics  and  chemistry ;  after  which  he  introduces 
the  general  reflection  animadverted  on  by  Cudworth. — The  whole  passage  concludes 
with  these  words.  .  "  Tanta  est  harmonise  discrepanlia  inter  spiritual  hominis  et 
<'  spiritual  mundi." 

.  The  criticism  may  appear  minute  ;  but  I  cannot  forbear  to  mention,  as  a  proof  of 
the  carelessness  with  which  Cudworth  had  read  Bacon,  that  the  prejudice  supposed 
by  the  former  to  belong  to  the  class  ot  idolaspecus,  is  expiessiy  quoted  by  the  latter. 
as  an  example  of  the  idola  tribus. — (See  the  5th  Book  de  Augment.  Scient.  Chap.  iv. 


342  ELEMENTS    OP    THE    PHILOSOPHY         [cHAP.  IV. 

observation  and  study  of  nature,  Bacon  was  laying  the  foun- 
dation of  a  bulwark  against  atheism,  more  stable  and  im- 
pregnable than  the  united  labours  of  the  ancients  were  able 
to  rear; — a  bulwark  which  derives  additional  strength  from 
every  new  accession  to  the  stock  of  human  knowledge.* 

Whether  Bacon's  contempt  for  the  Final  Causes  of  the  Aris- 
totelians has  not  carried  him  to  an  extreme  in  recommending 
the  total  exclusion  of  them  from  physics,  is  a  very  different 
question;  and  a  question  of  much  importance  in  the  theory 
of  the  inductive  logic.  My  own  opinion  is,  that  his  views 
on  this  point,  if  considered  as  applicable  to  the  present  state 
of  experimental  science,  are  extremely  limited  and  erroneous. 
Perhaps,  at  the  time  when  he  wrote,  such  an  exclusion  may 
have  appeared  necessary,  as  the  only  effectual  antidote 
against  the  errors  which  then  infected  every  branch  of  phi- 
losophy ;  but  granting  this  to  be  true,  no  good  reason  can  be 
given  for  continuing  the  same  language,  at  a  period  when  the 
proper  object  of  physics  is  too  well  understood,  to  render  it 
possible  for  the  investigation  of  final  causes  to  lead  astray 
the  most  fanciful  theorist.  What  harm  can  be  apprehended 
from  remarking  those  proofs  of  design  which  fall  under  the 

*  Extabit  eximium  Newtoni  opus  adversus  Alheorum  impetus  munitissimum  pre- 
sidium.   Cotesii  Prsef.  in  Edit.  Secund.  Prineip. 

In  the  above  vindication  of  Bacon,  I  have  abstained  from  any  appeal  to  the  instan- 
ces in  which  he  has  himself  forcibly  and  eloquently  expressed  the  same  senliments- 
here  ascribed  to  him  ;  because  I  conceive  that  an  author's  real  opinions  are  to  be 
most  indisputably  judged  of  from  the  general  spirit  and  tendency  of  his  writings. 
The  fallowing  passage,  however,  is  too  precious  a  document  to  be  omitted  on  the  pre-, 
sent  occasion.  It  is,  indeed,  one  of  the  most  hackneyed  quotations  in  our  language;, 
but  it  forms,  on  that  very  account,  the  more  striking  a  contrast  to  the  voluminous  and 
now  neglected  erudition  displayed  by  Cudworth  in  defence  of  the  same  argument. 

:t  I  had  rather  believe  all  the  fables  in  the  Legend,  and  the  Talmud,  and  the  Al- 
'•'  coran,  than  that  this  universal  frame  is  without  a  mind  !  It  is  true  that  a  little  phi  - 
"  losophy  inclineth  man's  mind  to  atheism  ;  but  depth  in  philosophy  bringeth  men's 
"  minds  about  to  religion  ;  for  while  the  mind  of  man  looketh  upon  second  causes 
"  scattered,  it  may  sometimes  rest  in  them  and  go  no  farther  ;  but  when  it  beholdeth 
"  the  chain  of  them  confederate  and  linked  together,  it  must  needs  fly  to  Providence 
"  and  Deit_y ;  nay,  even  that  school  which  is  most  accused  of  atheism,  doth  most 
"  demonstrate  religion ;  that  is,  the  school  of  Leucippus,  and  Democritus,  and  Epicu- 
"  rus  ;  for  it  is  a  thousand  limes  more  credible,  that  four  mutable  elements  and  one 
"  immutable  fifth  essence,  duly  and  eternally  placed,  need  no  God,  than  that  an  army 
"of  infinite  small  portions,  or  seeds  unplaced,  should  have  produced  this  order  end 
<■'■  beauty  without  a  divine  marshal."    Bacon's  Essays. 


SECT.    VI.]  OP    THE    HUMAN   MINI/.  343 

view  of  the  physical  inquirer  in  the  course  of  his  studies  ? 
Or,  if  it  should  be  thought  foreign  to  his  province  to  speak  of 
design,  he  may,  at  least,  be  permitted  to  remark  what  ends 
are  really  accomplished  by  particular  means  ;  and  what  ad- 
vantages result  from  the  general  laws  by  which  the  phenome- 
na of  nature  are  regulated.  In  doing  this,  he  only  states  a 
fact ;  and  if  it  be  iilogical  to  go  farther,  he  may  leave  the 
inference  to  the  moralist  or  the  divine. 

In  consequence,  however,  of  the  vague  and  common-place 
declamation  against  final  causes,  sanctioned  (as  has  been 
absurdly  supposed)  by  those  detached  expressions  of  Bacon, 
which  have  suggested  the  foregoing  reflections,  it  has,  for 
many  years  past,  become  fashionable  to  omit  the  considera- 
tion of  them  entirely,  as  inconsistent  with  the  acknowledged 
rules  of  sound  philosophizing  ; — a  caution  (it  may  be  remark- 
ed by  the  way)  which  is  most  scrupulously  observed  by 
those  writers  who  are  the  most  forward  to  censure  every  ap- 
parent anomaly  or  disorder  in  the  economy  of  the  universe. 
The  effect  of  this  has  been  to  divest  the  study  of  nature  of 
its  most  attractive  charms  ;  and  to  sacrifice  to  a  false  idea  of 
logical  rigour,  all  the  moral  impressions  and  pleasures  which 
physical  knowledge  is  fitted  to  yield.* 

Nor  is  it  merely  in  a  moral  view,  that  the  consideration  of 
uses  is  interesting.  There  are  some  parts  of  nature  in  which 
it  is  necessary  to  complete  the  physical  theory  ;  nay,  there 
are  instances,  in  which  it  has  proved  a  powerful  and  per- 
haps indispensable,  organ  of  physical  discovery.  That  Ba- 
con should  not  have  been  aware  of  this,  will  not  appear  sur- 

*  "  If  a  traveller,"  says  the  great  Mr.  Boyle,  "  being  in  some  ill-inhabited  eastern 
"  country,  should  come  to  a  large  and  fair  building,  such  as  one  of  the  most  stately 
"  of  those  they  call  caravanzeras,  though  he  would  esteem  and  be  delighted  with 
"  the, magnificence  of  the  structure,  and  the  commodiousness  of  the  apartments,  yet 
u  supposing  it  to  have  been  erected  but  for  the  honour  or  the  pleasure  of  the  founder, 
"  he  would  commend  so  stately  a  fabric,  without  thanking  him  for  it  ;  bu(,  if  he  were 
*'  satisfied  that  this  commodious  building  was  designed  by  the  founder  as  a  recepta- 
u  cle  for  passengers,  who  were  freely  to  have  the  use  of  the  many  conveniences  the 
*l  apartments  afforded,  he  would  then  think  himself  obliged,  not  only  to  praise  the 
"  magnificence,  but  with  gratitude  to  acknowledge  the  bounty  and  the  philanthropy 
*  »f  s«  munificent  n  benefactor.'' — Boyle's  Works-,  Vol.  IV.  p.  517.  Folio  odition. 


344  ELEMENTS    OP    THE    PHILOSOPHY  [CHA.P.  IV. 

prising,  when  it  is  recollected,  that  the  chief  facts  which  jus- 
tify (he  observation  have  been  brought  to  light  since  his  time. 

Of  these  facts,  the  most  remarkable  are  furnished  by  the 
science  of  anatomy.  To  understand  the  structure  of  an  ani- 
mal body,  it  is  necessary  not  only  to  examine  the  conforma* 
tion  of  the  parts,  but  to  consider  their  functions  ;  or,  in  other 
words,  to  consider  their  ends  and  uses  :  nor,  indeed,  does  the 
most  accurate  knowledge  of  the  former,  till  perfected  by  the 
discovery  of  the  latter,  afford  satisfaction  to  an  inquisitive 
and  scientific  mind.  Every  anatomist,  accordingly,  whatever 
his  metaphysical  creed  may  be,  proceeds,  in  his  researches, 
upon  the  maxim,  that  no  organ  exists  without  its  appropriate 
destination  ;  and  although  he  may  often  fail  in  his  attempts 
to  ascertain  what  this  destination  is,  he  never  carries  his 
scepticism  so  far,  as,  for  a  moment,  to  doubt  of  the  general 
principle.  1  am  inclined  to  think,  that  it  is  in  this  way  the 
most  important  steps  in  physiology  have  been  gained  ;  the 
curiosity  being  constantly  kept  alive  by  some  new  problem 
in  the  animal  machine  ;  and,  at  the  same  time,  checked  in 
its  wanderings,  by  an  irresistible  conviction,  that  nothing  is 
made  in  vain.  The  memorable  account  given  by  Mr.  Boyle 
of  the  circumstances  which  led  to  the  discovery  of  the  circu- 
lation of  the  blood,  is  but  one  of  the  many  testimonies  which 
might  be  quoted  in  confirmation  of  this  opinion. 

"  I  remember,  that  when  I  asked  our  famous  Harvey,  in 
u.  the  only  discourse  I  had  with  him,  (which  was  but  a  little 
u  while  before  he  died.)  what  were  the  things  which  induced 
"  him  to  think  of  a  circulation  of  the  blood  ?  he  answered  me, 
"  that  when  he  took  notice,  that  the  valves  in  the  veins  of  so 
"  many  parts  of  the  body  were  so  placed,  that  they  gave 
"  free  passage  to  the  blood  towards  the  heart,  but  opposed 
"  the  passage  of  the  venal  blood  the  contrary  way,  he  was 
"  invited  to  think,  that  so  provident  a  cause  as  nature  had 
"  not  placed  so  many  valves  without  design  ;  and  no  design 
"  seemed  more  probable,  than  that,  since  the  blood  could  not 
"  well,  because  of  the  interposing  valves,  be  sent  by  the  veins 
"  to  the  limbs,  it  should  be  sent  through  the  arteries,  and  re* 


SECT.  VI.]  OF   THE   HUMAN   MIND.  345 

¥  turn  through  the  veins  whose  valves  did  not  oppose  its 
"  course  that  way."* 

This  perception  of  design  and  contrivance  is  more  pecu> 
tiarly  impressive,  when  we  contemplate  those  instances  in 
the  animal  economy,  in  which  the  same  effect  is  produced, 
in  different  combinations  of  circumstances,  by  different 
means  : — when  we  compare,  for  example,  the  circulation 
of  'he  blood  in  the  foetus,  with  that  in  the  body  of  the  ani- 
mal after  it  is  born.  On  such  an  occasion,  how  is  it  possi- 
ble to  withhold  the  assent  from  the  ingenious  reflection  of 
Baxter  !  "  Art  and  means  are  designedly  multiplied,  that 
"  we  might  not  fake  it  for  the  effects  of  chance  ;  and,  in  some 
"  cases,  the  method  itself  is  different,  that  we  might  see  it  is 
"  not  the  effect  of  surd  necessity  ."t 

*  Boyle's  Works,  Vol.  IV.  p.  539.  Folio  ed.  See  Outlines  of  Moral  Philosophy,  p. 
185.  (Edin.  1793.) 

The  reasoning  here  ascribed  to  Harvey  seems  now  so  very  natural  and  obvious, 
that  some  have  been  disposed  to  question  his  claim  ro  the  high  rank  commonly  as- 
signed to  him  among  tiie  improvers  of  science.  The  late  Dr.  William  Hunter  has 
said,  that  after  the  discovery  of  the  valves  in  the  veinsj  which  Harvey  learned,  while 
in  Italy,  from  his  master  Fabriciusab  Aquapendenie,  the  remaining  step  might  easily 
have  been  made  by  any  person  of  common  abilities.  "  This  discovery,"  he  observes, 
"  set  Harvey  to  work  upon  the  use  of  the  heart  and  vascular  system  in  animals  :  and 
tf  in  the  course  of  some  years,  he  was  so  happy  as  to  discover,  and  to  prove  beyond 
"  all  possibility  of  doubt,  the  circulation  of  the  blood."  He  afterwards  expressed  his 
astonishment  that  this  discovery  should  have  been  left  for  Harvey;  adding,  thai 
"  Providence  meant  to  reserve  it  for  him,  and  would  not  let  men  see  what  was  be/ore 
"  them,  nor  understand  what  they  read." — Hunter's  Introductory  Lectures,  p.  42.  et  seq. 

Whatever  opinion  be  formed  on  this  point,  Dr.  Hunter's  remarks  are  valuable,  as 
an  additio  .al  proof  of  the  regard  paid  by  anatomists  to  Final  Causes,  in  the  study 
of  physiology. 

See  also  Haller,  Elem.  Physiolog.  Tom.  I.  p.  204, 

t  Inquiry  into  the  Nature  of  the  Human  Soul,  Vol.  I.  p.  136.  (3d  Ed.) 

The  following  passage  from  an  old  English  divine  may  be  of  use  for  the  farther 
illustration  of  thi*  argument.  I  quote  it  with  the  greater  confidence,  as  I  find  that 
the  most  eminent  and  original  physiologist  of  the  present  age  (M.  Cuvier)  has  been 
led,  by  his  enlightened  researches  concerning  the  laws  of  the  animal  economy,  into  Q 
train  of  thinking  strikingly  similar. 

"  Man  is  always  mending  and  altering  his  works  ;  but  nature  observes  the  same 
"  tenor,  because  her  works  are  so  perfect,  that  there  is  no  place  for  amendments,  no- 
"  thing  that  can  be  reprehended.  The  most  sagacious  men  in  so  many  ages  have 
"  not  been  able  to  find  any  flaw  in  these  divinely  contrived  and  formed  machines  J 
*'  no  blot  or  error  in  this  great  volume  of  the  world,  as  if  any  thing  had  been  an  im- 
"  perfect  essay  at  the  first ;  notliingthat  can  be  altered  for  the  better  ;  nothing  but  if 
"  it  were  altered  would  be  marred.  This  could  not  have  been,  had  man's  body  been 
VOL.  II.  44 


34£ 


ELEMENTS    OP    THE    PHILOSOPHY        [CHAP.  IV. 


The  study  of  comparative  anatomy  leads,  at  every  step, 
so  directly  and  so  manifestly  to  the  same  conclusion,  that 
even  those  physiologists  who  had  nothing  in  view  but  the 
advancement  of  their  own  science,  unanimously  agree  in  re- 
commending the  dissection  of  animals  of  different  kinds,  as 
the  most  effectual  of  all  helps  for  ascertaining  the  functions 
of  the  various  organs  in  the  human  frame ; — tacitly  assuming 
as  an  incontrovertible  truth,  that,  in  proportion  to  the  variety 
of  means  by  which  the  same  effect  is  accomplished,  the  pre~ 
sumption  increases,  that  this  effect  was  an  end  in  the  contem- 
plation of  the  artist.  "  The  intention  of  nature,"  says  one 
author,  "  in  the  formation  of  the  different  parts,  can  no  where 
"  be  so  well  learned  as  from  comparative  anatomy  ;  that  is, 
"  if  we  would  understand  physiology,  and  reason  on  the 
"  functions  of  the  animal  economy,  we  must  see  how  the 
"  same  end  is  brought  about  in  other  species. — We  mustcon- 

u  the  work  of  chance,  and  not  counsel  and  providence.  Why  should  there  be  con- 
"  etantly  the  same  parts  ?  Why  should  they  retain  constantly  the  same  places  ?  No- 
**  thing;  so  contrary  as  constancy  and  chance.  Should  T  see  a  man  throw  the  same 
"  number  a  thousand  times  together  upon  but  three  dice,  could  you  persuade  me  that 
<«  this  were  accidental,  and  that  there  was  no  necessary  cause  for  it  ?  How  much 
"  more  incredible  then  is  it,  that  constancy  in  such  a  variety,  such  a  multiplicity  of 
°  parts,  should  be  the  result  of  chance  P  Neither  yet  can  these  works  be  the  effects 
"  of  Necessity  or  Fate,  for  then  there  would  be  the  same  constancy  observed  in  the 
t(  smaller  as  well  as  in  the  larger  parts  and  vessels  ;  whereas  there  we  see  nature 
"  doth,  as  it  were,  sport  itself,  the  minute  ramifications  of  all  the  vessels,  veins,  arte- 
"  ries,  and  nerves,  infinitely  varying  in  individuals  of  the  same  species,  so  that  they 
"  are  no  in  any  two  alike."— Ray's  Wisdom  of  God  in  the  Creation. 

"  Nature,"  says  Cuvier,  "  while  confining  herself  strictly  within  those  limits  which 
"  the  conditions  necessary  for  existence  prescribed  to  her,  has  yielded  to  her  sponta- 
"  neous  fecundity  wherever  these  conditions  did  not  limit  her  operations ;  and  without 
»  ever  passing  beyond  the  small  number  of  combinations,  that  can  be  realized  in  the 
"  essential  modifications  of  the  important  organs,  she  seems  to  have  given  full  scope 
<  f  to  her  fancy,  in  filling  up  the  subordinate  parts.  With  respect  to  these,  it  is  not  in- 
«  quired,  whether  an  individual  form,  whether  a  particular  arrangement  be  necessa- 
«  ry  ;  it  seems  often  not  to  have  been  asked,  whether  it  be  even  useful,  in  order  to 
«  reduce  it  to  practice  ;  it  is  sufficient  that  it  be  possible,  that  it  destroy  not  the  har- 
"  irony  of  ihe  whole.  Accordingly,  as  we  recede  from  the  principal  organs,  and  ap- 
"  proach  to  those  of  less  importance,  the  varieties  in  structure  and  appearance  become 
«  more  numerous  ;  and  when  we  arrive  at  the  surface  of  the  body,  where  the  parts 
"  the  least  essential,  and  whose  injuries  are  the  least  momentous,  are  necessarily 
"  placed,  the  number  or  varieties  is  so  great,  that  the  conjoined  labours  of  naturalists 
"  have  not  yet  been  able  to  give  us  an  adequate  idea  of  them ."  Lemons  d'Anatomi* 
Corripar£e. 


SECT.  VI.}  OF  TH2   SUMA7   MIND.  347 

u  .template  the  part  or  organ  in  different  animals  ;  its  shape, 
w  position,  and  connection  with  the  other  pa  is;  and  observe 
"  what  thence  arises.  If  we  find  one  common  effect  con- 
"  stantly  produced,  though  in  a  very  different  way,  we  may 
"  safely  conclude  that  this  is  the  use  or  function  of  the  part. — 
•"  This  reasoning  can  never  betray  us,  if  we  are  but  sure  of 
"  the  facts."* 

The  celebrated  Albinus  expresses  himself  to  the  same  pur- 
pose in  his  preface  to  Harvey's  Exercilatio  de  Motu  Cordis, 
"  Incidenda  autem  animalia,  quibus  partes  illae  quarum  acti* 
4(  ones  quasrimus  easdem  atque  homini  sunt,  aut  certe  similes 
"  iis  ;  ex  quibus  sine  metu  erroris  judicare  de  illis  hominis 
"  liceat.  Quin  et  reliqua,  si  modo  aliquam  habeant  ad  homi- 
"  nem  similitudinem,  idonea  sunt  ad  aliquod  suppeditandum." 
If  B  icon  had  lived  to  read  such  testimonies  as  these  in  fa- 
\rour  of  the  investigation  of  Final  Causes  ;  or  had  witnessed 
the  discoveries  to  which  it  has  led  in  the  study  of  the  animal 
economy,  he  would,  I  doubt  not,  have  readily  admitted,  that 
it  was  not  altogether  uninteresting  and  unprofitable,  even  to 
the  physical  inquirer.  Such,  however,  is  the  influence  of  an 
illustrious  name,  that,  in  direct  opposition  to  the  evidence  of 
historical  facts,  the  assertion  of  the  complete  sterility  of  all 
these  speculations  is,  to  the  present  day,  repeated,  with  un- 
diminished confidence,  by  writers  of  unquestionable  learning 
and  talents.  In  one  of  the  most  noted  physiological  works 
which  have  lately  appeared  on  the  Continent,  Bacon's 
apothegm  is  cited  more  than  once  with  unqualified  approba- 
tion ;  although  the  author  candidly  owns,  that  it  is  difficult 
for  the  most  reserved  philosopher  always  to  keep  it  steadi- 
ly in  view,  in  the  course  of  his  inquiries.! 

The  prejudice  against  final  causes,  so  generally  avowed 
by  the   most  eminent  philosophers    of  France,  during  the 

*  Letter  by  an  anonymous  correspondent,  prefixed  to  Monro's  Comparative  Anato- 
my-   London,  1744. 

t  "  Je  regarde,  avec  le  grand  Bacon,  la  philosophie  des  causes  finales  eoijime  ste"- 
e<  rile  :  mais  il  est  bien  difficile  a  l'homme  le  plus  reserve,  de  n'y  avoir  jamais  recours 
iC  dans  ses  explications.-' — Rapports  du  Physique  et  du  Moral  de  l'Hotfime,  Par  M, 
te  Senateur  Cabanis.    Tome  I.  p.  352.    Paris,  1805, 


348  ELEMENTS  OP  THE  PHILOSOPHY       [CHAP.  IV. 

eighteenth  century,  was  first  introduced  into  that  country  by 
Des  Cartes.     It  must  not,  however,  be  imagined,  that,  in  the 
mind  of  this  great  man,  it  arose  from  any  bias  towards  athe- 
ism.    On  the  contrary,  he  himself  tells  us,  that  his  objection 
to  the  research  of  uses  or  ends,  was  founded  entirely  on  the 
presumptuous  confidence  which  it  seemed  to  argue  in  the 
powers  of  human  reason  ;  as  if  it  were  conceivable,  that  the 
limited  faculties  of  man  could  penetrate  into  the  counsels  of 
Divine  wisdom.     Of  the  existence  of  God  he  conceived  that 
a  demonstrative  proof  was  afforded  by  the  idea  we  are  able 
to  form  of  a  Being  infinitely  perfect,  and  necessarily  existing  j 
and  it  has,  with  some  probability,  been  conjectured,  that  it 
was  his  partiality  to  this  new  argument  of  his  own,  which  led 
him  to  reject  the  reasonings  of  his  predecessors  in  support  of 
the  same  conclusion.* 

To  this  objection  of  Pes  Cartes,  an  elaborate,  and,  in  my 
opinion,  a  most  satisfactory  reply,  is  to  be  found  in  the  works 
of  Mr.  Boyle.  The  principal  scope  of  his  essay  may  be  col- 
lected from  the  following  short  extract. 

"  Suppose  that  a  countryman,  being  in  a  clear  day  brought 
44  into  the  garden  of  some  famous  mathematician,  should  see 
*'  there  one  of  those  curious  gnomonic  instruments,  that  shew 
"  at  once  the  place  of  the  sun  in  the  zodiac,  his  declination 
"  from  the  equator,  the  day  of  the  month,  thp  length  of  the  day, 
"  &c.  &c.  It  would  indeed  be  presumption  in  him,  being  un- 
"  acquainted  both  with  the  mathematical  disciplines,  and  the 
\i  several  intentions  of  the  artist,  to  pretend  or  think  himself 

*  "  Nullas  unquam  rationes  circa  res  naturales  a  fin*  quam  Deus  aut  natura  in  iis  fa- 
a  ciendis  sibi  proposuit  desumemus  ;  quia  non  tantum  debemus  nobis  arrogare  ut  ejus 
11  consiliorum  participes  nos  esse  putemus.''  Princip.  Pars.  I.  §  28. "  Dum  ha?c  perpen- 
ci  doaltentius,  occurrit  primo  non  mihi  esse  mirandum  si  quaedam  a  Deo  fiant  quorum, 
"  rationes  non  intelligam  ;  nee  de  ejus  existentia  ideo  esse  dubitandum,  quod  forte  quae- 
"  dam  alia  esse  experiar  quce  quare,  vel  quomodo  ab  illo  facta  suit  non.  comprehendo ; 
"  cum  enim  jam  sciam  naturam  meam  esse  valde  infirmam  et  limitatam,  Dei  autem 
"  naturaru  esse  immensam,  incomprehensibilem,  infinitam,  ex  hoc  satis,  etiam  scio 
<{  innumerabilia  ilium  posse  quorum  causas  ignorem  ;  atque  ob  have  unicam  rationem 
a totum  illud  causarum  genus  quod  a  fine  peti  solet  in  rebus  physicis  nullum  usum  ha- 
ei  bere  exislimo ;  non  enim  absque  temcritate  me  puto  posse  investigare  fines  Dei." 
Meditatio  Quarta. 

See  Note  (BB.) 


SECT.  VI.]  OF    THE    HUMAN    MIND.  349 

"  able  to  discover  all  the  ends  for  which  so  curious  and 
K  elaborate  a  piece  was  framed  :  but  when  he  sees  it  furnish- 
"  ed  with  a  stile,  with  horary  lines  and  numbers,  and  in  short 
"  with  all  the  requisites  of  a  sun-dial,  and  manifestly  per- 
^ceives  the  shadow  to  mark  from  time  to  time  the  hour  of 
"  the  day,  it  would  be  no  more  a  presumption  than  an  error 
"  in  him  to  conclude,  that  (whatever  other  uses  the  instrument 
"  was  fit  or  was  designed  for)  it  is  a  sun-dial,  that  was  meant 
''  to  shew  the  hour  of  the  day."* 

With  this  opinion  of  Boyle  that  of  Newton  so  entirely  coin- 
cided, that  (according  to  Maclaurin)  he  thought  the  conside- 
ration of  final  causes  essential  to  true  philosophy  ;  and  was 
accustomed  to  congratulate  himself  on  the  effect  of  his  wri- 
tings in  reviving  an  attention  to  them,  after  the  attempt  of 
Pes  Cartes  to  discard  them  from  physics.  On  this  occasion, 
Maclaurin  has  remarked,  "  that  of  all  sort  of  causes,  final 
"  causes  are  the  most  clearly  placed  in  our  view  ; — and  that 
"  it  is  difficult  to  comprehend,  why  it  should  be  thought  ar- 
"  rogant  to  attend  to  the  design  and  contrivance  that  is  so 
"  evidently  displayed  in  nature,  and  obvious  to  all  men  ; — 
"  to  maintain,  for  instance,  that  the  eye  was  made  for  seeing, 
"  though  we  may  not  be  able  either  to  account  mechanically 
u  for  the  refraction  of  light  in  its  coats,  or  to  explain  how  the 
"  image  is  propagated  from  the  retina  to  the  mind.,1t — It  is 
Newton's  own  language,  however,  which  alone  can  do  jus- 
tice to  his  sentiments  on  the  present  subject. 

"  The  main  business  of  natural  philosophy  is  to  argue  from 
"  phenomena,  without  feigning  hypotheses,  and  to  deduce 

*  In  the  same  Essay,  Mr.  Boyle  has  offered  some  very  judicious  strictures  on  the 
abuses  to  which  the  research  of  final  causes  is  liable,  when  incautiously  and  pre- 
sumptuously pursued.  An  abstract  of  these,  accompanied  with  a  few  illustrations 
from  later  writers,  might  form  an  interesting  chapter  in  a  treatise  of  inductive  logic. 

The  subject  has  been  since  prosecuted  with  considerable  ingenuity  by  Le  Say;eof 
Geneva,  who  has  even  attempted  (and  not  altogether  without  success)  to  lay  down 
logical  rules  for  the  investigation  of  ends.  To  this  study,  which  he  was  anxious  to  form 
into  a  separate  science,  he  gave  the  very  ill  chosen  name  of  Teleologie ;  a  name,  if  I 
am  not  mistaken,  first  suggested  by  JVolfius. — For  some  valuable  fragments  of  his  in- 
tended work  with  respect  to  it,  see  the  Account  of  his  Life  and  Writings  by  his  friend 
M.  Prevost.    (Geneva,  1805.) 

t  Account  of  Newton's  .Philosophical  Discoveries,  Book  I.  Chap.  IL 


350  ELEMENTS  OF  THE  PHILOSOPHY  [CHAP.  IT. 

"causes  from  effects  till  we  come  to  the  very  first  cause, 
"  which  certainly  is  not  mechanical ;  and  not  only  to  unfold 
"  the  mechanism  of  the  world,  but  chiefly  to  resolve  these 
"  and  such  like  questions  :  Whence  is  it  that  Nature  does 
61  nothing  in  vain  ;  and  whence  arises  all  that  order  and  beauty 
**  which  we  see  in  the  world  ? — How  came  the  bodies  of  animals 
"  to  be  contrived  with  so  much  art,  and  for  what  ends  were 
"  their  several  parts  ?  Was  the  eye  contrived  without  skill  in 
"  optics,  and  the  ear  without  knowledge  of  sounds  /"'* 

In  multiplying  these  quotations,  I  am  well  aware  that  au- 
thorities are  not  arguments  ;  but  when  a  prejudice  to  which 
authority  alone  has  given  currency  is  to  be  combated,  what 
other  refutation  is  likely  to  be  effectual  ? 

After  all,  it  were  to  be  wished  that  the  scholastic  phrase 
final  cause  could,  without  affectation,  bp  dropped  from  our 
philosophical  vocabulary  ;  and  some  more  unexceptionable 
mode  of  speaking  substituted  instead  of  it.  In  this  elementa- 
ry work,  I  have  not  presumed  to  lay  aside  entirely  a  form  of 
expression  consecrated  in  the  writings  of  Newton,  and  of  his 
most  eminent  followers  ;  but  I  am  fully  sensible  of  its  impro- 
priety, and  am  not  without  hopes  that  I  may  contribute  some*- 
thing  to  encourage  the  gradual  disuse  of  it,  by  the  indiscrimi- 
nate employment  of  the  words  ends  and  uses  to  convey  the  same 
idea.  Little  more  perhaps  than  the  general  adoption  of  one 
or  other  of  these  terms  is  necessary,  to  bring  candid  and  re- 
flecting minds  to  a  uniformity  of  language  as  well  as  of  sen* 
timent  on  the  point  in  question. 

It  was  before  observed,  with  respect  to  anatomists,  that  all 
of  them,  without  exception,  whether  professedly  friendly  or 
hostile  to  the  inquisition  of  final  causes,  concur  in  availing 
themselves  of  its  guidance  in  their  physiological  researches. 
A  similar  remark  will  be  found  to  apply  to  other  classes  of 
scientific  inquirers.  Whatever  their  speculative  opinions 
may  be,  the  moment  their  curiosity  is  fairly  engaged  in  the 
pursuit  of  truth,  either  physical  or  moral,  they  involuntarily, 
and  often  perhaps  unconsciously,  submit  their  understandings 

¥  Newton's  Optics,  Query  28. 


SECT.  VI.]  OP    THE    HUMAN    MINI>.  351 

to  a  logic  borrowed  neither  from  the  schools  of  Aristotle  nor 
of  Bacon.  The  ethical  system  (for  example)  of  those  an- 
cient philosophers  who  held  that  Virtue  consists  in  follow- 
ing Nature,  not  only  involves  a  recognition  of  final  causes, 
but  represents  the  study  of  them,  in  as  far  as  regards  the 
ends  and  destination  of  our  own  being,  as  the  great  business 
and  duty  of  life.*  The  system,  too,  of  those  physicians  who 
profess  to  follow  Nature  in  the  treatment  of  diseases,  by 
watching  and  aiding  her  medicative  powers,  assumes  the 
same  doctrine  as  its  fundamental  principle.  A  still  more  re- 
markable illustration,  however,  of  the  influence  which  this 
species  of  evidence  has  over  the  belief,  even  when  we  are 
the  least  aware  of  its  connection  with  metaphysical  conclu- 
sions, occurs  in  the  history  of  the  French  Economical  Sys- 
tem. Of  the  comprehensive  and  elevated  views  which  at 
first  suggested  it,  the  title  of  Physiocratie,  by  which  it  was 
«arly  distinguished,  affords  a  strong  presumptive  proof;  and 
the  same  thing  is  more  fully  demonstrated,  by  the  frequent 
recurrence  made  in  it  to  the  physical  and  moral  laws  of  Na- 
ture, as  the  unerring  standard  which  the  legislator  should 
keep  in  view  in  all  his  positive  institutions. t  I  do  not  speak 
at  present  of  the  justness  of  these  opinions.  I  wish  only  to 
remark,  that,  in  the  statement  of  them  given  by  their  original 
authors,  it  is  taken  for  granted  as  a  truth  self-evident  and  in- 
disputable, not  merely  that  benevolent  design  is  manifested 
in  all  the  physical  and  moral  arrangements  connected  with 
this  globe,  but  that  the  study  of  these  arrangements  is  indis- 

*  "  Discite,  O  miseri,  et  causas  cognoscite  rerum, 
"  Quid  sumus,  et  quidnam  victuri  gignimur. 

Persius. 
Eyu  S't  Tt  /3sAe/M.«<'  xotrxftctSeiv  tjjv  <pv<rtv,  k}  ravry  en-ic-Octi. 

EflCTfcT. 

t  "  Ces  lois  forment  ensemble  ce  qu'on  appelle  la  loi  naturelle.  Tons  les  hommes  et 
"  tomes  les-  puissances  humaines  doivent  etre  soumis  a  ces  lois  souveraines,  institutees 
"  par  I'etre  supreme  :  elles  sont  immuables  et  irreTragables,  et  les  meilleurs  loix  pos- 
"  sibles  ;  et  par  consequent,  la  base  du  governement  le  plus  parfait,  et  la  regie  fonda- 
"  mentale  de  toutes  les  loix  positives  ;  car  les  loix  positives  ne  sont  que  des  loix  de 
"  nianutention  relatives  a  rordre%  nature!  evidemment  le  plus  avantageux  au  genre 
"  humain."  Quf.snay. 


352  elements  op  the  philosophy     [chap.  iv. 

pensably  necessary  to  lay  a  solid  foundation  for  political 
science. 

The  same  principles  appear  to  have  led  Mr.  Smith  into 
that  train  of  thinking  which  gave  birth  to  his  inquiries  con- 
cerning National  Wealth.  "  Man,"  he  observes  in  one  of  his 
oldest  manuscripts  now  extant,  "  is  generally  considered  by 
"  statesmen  and  projectors  as  the  materials  of  a  sort  of  poli- 
"  tical  mechanics.  Projectors  disturb  Nature  in  the  course 
"  of  her  operations  in  human  affairs  ;  and  it  requires  no  more 
"  than  to  let  her  alone,  and  give  her  fair  play  in  the  pursuit  of 
"  her  own  designs." — And  in  another  passage  :  "  Little  else 
"  is  requisite  to  carry  a  state  to  the  highest  degree  of  opu- 
"  lence  from  the  lowest  barbarism,  but  peace,  easy  taxes,  and 
"  a  tolerable  administration  of  justice ;  all  the  rest  being 
"  brought  about  by  the  natural  course  of  things.  All  govern- 
"  merits  which  thwart  this  natural  course  ;  which  force  things 
"  into  another  channel ;  or  which  endeavour  to  arrest  the 
"  progress  of  society  at  a  particular  point,  are  unnatural, 
"and  lo  support  themselves  are  obliged  to  be  oppressive 
"  and  tyrannical."*  Various  other  passages  of  a  similar  im- 
port might  be  quoted,  both  from  his  Wealth  of  Nations,  and 
from  his  Theory  of  Moral  Sentiments. 

This  doctrine  of  Smith  and  Quesnay,  which  tends  to  sim- 
plify the  theory  of  legislation,  by  exploding  the  policy  of 
those  complicated  check*  and  restraints  which  swell  the  mu- 
nicipal codes  of  most  nations,  has  now,  I  believe,  become  the 
prevailing  creed  of  thinking  men  all  over  Europe  ;  and,  as 
commonly  happens  to  prevailing  creeds,  has  been  pushed  by 
many  of  its  partizans  far  beyond  the  views  and  intentions  of 
its  original  authors.  Such  too  is  the  effect  of  fashion,  on  the 
one  hand,  and  of  obnoxious  phrases  on  the  other,  that  it  has 
found  some  of  its  most  zealous  abettors  and  propagators 
among  writers  who  would,  without  a  moment's  hesitation, 
have  rejected,  as  puerile  and  superstitious,  any  reference  to 
final  causes  in  a  philosophical  discussion. 

*  Biographical  Memoirs  of  Smith,  Robertson,  and  Reid,  p.  100. 


SECT.  VI.]  OP    THE   HUMAN   MIND.  353 

II. 

Danger  of  confounding  Final  with  Physical  Causes  in  the  Philosophy  of  the  Human 

Mind. 

Having  said  so  much  upon  the  research  of  Final  Causes  in 
Physics,  properly  so  called,  I  shall  subjoin  a  few  remarks  on 
its  application  to  the  Philosophy  of  the  human  mind  ; — a  sci- 
ence in  which  the  just  rules  of  investigation  are  as  yet  far 
from  being  generally  understood.  Of  this  no  stronger  proof 
can  be  produced,  than  the  confusion  betw°en  final  and  effi- 
cient causes,  which  perpetually  recurs  in  the  writings  of  our 
latest  and  most  eminent  moralists.  The  same  confusion,  as  I 
have  already  observed,  prevailed  in  the  physical  reasonings 
of  the  Aristotelians  ;  but,  since  the  time  of  Bacon,  has  been 
so  completely  corrected,  that,  in  the  wildest  theories  of  mo- 
dern naturalists,  hardly  a  vestige  of  it  is  to  be  traced. 

To  the  logical  error  just  mentioned  it  is  owing,  that  so 
many  false  accounts  have  been  given  of  the  principles  of 
human  conduct  or  of  the  motives  by  which  men  are  stimu- 
lated to.  action.  When  the  general  laws  of  our  internal 
frame  are  attentively  examined,  they  will  be  found  to  have 
for  their  object  the  happiness  and  improvement  both  of  the 
individual  and  of  society.  This  is  their  Final  Cause,  or  the 
end  for  which  we  may  presume  they  were  destined  by  our 
Maker.  But,  in  such  cases,  it  seldom  happens,  that,  while 
Man  is  obeying  the  active  impulses  of  his  nature,  he  has  any 
idea  of  the  ultimate  ends  which  he  is  promoting;  or  is  able 
to  calculate  the  remote  effects  of  the  movements  which  he 
impresses  on  the  little  wheels  around  him.  These  active 
impulses,  therefore,  may,  in  one  sense,  be  considered  as  the 
efficient  causes  of  his  conduct ;  inasmuch  as  they  are  the 
means  employed  to  determine  him  to  particular  pursuits  and 
habits  ;  and  as  they  operate  (in  the  first  instance,  at  least) 
without  any  reflection  on  his  part  on  the  purposes  to  which 
they  are  subservient.  Philosophers,  however,  have  in  every 
age  been  extremely  apt  to  conclude,  when  they  had  disco- 
vered the  salutary  \endency  of  any  active  principle,  that  it 

vol.  ii.  45 


354  ELEMENTS    OF    THE    PHILOSOPHY       [CHAP.    It. 

was  from  a  sense  or  foreknowledge  of  this  tendency  that  the 
prinaple  derived  its  origin.  Hence  have  arisen  the  theories 
which  attempt  to  account  for  all  our  actions  from  self  love  j 
and  also  those  which  would  resolve  the  whole  of  morality, 
either  into  political  views  of  general  expediency,  or  into  an 
enlightened  regard  to  our  own  best  interests. 

I  do  not  know  of  any  author  who  has  been  so  completely 
aware  of  this  common  error  as  Mr.  Smith.     In  examining 
the  principles  connected  with  our  moral  constitution,   he  al- 
ways treats  separately  of  their  final  causes,  and  of  the  me- 
chanism (as  he  calls  it)   by  which  nature  accomplishes  the 
effect  ;  and  he  has  even  been  at  pains  to  point  out  to  his  suc- 
cessors the  great  importance  of  attending  to  the  distinction 
between  these  two  speculations — "  In  every  part  of  the  uni- 
4  verse,  we  observe  means  adjusted  with  the  nicest  artifice 
'  to  the  ends  which  they  are  intended  to  produce  ;  and  in  the 
'  mechanhm  of  a  plant  or  animal  body,  admire  how  every 
"  thing  is  contrived  for  advancing  the  two  great  purposes  of 
'  nature,  the  support  of  the  individual,  and  the  propagation  of 
'  the  species.     But  in  these,  and  in  all  sur  h  objects,  we  still 
'  distinguish  the  efficient  from  the  final  cause  of  their  several 
"  motions  and  organizations.     The  digestion  of  the  food,  the 
'  circulation  of  the  blood,  and  the  secretion  of  the  several 

*  juices  which  are  drawn  from  it,  are  operations  all  of  thera 
'  necessary  for  the  gr^at  purposes  of  animal  life  ;  yet  we 
;  nevr  r  endeavour  to  account  for  them  from  those  purposes 
1  as  from  their  efficient  causes,  nor  imagine  that  the  blood 
'  circulates,  or  the  food  digests  of  its  own  accord,  and  with  a 
'  view  or  intention  to  the  purposes  of  circulation  or  diges- 
'  tion.  The  wheels  of  the  watch  are  all  admirably  adapted 
'  to  the  end  for  which  it  was  made,  the  pointing  of  the  hour. 
'  All  their  various  motions  conspire  in  the  nicest  manner  to 
'  produce  this  effect.     If  they  were  endowed  with  a  desire 

*  and  intention  to  produce  it,  they  could  not  do  it  better. 
'  Yet  we  never  ascribe  any  such  intention  or  desire  to  them, 
'  but  to  the  watch-maker,  and  we  know  that  they  are  put 
'  into  motion  by  a  spring,  which  intends  the  effect  it  produ- 


SECT.  VI.]  OP    THE   HUMAN   MIND.  355 

"  ces  as  little  as  they  do.  But  though,  in  accounting  for  the 
"  operations  of  bodies,  we  never  fail  to  distinguish,  in  this 
"  manner,  the  efficient  from  the  final  cause,  in  accounting  for 
"  those  of  the  mind,  we  are  apt  to  confound  these  two  differ- 
*l  ent  things  with  one  another.  When,  by  natural  principles, 
"  we  are  led  to  advance  those  ends  which  a  refined  and  en- 
u  lightened  reason  would  recommend  to  us,  we  are  very  apt 
*'  to  impute  to  that  reason,  as  to  their  efficient  cause,  the 
u  sentiments  and  actions  by  which  we  advance  those  ends, 
"  and  to  imagine  that  to  be  the  wisdom  of  Man,  which,  in 
"  reality,  is  the  wisdom  of  God.  Upon  a  superficial  view, 
*'  this  cause  seems  sufficient  to  produce  the  effects  which  are 
"  ascribed  to  it  ;  and  the  system  of  Human  Nature  seems 
*4  to  be  more  simple  and  agreeable,  when  all  its  different 
*•'  operations  are,  in  this  manner,  deduced  from  a  single  prin- 
■"  ciple."* 

These  remarks  apply  with  peculiar  force  to  a  theory  of 
morals  which  has  made  much  noise  in  our  own  times  ; — a 
theory  which  resolves  the  obligation  of  all  the  different  vir- 
tues into  a  sense  of  their  utility.  At  the  time  when  Mr. 
Smith  wrote,  it  had  been  recently  brought  into  fashion  by 
the  ingenious  and  refined  disquisitions  of  M*.  Hume  ;  and 
there  can  be  little  doubt,  that  the  foregoing  strictures  were 
meant  by  the  author  as  an  indirect  refutation  of  his  friend's 
doctrines. 

The  same  theory  (which  is  of  a  very  ancient  datef)  has 
been  since  revived  by  Mr.  Godwin,  and  by  the  late  excellent 
Dr.  Pa  ley.  Widely  as  these  two  writers  differ  in  the  source 
whence  they  derive  their  rule  of  conduct,  and  the  sanctions 
by  which  they  enforce  its  observance,  they  are  perfectly 
agreed  about  its  paramount  authority  over  every  other  prin- 
ciple of  action.  "  Whatever  is  expedient,''1  says  Dr.  Paley, 
"  is  right.  It  is  the  utility  of  any  moral  rule  alone  which 
"  constitutes  the  obligation  of  it.J     ....     But  then, 

*  Theory  of  Moral  Sentiments,  Vol.  I.  p.  216,  et  seq.  6th  edit. 

I  "  Ipsa  utililas,  justi  prope  mater  et  sequi." — Horat  Sat.  Lib.  I.  3. 

$  Principles  of  Moral  and.  Political  Philosophy,  Vol.  I.  p.  70. 5th  edit . 


356  ELEMENTS    OF    THE    PHILOSOPHY       [CHAP.  IV. 

"  it  must  be  expedient  on  the  whole,  at  the  long  run,  in  all  its 
"  effects  collateral  and  remote,  as  well  as  those  which  are 
"  immediate  and  direct  ;  as  it  is  obvious,  that,  in  computing 
"  consequences,  it  makes  no  difference  in  what  way,  or  at 
"  whai  distance  they  ensue."* — Mr.  Godwin  has  no  where 
expressed  himself,  on  this  fundamental  question  of  practical 
ethics,  in  terms  more  decided  and  unqualified. 

The  observations  quoted  from  Mr.  Smith  on  the  proneness 
of  the  mind,  in  moral  speculations,  to  confound  together  effi- 
cient and  final  causes,  furnish  a  key  to  the  chief  difficulty  by 
which  the  patrons  of  this  specious  but  very  dangerous  system 
have  been  misled. 

Among  the  qualities  connected  with  the  different  virtues* 
there  is  none  more  striking  than  their  beneficial  influence  on 
social  happiness;  and  accordingly,  moralists  of  all  descrip- 
tions when  employed  in  enforcing  particular  duties,  such  as 
justice,  veracity,  temperance,  and  the  various  charities  of 
private  life,  never  fail  to  enlarge  on  the  numerous  blessings 
which  follow  in  their  train.  The  same  observation  may  be 
applied  to  self-interest ;  inasmuch,  as  the  most  e0'ectual  way 
of  promoting  it  is  universally  acknowledged  to  be  by  a  strict 
and  habitual  regard  to  the  obligations  of  morality. — In  con- 
sequence of  this  unity  of  design,  which  is  not  less  conspicu- 
ous in  the  moral  than  in  the  natural  world,  it  is  easy  for  a 
philosopher  to  give  a  plausible  explanation  of  all  our  duties 
from  one  principle  ;  because  the  general  tendency  of  all  of 
them  is  to  determine  us  to  the  same  course  of  life.  It  does 
not,  however,  follow  from  this,  that  it  is  from  such  a  compre- 

*  Ibid.  p.  78. 

In  another  part  of  his  work,  Dr.  Paley  explicitly  asserts,  that  every  mora]  rule  is 
liable  to  be  superseded  in  particular  cases  on  the  ground  of  expediency.  "  Moral 
11  philosophy  cannot  pronounce  that  any  rule  of  moralit}'  is  so  rigid  as  to  bend  to  no 
"exceptions;  nor,  on  the  other  hand,  can  she  comprise  these  exceptions  within 
{I  any  previous  description.  She  confesses,  that  the  obligation  of  every  law  de- 
li  pends  upon  its  ultimate  utility  ;  that  this  utility  having  a  finite  and  determinate' 
"  value,  situations  may  be  feigaed,  and  consequently  may  possibly  arise,  in  which 
11  the  general  tendency  is  outweighed  by  the  enormity  of  the  particular  mischief; 
tl  and  of  course,  where  ultimate  utility  renders  it  as  much  an  act  of  duty  lo  break 
tJ  the  rule,  as  it  is  on  other  occasions  to  observe  it." — Vol.  II.  p.  411. 


SECT.  VI.]  OF    THE    HUMAN    MIND.  -        35? 

hensive  survey  of  the  consequences  of  human  conduct,  that 
our  ideas  of  right  and  wrong  are  derived ;  or  that  we  are 
entitled,  in  particular  cases,  to  form  rules  of  action  to  our- 
selves, drawn  from  speculative  conclusions  concerning  the 
final  causes  of  our  moral  constitution.  If  it  be  true  (as  some 
theologians  have  presumed  to  assert)  that  benevolence  is  the 
sole  principle  of  action  in  the  Deity,  we  must  suppose  that 
the  duties  of  veracity  and  justice  were  enjoined  by  him,  not 
on  account  of  their  intrinsic  rectitude,  but  of  their  utility  : 
but  still,  with  respect  to  man,  these  are  sacred  and  indis- 
pensable laws — laws  which  he  never  tansgresses  without  in- 
curring the  penalties  of  self-condemnation  and  remorse  :  And 
indeed  if,  without  the  guidance  of  any  internal  monitor,  he 
were  left  to  infer  the  duties  incumbent  on  him  from  a  calcu- 
lation and  comparison  of  remote  effects,  we  may  venture  to 
affirm,  that  there  would  not  be  enough  of  virtue  left  in  the 
world  to  hold  society  together. 

To  those  who  have  been  accustomed  to  reflect  on  the  gene- 
ral analogy  of  the  human  constitution,  and  on  the  admirable 
adaptation  of  its  various  parts  to  that  scene  in  which  we  are 
destined  to  act,  this  last  consideration  will,  independently  of 
any  examination  of  the  fact,  suggest  a  very  strong  presump- 
tion a  priori  against  the  doctrine  to  which  the  foregoing  re- 
marks relate.  For  is  it  at  all  consonant  with  the  other  ar- 
rangements, so  wisely  calculated  for  human  happiness,  to  sup- 
pose that  the  conduct  of  such  a  fallible  and  short-sighted 
creature  as  Man,  would  be  left  to  be  regulated  by  no  other 
principle  than  the  private  opinion  of  each  individual  concern- 
ing the  expediency  of  his  own  actions  ?  or,  in  other  words,  by 
the  conjectures  which  he  might  form  on  the  good  or  evil  re- 
sulting on  the  whole  from  an  endless  train  of  future  contingen- 
cies ?  Were  this  the  case,  the  opinions  of  mankind,  with  re- 
spect to  the  rules  of  morality,  would  be  as  various  as  their 
judgments  about  the  probable  issue  of  the  most  doubtful  and 
difficult  determinations  in  politics.  Numberless  cases  might 
be  fancied,  in  which  a  person  would  not  only  claim  merit  but 
actually  possess  it,  inconsequence  of  actions  which  are  gene- 


358 


ELEMENTS    OP    THE    PHILOSOPHY       [CHAP.  IT* 


rally  regarded  with  indignation  and  abhorrence  ;  for,  unless 
we  admit  such  duties  as  justice,  veracity,  and  gratitude,  to  be 
immediately  and  imperatively  sanctioned  by  the  authority  of 
reason  and  of  conscience,  it  follows  as  a  necessary  inference, 
that  we  are  bound  to  violate  them,  whenever  by  doing  so  we 
have  a  prospect  of  advancing  any  of  the  essential  interests 
of  society  ;  or  (which  amounts  to  the  same  thing)  that  a  good 
end  is  sufficient  to  sanctify  whatever  means  may  appear  to  us 
to  be  necessary  for  its  accomplishment.  Even  men  of  the 
soundest  and  most  penetrating  understandings  might  frequent- 
ly be  led  to  the  perpetration  of  enormities,  if  they  had  no 
other  light  to  guide  them  but  what  they  derived  from  their 
own  uncertain  anticipations  of  futurity.  And  when  we  con- 
sider how  small  the  number  of  such  men  is,  in  comparison 
of  those  whose  judgments  are  perverted  by  the  prejudices 
of  education  and  their  own  selfish  passions,  it  is  easy  to  see 
what  a  scene  of  anarchy  the  world  would  become.  Of  this, 
indeed,  we  have  too  melancholy  an  experimental  proof,  in  the 
history  of  those  individuals,  who  have,  in  practice,  adopted 
the  rule  of  general  expediency  as  their  whole  code  of  morali- 
ty ; — a  rule  which  the  most  execrable  scourges  of  the  human 
race  have,  in  all  ages,  professed  to  follow,  and  of  which  they 
have  uniformly  availed  themselves,  as  an  apology  for  their 
deviations  from  the  ordinary  maxims  of  right  and  wrong. 

Fortunately  for  mankind,  the  peace  of  society  is  not  thus 
entrusted  to  accident,  the  great  rules  of  a  virtuous  conduct 
being  confessedly  of  such  a  nature  as  to  be  obvious  to  every 
sincere  and  well-disposed  mind.  And  it  is  in  a  peculiar  de- 
gree striking,  that,  while  the  theory  of  ethics  involves  some 
of  the  most  abstruse  questions  which  have  ever  employed  the 
human  faculties,  the  moral  judgments  and  moral  feelings  of 
the  most  distant  ages  and  nations,  with  respect  to  all  the  most 
essential  duties  of  life,  are  one  and  the  same.* 

*  "  Si  quid  rectissimum  sit,  quserimus ;  perspicuum  est.  Si  quid  maxime  expediat ; 
"  obfcurum.  Sin  ii  sumus,  qui  profecto  essedebemus,  ut  nihil  arbilremur  expedire, 
*♦  nisi  quod  rectum  honestumque  sit  ;non  potest  esse  dubium,  quid  'faciendum  nobi< 
«  $it."_ Cic  Ep.  ad  Fam.  IV.  2. 


SECT,  vi.]  OP   THE   HUMAN   MIND.  359 

Of  this  theory  of  utility,  so  strongly  recommended  to  some 
by  the  powerful  genius  of  Hume,  and  to  others  by  the  well- 
merited  popularity  of  Paley,  the  most  satisfactory  of  all  refu- 
tations is  to  be  found  in  the  work  of  Mr.  Godwin.     It  is  un- 
necessary to  inquire  how  far  the  practical  lessons  he  has  in- 
culcated are  logically  infer-Fed  from  his  fundamental  princi- 
ple ;  for  although  I  apprehend  much  might  be  objected  to 
these,  even  on  his  own  hypothesis,  yet,  if  such  be  the  con- 
clusions to  which,  in  the  judgment  of  so  acute  a  reasoner,  it 
appeared  to  lead  with  demonstrative  evidence,  nothing  farther  ' 
is  requisite  to  illustrate  the  practical  tendency  of  a  system, 
which,  absolving  men  from  the  obligations  imposed  on  them 
with  so  commanding  an  authority  by  the  moral  constitution  of 
human  nature,  abandons  every  individual  to  the  guidance  of 
his  own  narrow  views  concerning  the  complicated  interests 
of  political  society.* 

One  very  obvious  consideration  seems  to  have  entirely  es- 
caped the  notice  of  this,  as  well  as  of  many  other  late  in- 
quirers :  That,  in  ethical  researches,  not  less  than  in  those 
which  relate  to  the  material  universe,  the  business  of  the  phi- 
losopher is  limited  to  the  analytical  investigation  of  general 
laws  from  the  observed  phenomena  ;  and  that  if,  in  any  iri- 

*  It  is  remarkable  that  Mr.  Hume,  by  far  the  ablest  advocate  for  the  theory  in 
question,  has  indirectly  acknowledged  iis  inconsistence  with  some  of  the  most  impor- 
tant facts  which  it  professes  to  explain.  "  Though  the  heart,''  he  observes  in  the  5th 
section  of  his  Inquiry  concerning  M- rals,  "  takes  not  part  entirely  with  those  general 
il  notions,  nor  regulates  all  its  love  and  hatred  by  the  universal  abstract  differences  of 
"  vice  and  virtue,  without  regard  to  self,  and  the  persons  with  whom  we  are  more  in- 
11  timately  connected:  yet  have  these  moral  differences  a  considerable  influence, 
"  and  being  sufficient,  at  least  for  discourse,  serve  all  the  purposes  in  company, 
"  on  the  theatre,  and  in  the  schools." — On  this  passage,  the  following  very  curi- 
ous note  is  to  be  found  at  the  end  of  the  volume ;  a  note  (by  the  way)  which  de- 
serves to  be  added  to  the  other  proofs  already  given  of  the  irresistible  inffuenee  v\  hieh 
the  doctrine  of  final  causes  occasionally  exercises  over  the  most  scep.ical  minds.  "  It 
tl  is  wisely  ordained  by  nature  that  private  connections  should  commonly  prevail  over 
"  universal  views  and  considerations;  otherwise  our  affections  and  actions  would  !  e 
"  dissipated  and  lost,  for  want  of  a  proper  limited  object." — Does  not  this  remark  im- 
ply an  acknowledgment,  First,  That  the  principle  of  general  expediency  (the  sole 
principle  of  virtuous  conduct,  according  to  Mr.  Hume,  in  our  most  important  transac- 
tions with  our  felk>w-crealures)  would  not  contribute  to  the  happiness  of  society,  if 
men  should  commonly  act  upon  it ;  and,  Secondly,  That  some  provision  is  made  in 
out  moral  constitfitinn,  that  we  shall,  in  fact;  be  influenced  by  other  motives  in  dis« 
charging  the  offices  of  private  life  I 


360  ELEMENTS    OF    THE    PHILOSOPHY       [CHAP.  IV. 

stance,  his  conclusions  should  be  found  inconsistent  with  ac- 
knowledged facts,  the  former  must  necessarily  be  corrected 
or  modified  by  the  latter.  On  such  occasions,  the  ultimate 
appeal  must  be  always  made  to  the  moral  sentiments  and 
emotions  of  the  human  race.  The  representations,  for  exam- 
ple, which  we  read  with  so  much  delight,  in  those  poets,  of 
whatever  age  and  country,  who  have  most  successfully  touched 
the  human  heart : — of  the  heroical  sacrifices  made  to  grati- 
tude, to  parental  duty,  to  filial  piety,  to  conjugal  affection  ; — 
are  not  amenable  to  the  authority  of  any  ethical  theory,  but 
are  the  most  authentic  records  of  the  phenomena  which  it  is 
the  object  of  such  theories  to  generalize.  The  sentiment  of 
Publius  Syrus  ;  Omne  dixeris  maledictum,  quum  ingratum 
homincm  dixeris — speaks  a  language  which  ar  cords  with  eve- 
ry feeling  of  an  unperverted  mind  ; — it  speaks  the  language 
of  Nature,  which  it  is  the  province  oi  the  moralist,  not  to 
criticise,  but  to  listen  to  with  reverence.  By  employing  our 
reason  to  interpret  and  to  obey  this,  and  the  other  moral 
suggestions  of  the  heart,  we  may  trust  with  confidence,  that  we 
take  the  most  effectual  means  in  our  power  to  augment  the 
sum  of  human  happiness  ; — but  the  discovery  of  this  connec- 
tion between  virtue  and  utility  is  the  slow  result  of  extensive 
and  philosophical  combinations  ;  and  it  would  soon  cease  to 
have  a  foundation  in  truth,  if  men  were  to  substitute  their 
own  conceptions  of  expediency,  instead  of  those  rules  of  ac- 
tion which  are  inspired  by  the  wisdom  of  God.* 

It  must  not  be  concluded  from  the  foregoing  observations, 
that,  even  in  ethical  inquiries,  the  consideration  of  final  causes 
is  to  be  rejected.  On  the  contrary,  Mr.  Smith  himself,  whose 
logical  precepts  on  this  subject  I  have  now  been  endeavour- 
ing to  illustrate  and  enforce,  has  frequently  indulged  his  cu- 
riosity in  speculations  about  uses  or  advantages  j  and  seems 
plainly  to  have  considered  them  as  important  objects  of  phi- 
losophical study,  not  less  than  efficient  causes.  The  only 
caution  to  be  observed  is,  that  the  one  may  not  be  confounded 
with  the  other. 

*  See  Note  (CC.) 


SECT.  VI."]  OP    THE    HUMAN    MIND.  361 

Between  these  two  different  researches,  however,  there  is, 
both  in  physics  and  ethics,  a  very  intimate  connection.  In 
various  cases,  the  consideration  of  final  causes  has  hd  to  the 
discovery  of  some  general  law  of  nature  ;  and  in  almost  eve- 
ry case,  the  discovery  of  a  general  law  clearly  points  out 
some  wise  and  beneficent  purposes  to  which  it  is  subservient. 
Indeed  it  is  chiefly  the  prospect  of  such  applications  which 
renders  the  investigation  of  general  laws  interesting  to  the 
mind.* 

*  See  Note  (DD.) 


VOL.    II.  46 


362  ELEMENTS    OF    THE    PHILOSOPHY 


CONCLUSION  OF  PART  SECOND. 

xN  the  foregoing  chapters  of  this  Second  Part,  I  have  en- 
deavoured to  turn  the  attention  of  my  readers  to  various  im- 
portant questions  relating  to  the  Human  Understanding  5 
aiming,  in  the  first  place,  to  correct  some  fundamental  errors 
in  the  theories  commonly  received  with  respect  to  the  pow- 
ers of  intuition  and  of  reasoning  ;  and,  secondly,  to  illustrate 
some  doctrines  connected  with  the  ground-work  of  the  in- 
ductive logic,  which  have  been  either  overlooked,  or  misap- 
prehended by  the  generality  of  preceding  writers.  The 
bulk  to  which  the  volume  has  already  extended,  renders  it 
impossible  for  me  now  to  attempt  a  detailed  recapitulation  of 
its  contents  : — Nor  do  I  much  regret  the  necessity  of  this 
omission,  having  endeavoured,  in  every  instance,  as  far  as  I 
could,  to  enable  the  intelligent  reader  to  trace  the  thread  of 
my  discussions. 

In  a  work  professedly  elementary,  the  frequent  references 
made  to  the  opinions  of  others  may,  at  first  sight,  appear  out 
of  place  ;  and  it  may  not  unnaturally  be  thought,  that  I  have 
too  often  indulged  in  critical  strictures,  where  I  ought  to  have 
confined  myself  to  a  didactic  exposition  of  first  principles. 
To  this  objection  I  have  only  to  reply,  that  my  aim  is  not  to 
supplant  any  of  the  estahlished  branches  of  academical  study  ; 
but,  by  inviting  and  encouraging  the  young  philosopher,  when 
his  academical  career  is  closed,  to  review,  with  attention  and 
candour,  his  past  acquisitions,  to  put  him  in  the  way  of  sup- 
plying what  is  defective  in  the  present  sytems  of  education. 
I  have  accordingly  entitled  my  book  Elements — not  of  Logic 
or  of  Pneumatology,  but — of  the  Philosophy  of  the  Human 
Mind  ;  a  study  which,  according  to  my  idea  of  it,  presupposes 
a  general  acquaintance  with  the  particular  departments  of 
literature  and  of  science,  but  to  which  I  do  not  know  that  any 
elementary  introduction  has  yet  been  attempted.      It  is  a 


OP    THE    HUMAN    MIND;  363 

Study,  indeed,  whereof  little  more  perhaps  than  the  elements 
can  be  communicated  by  the  mind  of  one  individual  to  that 
of  another. 

In  proof  of  this,  it  is  sufficient  here  to  hint,  (for  I  must  not 
at  present  enlarge  on  so  extensive  a  topic,)  that  a  knowledge 
of  the  general  laws  which  regulate  the  intellectual  phenome- 
na is,  to  the  logical  student,  of  little  practical  value,  but  as  a 
preparation  for  the  study  of  himself.  In  this  respect,  the 
anatomy  of  the  mind  differs  essentially  from  that  of  the 
body  ;  the  structure  of  the  former  (whatever  collateral  aids 
may  be  derived  from  observing  the  varieties  of  genius  in  our 
fellow-creatures)  being  accessible  to  those  alone  who  can. 
retire  into  the  deepest  recesses  of  their  own  internal  frame  j 
and  even  to  these  presenting,  along  with  the  generic  attri- 
butes of  the  race,  many  of  the  specific  peculiarities  of 
the  individual.  On  this  subject  every  writer,,  whose  spec- 
ulations are  at  all  worthy  of  notice,  must  draw  his  chief 
materials  from  within  ;  and  it  is  only  by  comparing  the 
conclusions  of  different  writers,  and  subjecting  all  of  them 
to  the  test  of  our  personal  experience,  that  we  can  hope  to 
separate  the  essential  principles  of  the  human  constitution 
from  the  unsuspected  effects  of  education  and  of  tempera- 
ment ;*  or  to  apply  with  advantage,  to  our  particular  cir- 
cumstances, the  combined  results  of  our  reading  and  of  our 
reflections.  The  constant  appeal  which,  in  such  inquiries, 
the  reader  is  thus  forced  to  make  to  his  own  consciousness 
and  to  his  own  judgment,  has  a  powerful  tendency  to  form  a 
habit,  not  more  essential  to  the  success  of  his  metaphysical 
researches,  than  of  all  his  other  speculative  pursuits. 

Nearly  connected  with  this  habit,  is  a  propensity  to  weigh, 
and  to  ascertain  the  exact  import  of  words  ;  one  of  the  ni- 
cest and  most  difficult  of  all  analytical  processes  ;  and  that 

*  I  usi!  (be  word  temperament,  in  tins  instance,  as  synonymous  with  the  idiosyncrasy 
of  medical  authors  ;a  term  which  I  thought  might  have  savoured  of  affectation  if  ap- 
plied to  the  mind  ;  although  authorities  for  such  an  employment  of  it  are  not  wanting 
among  old  English  writers.  One  example,  directly  in  point,  is  quoted  by  Johnson 
from  Gfanville.  "The  understanding  also  hath  its  idiosijncracies,  as  well  as  other 
''  faculties."  . 


364  ELEMENTS    OF    THE    PHILOSOPHY 

tjpoti  which  more  stress  has  been  justly  laid  by  our  best 
modern  logicians,  than  upon  any  other  organ  for  the  investi- 
gation of  truth.  For  the  culture  of  this  propensity,  no  sci- 
ence is  so  peculiarly  calculated  to  prepare  the  mind,  as  the 
Study  of  its  own  operations.  Here,  the  imperfections  of 
words  constitute  the  principal  obstacle  to  our  progress  ;  nor 
is  it  possible  to  advance  a  single  step,  without  struggling 
against  the  associations  imposed  by  the  illusions  of  meta- 
phorical terms,  and  of  analogical  theories.  Abstracting, 
therefore,  from  its  various  practical  applications,  and  consid- 
ering it  merely  as  a  gymnastic  exercise  to  the  reasoning  pow- 
ers, this  study  seems  pointed  out  by  nature,  as  the  best  of  all 
schools  for  inuring  the  understanding  to  a  cautious  and  skil- 
ful employment  of  language  as  the  instrument  of  thought. 

The  two  first  chapters  of  this  volume  relate  to  logical 
"questions,  on  which  the  established  opinions  appear  to  me 
to  present  stumbling  blocks  at  the  very  threshold  of  the  sci' 
encc.  In  treating  of  these,  I  have  canvassed  with  freedom, 
but,  I  hope,  with  due  respect,  the  doctrines  of  some  illustri  - 
ous  moderns,  whom  1  am  proud  to  acknowledge  as  my  mas- 
ters ;  of  those  more  particularly,  whose  works  are  in  the 
highest  repute  in  our  British  Universities,  and  whose  errors 
I  was,  on  that  account,  the  most  solicitous  to  rectify.  For 
the  space  allotted  to  my  criticisms  on  Condillac,  no  apology 
is  necessary  to  those,  who  have  the  slightest  acquaintance 
with  the  present  slate  of  philosophy  on  the  Continent,  or  who 
have  remarked  the  growing  popularity,  in  this  Island,  of  some 
of  his  weakest  and  most  exceptionable  theories. — On  various 
controverted  points  connected  with  the  theory  of  evidence, 
both  demonstrative  and  experimental,  I  trust,  with  some  con- 
fidence, that  I  shall  be  found  to  have  thrown  considerable 
light :  in  other  instances,  1  have  been  forced  to  content  my- 
self with  proposing  my  doubts  ;  leaving  the  task  of  solving 
them  to  future  inquirers.  To  awaken  a  dormant  spirit  o. 
discussion,  by  pointing  out  the  imperfections  of  generally 
received  systems,  is  at  least  one  step  gained  towards  the 
farther  advancement  of  knowledge. 


OF    THE    HUMAN    MIND.  365 

It  is  justly  and  philosophically  remarked  by  Burke,  that 
"  nothing  tends  more  to  the  corruption  of  science  than  to 
"suffer  it  to  stagnate.  These  waters  must  be  troubled  be- 
"  fore  they  can  exert  their  virtues.  A  man  who  works  be- 
"  yond  the  surface  of  things,  though  he  may  be  wrong  him- 
<{  self,  yet  he  clears  the  way  for  others,  and  may  chance  to 
■"  make  even  his  errors  subservient  to  the  cause  of  truth."* 

The  subsequent  chapters,  relative  to  the  Baconian  Logic, 
bear,  all  of  them,  more  or  less  in  their  general  scope,  on  the 
theory  of  the  intellectual  powers,  and  on  the  first  principles 
of  human  knowledge.  In  this  part  of  my  work,  the  reader 
will  easily  perceive,  that  I  do  not  profess  to  deliver  logical 
precepts  ;  but  to  concentrate,  and  to  reflect  back  on  the 
Philosophy  of  the  Mind,  whatever  scattered  lights  I  have 
been  able  to  collect  from  the  experimental  researches  to 
which  that  Philosophy  has  given  birth.  I  have  aimed,  at 
the  same  time,  (and  1  hope  not  altogether  without  success,)  to 
give  somewhat  more  of  precision  to  the  technical  phraseolo- 
gy of  the  Baconian  school,  and  of  correctness  to  their  meta- 
physical ideas. 

Before  concluding  these  speculations,  it  may  not  be  im- 
proper to  caution  my  readers  against  supposing,  that  when 
I  speak  of  the  Baconian  school,  or  of  the  Baconian  logic,  I 
mean  to  ascribe  entirely  to  I  he  Novum  Organon  the  advan- 
ces made  in  physical  science,  since  the  period  of  its  publica- 
tion. The  singular  effects  of  this,  and  of  the  other  inestima- 
ble writings  of  the  same  author,  in  forwarding  the  subsequent 
progress  of  scientific  discovery,  certainly  entitle  his  name, 
far  more  than  that  of  any  other  individual,  to  be  applied  as 
a  distinguishing  epithet  to  the  modern  rules  of  philosophi- 
zing ;  but  (as  I  have  elsewhere  observed)  "  the  genius  and 
*  writings  of  Bacon  himself  were  powerfully  influenced  by 
"  the  circumstances  and  character  of  his  age  :  Nor  can 
"  there  be  a  doubt,  that  he  only  accelerated  a  revolution 
"  which  was  already  prepared  by  many  concurrent  causes."t 
— My  reasons  for  thinking  so,  which  rest  chiefly  on  histori- 

*  Inquiry  Into  the  Sublime  and  Beautiful,  Part  I.  Sect,  xiw 
t  Outlines  of  Moral  Philosophy,  first  printed  in  1793. 


366  ELEMENTS    OF    THE    PHILOSOPHY 

cal  retrospects,  altogether  foreign  to  my  present  design,  t 
must  delay  stating,  till  another  opportunity. 

To  this  observation  it  is  of  still  greater  importance  to  add> 
that,  in  contrasting  the  spirit  and  the  utility  of  the  new  logic 
with  those  of  the  old,  I  have  no  wish  to  see  the  former  .sub- 
stituted, in  our  universities,  in  room  of  the  latter.  By 
a  strange  inversion  in  the  order  of  instruction,  Logic,  in- 
stead of  occupying  its  natural  place  at  the  close  of  the 
academical  course,  has  always  been  considered  as  an  intro- 
duction to  the  study  of  the  sciences  ;  and  has,  accordingly, 
been  obtruded  on  the  uninformed  minds  of  youth,  at  their 
first  entrance  into  the  schools.  While  the  syllogistic  art 
maintained  its  reputation,  this  inversion  was  probably  attend- 
ed with  little  practical  inconvenience;  the  trite  and  puerile 
examples  commonly  resorted  to  for  the  illustration  of  its 
rules,  presupposing  a  very  slender  stock  of  scientific  attain- 
ments :  but  now,  when  the  word  Logic  is  universally  under- 
stood in  a  more  extensive  sense,  as  comprehending,  along 
with  an  outline  of  Aristotle's  Organon,  some  account  of  the 
doctrines  of  Bacon,  of  Locke,  and  of  their  successors,  it  seems 
indispensably  necessary,  that  this  branch  of  education  should 
be  delayed  till  the  understanding  has  acquired  a  wider  and 
more  varied  range  of  ideas,  and  till  the  power  of  reflection 
(the  last  of  our  faculties  which  nature  unfolds)  begins  to  soli- 
cit its  appropriate  nourishment.  What  notions  can  be  an- 
nexed to  such  words  as  analysis,  synthesis,  induction,  expe- 
rience, analogy,  hypothetical  and  legitimate  theories,  demon- 
strative and  moral  certainty,  by  those  whose  attention  has 
hitherto  been  exclusively  devoted  to  the  pursuits  of  classic- 
al learning?  A  fluent  command,  indeed,  of  this  technical 
phraseology  may  be  easily  communicated  ;  but  it  would  be 
difficult  to  devise  a  more  effectual  expedient  for  misleading, 
at  the  very  outset  of  life,  the  inexperienced  and  unassured 
judgment.  The  perusal  of  Bacon's  writings,  in  particular, 
disfigured  as  they  are  by  the  frequent  use  of  quaint  and  bar- 
barous expressions,  suited  to  the  scholastic  taste  of  his  con- 


OP    THE    HUMAN    MIND.  367 

temporaries,   ought    to   be   carefully  reserved  for  a   riper 
age.* 

fn  confirmation  of  this  last  remark,  many  additional  argu- 
ments might  be  drawn  from  the  peculiar  circumstances  in 
whi<  h  Bacon  wroie.  At  the  period  when  he  entered  on  his 
li'>  rary  career,  various  branches  of  physical  science  were 
already  beginning  to  exhibit  the  most  favourable  presages  of 
future  improvement  ;  strongly  inviting  his  original  and 
powerful  mind  to  co-oper.ttc  in  the  reformation  of  philosophy. 
The  turn  of  his  geniu-  fortunately  led  him  to  employ  him- 
self chiefly  in  general  suggestions  for  the  advancement  of 
learning-,  and,  leaving  to  others  the  task  of  inductive  inves- 
tigation, to  aim  rather  at  stating  such  rules  as  might  direct 
and  systematize  their  exertions.  In  his  own  experimental 
researches  he  was  not  very  fortunate  ;  nor  is  much  reliance 
to  be  placed  on  the  facts  recorded  in  his  Histories.  Per- 
hri; -?  the  comprehensiveness  of  his  views  diminished  his 
curiosity  with  respect  to  the  particular  objects  of  science  ; 
or,  perhaps  be  found  the  multiplicity  of  his  engagements  in 
^ctive  life,  more  consistent  with  speculations,  in  which  the 
chief  materials  of  his  reasonings  were  to  be  drawn  from  his 
own  reflections,  than  with  inquiries  which  demanded  an  ac- 
curate observation  of  external  phenomena,  ora  minute  atten- 
tion to  experimental  processes.  In  this  respect,  he  has  been 
compared  to  the  Legislator  of  the  Jews,  who  conducted  his 
followers  within  sight  of  their  destined  inheritance ;  and  en- 

*  Mailer  mentions,  in  his  Elements  of  Physiology,  that  he  was  forced  to  enter  on 
the  study  of  Ionic  in  the  tenth  year  of  his  age.  "  Meniini  me  annum  natum  deeimum, 
*l  quo  avidus  historian)  et  poesin  devorassem,  ad  logicam,  et  ad  Ci.aubeegianam 
"  logicam  ediscendain  coactttm  fuisse,  qua  nihil  poterat  esse,  pro  hujusmodi  homun- 
•'  cio.ie,  sterilius  "  (Tornus  VIII.  Pars  Secunda,  p.  24.  Lnusannse,  1778  )  It  seems 
difficult  to  imagine  any  attempt  more  extravagant,  than  that  of  instructing  a  child, 
only  ten  years  old,  in  the  logic  of  the  schools;  and  yet,  it  is  by  no  means  a  task  so 
aompletcly  impracticable,  as  to  convey  to  a  pupil,  altogether  uninitiated  in  the  Ele- 
ments of  Physics,  a  distinct  idea  of  the  object  and  rules  of  the  Novum  Organon. 

The  example  of  Mr.  Smith,  during  the  short  time  he  held  the  Professorship  of 
Logic,  at  Glasgow,  is  worthy  of  imitation  in  those  universities  which  admit  of  simi- 
lar deviations  from  old  practices.  For  an  account  of  his  plan,  see  Biographical  Me- 
moirs ot  Smith,  Robertson,  and  Reid,  p.  12  ;  where  I  have  inserted  a  slight  but  mas- 
terly sketch  of  his  academical  labours,  communicated  to  me  by  his  pupil  and  friend., 
the  late  Mr.  Millar. 


368  ELEMENTS    OP    THE    PHILOSOPHY 

joyed  in  distant  prospect,  that  promised  land  which  he  him- 
self was  not  permitted  to  enter.* 

The  effect  of  this  prophetic  imagination  in  clothing  his 
ideas,  to  a  greater  degree  than  a  severe  logician  may  ap- 
prove, with  the  glowing  colours  of  a  poetical  diction,  was 
unavoidable.  The  wonder  is,  that  his  style  is  so  seldom 
chargeable  with  vagueness  and  obscurity  ;  and  that  he  has 
been  able  to  bequeath  to  posterity  so  many  cardinal  and 
eternal  truths,  to  which  the  progressive  light  of  science  is 
every  day  adding  a  new  accession  of  lustre.  Of  these  truths, 
however  (invaluable  in  themselves  as  heads  or  texts,  preg- 
nant with  thought,)  many. — to  borrow  the  expression  of  a 
Greek  poet, — sound  only  to  the  intelligent ;  while  others  pre- 
sent those  confident  but  indefinite  anticipations  of  intellectual 
regions  yet  undiscovered,  which,  though  admirably  calculated 
to  keep  alive  and  to  nourish  the  ardour  of  the  man  of  sci- 
ence, are  more  fitted  to  awaken  the  enthusiasm  than  to  direct 
the  studies  of  youth.  Some  of  them,  at  the  same  time  (and 
these  I  apprehend,  cannot  be  too  early  impressed  on  the 
memory)  are  singularly  adapted  to  enlarge  and  to  elevate 
the  conceptions  ;  exhibiting  those  magnificent  views  of 
knowledge,  which,  by  identifying  its  progress  with  the  en- 
largement of  human  power  and  of  human  happiness,  ennoble 
the  humblest  exertions  of  literary  industry,  and  annihilate, 
before  the  triumphs  of  genius,  the  most  dazzling  objects  of 
vulgar  ambition. — A  judicious  selection  of  such  passages. 

*  See  Cowley's  Ode,  prefixed  to  Sprat's  History  of  the  Royal  Society. 

Nor  does  Bacon  himself  seem  to  have  been  at  all  disposed  to  overrate  the  value  of 
his  own  contributions  to  Experimental  Science.  u  In  rebus  quibuscunque  difficilio- 
"ribus,"he  has  observed  on  one  occasion,  "  non  expectandum  est  ut  quis  simul  el 
"  serai  et  metat;  sed  prteparalione  opus  est,  ut  per  gradus  maturescant."  But  the 
most  remarkable  passage  of  this  sort,  which  I  recollect  in  his  writings,  occurs  towards 
the  close  of  his  great  no:  k,  De  Jiugmentis  Scientiarum : — "  Tandem  igitur  paululum 
"  respiranles,  atque  ad  ea,  quae  praetervecti  sumus,  oculos  reflectentes,  hunc  tractatum 
11  nostrum  non  absimilem  esse  censemus  sonis  il lis  et  prseludiis,  quae  praetentain 
"  Musici,  dum  fides  ad  modulationem  concinnant :  Qua?  ipsa  quidem  auribus  ingra- 
«■  turn  quiddam  et  asperum  exhibent ;  at  in  causa  sunt,  ut  quae  sequuntur  omnia  sint 
'•'suaviora:  Sic  nimirum  nos  in  animum  induximus,  ut  in  cithara  Musarum  concin- 
11  nanda,  et  ad  harmoniam  veram  redigenda,  operam  navaremus,  quo  sb  aliii  poster. 
il  pulsentur  chordae,  rneliere  digito,  aut  plectro." — Bacojt. 


OF    THE    HUMAN    MIND.  369 

and  of  some  general  and  striking  aphorisms  from  the  N.ivum 
Organon,  would  form  a  useful  manual  U)r  animating  the  aca- 
demical tasks  of  the  student ;  and  for  gradually  conducting 
him  from  the  level  of  the  subordinate  sciences,  to  the  van- 
tage-ground of  a  higher  philosophy. 

Unwilling  as  I  am  to  touch  on  a  topic  so  hopeless  as  that 
of  Academical  Reform,  I  cannot  dismiss  this  suhjoct,  without 
remarking,  as  a  fact  which,  at  some  future  period,  will  figure 
in  literary  history,  that  two  hundred  jears  after  the  date  of 
Bacon's  philosophical  works,  the  antiquated  routine  of  study, 
originally  prescribed  in  times  of  scholastic  barbarism  and  of 
popish  superstition,  should  in  so  many  Universities,  be  still 
suffered  to  stand  in  the  way  of  improvements,  recommended 
at  once  by  the  present  stale  of  the  sciences,  and  by  the  order 
which  nature  follows  in  developing  the  intellectual  faculiies. 
On  this  subject,  however,  I  forbear  to  enlarge. — Obstacles 
of  which  I  am  not  aware  may  perhaps  render  any  considera- 
ble innovations  impracticable  ;  and,  in  the  mean  lime,  it 
would  be  vain  to  speculate  on  ideal  projects,  while  the  pro- 
spect of  realizing  them  is  so  distant  and  uncertain. 


vol.  n.  47 


NOTES  AND  ILLUSTRATIONS. 


Note  (A.)  page  28. 

vjF  the  fault  in  Euclid's  arrangement  which  t  have  here  remarked,  some 
of  the  ancient  editors  were  plainly  aware,  as  they  removed  the  two  theorems 
in  question  from  the  class  of  axioms,  and  placed  them,  with  at  least  an 
equal  impropriety,  in  that  of  postulates.  "  In  quibusdam  codicibus,"  says 
Dr.  Gregory,  "  Axiomata  10  et  11  inter  postulata  numerantur." — Euclidis 
quae  supersunt  omnia.    Ex  Recens.  Dav.  Gregorii.     Oxon.  1703.  p.  3. 

The  8th  Axiom  too  in  Eucld's  enumeration  is  evidently  out  of  its  proper 
place.  K«<  ret  e<pxgfx.o£ovrct  est*  ct,X\*)Xcc,  ttr»  «AA*jAe<s  eo-rt  : — 
thus  translated  by  Dr.  Simson  :  "  Magnitudes  which  coincide  with  one 
"  another,  that  is,  which  exactly  fill  the  same  space,  are  equal  to  one  an- 
"  other."  This,  in  truth,  is  not  an  axiom,  but  a  definition.  It  is  the  defi- 
nition of  geometrical  equality  ;  the  fundamental  principle  upon  which  the 
comparison  of  all  geometrical  magnitudes  will  be  found  ultimately  to  de- 
pend. 

For  some  of  these  slight  logical  defects  in  the  arrangement  of  Euclid's 
definitions  and  axioms,  an  ingenious,  and,  I  think,  a  solid  apology,  has  been 
offered  by  M.  Prevost,  in  his  Essais  de  Philosophie.  According  to  this 
author,  (if  I  rightly  understand  his  meaning,)  Euclid  was  himself  fully 
aware  of  the  objections  to  which  thss  part  of  his  work  is  liable  ;  but  found 
it  impossible  to  obviate  them,  without  incurring  the  still  greater  inconve- 
nience of  either  departing  from  those  modes  of  proof  which  he  had  resolved 
to  employ  exclusively  in  the  composition  of  his  Elements  ;*  or  of  revolting 
the  student,  at  his  first  outset,  by  prolix  and  circuitous  demonstrations  of 
manifest  and  indisputable  truths.  I  shall  distinguish  by  Italics,  in  the  fol- 
lowing quotation,  the  clauses  to  which  I  wish  more  particularly  to  direct 
the  attention  of  my  readers. 

"  C'est  done  l'imperfection  (peUt-etre  inevitable)  de  nos  conceptions,  qui 
"  a  engage  a  faire  entrer  les  axiomes  pour  quelque  chose  dans  les  principes 
"  des  sciences  de  raisonnement  pur.  Et  ils  y  font  un  double  office.  Les 
"  uns  remplacent  des  definitions.  Les  autres  remplacent  des  propositions 
"  susceptibles  d'etre  demontrees.  J'en  donnerai  des  exemples  tires  des 
"  Elcmens  d'Euclide. 

"  Les  axiomes  remplacent  quelquefois  des  definitions  tres  faciles  a  faire, 
"  comme  celle  du  mot  tout.     (El.  Ax.  9.)     D'mttres  auppUent  d  certaints 

*  By  introducing;,  for  example,  the  idea  of  Motion,  which  lie  has  studied  to  avoid, 
as  much  as  possible,  in  delivering  the  Elements  of  Plane  Geometry. 


372  NOTES    AND    ILLUSTRATIONS. 

"  definitions  dijficiles  et  gu,07i  ivite,  comme  celles  de  la  ligite  droite  et  de 
"  /'angle. 

"  Q  lelques  axiomes  vemplacent  des  theoremes.  J'ignore  si  (dans  les 
"  principes  d'Euciide)  i'axiome  11.  peut-etre  demontre  (comme  l'ont  cru 
"  Pmclas  et  tant  d'autres  anciens  et  modernes.)  S'il  peut  Petre,  cet  axiome 
"  svpplSe  a  una  demonstration  probablement  laborieuse. 

"  Pmsque  les  axiomes  ne  font  autre  office  que  suppleer  a  des  definitions 
"et  a  des  theoremes,  on  demandera  peut-etre  qu'on  s'en  passe.  Obser- 
*'  vons  1.  Qu'ils  eviient  souvent  des  longueurs  inutiles.  2.  Qit'ils  tranchent 
*'  les  disputes  d  Vepoque  meme  on  la  science  est  impurfaite.  3.  Que  s,il  est  un 
"  etat,  auquel  la  science  puis se  s'en  passer  (~ce  que  je  rfaffirme  point _)  il  est 
"  da  moins  sage,  et  meme  indispensable,  de  les  employer,  tant  que  quelqtte 
"  insuffisance,  dans  ce  degre  de  perfection  oil  I' on  tend,  interdit  un  ordre  ub- 
"  sohiment  irrepro enable.  Ajoutons  4.  Que  dans  chaque  science  il  y  a  ordi- 
"  na.rement  un  principe  qu'on  pourvoit  appellor  dominant,  et  qui  par  cette 
"  rasson  seule  (et  lndtpendamment  de  celles  que  je  viens  d'alleguer)  a  paru 
*'  devoir  etre  sorti,  pour  ainsi  d;re,  du  champ  des  definitions  pour  etre 
°  m,s  en  vue  sous  forme  d'axiome.  Tel  me  paroit  etre  en  geometrie  le  prin- 
"  cipe  de  congruence  contenu  dans  le  8  Axiome  d'Euciide." — Essais  de  Phi- 
losophic, Tom  II.  pp.  30,  31,  32. 

These  remarks  go  far,  in  my  opinion,  towards  a  justification  of  Euclid 
For  the  latitude  with 'which  he  has  used  the  word  axiom  in  his  Elements. 
As  in  treating,  he  ever,  of  the  fundamental  laws  of  human  belief,  the. ut- 
most poss.ble  precision  of  language  is  indispensably  necessary,  I  must  beg 
leave  once  more  to  remind  my  readers,  that,  in  denying  Jlxioms  to  be  the 
first  pnnc.ples  of  reasoning  in  mathematics,  1  restrict  ibe  meaning  of  that 
Word  to  such  as  are  analogous  to  the  first  seven  in  Euclid's  list.  Locke,  in 
what  he  has  written  on  the  subjecc,  has  plainly  understood  the  word  in  the. 
same  limited  sense. 

Note  (B.)  page  51. 

The  prevalence  in  India  of  an  opinion  bearing'  some  resemblance  to  the 
Berki  leian  Theory  may  be  urged  as  an  objection  to  the  reasoning  in  the 
text ;  but  the  fact  is,  that  this  resemblance  is  much  slighter  than  has  been 
generally  apprehended.  (See  Philosophical  Essays,  pp.  81,  82,  et  seq)  Ore 
this  point  die  following  passage  from  Sir  William  Jones  is  decisive ;  and 
the  more  so,  as  he  himself  has  fallen  into  the  common  mistake  of  identi- 
fying the  Hindu  belief  with  the  conclusions  of  Berkeley  and  Hume. 

"  The  fundamental  tenet  of  the  V6d':nti  school  consisted,  not  in  denying 
'*  the  existence  of  matter,  that  is,  of  solidity,  impenetrability,  and  extended 
"  fgwe,  (~to  deny  -which  -woidd  be  lunacy, J  but  in  correcting  the  popular  no- 
"  tion  of  it,  and  in  contending,  that  it  has  no  essence  independent  of  mental 
"  perception,  that  existence  and  perceptibility  are  convertible  terms,  that 
'*  external  appearances  and  sensations  are  illusory,  and  -would  vanish  into 
"  nothing,  if  the  divine  energy,  which   alone  sustains   tliem,  were  suspended 


NOTES  AND  ILLUSTRATIONS.  375 

"  but  for  a  moment  ,•*  an  opinion,  which  Epicharmus  and  Plato  seem  to 
"  have  adopted,  and  winch  has  been  maintained  in  the  present  century  with, 
"great  elegance,  but  with  little  public  applause;  partly  because  it  has 
"  been  misunderstood,  and  partly  because  it  has  been  misapplied  by  the 
"  false  reasoning  of  some  unpopular  writers,  who  are  said  to  have  disbe- 
"  lieved  in  the  moral  attributes  of  God,  whose  omnipresence,  wisdom,  and 
"  goodness,  are  the  basis  of  the  Indian  philosophy.  I  have  not  sufficient 
"  evidence  on  the  subject  to  profess  a  belief  in  the  doctrine  of  the  Veddnta, 
"  winch  human  reason  alone  could,  perhaps,  neither  fully  demonstrate,  nor 
*'  fully  disprove  ;  but  it  is  manifest,  that  nothing*  can  be  farther  removed 
"  from  impiety  than  a  system  wholly  built  on  the  purest  devotion." — Works 
of  S^  William  Jones,  Vol.  I.  pp.  165,  166. 

From  these  observations,  (in  some  of  which,  I  must  be  permitted  to  say, 
there  is  a  good  deal  of  indistinctness,  and  even  of  contradiction,)  it  may 
on  the  whole  be  inferred,  1.  That  in  the  tenets  of  the  Vedanti  school,  how- 
ever different  from  the  first  apprehensions  of  the  unreflecting  mind,  there 
Was  nothing  inconsistent  with  the  fundamental  laws  of  human  belief,  any 
more  than  in  the  doctrine  of  Copernicus  concerning  the  earth's  motion. 
2.  That  these  tenets  were  rather  articles  of  a  theological  creed,  than  of  a 
philosophical  system  ;  or  at  least,  that  the  two  were  so  blended  together, 
as  sufficiently  to  account  for  the  hold  which,  indepeNdently  of  any  refined 
reasoning,  they  had  taken  of  the  popular  belief. 

In  this  last  conclusion  I  am  strongly  confirmed,  by  a  letter  which  I  had 
the  pleasure  of  receiving,  a  few  years  ago,  from  my  friend  Sir  James  Mack- 
intosh, then  Recorder  of  Bumbay.  His  good  nature  will,  I  trust,  pardon 
the  liberty  I  take  in  mentioning  his  name  upon  the  present  occasion,  as  I 
Wish  to  add  to  the  following  very  curious  extract,  the  authority  of  so  en- 
lightened and  philosophical  an  observer.  Anndsl  the  variety  of  his  other 
important  engagements,  it  is  to  be  hoped  that  the  results  of  his  literary  re- 
searches and  speculations,  whAe  in  the  East,  will  not  be  lost  to  the  world. 

"I  had  yesterday  a  conversation  with  a  young  Bramin  of 

"  no  great  learning,  the  son  of  the  Pundit  (or  assessor  for  Hindu  law^  of 
"  my  court.  He  told  me,  that  besides  the  myriads  of  gods  whom  their 
"  creed  admits,  there  was  one  whom  they  know  by  the  name  of  Brim,  or 
"  the  great  one,  without  form  or  limits,  whom  no  created  intellect  could 
"  make  any  approach  towards  conceiving ;  that,  in  reality,  there  were  no 
"  trees,  no  houses,  no  land,  no  sea,  but  all  without  was  Maia,  or  illusion, 

*  Sir  \*  ill  'tin  Jon<?s  here  evidently  confounds  the  system  which  represents  the 
material  universe  as  not  only  at  first  created,  hut  as  every  moment  upheld  by  the 
agency  of  Divine  Power,  with  that  ol  Berkeley  and  Hume,  which,  denying  the 
distinction  between  primary  and  secondary  qualities,  asserts,  that  extension,  figure, 
and  impenetrability  are  not  les--  inconceivable,  without  a  percipient  mind,  than  our 
sensations  of  heat  and  cold,  sounds  and  odours.  According  to  both  systems,  it  may 
undoubtedly  be  «aid,  that  the  material  universe  has  no  existence  independent  of 
mind;  bin  it  ought  not  to  be  overlooked,  that  in  the  one,  this  word  refers  to  the 
Creator,  and  in  the  ether,  to  the  created  percipient. 


374  NOTES    AND    ILLUSTRATIONS. 

"  the  act  of  Bmm  ;  that  whatever  we  saw  or  felt  was  only  a  dream,  or,  as 
"  he  expressed  it  in  his  imperfect  English,  thinking  in  one's  sleep,  and  that 
"  the  reunion  of  the  soul  to  Brim,  from  whom  it  originally  sprung,  was 
"  the  awakening  from  the  long  sleep  of  finite  existence,  i  All  this  you  have 
"  heard  and  read  before  as  Hindu  speculation.  What  struck  me  was,  that 
"  speculations  so  refined  and  abstruse  should,  in  a  long  course  of  ages, 
"  have  fallen  through  so  great  a  space  as  that  which  separates  the  genius 
"  of  their  original  inventor  from  the  mind  of  this  weak  and  unlettered  man. 
"  The  names  of  these  inventors  have  perished ;  but  their  ingenious  and 
"  beautiful  theories,  blended  with  the  most  monstrous  superstitions,  have 
"  descended  to  men  very  little  exalted  above  the  most  ignorant  populace, 
"  and  are  adopted  by  them  as  a  sort  of  articles  of  faith,  without  a  suspi- 
"  cion  of  their  philosophical  origin,  and  without  the  possibility  of  compre- 
"■  hending  any  part  of  the  premises  from  which  they  were  deduced.  I  in- 
"  tend  to  investigate  a  little  the  history  of  these  opinions,  for  I  am  not  alto- 
"  gether  without  apprehension,  that  we  may  all  the  while  be  mistaking  the 
"  hyperbolical  effusions  of  mystical  piety,  for  the  technical  language  of  a 
"  philosophical  system.  Nothing  is  more  usual,  than  for  fervent  devotion 
"  to  dwell  so  long  and  so  warmly  on  the  meanness  and  worthlessness  of 
"  created  things,  and  on  the  all-sufficiency  of  the  Supreme  Being,  that  it 
"  slides  insensibly  from  comparative  to  absolute  language,  and,  in  the  ea- 
"  gerness  of  its  zeal  to  magnify  the  Deity,  seems  to  annihilate  every  thing 
"  else.  To  distinguish  between  the  very  different  import  of  the  same  words 
"  in  the  mouth  of  a  mystic  and  of  a  sceptic,  requires  more  philosophical 
"  discrimination  than  most  of  our  Sanscrit  investigators  have  hitherto 
"  shewn." 


Note  (C.)  page  59. 

The  private  correspondence  here  alluded  to,  was  between  Mr.  Hume  and 
the  late  Sir  Gilbert  Elliott ;  a  gentleman  who  seems  to  have  united,  with 
his  other  well-known  talents  and  accomplishments,  a  taste  for  abstract  dis- 
quisitions, which  rarely  occurs  in  men  of  the  world ;  accompanied  with 
that  soundness  and  temperance  of  judgment  which,  in  such  researches,  are 
so  indispensably  necessary  to  guard  the  mind  against  the  illusions  engen- 
dered by  its  own  subtilty.  In  one  of  his  letters  (of  which  the  original 
draft  in  his  own  hand-writing  was  communicated  to  me  by  the  Earl  of 
Minto)  he  expresses  himself  thus  :* 

.  .  .  "  I  admit,  that  there  is  no  writing"  or  talking  of  any  subject 
"  which  is  of  importance  enough  to  become  the  object  of  reasoning,  with- 
"  out  having  recourse  to  some  degree  of  subtilty  and  refinement.  The  only 
"  question  is,  where  to  stop,  how  far  we  can  go,  and  why  no  farther  \  To 
">  this  question  I  should  be  extremely  happy  to  receive  a  satisfactory  an- 
"  swer.  I  can't  tell  if  I  shall  rightly  express  what  I  have  just  now  in  my 
"  mind  ;  but  I  often  imagine  to  myself,  that  I  perceive  within  me  a  certain 

?:  The  letter  is  dated  in  1751. 


NOTES  AND  ILLUSTRATIONS.  375 

"  instinctive  feeling,  which  shoves  away  at  once  all  over  subtile  refinements, 
*'  and  tells  me,  with  authority,  that  these  air-built  notions  are  inconsistent 
*c  with  life  and  experience,  and  by  consequence  cannot  be  true  or  solid. 
**  From  this  I  am  led  to  think,  that  the  speculative  principles  of  our  nature 
"  ought  to  go  hand  in  hand  with  the  practical  ones  ;  and,  for  my  own  part, 

*  when  the  former  are  so  far  pushed,  as  to  leave  the  latter  quite  out  of 
"  sight,  I  am  always  apt  to  suspect  that  we  have  transgressed  our  limits. 
"  If  it  should  be  asked,  how  far  will  these  practical  principles  go  ?  I  can 
e*  only  answer,  that  the  former  difficulty  will  recur,  unless  it  be  found,  that 

*  there  is  something  in  the  intellectual  part  of  our  nature,  resembling  the 
"  moral  sentiment  in  the  moral  part  of  our  nature,  which  determines  this, 
*f  as  it  were,  instinctively.  Very  possibly,  I  have  wrote  nonsense  :  how- 
"  ever,  this  notion  first  occurred  to  me  at  London,  in  conversation  with  a 
"  man  of  some  depth  of  thinking  ;  and>  talking  of  it  since  to  your  friend 
"  Henry  Home,*  I  found  that  he  seemed  to  entertain  some  notions  nearly  of 
"  the  same  kind,  and  to  have  pushed  them  much  farther." 

The  practical  principles  referred  to  in  this  extract,  seem  to  me  to  corre- 
spond very  nearly  with  what  I  have  called  fundamental  laws  of  belief,  or  first 
elements  of  human  reason  „•  and  the  something  in  the  intellectual  part  of  our 
nature,  resembling  tlie  moral  sentiment  in  the  moral  part  of  our  nature,  iii 
plainly  descriptive  of  what  Reid  and  others  have  since  called  common  sense  ; 
coinciding,  too,  in  substance  with  the  philosophy  of  Lord  Karnes,  who  re- 
fers our  belief  of  the  existence  of  the  Deity,  and  of  various  other  primary 
truths,  to  particular  senses,  forming  a  constituent  part  of  our  intellectual 
frame.  I  do  not  take  upon  me  to  defend  the  forms  of  expression  which  Mr. 
Hume's  very  ingenious  correspondent  has  employed  to  convey  his  ideas  ; 
and  which,  it  is  probable,  he  did  not  think  it  necessary  for  him,  in  addres- 
sing a  confidential  friend,  to  weigh  with  critical  exactness  :  but  his  doctrine 
must  be  allowed  to  approximate  remarkably  to  those  parts  of  the  works  of 
Reid,  where  he  appeals  from  the  paradoxical  conclusions  of  metaphysicians, 
to  the  principles  on  which  men  are  compelled,  by  the  constitution  of  their 
nature,  to  judge  and  to  act  in  the  ordinary  concerns  of  life ; — as  well  as  to 
various  appeals  of  the  same  kind,  which  occur  in  Lord  Karnes's  writings. 
My  principal  object,  however,  in  introducing  it  here,  was  to  shew,  that 
this  doctrine  was  the  natural  result  of  the  state  pf'science  at  tlie  period 
when  Reid  appeared ;  and,  consequently,  that  no  argument  against  his  ori- 
ginality in  adopting  it  can  reasonably  be  founded  on  a  coincidence  between 
his  views  concerning  it  and  those  of  any  preceding  author. 

Of  Mr.  Hume's  respect  for  the  literary  attainments  of  this  correspond- 
ent, so  strong  a  proof  occurs  in  a  letter,  (dated  Ninewells,  March  10, 
1751,)  that  I  am  tempted  to  subjoin  to  the  foregoing  quotation  the  passage 
to  which  I  allude. 

"  You  would  perceive,  by  the  sample  I  have  given  you,  that  I  make 
"  Cleanthes  tlie  hero  of  the  dialogue.  Whatever  you  can  think  of  to 
ff  strengthen  that  side  of  the  argument,  will  be  most   acceptable  to  me. 

\fterwards  Lord  Karnes. 


376  NOTES    AND    ILLUSTRATIONS. 

"  Any  propensity  you  imagine  I  have  to  the  other  side  crept  in  upon  me 
"  against  my  will ;  and  'tis  not  long  ago  that  I  burned  an  old  manuscript 
"  book,  wrote  before  I  was  twenty,  which  contained,  page  after  page,  the 
"  gradual  progress  of  my  thoughts  on  that  head.    It  began  with  an  anxious 
"  search  after  arguments  to  confirm  the  common  opinion  :  Doub's  stole 
"  in, — dissipated, — returned, — were  again  dissipated, — returned  again  :  And 
"  it  was  a  perpetual  straggle  of  a  restless  imagination  against  inclination, 
"  perhaps  against  reason. 

"  "  I  have  often  thought,  that  the  best  way  of  composing  a  dialogue  would 
"  be,  for  two  persons  that  are  of  different  opinions  about  any  question  of 
"  importance,  to  write  alternately  the  different  parts  of  the  discourse,  and 
"  reply  to  each  other.     By  this  means  that  vulgar  error  would  be  avoided, 
*'  of  putting  nothing  but  nonsense  into  the  mouth   of  the  adversary  ;  and, 
"  at  the  same  time,  a  variety  of  character  and  genius  being  upheld,  would 
"  make  the  whole  look  more  natural  and  unaffected.     Had  it  been  my  good 
"  fortune  to  live  near  you,  I  should  have  taken  upon  me  the  character  of 
"  Philo  in  the  dialogue,  which  you'll   own  I  could  have  supported  natu* 
"  rally  enough :  and   you  would  not  have  been  averse  to  that  of  Clean- 
"  thes."     ....... 

In  a  postscript  to  this  letter,  Mr.  Hume  recurs  to  the  same  idea.  "  If 
"  you'll  be  persuaded  to  assist  me  in  supporting  Cleanihes,  I  fancy  yoa 
"  need  not  take  the  matter  any  higher  dian  Part  3  He  allows,  indeed,  in 
"  Part  2d,  that  all  our  inference  is  founded  on  the  similitude  of  the  works 
"  of  nature  to  the  usual  effects  of  mind  :  otherwise  they  must  appear  a 
"  mere  chaos.  The  only  difficulty  is,  why  the  other  dissimilitudes  do  not 
"  weaken  the  argument :  And,  indeed,  it  would  seem  from  experience  and 
"'  feeling,  that  they  do  not  weaken  it  so  much  as  we  might  reasonably  ex- 
•c  pect.     A  theory  to  solve  this  would  be  very  acceptable."* 

Note  (D.)  page  64. 

It  would  perhaps  be  difficult  to  mention  another  phrase  in  our  language, 
which  admits  of  so  great  a  variety  of  interpretations  as  common  setise  ;  and 
to  which,  of  consequence,  it  could  have  been  equally  dangerous  to  annex 
a  new  technical  meaning  in  stating  a  controversial  argument.  Dr.  Beattie 
has  enumerated  some  of  these  in  the  beginning  of  his  Essay,  but  he  has  by 
no  means  exhausted  the  subject :  nor  is  his  enumeration  altogether  unex- 
ceptionable in  point  of  icgical  distinctness.  On  this  point,  however,  I  must 
allow  my  readers  to  judge  for  themselves. — See  Essay  on  the  Nature  and 
Immutability  of  Truth,  p.  37,  et  seq.  2d  Edit. 

The  Latin  phrase  sensus  communis  has  also  been  used  with  much  latitude. 
In  various  passages  of  Cicero  it  may  be  perfectly  translated  by  the  English 
phrase  common  sense  ;  and,  in  the  same  acceptation,  it  is  often  employed  in 

*  From  the  aibve  quotation's  it  appears,  that  Mr.  Hume's  posthumous- work,  en- 
titled Dialogues  concerning'  IN aiurai  Religion,  was  projected,  and,  in  part  at  least, 
executed,  twenty-five  j'ears  before  his  death. 


n6tes  and  illustrations,  377 

ttioderh  latinity.  Of  this  (not  to  mention  other  authorities)  many  examples 
occur  in  the  Lectiones  Mathematics  of  Dr.  Barrow ;  a  work  not  more  dis- 
tinguished by  originality  and  depth  of  thought,  than  by  a  logical  precision 
of  expression.  In  one  of  these,  he  appeals  to  common  sense,  fsensus  com- 
munis^ in  proof  of  the  circumference  of  the  circle  being  less  than  the 
perimeter  of  the  circumscribed  square. — Lect  1. 

On  other  occasions,  the  sensus  communis  of  classical  writers  plainly 
means  something  widely  different;  as  in  those  noted  lines  of  Juvenal,  so 
ingeniously  illustrated  by  Lord  Shaftesbury,  in  his  Essay  on  the  Freedom 
of  Wit  and  Humour. 

"  thee  satis  ad  juvenem,  quern  nobis  fama  superbum 
"  Tradit,  et  inflalum,  plenumque  Nerone  propinqao. 
"  Rarus  enini  ferme  sensus  communis  in  ilia 
*'  Fortuna."' 

"  Some  commentators,*'  says  Shaftesbury,  *'  interpret  this  very  differently 
"  from  what  is  generally  apprehended.  They  make  this  common  sense  of 
"  the  poet,  by  a  Greek  derivation,  to  signify  sense  of  public  weal,  and  of 
"  the  common  interest ;  love  of  the  community  or  society,  natural  affection, 
"  humanity,  obligingness,  or  that  sort  of  civility  which  rises  from  a  just 
V,  sense  of  the  common  rights  of  mankind,  and  the  natural  equality  there  is 
"  among  those  of  the  same  species. 

"  And,  indeed,  if  we  consider  the  thing  nicely,  it  must  seem  somewhat 
'"  hard  in  the  poet  to  have  deny'd  wit  or  abdity  to  a  court  such  as  that  of 
"  Rome,  even  under  a  Tiberius  or  a  Nero.  But  for  humanity  or  sense  of 
ft  public  good,  and  the  common  interest  of  mankind,  'twas  no  such  deep 
**  satire  to  question  whether  this  was  properly  the  spirit  of  a  court.  'Twas. 
"  difficult  to  apprehend  what  Community  subsisted  among  courtiers  ;  or 
"  what  Public  among  an  absolute  Prince  and  his  slave-subjects.  And  for 
"  real  society,  there  could  be  none  between  such  as  had  no  other  sense  than 
"  that  of  private  good. 

"  Our  poet,  therefore,  seems  not  so  immoderate  in  his  censure ;  if  we 
'•  consider  it  is  the  heart,  rather  than  the  Iwad,  he  takes  to  task  :  when  re- 
"  fleeting  on  a  court  education,  he  thinks  it  unapt  to  raise  any  affection  to- 
"  wards  a  country  ;  and  looks  upon  young  Princes  and  Lords  as  the  young 
"  masters  of  the  world ;  who,  being  indulged  in  all  their  passions,  and 
"  trained  up  in  all  manner  of  licentiousness,  have  that  thorough  contempt 
"  and  disregard  of  Mankind,  which  Mankind  in  a  manner  deserves,  where 
"  arbitrary  power  is  permitted,  and  a  tyranny  adored." 

"While  I  entirely  agree  with  the  general  scope  of  these  observations,  I  am 
inclined  to  think,  that  the  sensus  communis  of  Juvenal  might  be  still  more 
precisely  rendered  by  sympathy  ;  understanding  this  word  (in  the  appropri- 
ate acceptation  annexed  to  it  by  Mr.  Smith)  as  synonymous  with  that  fel- 
low-feeling which  disposes  a  man,  in  ^ie  discharge  of  his  social  duties,  to 
place  himself  in  the  situation  of  others,  and  to  regulate  his  conduct  ac- 
cordingly. Upon  this  supposition,  the  reflection  in  question  coincides  near- 
vol.  II.  48 


378  NOTES  AND  ILLUSTRATIONS. 

ly  with  one  of  Mr.  Smith's  own  maxims,  that  "  the  great  never  look  upon 
«  their  inferiors  as  their  fellow-creatures  ;"*— a  maxim  which,  although 
sufficiently  founded  in  fact  to  justify  the  sarcasm  of  the  satirical  poet,  must 
(it  is  to  be  hoped  for  the  honour  of  human  nature)  be  understood  with  con- 
siderable limitations,  when  stated  as  a  correct  enunciation  of  philosophical 
truth. 

It  yet  remains  for  me  to  take  some  notice  of  the  sensus  communis  of  the 
schoolmen ;  an  expression  which  is  perfectly  synonymous  with  the  word 
conception,  as  defined  in  the  first  volume  of  this  work.  It  denotes  the  power 
whereby  the  mind  is  enabled  to  represent  to  itself  any  absent  object  of  per- 
ception, or  any  sensation  which  it  has  formerly  experienced.  Its  seat  was 
supposed  to  be  that  part  of  the  brain  (hence  called  the  sensorium,  or  the 
sensorium  commune)  where  the  nerves  from  all  the  organs  of  perception  ter- 
minate. Of  the  peculiar  function  allotted  to  it  in  the  scale  of  our  intellec- 
tual faculties,  the  following  account  is  given  by  Hobbes.  "  Some  say  the 
"  senses  receive  the  species  of  things,  and  deliver  them  to  the  Common 
"  Sense ;  and  the  Common  Sense  delivers  them  over  to  the  Fancy ;  and  the 
*e  Fancy  to  the  Memory,  and  the  Memory  to  the  Judgment ;  like  handing 
"  of  things  from  one  to  another,  with  many  words  making  nothing  under- 
stood."—0/  Man,  Part  I.  Chap.  2- 

Sir  John  Davis,  in  his  poem  on  the  Immortality  of  the  Soul,  (published  in 
the  reign  of  Queen  Elizabeth)  gives  the  name  of  common  sense  to  the  power 
of  imagination  ,•  (See  Sections  XIX.  and  XX  )  and  tue  very  same  phraseology 
occurs,  at  a  later  period,  in  the  Philosophy  of  Des  Cartes  :  (see,  in  particu- 
lar, his  Second  Meditation,  where  he  uses  Sensus  Communis  as  synonymous 
with  Poientia  fmaginutrix.)  Both  of  these  writers,  as  appears  evidently 
from  the  context,  understand  by  Imagination  what  I  have  called  Conception. 
To  the  power  now  denoted  by  the  word  Imagination,  Sir  John  Davis  gives  the 
name  of  Fantasy.  Gassendi  seems  disposed  to  consider  this  use  of  the 
phrase  Sensus  Communis  as  an  innovation  of  Des  Cartes,  (see  his  Objections 
to  Des  Cartes'  Second  Meditation,  §  6.)  but  it  had  been  previously  adopted 
by  various  philosophical  writers  ;  and,  in  the  English  schools,  was  at  that 
time  familiar  to  every  ear. 

The  singular  variety  of  acceptations  of  which  this  phrase  is  susceptible  -f 
and  the  figure  which,  on  different  occasions,  it  has  made  in  the  history  of 
philosophy,  will,  I  trust,  furnish  a  sufficient  apology  for  the  length  as  well 
as  for  the  miscellaneous  nature  of  the  foregoing  remarks.f 

*  Theory  of  Moral  Sentiments,  Vol.  I.  p.  136,  6th  edit. 

t  It  has  been  observed  to  me  very  lately  by  a  learned  and  ingenious  friend,  that  in 
one  of  the  phrases  which  I  have  proposed  to  substitute  for  the  common  sense  of  Buf- 
fier  and  Rcid,  I  have  been  anticipated,  two  hundred  years  ago,  by  Sir  Walter 
Raleigh.  "  Where  natural  reason  hath  built  any  thing  so  strong  against  itself,  as 
<(  the  same  reason  can  hardly  assail  it,  much  less  batter  it  down  ;  the  same,  in  every 
li  question  of  nature,  and  infinite  power,,  may  be  approved  for  a  fundamental  law  of 
u  human  knowledge."  (Preface  to  Raleigh's  History  of  the  World.)  The  coinci- 
dence in  point  of  expression,  is  not  a  little  curious ;  but  is  much  less  wonderful  than 


NOTES    AND    ILLUSTRATIONS.  379 


Note{E.)  p.  74. 

The  Arithmetical  Prodigy,  alluded  to  in  the  text,  is  an  American  boy, 
(still,  I  believe,  in  London,)  of  whose  astonishing  powers  m  performing,  by 
a  mental  process,  hitherto  unexplained,  the  most  difficult  numer.cal  opera- 
tions, some  accounts,  have  lately  appeared  in  various  literary  journals. 
When  the  sheet  containing  the  reference  to  this  note  was  thrown  off,  I  en- 
tertained the  hope  of  having  an  opportunity,  before  reaching  the  end  of  the 
volume,  to  ascertain,  by  personal  observation,  some  particulars  with  respect 
to  him,  which  I  thought  might  throw  light  on  my  conclusions  concerning 
the  faculty,  of  Attention,  in  the  former  volume  of  this  work.  In  this  expec- 
tation, however,  I  have  been  disappointed ;  and  have,  therefore,  only  to 
apologize  for,  having  inadvertently  excited  a  curiosity  which  1  am  at  present 
rUnable  to  gratify. 

[Since  the  first  edition  of  this  volume  was  published,  I  have  seen  the 
hoy  here  alluded  to  ;  but  for  too  short  a  time,  and  under  too  unfavourable 
circumstances,  to  be  able  to  form  any  satisfactory  conclusions  concerning 
the  nature  of  his  arithmetical  processes.  Whatever  opinion  may  be  enter- 
tained on  this  point,  every  person  who  has  witnessed  his  public  exhibitions 
must  allow,  that  his  powers  of  Memory  and  of  cancentrated  Attention,  when 
nontrasted  with  his  very  tender  years,  and  with  the  constitutional  playful- 
ness of  his  disposition,  entitle  him  to  a  conspicuous  place  among  the  rare 
phenomena  of  the  intellectual  world.  Nor  can  I  forbear  to  add, '  that  the 
general  character  of  his  own  mind  seems  to  be  simple,  amiable,  and  interest- 
ing. When  farther  advanced  in  life,  he  may  probably  have  it  in  his  power 
to  communicate  some  curious  information  with  respect  to  the  origin  and  his- 
tory of  his  peculiar  intellectual  habits.  In  the  mean  time,  I  must  decline, 
.for  obvious  reason.?,  to  say  any  tiling  farther  on  the  subject.] 

Note  (P.)  page  122. 

£v  t«t«<s  y  uroTvs  IvoT$?$.  "Jn  mathematical  quantities,  equality 
**  is  identity." — Arist.  Met.  x.  c.  3. 

This  passage  has  furnished  to  Dr.  Gillies  (when  treating  of  the  theory  of 
syllogisms,)  the  subject  of  the  following  comment,  in  which,  if  I  do  not 
greatly  deceive  myself,  he  has  proceeded  upon  a  total  misapprehension  of 
the  scope  of  the  original.  "In  mathematical  quantities,"  Aristotle  savs, 
that,  "equality  is  sameness,"  because  •  Aeye?  o  rm  vqartu  yo-ix$  its 
tPTt.  "  The  definition  of  any  particular  object  denoted  by  the  one  is  pre- 
"  cisely  the  same  with  the  definition  of  any  particular  object  denoted  by  the 
«  other."— Gillies's  Aristotle,  Vol.  I.  p.  87. 

the  coincidence  of  the  thought  with  the  soundest  logical  conclusions  of  the  eighteenth 
century. — The  ver3'  eloquent  and  philosophical  passage  which  immediately  follow? 
the  above  sentence,  is  not  less  worthy  of  attention, 


380  NOTES  AN©  ILLUSTRATIONS. 

In  order  to  enable  my  readers  to  form  a  judgment  of  the  correctness  of 
this  paraphrase,  I  must  quote  Aristotle's  words,  according  to  his  own  ar- 
rangement, which,  in  this  instance,  happens  to  be  directly  contrary  to  that 
adopted  by  his  interpreter.  Er<  J*f  eiv  o  Aeyes  o  tjjj  tc^antis  una? 
SIS  v,  otov  ui  irxi  ygetf&ft.xt  evSeicti  ut  ccvrxt,  kj  ret  i<r<t  ^  to, 
$o~oyavix  rtrgctyuyct,  xat  rot  irXeta.  asAA*  ev  rsre/s  q  le-ory? 
tvorns.  The  first  clause  of  this  passage  is,  from  its  conciseness,  obscure; 
but  Ai-istotle's  meaning,  on  the  whole,  seems  to  be  this  : — "That  all  those 
"  magnitudes  which,  bear  the  same  ratio  to  the  same  magnitude,  though  in 
"  fact  they  may  form  a  multitude,  yet,  in  a  scientific  view,  they  may  be  re- 
"  gai  ded  as  one  ;  the  matliematical  notion  of  equality  being  ultimately  re* 
*'  solvable  into  tliat  of  unity  or  identity."*  It  was  probably  to  obviate  any 
difficulty  that  might  have  been  suggested  by  diversities  of  figure,  that  Aris- 
to:  le  has  confined  his  examples  to  equal  straight  lines,  and  to  such  quadran- 
gles as  are  not  only  equal  but  similar. 

Let  us  now  consider  the  paraphrase  of  Dr.  Gillies.  "  In  mathematical 
"  quantities,  equality  is  sameness,  because  the  definition  of  any  particular 
"  object  denoted  by  the  one,  is  precisely  the  same  with  the  definition  of  any 
"  particular  object  denoted  by  the  other."  Are  we  to  understand  by  this, 
that  "  to  all  things  which  are  equal  the  same  definition  is  applicable  ;"  or 
conversely,  that "  all  things  to  which  the  same  definition  is  applicable,  are 
"  equal  ?"  On  the  former  supposition,  it  would  follow,  that  the  same  defi- 
nition is  applicable  to  a  circle,  and  to  a  triangle  having  its  base  equal  to  the 
circumference,  and  its  altitude  to  the  radius.  On  the  latter,  that  all  circles 
are  of  the  same  magnitude ;  all  squares,  and  all  equilateral  triangles. — 
There  is,  indeed,  one  sense  wherein  those  geometrical  figures  which  are  call- 
ed by  the  same  name,  (all  circles,  for  example,)  may  be  identified  in  the  mind 
of  the  logician;  inasmuch  as  any  theorem  which  is  proved  of  one,  must 
equally  hold  true  of  all  the  rest ;  and  the  reason  of  this  is  assigned,  with 
tolerable  correctness,  in  the  last  clause  of  the  sentence  quoted  from  Dr. 
Gillies.  But  how  this  reason  bears  on  the  question  with  respect  to  the  con- 
vertibility of  the  terms  equality  and  sameness,  I  am  at  a  loss  to  conjecture. 

Note  (G.)  page  152. 

In  an  Essay  on  Quantity,  (by  Dr.  Reid)  published  in  the  Transactions  of 
the  Royal  Society  of  London,  for  the  year  1748,  mathematics  is  very  cor- 
rectly defined  to  be  "  the  doctrine  of  measure." — "  The  object  of  this  sci- 
"  ence,"  the  author  observes,  "  is  commonly  said  to  be  quantity  ;  in  which 
f  case,  quantity  ought  to  be  defined,  ivhaL  may  be  measured.  Those  who 
**  have  defined  quantity  to  be  whatever  is  capable  of  more  or  less,  have 
"  given  too  wide  a  notion  of  it,  which  has  led  some  persons  to  apply  math- 

*  Tot  «•£«?  to  ctvro  rev  xvrov  $%ovrct  Xoyov,  is- a  ctbto&oif  rrrc 
Eue.  Elem.  Lib.  V.  Prop.  ix. 


NOTES    AND    ILLUSTRATIONS.  381 

(t  ematical  reasoning  to  subjects  that  do  not  admit  of  it."*  The  appro- 
priate objects  of  this  science  are  therefore  such  tilings  alone  as  admit  not 
only  of  being  increased  and  diminished,  but  of  being  multiplied  and  divi- 
ded. In  other  words,  the  common  quality  which  characterizes  all  of  them 
is  tliea-  mensur ability. 

In  the  same  Essay,  Dr.  Reid  has  illustrated,  with  much  ingenuity,  a  dis- 
tinction (liinted  at  by  Aristotlef)  of  quantity  into  proper  and  improper. 
"  I  call  that,"  says  he,  "  proper  quantity,  which  is  measured  by  its  own 
"  kind  ;  or  which,  of  its  own  nature,  is  capable  of  being  doubled  or  trebled, 
"  without  taking  in  any  quantity  of  a  different  kind  as  a  measure  of  it. 
"  Thus  a  line  is  measured  by  known  lines,  as  inches,  feet,  or  miles  ;  and 
*{  the  length  of  a  foot  being  known,  there  can  be  no  question  about  the 
"  length  of  two  feet,  or  of  any  part  or  multiple  of  a  foot.  This  known 
"  length,  by  being  multiplied  or  divided,  is  sufficient  to  give  us  a  distinct 
"  idea  of  any  length  whatsoever. 

"  Improper  quantity  is  that  which  cannot  be  measured  by  its  own  kind, 
"  but  to  which  we  assign  a  measure  in  some  proper  quantity  that  is  related 
"  to  it.  Thus  velocity  of  motion,  when  we  consider  it  by  itself,  cannot  be 
"  measui'ed.  We  may  perceive  one  body  to  move  faster,  anothe,r  slower, 
"  but  we  can  perceive  no  proportion  or  ratio  between  their  velocities,  with- 
"  out  taking  in  some  quantity  of  another  kind  to  measure  them  by.  Hav- 
"  ing  therefore  observed,  that  by  a  greater  velocity,  a  greater  space  is 
"  passed  over  in  the  same  time,  by  a  less  velocity,  a  less  >space,  and  by  an 
"  equal  velocity  an  equal  space  ;  we  hence  learn  to  measure  velocity  by  the 
"  space  passed  over  in  a  given  time,  and  to  reckon  it  to  be  in  exact  pro- 
"  portion  to  that  ;  and  having  once  assigned  this  measure  to  it,  we  can 
"  then,  and  not  till  then,  conceive  one  velocity  exactly  double,  or  triple,  or 
"  in  any  proportion  to  another.  We  can  then  introduce  it  into  mathemati- 
"  cal  reasoning,  without  danger  of  error  or  confusion  ;  and  may  use  it  as  a. 
"  measure  of  other  improper  quantities. 

"  All  the  proper  quantities  we  know  may,  I  think,  be  reduced  to  these 
"  four  :  extension,  duration,  number,  and  proportion. 

"  Velocity,  the  quantity  of  motion,  density,  elasticity,  the  vis  insita  and 
"  impressa,  the  various  kinds  of  centripetal  forces,. and  the  different  orders 
"  of  fluxions,  are  all  improper  quantities  ;  which  therefore  ought  not  to  be 
"  admitted  into  mathematical  reasoning,  without  having  a  measure  of  them 
"  assigned. 

*  In  this  remark,  Dr  Reid,  as  appears  from  the  title  of  his  paper,  had  an  eye  to 
the  abuse  of  mathematical  language  by  Dr.  Hutcheson,  who  h  ad  recently  carried  it 
so  far  as  to  exhibit  algebraical  formulas  (or  ascertaining  the  moral  merit  or  demerit 
of  particular  actions.  (See  his  inquiry  into  the  Original  of  our  Ideas  of  Beauty  and 
Virtue. 

f  Kwf  <«?  £e  Tleo-cc  rotvTct  Xtyzrcti  fiovct,  roc  $e  ocXXct  irccvra, 
xocru,  o-vf*,fie/Z>jx.e$'  «s  roevrec  yxg  «flre/3AfW«VTf«,  ^  ret  cchZ.cn  Uocrec 
Xtyofity.f—jlrist,  Categ.  cap.  vi.  17. 


382  NOTES    AND    ILLUSTRATIONS. 

"  The  measure  of  an  improper  quantity  ought  always  to  be  included  in  the 
u  definition  of  it ;  for  it  is  the  giving  it  a  measure  that  makes  it  a  proper 
«  subject  of  mathematieal  reasoning.  If  all  mathematicians  had  considered 
«*  this,  as  carefully  as  Sir  Isaac  Newton  has  done,  some  trouble  had  been 
"  saved  both  to  themselves  and  their  readers.  That  great  man,  whose  clear 
"  and  comprehensive  understanding  appears  even  in  his  definitions,  having 
«  frequent  occasion  to  treat  of  such  improper  quantities,  never  fails  to  de- 
"  fine  them,  so  as  to  give  a  measure  of  them,  either  in  proper  quantities,  or 
"  such  as  had  a  known  measure.  See  the  definitions  prefixed  to  his  Prin- 
t(  cipia." 

With  these  important  remarks  I  entirely  agree,  excepting  only  the  enu- 
meration here  given  of  the  different  kinds  of  proper  quantity,  which  is  lia- 
ble to  obvious  and  insurmountable  objections.  It  appears  to  me  that,  ac- 
cording to  Reid's  own  definition,  extension  is  the  only  proper  quantity 
within  the  circle  of  our  knowledge.  Du  ation  is  manifestly  not  measured 
by  duration,  in  the  same  manner  as  a  line  is  measured  by  a  line  ;  but  by 
some  regulated  motion,  as  that  of  the  hand  of  a  clock,  or  of  the  shadow  on 
a  sun-dial.  In  this  respect  it  is  precisely  on  the  same  footing  with  veloci- 
ties and  forces,  all  of  them  being  measured,  in  the  last  result,  by  extension. 
As  to  number  and  proportion,  it  might  be  easily  shewn,  that  neither  of  them 
fall  under  the  definition  of  quantity,  in  any  sense  of  that  word.  In  proof  of 
this  assertion  (which  may,  at  first  sight,  seem  somewhat  paradoxical)  I  have 
only  to  refer  to  the  mathematieal  lectures  of  Dr.  Barrow,  and  to  some  very 
judicious  observations  introduced  by  Dr.  Clarke  in  his  controversy  with 
Leibnitz.  It  is  remarkable,  that,  at  the  period  when  this  essay  was  written, 
Dr.  Reid  should  have  been  unacquainted  with  the  speculations  of  these  il- 
lustrious men  on  the  same  subject  ;  but  this  detracts  little  from  the  merits 
of  his  memoir,  which  rest  chiefly  on  the  strictures  it  contains  on  the  contro- 
versy between  the  Newtonians  and  Leibnitzians  concerning  the  measure  of 
forces. 

Note  (H.)  page  153, 

The  following  view  of  the  relation  between  the  theorems  of  pure  geome- 
try and  their  practical  applications,  strikes  me  as  singularly  happy  and  lu- 
minous ;  more  especially  the  ingenious  illustration  borrowed  from  the  sci- 
ence of  geometry  itself. 

"  Les  verites  que  la  geometrie  demontre  sur  l'etendue,  sont  des  Veritas 
**  purement  hypothetiques.  Ces  verites  cependant  n'en  sont  pas  moin:-; 
"  utiles,  eu  egard  aux  consequences  pratiques  qui  en  resultent.  II  est  aist 
"  de  le  faire  sentir  par  une  comparaison  tiree  de  la  geom£trie  meme.  On 
"  connoit  dans  cette  science  des  lignes  courbes  qui  doivent  s'approcher 
"  continuellement  d'une  ligne  droite,  sans  la  rencontrer  jamais,  et  qui  nean- 
"  moins,  etant  tracees  sur  le  papier,  se  confondent  sensiblement  avec  cette 
"  ligne  droite  au  bout  d'un  assez  petit  espace.  II  en  est  de  meme  des  pro- 
"  positions  de  geometrie  ;  elles  sont  la  limite  intellectttelle  des  vifritds  phtisi 


NOTES    AND    ILLUSTRATIONS.  383 

**  ques,  le  terme  dont  celles-ci  peuvent  approcher  aussi  pres  qu'on  le  desire* 
"  sans  jamais  y  arriver  exactement.  Mais  si  les  theoremes  mathematiques 
"  n'ont  pas  rigoureusement  lieu  dans  la  nature,  lis  servent  du  moins  a  resou- 
"  dre,  avec  une  precision  suffisante  pour  la  pratique,  les  differentes  ques- 
"  tions  qu'on  peut  se  proposer  sur  l'etendue.  Dans  l'univers  il  n'y  a  point 
"  de  cercle  parfait ;  mais  plus  un  cercle  approchera  de  l'etre,  plus  il  ap- 
'•  prochera  des  proprietes  rigoureuses  du  cercle  parfait  que  la  geometrie 
"  demontre  }  et  il  peut  en  approcher  a  un  degre  suffisant  pour  notre  usage. 
"  II  en  est  de  meme  des  autres  figures  dont  la  geometrie  detaille  les  pro- 
"  prietes.  Pour  demontrer  en  toute  rigueur,  les  verites  relatives  a  la  figure 
"  des  corps,  on  est  oblige  de  supposer  dans  cette  figure  une  perfection  arbi- 
"  traire  qui  n'y  sauroit  etre.  En  effet,  si  le  cercle,  par  exemple,  n'est  pas 
"  suppose"  rigoureux,  il  faudra  autant  de  theoremes  differens  sur  le  cercle 
"  qu'on  imaginera  de  figures  differentes  plus  ou  moins  approchantes  du  cer- 
"  cle  parfait  ;  et  ces  figures  elles-memes  pourront  encore  etre  absolument 
"  hypoth£tiques,  et  n'avoir  point  de  modele  existant  dans  la  nature.  Les 
**  lignes  qu'on  considere  dans  la  geometrie  usuelle,  ne  sont  ni  parfaitement 
"  droites,  ni  parfaitement  courbes  ;  les  surfaces  ne  sont  ni  parfaitement 
M  planes,  ni  parfaitement  curvilignes  ;  mais  il  est  necessaire  de  les  supposer 
"  telles,  pour  arriver  a  des  verites  fixes  et  determinees,  dont  on  puisse  faire 
"  ensuite  l'application  plus  ou  moins  exacte  aux  lignes  et  aux  surfaces 
u  physiquese." — D'Alembert,  El^mens  de  Philosophic,  Article  Geometrie. 


Note  (I.)  page  167. 

From  some  expressions  in  this  quotation,  it  would  seem  that  the  writer 
considered  it  as  now  established  by  mathematical  demonstration,  not  only 
that  a  provision  is  made  for  maintaining  the  order  and  the  stability  of  the 
solar  system  ;  but  that,  after  certain  periods,  all  the  changes  arising  from 
the  mutual  actions  of  the  planets,  begin  again  to  be  repeated  over  in  an  in- 
variable and  eternal  round  ;  or  rather,  that  all  this  is  the  result  of  the  neces- 
sary properties  of  matter  and  of  motion.  So  completely  unfounded  is 
this  assumption  in  point  of  fact,  that  the  astronomical  discovery  in 
question  affords  not  the  slightest  analogical  presumption  in  favour  of  a 
moral  cycle  ;  even  on  the  supposition,  that  the  actions  of  the  human  race, 
and  the  motions  of  the  globe  which  they  inhabit,  were  both  equally  sub- 
jected to  the  laws  of  mechanism. 

I  shall  avail  myself  of  this  opportunity  to  remark  further,  that  notwith- 
standing the  lustre  thrown  by  the  result  of  La  Grange's  investigations  on  the 
metaphysical  reasoning  of  Leibnitz  against  the  manus  emendatrix  of  New- 
ton,—this  reasoning,  when  we  consider  the  vagueness  of  the  abstract  prin- 
ciples on  which  it  rests,  can  be  regarded  in  no  other  light  than  as  a  fortu- 
nate conjecture  on  a  subject  where  lie  had  neither  experience  nor  analogy 
for  a  guide-  The  follow *ng  argument  is  not  ill-stated  by  Voltaire  ;  and,  in 
my  opinion,  is  more  plaus  ble  than  any  thing  alleged  a  priori,  on  the  other 
Side  of  the  question,  by  Leibmtz.    "11  est  trop  clair  par  Pexpenence  que 


384  NOTES    AND    1LLUSTRATIOVS. 

**  Dieu  a  fait  des  machines  pour  etre  detruites.  Nous  sommes  l'ouvrage  de 
"  sa  sagesse ;  et  nous  perissons.  Pourquoi  n'en  seroit-il  pas  de  meme  du 
*'  monde  ?  Leibnitz  veut  que  ce  monde  soit  parfait ;  raais  si  Dieu  ne  l'a  forme" 
"que  pour  durer  un  certain  terns,  sa  perfection  consiste  alors  a  ne  durer  que 
"jusqu'  a  l'instant  fixe  pour  sa  dissolution."  Voltaire's  Account  of  New - 
tbn*s  Philosophy. 

For  some  excellent  observations  on  these  opposite  conjectures  of  Leibnitz 
and  of  Newton,  see  Edinburgh  Review,  Vol.  XIV.  pp.  80,  81. 

The  quotation  which  gave  occasion  to  the  foregoing  strictures  induces 
me  to  add,  before  concluding  this  note,  that  when  we  speak  of  La  Grange's 
Demonstration  of  the  Stability  of  the  Solar  System,  it  is  by  no  means  to  be 
understood  that  he  has  proved,  by  mathematical  reasoning,  that  this  system 
never  lOill,  nor  ever  can  come  to  an  end.  The  amount  of  his  truly  sublime 
discovery  is,  that  the  system  does  not,  as  Newton  imagined,  contain  within 
itself,  like  the  workmanship  of  mortal  hands,  the  elements  of  its  own  decay  ; 
and  that,  therefore,  its  final  dissolution  is  to  be  looked  for,  not  from  the 
operation  of  physical  causes  subjected  to  the  calculations  of  astronomers, 
but  from  the  will  of  that  Almighty  Being,  by  whose  fiat  it  was  at  first  called 
into  existence.  That  this  stability  is  a  necessary  consequence  of  the  gene- 
ral laws  by  which  we  find  the  system  to  be  governed,  may,  indeed,  be  assu- 
med as  a  demonstrated  proposition  ;  but  it  must  always  be  remembered,  that 
this  necessity  is  only  hypot/wtical  or  conditional,  being  itself  dependent  on  the 
continuance  of  laws,  which  may  at  pleasure  be  altered  or  suspended. 

The  wholeof  the  argumentin  the  text,  on  the  permanence  or  stability  of  the 
order  of  nature,  is  manifestly  to  be  understood  with  similar  restrictions.  It 
relates,  not  to  necessary  but  to  probable  truths ;  not  to  conclusions  syllo- 
gistically  deduced  from  abstract  principles,  but  to  future  contingencies, 
which  we  are  determined  to  expect  by  a  fundamental  Law  of  Belief,  adapted 
to  the  present  scene  of  our  speculations  and  actions. 

Note  (K.)  page  171. 

"  The  power  of  designating  an  individual  object  by  an  appropriate  artlc  - 
"  lation,  is  a  necessary  step  in  the  formation  of  language,  but  very  far  re- 
"  moved  indeed  from  its  consummation.  Without  the  use  of  general  signs, 
"  the  speech  of  man  would  differ  little  from  that  of  brutes  ;  and  the  transi- 
"  tion  to  the  general  term  from  the  name  of  the  individual,  is  a  difficulty 
"  which  remains  still  to  be  surmounted.  Condillac,  indeed,  proposes  to 
"  shew,  how  this  transition  may  be  made  in  the  natural  course  of  things."  '  Un 
"  enfant  appelle  du  ram  d*  arbre  le  premier  arbre  que  nous  lui  montrons. 
"  Un  second  arbre  qu'il  voit  ensuite  lui  rappelle  la  meme  idee  ;  il  lui  donne 
"  le  meme  nom  ;  de  meme  a  un  troisieme,  a.  un  quatrieme,  et  voila  le  mot 
"  d'arbre,  donne  d'abord  a  un  individu,  qui  devient  pour  lui  un  nom  de  classe 
"  ou  de  genre,  une  idee  abstraite  qui  comprend  tous  les  arbres  en  general.'  In 
"  like  manner,  Mr.  Adam  Smith,  in  his  Dissertation  on  the  Origin  of  Langva- 
" ges,  and  Mr.  Dagald  Stewart,  in  his  Elements  of  the  Philosophy  of  tfie  Human 


NOTES    AND    ILLUSTRATIONS. 

**  Mind,  endeavour  to  explain  this  process,  by  representing1  those  words  which 
w  were  originally  used  as  the  proper  names  of  individuals,  to  be  success. vely 
"  transferred  to  other  individuals,  until  at  length  each  of  them  became  in- 
"  sensibly  the  common  name  of  a  multitude.  This,  however,  is  more  inge- 
nious than  solid.  The  name  given  to  an  individual,  being  intended  ex- 
"  clusively  to  designate  that  individual,  it  is  a  direct  subversion  of  its  very 
"  nature  and  design,  to  apply  it  to  any  other  individual,  known  to  be  dif- 
"  ferent  from  the  former.  The  child,  it  is  true,  may  give  the  name  of  father 
"  to  an  individual  like  to  the  person  it  has  been  taught  to  call  by  that  name  : 
"  but  this  is  from  mistake,  not  from  design  ;  from  a  confusion  of  the  two 
"  as  the  same  person,  and  not  from  a  perception  of  resemblance  between 
"  them  whilst  known  to  be  different.  In  truth,  they  whose  thoughts  are 
"  occupied  solely  about  individual  objects,  must  be  the  more  careful  to  dis- 
tinguish them  from  each  other;  and  accordingly,  the  child  will  most  pe- 
"  remptorily  retract  the  appellation  of  father,  so  soon  as  the  distinctness  is  ob- 
"  served.*  The  object  with  those  whose  terms  or  signs  refer  only  to  individu- 
"  als,  must  naturally  be  to  take  care,  that  every  such  term  or  sign  shall  be 
"  applied  to  its  appropriate  individual,  and  to  none  else.  Resemblance  can 
"produce  no  other  effect,  than  to  enforce  a  greater  caution  in  the  applica- 
*'•  tion  of  the  particular  names,  and  therefore  has  no  natural  tendency  to  lead 
"  the  mind  to  the  use  of  general  terms."  (Discourses  and  Dissertations  on. 
the  Scriptural  Doctrines  of  Atonement  and  Sacrifice.  By  William  Alagee, 
D.  D.  Senior  Fellow  of  Trinity  College,  and  Professor  of  Mathematics  in  the 
University  of  Dublin.     Vol.  II.  pp.  63,  64.     3d  Edit.) 

The  observations  in  pp.  in,  172,  &c.  of  tins  volume,  (to  which  I  must 
request  the  attention  of  my  readers  before  they  proceed  to  the  following  re- 
marks,) appear  to  me  to  weaken  considerably  the  force  of  this  reasoning,  as 
far  as  it  applies  to  the  substance  of  the  theory  in  question.  With  respect  to 
M:*.  Smith's  illustration,  drawn  from  the  accident  of  a  child's  calling  a 
stranger  by  the  name  of  father,  I  readily  acknowledge  that  it  was  unluckily 
chosen  ;  and  I  perfectly  assent  to  the  strictures  bestowed  on  it  by  Dr.  Magee. 
In  consequence  of  the  habitual  intercourse  which  this  domestic  relation  na- 
turally keeps  up  between  the  parties,  the  mistake  of  the  child  (as  Dr.  Magee 
very  properly  calls  it)  must,  of  course,  be  immediately  corrected  ;  and  there- 
fore, the  example  is  of  no  use  whatever  in  confirming  the  conclusion  it  is  brought 
to  support.  It  is  to  be  regretted  that,  upon  this  occasion,  Mr.  Smith  should 
not  only  have  appealed  to  a  period  of  infancy,  when  the  notions  of  similarity 
and  of  identity  cannot  fail  to  be  sometimes  one  and  the  same ;  but  should 
have  assumed,  as  a  general  fact,  an  accidental  occurrence,  which,  if  it  ever 
has  happened,  may  be  justly  regarded  as  an  exception  to  the  usual  history 
of  the  species.     While  yet  on  the  breast,  a  child  is  able  to  distinguish,  with 

*  These  remarks  have  a  particular  reference  to  the  following  sentence  in  Mr. 
Smith's  Dissertation  :  "  A  child  that  is  just  learning  to  spe.ik  calls  every  person  who 
"  comes  to  the  house  its  papa  or  its  mama;  anil  thus  betows  upon  the  whole  species 
"  those  names  which  it  had  been  taught  to  apply  to  two  individuals." 

vol.   ii.  49 


386  NOTES    AND    ILLUSTRATIONS. 

the  utmost  quickness,  and  accuracy,  between  the  face  of  an  acquaintance 
and  that  of  a  stranger;  and,  when  it  is  so  far  advanced  as  to  beg.n  o  :tter 
articulate  sounds,  any  tendency  to  transfer  or  to  generalize  the  wor  .s  mother 
or  nurse  seems  scarcely  conceivable.  We  are  apt  to  suppose  that  the  first 
attempts  towards  speech  are  coeval  wi\h  the  study  of  language  ;  whereas 
the  fact  manifestly  is,  that  these  attempts  are  only  the  consequences  of  the 
progress  previously  and  silently  made  in  the  interpretation  of  words.  Long 
before  this  time,  many  of  the  logical  difficulties  which  appear  so  puzzling 
to  the  speculative  grammarian,  have  been  completely  surmounted* 

But  although  tins  particular  example  has  been  ill  chosen,  it  does  not 
therefore  follow  that  the  author's  theory  is  altogether  unfounded.  Who- 
ever has  paid  any  attention  to  the  phenomena  of  the  infant  mind,  must  be 
satisfied  of'  its  strong  bias  m  the  first  developement  of  the  intellectual  powers^ 
to  apply  to  similar  objects  a  common  name,  without  ever  thinking  of  con- 
founding them  together.  Nor  does  this  hold  merely  with  respect  to  simi- 
lar objects  :  it  holds  also  (and  at  a  surprisingly  early  period  of  life)  with 
respect  to  similar  relations.  A  child  who  has  been  accustomed  to  the  con- 
stant attentions  and  caresses  of  its  mother,  when  it  sees  another  child  in  the 
arms  of.  its  nurse,  will  naturally  and  infallibly  call  the  nurse  the  child's 
mother.  In  this  instance,  as  in  numberless  others,  its  error  arises  from  ge- 
neralizing too  hastily ; — the  distinction  between  the  meanings  of  the  two 
relative  words  Mother  and  Nurse  being  too  complex  to  be  comprehended, 
till  the  power  of  observation  begins  to  be  exercised  with  some  degree  of  at- 
tention and  accuracy.  This  disposition,  however,  to  transfer  names  from  one 
thing  to  another,  the  diversity  of  which  is  obvious  even  to  sense,  cer- 
tainly affords  no  inconsiderable  an  argument  in  favour  of  the  opinion  dis- 
puted by  Dr.   Magee. 

It  is,  indeed,  wonderful,  how  readily  children  transfer  or  generalize  the 
name  of  the  maternal  relation  {that  which  of  all  others  must  necessarily  impress 
their  minds  most  strongly)  not  only  in  the  case  of  their  own  species,  but  of 
the  lower  animals  ;  applying  with  little  or  no  aid  from  instruction,  the  word 
mother  to  the  hen,  the  sheep,  or  the  cow,  whom  they  see  employed  in  nur- 
turing and  cherishing  their  young. 

*  The  general  fact  with  respect  to  children,  assumed  by  Mr  Smith  in  the  foregoing 
note,  is  stated  still  more  strongly  by  Aristotle.  Both  of  these  philosophers  have,  1  sus- 
pect, -Misted  iiK»-e.  in  this  instance,  to  theorvthan  to  observation.  Kxt  rat,  iFXidtx 
ro  fiei  9rga>Tov  Trfoe-xyogevet  ttxvtxs  rus  ecvS'^xi,  Trxvegxf  £ 
fitiregxs,  rxi  yvvxDc.xf  uo-regov  St  dtogt^ei  ravrut  exccrsgov. 
"  Ac  pueri  quoijiie  pi  iinuui  unities  vi.  os  appellant  patre>,  et  oinne-.  mulieres,  matres  : .. 
"  postea  vero  di-cernnnt  horum  ulrumque." — Arist.  Nat.  Ausc.  Lib.  I.  Cap.  i. 

This  passage  (which  •  do  noi  recollect  to  have  seen  quoted  by  any  former  writer) 
does  honour  to  Aristotle's  acuteness.  The  fad,  indeed,  asserted  in  it,  is  more  than 
questionable  ;  but,  admitting  the  diet  to  be  true,  it  must  be  owned  that  Aristotle  has 
vievved  it  in  a  juster  light  than  Mr.  Smith  ; — not  as  an  instance  of  any  disposition  to 
generalize  proper  names,  but  merely  of  imperfect  and  undistinguishing  perception, 


NOTES   AND    ILLUSTRATIONS.  387 

To  myself,  I  own,  it  appears,  that  the  theory  of  Condillac  and  Smith  oil 
this  point,  is  confirmed  by  every  thing  I  have  been  able  to  observe  ot  clul- 
dren.  Even  generic  terms  will  be  found  on  examination,  it  I  be  not  n  uch 
deceived,  to  be  originally  understood  by  them  merely  as  proper  names  ;  in- 
somuch that  the  notions  annexed  by  an  infant  to  the  words  denoting  the  dif- 
ferent articles  of  its  nursery-furniture,  or  the  little  toys  collected  for  its 
amusement,  are,  in  its  conceptions,  as  individually  and  exclusively  appropri- 
ated  as  the  names  of  its  father,  mother,  or  nurse.  If  this  <<bseiv«uon  be 
well-founded,  the  same  gradual  conversion  of  proper  names  mio  appellatives, 
which  Mr.  Smith  supposes  to  have  taken  place  in  the  formation  of  a  lan- 
guage, is  exemplified  in  the  history  of  every  infant  while  learning  to  inter- 
pret its  mother  tongue.  The  case  is  nearly  the  same  with  the  peasant,  who 
has  never  seen  but  one  town,  one  lake,  or  one  river.  All  of  these  appella- 
tives are  to  his  ear,  precisely  equivalent  to  so  many  proper  names. 

"  Quo  te,  Moeri,  pedes  ?  An,  quo  via  ducit,  in  Urbem  ? 

That  resemblance  is  one  of  our  most  powerful  associating  principles  will 
not  be  disputed ;  and  that,  even  in  the  maturity  of  our  reason,  we  have  a 
natural  disposition  to  generalize  the  meaning  of  signs,  in  consequence  of  ap« 
prehended  similarities,  both  of  things  and  of  relations,  is  equally  certain. 
"Why  then  should  it  be  apprehended,  that  there  is  any  peculiar  mystery 
connected  with  this  step  in  the  commencement  of  the  progress,  when  it 
seems  to  admit  of  an  explanation  so  satisfactory,  from  a  law  of  the  humam 
mind,  exemplified  dady  in  facts  falling  within  the  circle  of  our  own  ex- 
perience ? 

Note  (L.)  page  191. 

**  Aristotle's  rules  are  illustrated,  or  rather,  in  my  opinion,  purposely  dark- 
"  ened,  by  putting  letters  of  the  alphabet  for  the  several  terms."— Reid's 
Analysis  of  Aristotle's  Logic. 

On  this  remark  the  following  criticism  has  been  made  by  Dr.  Gillies. 

"In  the  first  Analytics,  Aristotle  shews,  what  is  that  arrangement  of 
"  terms  in  each  proposition,  and  that  arrangement  of  propositions  in  each 
"syllogism,  which  constitutes  a  necessary  connection  between  the  premises 
"  and  the  conclusion.  When  this  connection  takes  place,  the  syllogism  is 
"  perfect  in  point  of  form  ;  and  when  the  form  is  perfect,  the  conclusion 
"  necessarily  follows  from  the  premises,  whatever  be  the  signification  of  the 
"  terms  of  which  they  are  composed.  These  terms,  therefore,  he  commonly 
"  expresses  by  the  letters  of  the  alphabet,  for  the  purpose  of  shewing  that 
"  our  assent  to  the  conclusion  results,  not  from  comparing  the  things  signi. 
"  fied,  but  merely  from  considering  the  relation  which  the  signs  (whether 
"  words  or  letters)  bear  to  each  other.  Those,  therefore,  totally  misconceive 
"  the  meaning  of  Aristotle's  logic,  who  think  that,  by  employing  letters  in- 
stead of  words,  he  has  darkened  the  subject;  since  the  more  abstract  and 
"  general  his  signs  are,  they  must  be  the  better  adapted  to  shew,  that  the 


388  NOTES    AND    ILLUSTRATIONS. 

"  inference  results  from  considering  them  alone,  without  at  all  regarding 
"  the  things  which  they  signify."* 

With  the  doctrine  stated  in  the  beginning  of  this  extract  I  entirely  agree> 
It  coincides,  indeed,  remarkably  with  a  passage  in  the  former  volume  of  this 
work,  where  I  have  shewn,  at  some  length,  that  our  assent  to  the  conclusion 
of  a  legitimate  syllogism  results  not  from  comparing  the  things  signified, 
but  merely  from  considei'Jng  the  relations  of  the  signs  ;  and,  consequently, 
that  letters  of  the  alphabet  might  be  substituted  instead  of  verbal  terms, 
without  impairing  the  force  of  the  argument.  The  observation  appears  to 
myself  of  considerable  importance,  when  connected  with  the  fundamental 
question  there  discussed,  concerning  the  use  of  language  as  an  instrument 
of  thought ;  but,  I  own,  I  am  at  a  loss  to  conceive  how  it  should  have  been 
supposed  to  bear  on  the  present  subject.  The  only  point  at  issue  between 
Dr.  Gillies  and  Dr.  Reid  is,  whether  the  use  of  letters  instead  of  words  be, 
or  be  not,  a  useful  expedient  for  facilitating  the  study  of  logic  ;  and  upon 
this,  I  apprehend,  there  can  scarcely  exist  a  diversity  of  opinion.  No  in- 
stance, I  will  venture  to  affirm,  ever  occurred  of  any  hesitation  in  the  mind 
of  the  merest  novice  about  the  conclusiveness  of  a  legitimate  syllogism,  when 
illustrated  by  an  example  ;  but  how  difficult  to  explain  to  a  person  alto- 
gether unaccustomed  to  scholastic  abstractions,  the  import  and  cogency  of 
those  symbolical  demonstrations  by  which  Aristotle  has  attempted  to  fortify 
the  syllogistic  theory '. 

The  partiality  of  Dr.  Gillies  for  this  technical  device  has  probably  arisen, 
in  part,  from  his  supposing  it  to  bear  a  much  closer  analogy  than  it  does, 
in  fact,  to  the  algebraical  art.  Another  very  learned  writer  has  proceeded 
on  the  same  idea,  when  he  observes,  that  "it  should  recommend  the  study 
"  of  logic  to  mathematicians,  that,  in  order  to  make  his  demonstrations  uni- 
"  versal,  Aristotle  uses  letters  as  universal  characters,  standing  for  all  kinds 
**  of  terms  or  propositions."f  It  would  be  an  idle  waste  of  words  to  shew, 
how  very  slight  this  analogy  is,  and  how  totally  inapplicable  to  the  question 
before  us ;  amounting  to  little  more  than  this,  that,  in  both  cases,  the  al- 
phabet happens  to  be  employed  as  a  substitute  for  common  language.  An 
analogy  much  more  in  point,  may  be  traced  in  the  practice  of  designating  by 
letters  the  different  parties  in  a  hypothetical  law -suit ; — a  practice  attended 
with  no  inconvenience,  where  these  symbols  only  supply  the  place  of  proper 
names  ;  but  which  would  at  once  convert  the  simplest  case  into  an  senigma, 
if  they  were  to  be  employed  (as  they  are  by  Aristotle)  to  denote,  not  merely 
individual  existencies,  but  the  relations  of  general  ideas. 

While  Dr.  Gillies  has  thus  exerted  his  ingenuity  in  defending  the  use 
made  by  Aristotle  of  letters  instead  of  words,  it  is  to  be  regretted,  that  he 
has  said  nothing  about  the  motives  which  induced  that  philosopher,  in  dis- 

*  Analysis  of  Aristotle's  Speculative  Works,  &c.  by  Dr.  Gillies,  Vol.  I.  p.  89. 
2d.  Edit. 

From  a  note  at  the  foot  of  the  page  it  appears,  that  the  remarks  just  quoted  from 
Reid  gave  occasion  to  the  above  strictures. 

f  Ancient  Metaphysics,  Vol.  III.  p.  51  of  th?  Preface. 


NOTES    AND    ILLUSTRATIONS.  389 

proving1  the  illegitimate  modes,  to  content  himself  with  general  references 
to  such  words  as  bonum,  habitus,  prudevtia,  upon  which  the  student  is  left 
to  his  own  judgment,  in  ringing  the  va  ious  changes  necessary  for  the  illus- 
tration of  the  theory.  A  more  effectual  contrivance  could  not  easily  have 
been  thought  of,  for  perplexing  a  subject,  level,  in  itself,  to  the  meanest  ca- 
pacity. In  this  respect,  it  answers  the  intended  purpose  still  better  than  his 
alphabetical  formula. 

Note  (M.)  page  218. 

As  instances  of  what  are  called  by  logicians  fullacicein  dictione,  a  modern 
writer  mentions  the  mistakes  which  may  arise  from  confounding  "  liber  Bac- 
"*  chus,  et  liber  a  servitute  ;  liber  codex,  et  liber  cortex  ;  crevi  a  cerno,  et 
"  crevi  i  cresco  ;  infractiis  ptrticipium  ab  ivfrintfo,  et  infractus  compositum 
**  ab  in.  et  fructus,  senso  plane  contrario."  He  mentions  also  the  danger  of 
confounding  the  literal  with  the  figurative  sense  of  a  word,  as  wipes  when 
applied  to  a  quadruped,  and  to  a  man  noted  for  cunning. — "  Sic  siquis  argu- 
"  .,''  he  adds  for  the  sake  of  illustration,  "  stettam  latrare,  qitia  stella  qute- 
**  dam  Cards  dicitur,  facile  respondebitur  captioso  argumento,  distinguendo 
"  .  .OS  sensus  ejusdem  vocis,  mueque  ostendendo  syllogismi  quatuor  ter- 
"  1:      .s  (si  sensuvn  spectes)  ubi  tres  saltern  sono  comparent." 

To  exunpUy  tLtfu/h^cia  accentus,  tie  same  writer  warns  us  against  con- 
found ng  hortus  and  onus  ;  hara  and  ara  ;  malum  adjectivum,  and  malum 
pro  porno  ;  cervus  and  jseivuw;  concilium  and  consilium,  &c.  &c.  The  reme- 
dy against  such  fallacies,  he  gravely  tells  us,  is  to  distinguish  the  words  thus 
identified,  so  as  to  shew  that  the  syllogism  consists  of  more  than  three 
terms.  "Solvuntur  cLstinguendo  ea  quae  confunduntur,  indeque  monstran- 
"  do  pluralitateni  terminorum,"  He  acknowledges,  however,  that  fallacies 
of  this  sort  are  not  likely  to  impose  on  a  skilful  logician.  "  Sed  crassiores 
"  sunt  hae  fallaciae  quam  ut  perito  miponant." 

I  have  purposely  quoeed  these  remarks,  not  from  a  mere  schoolman,  but 
frpm  an  author  justly  distinguished  both  by  science  and  learning,  Dr.  Wallis 
of  Oxford.  They  are  taken,  too,  from  a  treatise  written  with  the  express 
view  of  adapting  the  logic  commonly  taught  in  our  universities  to  the  ordi- 
nary business  of  life  ;  having  a  formal  dedication  prefixed  to  it  to  the  Royal 
Society  of  London,  then  recently  instituted-.  The  subject  is  the  same  with 
that  of  the  third  Book  of  Locke's  Essay,  relating  to  the  abuse  of  words  ,■  and 
the  interval  between  the  two  publications  was  only  two  years.  Yet  how  im- 
mense the  space  by  which  they  are  separated  in  the  history  of  the  Human 
Mind  ! 

The  concluding  paragraph,  however,  of  this  very  puerile  chapter  on 
sophisms,  bears  marks  of  a  mind  fitted  for  higher  undertakings.  I  cannot, 
deny  myself  the  pleasure  of  transcribing  it,  and  of  pointing  it  out  to  those 
who  may  hereafter  speculate  upon  the  theory  of  wit,  as  not  unworthy  of 
>Jieir  attention. 


390  NOTES    AND    ILLUSTRATIONS. 

"Interim  hie  monendum  duco  ;  quod  hje  fallacies,  utcunque  justam  argu- 
"  menti  vim  non  habeant,  ^pprinie  tamen  commodat  sunt  ad  id  omne  quod  in- 
" geniosum  vulgo  dicimus :  Ut  sunt  joci,  facet, ae,  dicteria,  scommata,  sarcasm!, 
"  retorsiones  lepidae,  (joit,  raillery,  repartee.)  Quippe  hoc  omne  fundari  solet 
"  in  hujusmodi  faliaciarum  ahqua.  Nonnunquam  allusio  fit  ad  verb  or  um 
"  sonos  ;  nunc  ad  ambiguam  vocum  sigmficationem  j  nunc  ad  dubiam  syn- 
*'  taxin  ;  nunc  proverbialner  dici  sohta  accommodantur  sensu  propno,  aut 
"  vice  versa  :  nunc  ahud  aperte  dicitur,  aliud  clam  insinuatur ;  saltern  ob- 
w  Lquc  insinuatur,  quod  non  erat  directo  dicendum  ;  nunc  verba  contrario 
"  sensu  captantur,  et  retorquentur  ;  nunc  vei  isimile  insinuatur  ut  verum,  sal- 
"  tem  ut  suspectum  ;  nunc  de  uno  dicitur,  quod  mutato  nomine,  de  alio  intel- 
"  lectum  vellent ;  nunc  iromce  laudando  vituperant ;  nunc  objecta  spicula,  re- 
'*  spondendo  declinantur,  aut  eiiam  (obhquata)  alio  dinguntur,  forte  sic  ut 
"  auctorem  feriant ;  et  fere  semper  ex  ambiguo  luditur.  Quae  quidem  fallacia- 
"  rum  formula,  si  fr;gidae  sint  crassaeque,  ridentur ;  si  subtdiores  arrident ; 
"  si  acutse,  titdlant ;  si  aculeatx,  pungunt." 

(Note  N.  page  235.) 

In  the  first  volume  of  these  Elements,  I  have  endeavoured  to  trace  the 
origin  of  that  bias  of  the  imagination,  which  has  led  men,  in  all  ages  of  the 
world,  to  consider  physical  causes  and  effects  as  a  series  of  successive  events 
necessarily  connected  together,  like  the  links  of  a  metallic  chain.  (See 
Chap.  i.  Sect.  2.)  So  very  strong  is  this  bias,  that,  even  in  the  present  times, 
some  of  the  most  sagacious  and  cautious  of  Bacon's  followers  occasionally 
shew  a  disposition  to  relapse  into  the  figurative  language  of  the  multitude. 
"  The  chain  of  natural  causes,"  says  Dr.  Reid,  "  has,  not  unfitly,  been  com- 
"  pared  to  a  chain  hanging  down  from  heaven  :  A  link  that  is  discovered 
"  supports  the  links  below  it,  but  it  must  itself  be  supported ;  and  that 
"  which  supports  it  must  be  supported,  until  we  come  to  the  first  link, 
"  which  is  supported  by  the  throne  of  the  Almighty."  (Essays  on  the  In- 
tellectual Powers,  p.  1 15.  4to  Ed.)  It  is  difficult  to  reconcile  the  approbation 
here  bestowed  on  the  above  similitude,  with  the  excellent  and  profound  re- 
marks on  the  relation  of  cause  and  effect,  which  occur  in  other  parts  of  Dr. 
Reid's  works.  (See  Essays  on  the  Active  Powers,  p.  44.  and  pp.  286,  287, 
288.  4to  Edit.) 

Mr.  Maclaurin,  in  the  concluding  chapter  of  his  Account  of  Newton's 
Discoveries,  has  still  more  explicitly  lent  the  sanction  of  his  name  to  this 
idea  of  a  chain  of  second  causes.  "  As  we  cannot  but  conceive  the  universe 
"  as  depending  on  the  first  cause  and  chief  mover,  whom  it  would  be  ab- 
"  surd,  not  to  say  impious,  to  exclude  from  acting  in  it ;  so  we  have  some 
"  hints  of  the  manner  in  which  he  operates  in  nature,  from  the  laws  which 
"  we  find  established  in  it.  Though  he  is  the  source  of  all  efficacy,  yet  we 
"  find  that  place  is  left  for  second  causes,  to  act  in  subordination  to  him  ; 
"  and  mechanism  has  its  share  in  carrying  on  the  great  scheme  of  nature. 
"  The  establishing  the  equality  of  action  and  re-a«tion,  even  in  those  powers 


NOTES  AND  ILLUSTRATIONS.  391 

u  which  seem  to  surpass  mechanism,  and  to  be  more  immediately  derived 
tt  from  him,  seems  to  be  an  indication  that  those  powers,  while  they  derive 
"  their  efficacy  from  him,  are,  however,  in  a  certain  degree,  circumscribed 
"and  regulated  in  their  operations  by  mechanical  principles  ;  and  that  they 
"  are  not  to  be  considered  as  mere  immediate  volitions  of  his,  (as  they  are  of> 
"  ten  represented,)  but  rather  as  instruments  made  by  him,  to  perform  the 
"  purposes  for  which  he  intended  them.  If,  for  example,  the  most  noble 
a  phenomena  in  nature  be  produced  by  a  rare  elastic  xtherial  medium,  as  Sir 
"  Isaac  Newton  conjectured,  the  •'. "hole  efficacy  of  this  medium  must  be  re" 
'*  solved  into  his  power  and  will  who  is  the  supreme  cause.  This,  however, 
"does  not  hinder,  but  that  the  same  medium  may  be  svbject  to  the  like 
"  laws  as  other  elastic  fluids,  in  its  actions  and  vibrations  ;  and  that,  if  its 
"  nature  were  better  known  to  us,  we  might  make  curious  and  useful  dis- 
"  coveries  concerning  its  effects  from  those  laws.  It  is  easy  to  see,  that  this 
"  conjecture  no  way  derogates  from  iiu  government  and  influences  of  the 
"  Deity  ;  while  it  leaves  us  at  liberty  to  pursue  •mi  inquiries  concerning  the 
"nature  and  operations  of  such  a  medium  :  Whereas  they  who  hastily  re- 
"  solve  tfiese  powers  into  immediate  volition.?  of  the  Supreme  Cause,  without  ad- 
"  mitting  any  intermediate  instruments,  put  an  end  to  our  inqidries  at  once  ;  and 
"  deprive  us  of  -what  is  probably  th,'  most  sublime  part  of  philosophy,  by  repre- 
"  senting  it  us  imaginary  and  fictitious" 

On  the  merits  of  tins  passage,  considered  in  relation  to  the  evidences  of 
natural  religion,  I  do  not  mean  to  offer  any  remarks  here.  Some  acute 
strictures  upon  it  in  this  point  of  view  (but  expressed  with  a  most  unbe- 
coming and  offensive  petulanGe)  may  be  found  in  the  th  rd  volume  of  Bax- 
ter's' Inquiry  into  the  Human  Soul. — It  is  with  the  logical  proposition  alone, 
stated  in  the  concluding  sentence,  that  we  are  concerned  at  present ;  and 
this  (although  Baxter  has  passed  it  over  without  any  animadversion)  ap- 
pears to  me  highly  exceptionable  ;  proceeding  on  a  very  inaccurate,  or  rather 
totally  erroneous  conception  of  the  object  and  aim  of  physical  science 
From  the  sequel  of  the  sechon  to  which  this  note  refers,  (particularly  from 
pages  239,  240,  241,  242,)  I  trust  it  will  appear,  that,  supposing  all  the  phe- 
nomena of  the  universe  to  be  produced  by  the  immediate  volitions  of  the  Su- 
preme Cause,  the  business  of  natural  philosophers  would  be  precisely  the 
same  as  upon  the  hypothesis  adopted  by  Maclaurin  ;  the  investigation  of  the 
iiecessary  connections  linking  together  physical  causes  and  effects,  (if  any 
such  necessary  connections  do  exist,)  be.ng  confessedly  placed  beyond  the 
reach  of  our  faculties  ;  and,  of  consequence,  our  most  successful  researches 
terminating  in  the  discovery  of  some  general  law,  or  in  the  farther  generaliza- 
tion and  simplification  of  laws  already  kiown.  In  this  intellectual  process 
there  is  no  more  reason  to  apprehend  that  any  limit  is  fixed  to  our  inquiries, 
than  that  the  future  progress  of  geometry  should  be  stopped  by  the  discove- 
ry of  some  one  truth  comprising  the  whole  science  in  a  single  theorem. 

Nor  do  I  apprehend  that  the  theory  which  excludes  from  the  universe 
mechanism  (strictly  so  called)  tends,  in  the  smallest  degree,  to  detract  from 
its  beauty  ami  grandeur  ;   notwithstanding  the  popular  and  much  admired 


392  NOTES    AND    ILLUSTRATIONS. 

argument  of  Mr.  Boyle  in  support  of  this  idea.  "  As  it  more  recommends,57 
he  observes,  "  the  skill  of  an  engineer  to  contrive  an  elaborate  engine,  so  as 
"  that  there  need  nothing  to  reach  his  ends  in  it,  but  the  contrivance  of 
"  parts  void  of  understanding  ;  than  if  it  were  necessary  that,  ever  and 
"  anon,  a  discreet  servant  should  he  employed  to  concur  notably  to  the  ope- 
"  rations  of  this  or  that  part,  or  to  hinder  the  engine  from  being  out  of  or- 
"  der  :  so  it  more  sets  off  the  wisdom  of  God,  in  the  fabric  of  the  universe, 
"  that  he  can  make  so  vast  a  machine  perform  all  those  many  things  which 
"  he  designed  it  should,  by  the  mere  contrivance  of  brute-matter,  managed 
"  by  certain  laws  of  motion,  and  upheld  by  his  ordinary  and  general  con- 
"  course  ;  than  if  he  employed,  from  time  to  time,  an  intelligent  overseer 
"  to  regulate  and  control  the  motion  of  the  parts."*—"  What  maybe  the 
"  opinion  of  others,"  says  Lord  Kames,  after  quoting  the  foregoing  pas- 
sage, "  I  cannot  say ;  but  to  me  this  argument  is  perfectly  conclusive. 
"  Considering  this  universe  as  a  great  machine,  the  workmanship  of  an  in- 
"  intelligent  cause,  I  cannot  avoid  thinking  it  the  more  complete,  the  less 
"  mending  or  interposition  it  requires.  The  perfection  of  every  piece  of 
"  workmanship,  human  and  divine,  consists  in  its  answering  the  designed 
*'  purpose,  without  bestowing  further  labour  upon  it."f — To  myself,  I  must 
confess,  Mr.  Boyle's  argument  appears  altogether  unworthy  of  its  author. 
The  avowed  use  of  a  machine  is  to  save  labour ;  and  therefore,  the  less  fre- 
quently the  interposition  of  the  artist  is  necessary,  the  more  completely  does 
the  machine  accomplish  the  purpose  for  which  it  was  made.  These  ideas 
surely  do  not  apply  to  the  works  of  the  Almighty.  The  multiplicity  of  his 
operations  neither  distract  his  attention,  nor  -exhaust  his  power  ;  nor  can 
we,  without  an  obvious  inconsistency  in  the  very  terms  of  the  proposition, 
suppose  him  reduced  to  the  necessity  of  economizing,  by  means  of  mechan- 
ism, the  resources  of  Omnipotence.^ 

My  object  in  these  observations  (I  think  it  proper  once  more  to  remind 
my  readers)  is  not  to  prejudge  .he  metaphysical  question  between  Maclau- 
rin  and  Baxter  ;  but  merely  to  establish  the  two  following  propositions. 
1.  That  this  question  is  altogether  foreign  to  the  principles  which  form 
the  basis  of  the  inductive  logic  ;  these  principles  neither  affirming  nor  de- 
nying the  existence  of  necessary  connections  between  physical  causes  and 
effects,  but  only  asserting,  that  such  connections,  if  they  do  exist,  are  not 
objects  of  human  knowledge.  2.  That  no  presumption  in  favour  of  their 
existence  is  afforded  by  Mr.  Boyle's  similitude  ;  the  reasoning  founded  on 

*  Inquiry  into  the  vulgar  notion  of  Nature. 

t  Ofthe  Laws  of  Motion.  Published  in  the  First  Volume  of  the  Physical  and  Lite- 
rary Essays,  read  before  the  Edinburgh  Philosophical  Society,  (1754.) 

%  A  comparison  still  more  absurd  than  that  of  Mr.  Boyle  occurs  in  the  6th  Chap* 
ter  of  Aristotle's  book  de  mundo  ;  where  he  represents  it  as  unbecoming  the  dignity 
ofthe  Supreme  Being  avrapyeiv  oi^xvroi) — "  to  put  his  own  hand  to  every 
"  thing  ;"  a  supposition,  according  to  him,  "  much  more  unsuitable  to  the  Divine 
"majesty,  than  to  conceive  a  great  monarch  like  Xerxes  taking  upon  himself  the 
,:  actual  execution  of  all  his  own  decrees." 


NOTES    AND    ILLUSTRATIONS-  393 

the  supposed  analogy  between  the  universe  and  a  machine,  being  manifestly 
inapplicable  where  the  power  as  well  as  the  skill  of  the  Contriver  is  admitted 
to  be  infinite. — If  the  remarks  offered  on  these  points  be  well  founded, 
they  may  serve,  at  the  same  time,  to  shew,  that  the  attempt  made  in  the  text 
to  illustrate  some  abstract  topics  connected  with  the  received  Rules  of  Phi- 
losophising was  not  altogether  superfluous. 

The  metaphisical  doctrine  maintained  by  Baxter  in  opposition  to  Maclau- 
rin,  seems  to  coincide  nearly  with  Malebranche's  Theory  of  Occasional 
Causes,  as  well  as  with  the  theology  of  the  old  Orphic  verses  quoted  in  the 
7th  chapter  of  Aristotle's  Treatise  de  Mundo. — A  very  striking  resemblance 
is  observable  between  these  verses,  and  the  Hymn  to  Narrayna  or  the  Spirit 
of  God,  translated  by  Sir  William  Jones  from  the  writings  of  ancient  Hin- 
du Poets.* 

Note  (O.)  page  248. 

Although  Dr.  Reid  was  plainly  led  into  this  train  of  thinking  by  Mr. 
Hume,  the  same  doctrine  with  respect  to  the  relation  of  cause  and  effect, 
(considered  as  the  object  of  physical  science,)  is  to  be  found  in  many  Eng- 
lish writers  of  a  far  earlier  date.  Of  this  assertion  I  have  produced  various 
proofs  in  my  first  Volume,  from  Hobbes,  Barrow,  Berkeley,  and  others,  to 
whose  speculations  on  tins  head  Dr.  Reid  does  not  seem  to  have  paid  any 
attention.  To  these  quotations  I  beg  leave  to  add  the  following,  from  a 
book,  of  which  the  third  edition  was  published  in  1737. 

"  Flere  it  is  worth  observing',  that  all  the  real  true  knowledge  we  have  of 
ft  nature  is  entirely  experimental ;  insomuch,  that  how  strange  soever  the 
"  assertion  seems,  we  may  lay  this  down  as  the  first  fundamental  unerring 
"  rule  in  physics,  that  it  is  not  within  the  compass  of  human  understanding,  to 
"  assign  a  purely  speculative  reason  for  any  one  phenomenon  in  nature  ;  as  why 
"  grass  is  green,  or  snow  is  white  ;  why  fire  burns,  or  cold  congeals.  By  a 
"  speculative  reason,  I  mean  assigning  an  immediate  efficient  cause  a  priori, 
"  together  with  the  manner  of  its  operation,  for  any  effect  whatsoever  purely 
"  natural.  We  find,  indeed,  by  observation  and  experience,  that  such  and 
"  such  eff  cts  are  produced  ;  but  when  we  attempt  to  think  of  the  reason  why 
"  and  the  manner  how  the  causes  work  those  effects,  then  we  are  at  a  stand, 
"  and  all  our  reasoning  is  precarious,  or  at  best  but  probable  conjecture. 

"  If  any  man  is  surprised  at  this,  let  him  instance,  in  some  speculative 
"  reason  he  can  give  for  any  natural  phenomenon  ;  and  how  plausible  soev- 
"  er  it  appears  to  him  at  first,  he  will,  upon  weighing  it  thoroughly,  find  it  at 
«'  last  resolved  into  nothing  more  than  mere  observation  and  experiment,  and 

*The  same  opinion  is  explicitly  avowed  by  Dr.  Claike,  a  zealous  partisan  of  the 
Experimental  Philosophy,  and  one  of  the  ablest  logicians  that  the  Newtonian  School 
has  hitherto  produced.  "  The  course  of  nature,  truly  and  properly  speaking,  is  no- 
"  thing:  hut  the  will  of  Godt producing  certain  effects  in  a  continued,  regular,  constant, 
"  and  uniform  manner.1" — Clarke's  Works,  Vol.  II.  p.  698.  Fol.  edit. 

vol.  a.  50 


394  NOTES  AND  ILLUSTRATIONS', 

*'  will  perceive  that  these  expressions  generally  used  to  describe  the  eavse  or 
"  manner  of  the  productions  of  nature,  do  really  signify  nothing  more  than 
"  the  effects"  The  Procedure,  Extents,  and  Limits  of  Human  Under- 
standing. Ascribed  to  Or.  Peter  Brown,  Bishop  of  Cork,  (London,  1737 
3d  Ed. 

For  the  following  very  curious  extracts,  (together  with  many  others  of  a 
similar  import,  both  from  English  and  from  foreign  writers,)  I  am  indebted 
to  a  learned  correspondent,  William  Dickson,  LL.  D.  a  gentleman  well 
known  by  his  able  and  meritorious  exertions  for  the  abolition  of  the  slave- 
trade. 

"  Confidence  of  science  is  one  great  reason  we  miss  it :  for  on  this  account, 
{t  presuming  we  have  it  every  where,  we  seek  it  not  where  it  is  ;  and,  there- 
"  foro,  fall  short  of  the  object  of  our  inquiry.  Now,  to  give  further  check  to 
"  dogmatical  pretensions,  and  to  discover  the  vanity  of  assuming  ignorance, 
"  we'll  make  a  short  inquiry,  whether  there  be  any  such  thing  as  science  in 
"  the  sense  of  its  asser  ers.  In  their  notion,  then,  it  is  the  knowledge  of  things 
"  in  their  true,  immediate,  necessary  causes  i  Upon  this  I'll  advance  the  fol- 
**  lowing  observations. 

"  1.  All  knowledge  of  causes  is  deductive  ;  for  we  know  none  by  simple 
•*  intuition,  but  through  the  mediation  of  their  effects.  So  that  we  cannot 
"  conclude  any  thing  to  be  the  cause  of  another,  but  from  its  continual  ac* 
"  companying  it ;  for  the  causality  itself  is  insensible.  But  now  to  argue 
K  from  a  concomitancy  to  a  causality  is  not  infallibly  conclusive  ;  yea,  in  this 
'*  way  lies  notorious  delusion,  &c.  &c.  &c. 

"  2.  We  hold  no  demonstration  in  the  notion  of  the  dogmatist,  but  where 
"  the  contrary  is  impossible  :"  &c.  &c.  (Scepsis  Scientifica  ;  or  Confess't 
Ignorance  the  Way  to  Science ;  in  an  Essay  of  the  Vanity  of  Dogmatizing 
and  Confident  Opinion;  with  a  Reply  to  the  Exceptions  of  the  learned 
Thomas  Albius.*  By  Joseph  Glanvill,  M.  A.  London,  1665.  Dedicated  to- 
the  Royal  Society.) 

"  Causalities  are  first  found  out  by  concomitancy,  as  I  intimated.  And 
"  our  experience  of  the  dependence  of  one,  and  independence  of  the  other, 
"  shews  which  is  the  effect,  and  whichHhe  cause.  Definitions  cannot  disco- 
"'  ver  causalities,  for  they  are  formed  after  the  causality  is  known.  So  that,  in 
"  our  author's  instance,  a  man  cannot  know  heat  to  be  the  atoms  of  fire,  till 
"  the  concomitancy  be  known,  and  the  efficiency  first  presumed.  The  ques- 
"  tion  is,  then,  How  heat  is  known  to  be  the  effect  of  fire  ?  Our  author  an- 
**  swers  by  its  definition.  But  how  came  it  to  be  so  defined  ?  The  answer 
"  must  be,  by  the  concomitancy  and  dependence,  for  there's  nothing  else  as- 
"■  signable."  (SCIR^  tuum  nihil  est ;.  or  the  Author's  Defence  of  the  Vani- 
*  ty  of  Dogmatizing  against  the  Exceptions  of  the  learned  Thomas  Albius,  in 
"  his  late  SCIRI.)     London,  1665.     .... 

*  Or  White,  a  Romish  priest,  author  of  a  treatise  entitled,  Sciri  site  Sceplices  er 
Scepticorum a  jure  Disputationis  Exclasio.    (See  Biog.  Diction.) 


NOTES    AND    ILLUSTRATIONS.  395 

"  Inter  causam  proprie  dictam  et  effectum  oportet  esse  necessarlum  nex- 
**  urn  ;  adeo  ut  posita  actione  causas  sequatur  necessar.o  effectus.  Cum 
4t  Deus  vult  aliquid  efficere  id  ntcessario  eveniat  oportet,  &c.  Quia  autem 
"  ejusmodi  nexus  noncernitur  inter  causas  creataset  effectus,  nonnulli  causas 
"  secundas,  seu  creatas,  sua,  vi  agere  negarunt.  Negant  corpora  a  corpori- 
*'  bus  moveri,  quod  inter  motum  corporis,  et  motum  eorum  in  quae  inc;dit 
"  nullus  deprehendatur  nexus,  adeo  ut  moto  corpore  A,  necesse  sit  moveri 
"  corpus  B,  cui  colliditur.  Iidem  quoque  negant  corpora  a  spiritibus  mo- 
"  ven,quia  inter  voluntatem  spintuum  et  motum  corporum  nullam  connexio- 
**  nem  animadvertunt,  &c.  Fatendum  a  nobis  hujusmodi  connexum  nullum 
"  cerni,  nee  srqui  ex  eo  quod,  corpore  moto,  id,  in  quod  incidit  movetur; 
*'  aut  ex  eo  quod,  mente  volente,  corpus  agitatur,  corpora  et  mentent 
"  esse  veras  motus  causas.  Fieri  posset,  ut  occasiones  tantum  essent, 
"  qu.bus  positis,  alia  causa  ageret.  Verum  uti,  ex  ejusmodi  possibditate, 
■"  nou  colligeris  rem  ita  se  habere  ;  ita  ne  eo  quod  non  adsequeris  aliqu.d, 
"  consequens  est  ut  nihil  sit ;  nisi  aliunde  probaveris  tibi  esse  earum  rerum, 
"  de  quibus  agitur,  adaequatam  ideam,  aut  rem  repugnare,  &c. — Possunt 
**  messe  corporibus  motis,  et  spiritibus,  facilitates  ignotae,  de  quibus  judici- 
■"  um  nullum,  aut  negando  aut  affirmando,  ferre  possumus.  Itaque  ex 
"  aequo  peccant,  qui  affirmant  inesse  us  certo  facultates  efficiendorum  quo* 
**  rundam,  quae  an  ab  iis  fiant  ignorant ;  et  qui  negant  quidquam  inesse  cor- 
«'  poribus  et  spiritibus,  nisi  quod  in  iis  perspicue  norunt." — Joannis  Clerici 
Opera  Philosophica.    Amstel.  1698.  Ontol.  T.  I.  p.  376. 


After  this  cloud  of  authorities  (many  of  which  are  from  books  in  very 
general  circulation,)  it  is  surprising  that  the  following  sentence  should  have 
escaped  the  pen  of  Dr.  Beattie.  "  The  sea  has  ebbed  and  flowed  twice 
"  every  day  in  time  past ;  therefore  the  sea  -will  continue  to  ebb  and  flow 
"  twice  every  day  in  time  to  come, — is  by  no  means  a  logical  deduction  of  a 
**  conclusion  from  premises. — This  remark  was  first  made  by  Mr. 
«  Hume."— Essay  on  Truth,  2d.  ed.  p.  126. 

It  is  evident,  that  this  remark  is  only  a  particular  application  of  the  doc- 
trine contained  in  the  above  quotations  ;  as  well  as  in  the  numerous  extracts 
to  the  same  purpose,  collected  in  Note  (C.)  at  the  end  of  the  first  Volume 
of  this  Work.  In  one  of  these  (from  Hobbes)  the  very  same  observation 
is  made  ;  and  a  sort  of  theory  is  proposed  to  explain  how  the  mind  is  thus 
led  to  infer  the  future  from  the  past  -; — a  theory  which,  however  unsatisfac- 
tory for  its  avowed  purpose,  is  yet  sufficient  to  shew,  that  the  author  was 
fully  aware,  that  our  expectation  of  the  continuance  of  the  laws  of  Nature 
was  a  fact  not  to  be  accounted  for  from  the  received  principles  of  the  scho- 
lastic philosophy. 

Note  (P.)  page  264. 

From  the  Preface  of  Pappus  Alexandrinus  to  the  Seventh  Book  of  his 
Mathematical  Collection.  (See  Halley's  Version  and  Restitution  of  Apol- 
lonius  Pergaeus  de  Sectione  Rationis  et  Spatii,  p.  xxviii.) 


396  NOTES    AND    ILLUSTRATIONS. 

.  .  .  .  "  Resolutio  est  methodus,  qua  a  qusesito  quasi  jam  concesso 
"  per  ea  quae  deinde  consequuntur,  ad  conclusionem  ahquam,  cnjus  ope 
"  Compositio  fiat,  perducamur.  In  resolutione  emm,  quod  qusritur  ut  jam 
"  factum  supponentes,  ex  quo  antecedente  hoc  consequatur  expendimus  ; 
"  iterumque  quodnam  fuent  hujus  antecedens  ;  atque  ita  demceps,  usque 
"  dum  in  hunc  modum  regredientes,  in  aliquid  jam  cognitum  locoque  pnn- 
"  cipii  habitum  incidamus.  Alque  hie  processus  Analysis  vocatur,  quasi 
"  dicas,  mversa  solutio.  E  contrano  autem  in  Compositione,  cognitum  lllud, 
"  in  Resolutione  ultimo  loco  acquisitum  ut  jam  factum  praemittentes  ;  et 
"  qua  ibi  consequentia  erant,  hie  ut  antecedentia  naturah  ordine  disponent 
'  *  tes,  atque  inter  se  conferentes,  tandem  ad  Constructionem  •  quzesiti  per- 
tf  venimus.  Hoc  autem  vocamus  Synthesin.  Duplex  autem  est  Analyseos 
"  genus,  vel  enim  est  veri  inciagatrix,  diciturque  Theoretica  ;  vel  propositi 
"  investigatrix,  ac  Problematica  vocatur.  In  Theoretico  autem  genere, 
"  quod  quxritur,  revera  ita  se  habere  supponentes,  ac  deinde  per  ea  quae 
"  consequuntur,  quasi  vera  sint  (ut  sunt  ex  hypothesi)  argumentantes  ;  ad 
"  evidentem  aliquam  conclusionem  procedimus.  Jam  si  conclusio  ilia  vera 
"  sit,  vera  quoque  est  propositio  de  qua  quxritur ;  ac  demonstrate  reci- 
**  proce  respondet  analysi.  Si  vero  in  falsam  conclusionem  incidamus,  fal- 
*'  sum  quoque  erit  de  quo  quseritur.*  In  Problematico  vero  genere,  quod 
"  proponitur  ut  jam  cognitum  sistentes,  per  ea  qua  exinde  consequuntur 
"  tanquam  vera,  perducimur  ad  conclusionem  aliquam  :  quod  si  conclusio 
"  ilia  possibilis  sit  ac  w«£ le-Tq  quod  Mathematici  Datum  appellant ;  pos- 
"  sibile  quoque  erit  quod  proponitur  :  et  hie  quoque  demonstrate  reciproce 
"  respondebit  Analysi.  Si  vero  incidamus  in  conclusionem  impossibilem, 
"  erit  etiam  problema  impossibile.  Diorismus  autem  sive  determinatio  est 
"  qua  discernitur  quibus  conditionibus  quotque  modis  problema  effici  possit. 
"  Atque  hecc  de  Resolutione  et  Compositione  dicta  sunto." 

Note  (Q.)  page  290. 

The  following  passage  from  Buffon,  although  strongly  marked  with  the 
author's  characteristical  spirit  of  system,  is  yet,  I  presume,  sufficiently  cor- 
rect  in  the  outline,  to  justify  me  for  giving  it  a  place  in  this  note,  as  an 
illustration  of  what  I  have  said  in  the  text  on  the  insensible  gradations  which 
fix  the  limits  between  resemblance  and  analogy. 

"  Take  the  skeleton  of  a  man  ;  incline  the  bones  of  the  pelvis  ;  shorten 
"those  of  the  thighs,  legs,  and  ai*ms  ;  join  the  phalanges  of  the  fingers  and 
tftoes;  lengthen  the  jaws  by  shortening  the  frontal  bones;  and  lastlv,  ex- 

*  From  the  account  given  in  the  text  of  Theoretical  Analysis,  it  would  seem  to  fol. 
low,  thtt  its  advantages,  as  a  method  of  investigation,  increase  in  proportion  to  the 
variety  of  demonstrations  of  which  a  theorem  admits  ;and  that,  in  the  case  of  a  theo- 
rem admitting  of  one  demonstration  alone,  the  two  methods  would  be  exactly  on  a 
level.  The  justness  of  this  conclusion  will,  I  believe,  be  found  to  correspond  with  the 
experience  of  every  person  conversant  with  the  processes  of  the  Greek  Geometry, 


NOTES    AND    ILLUSTRATIONS.  397 

"  tend  the  spine  of  the  back.  This  skeleton  would  no  longer  represent 
"  diat  of  a  man  ;  it  would  be  the  skeleton  of  a  horse.  For,  by  lengthening 
"  the  back-bone  and  the  jaws,  the  numbers  of  the  vertebrae,  ribs,  and  teeth, 
"  would  be  increased ;  and  it  is  only  by  the  numbers  of  these  bones,  and  by 
"the  prolongation,  contraction,  and  junction  of  others,  that  the  skeleton  of 
"a  horse  differs  from  that  of  a  man.  The  ribs,  which  are  essential  to  the 
"figure  of  animals,  are  found  equally  in  man,  in  quadrupeds,  in  bads,  in 
"  fishes,  and  even  in  the  turtle.  The  foot  of  the  horse,  so  apparently  different 
"  from  the  hand  of  a  man,  is  composed  of  similar  bones,  and,  at  the  extre- 
"  mity  of  each  finger,  we  have  the  same  small  bone  resembling  the  shoe  of 
"  a  horse  which  bounds  the  foot  of  that  animal.  Raise  the  skeletons  of 
"  quadrupeds,  from  the  ape  kind  to  the  mouse,  upon  their  hind  legs,  and 
"  compare  them  with  the  skeleton  of  a  man ;  the  mind  will  be  instantly 
"  struck  with  the  uniformity  of  structure  observed  in  the  formation  of  the 
"  whole  group.  This  uniformity  is  so  constant,  and  the  gradations  from 
"  one  species  to  another  are  so  imperceptible,  that,  to  discover  the  marks  of 
"  their  discrimination,  requires  the  most  minute  attention.  Even  the  bones 
"  of  the  tail  will  make  but  a  slight  impression  on  the  observer.  The  tail 
"  is  only  a  prolongation  of  the  os  coccygis  or  rump  bone,  which  is  short 
"  in  man.  The  ouran  outang  and  true  apes  have  no  tail,  and  in  the  baboon 
"  and  several  other  quadrupeds  its  length  is  very  inconsiderable.  Thus,  in 
"  the  creation  of  animals,  the  Supreme  Being  seems  to  have  employed  only 
"  one  great  idea,  and,  at  the  same  time,  to  have  diversified  it  in  every  possi- 
"  ble  manner,  that  men  might  have  an  opportunity  of  admiring  equally  the 

"  magnificence  of  the  execution  and  the  simplicity  of  the  design." Smel- 

lie's  Translation. 

As  a  proof  that  the  general  conclusion  in  which  the  foregoing  extract 
terminates,  requires  some  important  qualifications  and  restrictions,  if  is 
sufficient  to  subjoin  a  few  remarks  from  a  later  writer,  who,  with  the  com- 
prehensive views  of  Buffon,  has  combined  a  far  greater  degree  of  caution 
and  correctness  in  his  scientific  details. 

"  It  has  been  supposed  by  certain  naturalists,  that  all  beings 

"maybe  placed  in  a  series  or  scale,  beginning  with  the  most  perfect,  and 
"  terminating  in  the  most  simple,  or  in  the  one  which  possesses  quui.t.es 
"  the  least  numerous  and  most  common,  so  that  the  mmd,  m  passtn°-  alon^ 
"  the  scale  from  one  being  to  another,  shall  be  no  where  conscious  of  any 
"  chasm  or  interval,  but  proceed  by  gradations  almost  insensible.  In  reahtv 
"  while  we  confine  our  attention  within  certain  limits,  and  especially  while 
"  we  consider  the  organs  separately,  and  trace  them  through  an  mats 
"  of  the  same  class  only,  we  find  them  proceed,  in  their  degrada.1  ion,  in  the 
«  most  uniform  and  regular  manner,  and  often  perceive  a  part,  or  vestige  of 
"  a  part,  in  animals  where  it  is  of  no  use,  and  where  it  seems  to  have  been 
"left  by  Nature,  only  that  she  might  not  transgress  her  general  law  of 
"  continuity. 

"  But,  on  the  one  hand,  all  the  organs  do  not  follow  the  same  qrder  in 
"their  degradation.     This  organ  is  at  its  highest  state  of  perfection  in  one 


398  NOTES    AND    ILLUSTRATIONS. 

"  species  of  animals ;  that  organ  is  most  perfect  in  a  different  species,  so 
"  that,  if  the  species  are  to  be  arranged  after  each  particular  organ,  ihere 
"  must  be  as  many  scales  or  series  formed,  as  there  are  regulating  organs 
"  assumed  ;  and  in  order  to  construct  a  general  scale  of  perfection,  appl.ca- 
"ble  to  all  beings,  there  must  be  a  calculation  made  of  the  effect  resulting 
*f  from  each  particular  combination  of  organs, — a  calculation  which,  it  is 
"  needless  to  add,  is  hardly  practicable. 

"  On  the  other  hand,  these  slight  shades  of  difference,  these  insensible 
'*  gradations  continue  to  be  observed,  only  while  we  confine  ourselves  to  the 
"  same  combinations  of  leading  organs  ;  only  while  we  direct  our  attention 
"  to  the  same  great  central  springs.  Within  these  boundaries  all  animals  ap- 
"  pear  to  be  formed  on  one  common  plan,  which  serves  as  the  g  ound-work 
"  to  all  the  lesser  internal  modifications  ;  but  the  instant  we  pass  to  animals 
"  where  the  leading  combinations  are  different,  the  u  hole  of  the  resem- 
"  blance  ceases  at  once,  and  we  cannot  but  be  conscious  of  the  abruptness  of 
"  the  transition. 

'*  Whatever  separate  arrangements  may  be  suitable  for  the  two  great 
*'  classes  of  animals,  with  and  without  vertebra,  it  will  be  impossible  to 
"place  at  the  end  of  the  one  series,  and  at  the  commencement  of  the  other, 
"  two  animals  sufficiently  resembling,  to  form  a  proper  bond  of  connection." 
Introduction  to  Cuvier's  Legons  tCAnatomie  Comparde. 

Note  (R.)  page  302. 

Of  fortunate  conjectures  or  hypotheses  concerning  the  laws  of  nature, 
many  additional  examples  might  be  produced  from  the  scientific  history  of 
the  eighteenth  century.  Franklin's  sagacious  and  confident  anticipation  of 
the  identity  of  lightning  and  of  electricity,  is  one  of  the  most  remarkable- 
The  various  analogies  previously  remarked  between  their  respective  phe- 
nomena, had  become,  at  this  period,  so  striking  to  philosophers,  that  the  de- 
cisive experiment  necessary  to  complete  the  theory,  was  carried  in  to  execu- 
tion, in  the  course  of  the  same  month,  on  both  sides  of  the  Atlantic.  In  the 
circumstantial  details  recorded  of  that  made  in  America,  there  is  some- 
thing peculiarly  interesting.  I  transcribe  them  in  the  words  of  Dr.  Priest- 
ley, who  assures  us  that  he  received  them  from  the  best  authority. 

"  After  Franklin  had  published  his  method  of  verifying  his  hypothesis 
"  concerning  the  sameness  of  electricity  with  the  matter  of  lightning,  he  was 
"  waiting  for  the  erection  of  a  spire  in  Philadelphia  to  carry  his  views  into  ex- 
"  ecution ;  not  imagining  that  a  pointed  rod,  of  a  moderate  height,  could  an- 
"  swer  the  purpose ;  when  it  occurred  to  him  that,  by  means  of  a  common 
'•'  kite,  he  could  have  a  readier  and  better  access  to  the  regions  of  thunder, 
' '  than  by  any  spire  whatever.  Preparing,  therefore,  a  large  silk  handkerchief 
"  and  two  cross  sticks  of  a  proper  length  on  which  to  extend  it,  he  took  the 
"  opportunity  of  the  first  approaching  thunder-storm  to  take  a  walk  into  a 
"  field  in  which  there  was  a  shed  convenient  for  his  purpose.  Rut  dreading 
"  the  ridicule  which  too  commonly  attends  unsuccessful  attempts  in  science. 


NOTES   AND    ILLUSTRATIONS.  399 

*•  he  communicated  his  intended  experiment  to  nobody  but  his  son,  who  as- 
"  sistedlum  in  raising  the  kite. 

"  The  kite  being  raised,  a  considerable  time  elapsed  before  there  was  any 
"  appearance  of  its  being  electrified.  One  very  promising  cloud  had  passed 
*'  over  it  without  any  effect;  when  at  length,  just  as  he  was  beginning  to 
"  despair  of  his  contrivance,  he  observed  some  loose  threads  of  the  hempen 
"  string  to  stand  erect,  and  to  avoid  one  another,  just  as  if  they  had  been 
"  suspended  on  a  common  conductor.  Struck  with  this  promising  appear- 
*'  ance,  he  immediately  presented  his  knuckle  to  the  key,  and  (let  the  reader 
"judge  of  the  exquisite  pleasure  he  must  have  felt  at  that  moment)  the 
*'  discovery  was  complete.  He  perceived  a  very  evident  electric  spark. 
*'  Others  succeeded,  even  before  the  string  was  wet,  so  as  to  put  the  matter 
"  past  all  dispute ;  and  when  the  rain  had  wet  the  string,  he  collected  elec- 
"  trie  fire  very  copiously.  This  happened  in  June  1752,  a  month  after  the 
"  electricians  in  France  had  verified  the  same  theory,  but  before  he  heard  of 
J*  any  thing  they  had  done." 

Priestley's  History  of  Electricity,  pp.  180,  181,  4to.  ed. 


Note  (S.)  page  306.  . 

"  Natural  knowledge  may  not  unaptly  be  compared  to  a  vegetable,  whe- 
"  ther  plant  or  tree,  which  springs  from  a  seed  sowed  in  a  soil  proper,  and 
"  adapted  by  a  skilful  gardener,  for  that  plant.  For  as  the  seed,  by  small 
"  fibrills  or  roots  it  shoots  out,  receives  from  the  soil  or  earth  a  nourish- 
"  ment  proper  and  adapted  for  ascending  into  the  body  or  stalk,  to  make  it 
"  grow  in  bulk  and  strength  to  shoot  upwards,  and  from  thence  to  shoot 
"  forth  branches,  and  from  them  leaves,  thereby  to  draw  and  receive  out  of 
f  the  air  a  more  refined,  spirituous,  and  enlivening  juice,  which,  descending 
"  back  into  the  body  or  stock,  increases  its  stature,  bulk,  circumference, 
"  and  strength,  by  new  encirclings,  and  thereby  enables  it  to  send  forth 
"  more  fibrills  and  greater  roots,  which  afford  greater  and  more  plentiful 
"  supplies  to  the  stock  or  trunk,  and  enables  that  to  exert  and  shoot  forth 
"  more  branchings  and  greater  numbers  oi'  leaves  ;  which,  repeating  all  the 
"  effects  and  operations  by  continued  and  constant  circulations,  at  length 
"  bring  the  plant  to  its  full  stature  and  perfection  : 

"  So  natural  knowledge  doth  receive  its  first  informations  from  the  sup- 
"  plies  afforded  by  select  and  proper  phenomena  of  nature  conveyed  by  the 
"  senses  j  these  improve  the  understanding,  and  enable  it  to  raise  some 
"  branchings  out  into  conclusions,  corollaries,  and  maxims  ;  these  afford  a 
"  nutritive  and  strengthening  power  to  the  understanding,  and  enable  it  to 
"  put  forth  new  roots  of  inquisition,  trials,  observations,  and  experiments, 
"  and  thereby  to  draw  new  supplies  of  information  :  which  further  strength - 
**  ening  the  understanding,  enable  it  to  exert  and  produce  new  deductions 
"  and  new  axioms  :  These  circulate  and  descend  downwards,  increasing 
*•  and  strengthening  the  judgment,  and  thereby  enable  it  to  make  more 


400  NOTES    AND    1LLUSTRATIOVS." 

"  striking  out  of  roots  of  inquiries  and  experiments,  which  cause  the  like 
"  effects  as  before,  but  more  powerfully,  and  so  by  consent  and  continued 
"  circulations  from  phenomena  to  make  deductions,  and  from  deductions  to 
"  inquire  phenomena,  it  brings  the  understanding  to  a  complete  and  pe.fect 
"  comprehension  of  the  matter  at  first  proposed  to  be  considered." — Hooke's 
Posthumous  Works,  p.  553. 

Note  (T.)  page  308. 

"  Aliquando  observations  et  experimenta  immediate  nobis  exhibent  prin- 
"  cipia,  quae  quserimus  ;  sed  aliquando  etiam  hypotlieses  in  auxilium  vocamus, 
"  non  tamen  penitus  arbitrarias,  sed  conformes  iis  quee  obse:  vantur,  et  quae 
"  supplentes  immediatarum  ob  servationum  defectum,  viam  investigation! 
"  sternunt,  tanquam  divinantibus  ;  ut  si  ea,  quae  ex  ipsis  deducuntur,  invenia- 
"  mus  re  ipsa,eadem  retineamus,  et  progrediamur  ad  novaconsectaria  j  secus 
"  vero,  ipsasrejiciamus.  Et  quidem  plerumque  banc  esse  arbitror  meth<  dum 
"  omnium  aptissimam  in  physica,  quae  ssepissime  estvelutqusedam  enucleatio 
"  epistolffi  arcanis  notis  conscripts,  ubi  per  attentationem,  et  per  errores 
"  etiam  plurimos  paulatim  et  caute  progrediendo,  ad  veram  ejus  theoriam  de- 
"  venitur :  cujus  rei  specimen  admodum  luculentum  exhibui  in  mea  dwserta- 
"  tione  de  lumine,  agens  de  rectilinea  luminis  propagatione  ;  ac  in  Stayanse 
"  Philosophise  Tomol.  agens  de  gcneralibus  proprietatibus  corporum,  et  de 
'•'  vi  inertise  in  primis  ;  Tomo  vero  II.  agens  de  totius  Astronomic  constitu- 
"  tione." — Boscovich  de  Solis  ac  Lunse  Defectibus. 

In  Sprat's  History  of  the  Royal  Society,  a  similar  idea  occurs,  illustrated 
fry  an  image  equally  fanciful  and  apposite.  "  It  is  not  to  be  questioned, 
"  but  many  inventions  of  great  moment  have  been  brought  forth  by  authors, 
"  who  began  upon  suppositions,  which  afterwards  they  found  to  be  untrue. 
"  And  it  frequently  happens  to  philosophers,  as  it  did  to  Columbus  ;  who 
"  first  believed  the  clouils  that  hovered  about  the  Continent  to  be  the  firm 
"  land :  But  this  mistake  was  happy  ;  for,  by  sailing  towards  them,  he  was 
"  led  to  what  he  sought ;  so  by  prosecuting  of  mistaken  causes,  with  a  re- 
"  solution  of  not  giving  over  the  pursuit,  they  have  been  guided  to  the 
"  truth  itself." 

[The  work  from  which  this  passage  is  taken  (it  may  be  here  remarked,  by 
the  way)  affords  comple.e  evidence  of  the  share  which,  m  the  judgment  of 
the  founders  of  the  Royal  Society,  Bacon  had  in  giving  a  beginning  to  experi- 
mental pursuits  in  England.     See  in  particular,  Section  xvi.] 

Note  (U.)  page  308. 

With  respect  to  the  application  of  the  method  of  exclusions  to  physics, 
an  important  logical  remark  is  made  by  Newton,  in  one  of  his  letters  to  Mr. 
Oldenburgh.  Obvious  and  trivial  as  it  may  appear  to  some,  it  has  been 
overlooked  by  various  writers  of  great  name  ;  and  therefore  I  think  proper 
to  state  it  in  Newton's  own  words. 


NOTES    AND    ILLUSTRATIONS.  401 

*  In  the  meanwhile,  give  me  leave,  Sir,  to  insinuate,  that  I  cannot  think  it 
"  effectual  for  determining  truth,  to  examine  the  several  ways  by  which 
"  phenomena  may  be  explained,  taxless  -ivliere  there  can  be  a  perfect  enumera- 
"  tion  of  all  tfwse  ways.  You  know  the  proper  meLhod  for  inquiring  after 
"  the  properties  of  things,  is  to  deduce  them  from  experiments.  And  I  told 
■*  you,  that  the  theory  which  I  propounded  (concerning  light  and  colours) 
"  was  evinced  to  me,  not  by  inferring,  it  is  thus,  because  it  is  not  otherwise  ; 
"that  is,  not  by  dedudng  it  only  from  a  confutation  of  contrary  supposi- 
"  tions,  but  by  deriving  it  from  experiments  concluding  positively  and  di- 
"  rectly.  The  way,  therefore,  to  examine  it,  is,  by  considering  whether  the 
*'  experiments  which  I  propound,  do  prove  those  parts  of  the  theory  to 
"  which  they  are  applied  ;  or  by  prosecuting  other  experiments  which  the 
"  theory  may  suggest  for  its  examination/'  &c.  &c.  Horseley's  Edition  of 
Newton's  Works,  Yol.  I\ .  p.  320. 

Note  (X.)  page  313. 

"  If  we  consider  the  infantine  state  of  our  knowledge  concerning  vision, 
**  light,  and  colours,  about  a  century  ago,  very  great  advancements  will  ap^ 
[*  pear  to  have  been  made  in  this  branch  of  science ;  and  yet  a  philosopher  of 
"  the  present  age  has  more  desiderata,  can  start  more  difficulties  and  propose 
"  more  new  subjects  of  inquiry  than  even  Alhazen  or  Lord  Bacon.  The  rea- 
"  son  is,  that  whenever  a  new  property  of  any  substance  is  discovered,  it  ap- 
"  pears  to  have  connections  with  other  properties,  and  other  things,  of  which 
"  we  could  have  no  idea  at  all  before,  and  which  are  by  this  means  but  im- 
"  perfectly  announced  to  us.  Indeed,  every  doubt  implies  some  degree  of 
w  kno-ailedge  ,•  and  while  nature  is  a  field  of  such  amazing,  perhaps  boundless 
"  extent,  it  may  be  expected  that  the  more  knowledge  we  gain,  the  more 
"doubts  and  difficulties  we  shall  have;  but  still,  since  every  advance  in 
"  knowledge  is  a  real  and  valuable  acquisition  to  mankind,  in  consequence 
"of  its  enabling  us  to  apply  the  powers  of  nature  to  render  our  situation 
"  in  life  more  happy,  we  have  reason  to  rejoice  at  every  new  difficulty  that  is 
"started,  because  it  informs  us  that  more  knowledge,  and  more  advantage 
"  are  yet  unattained,  and  should  serve  to  quicken  our  diligence  in  the  pur- 
" suit  of  them.  Every  desideratuin  ;s  an  imperfect  discovery"  Priestley's 
History  of  Discoveries  relating  to  Vision,  Light,  and  Colours,  p.  773. 
(Lond.  1772.) 

Note  (Y.)  page  324. 

For  the  analogies  between  Galvanism  and  Electricity,  see  Traite'  Elemen- 
taire  de  Physique,  par  M.  UAbbe"  Haiiy,  §  717.— The  passage  concludes 
with  the  following  remark,  which  may  be  regarded  as  an  additional  proof 
that,  even  when  analogical  conjectures  appear  to  depart  the  most  widely 
from  the  evidence  of  experience,  it  is  from  experience  that  they  derive  their 

YOL.   II.  51 


402  NOTES    AND    ILLUSTRATIONS. 

whole  authority  over  the  belief.  "  Partout  le  fluide  electrique  semble  se 
"  multiplier  par  la  diversity  des  phenomenes  ;  et  il  nous  avait  tellement  ac- 
'*  coutumes  a  ses  metamorphoses,  que  la  nouveaute  meme  de  la  forme  sous 
"  laquelle  il  s'offrait  dans  le  Galvanisme  naissant,  semblait  etre  une  raison 
"  de  plus  pour  le  reconnaitre." 

Note  (Z.)  page  333. 

In  that  branch  of  politics  which  relates  to  the  theory  of  Government, 
one  source  of  error  (not  unfrequently  overlooked  by  the  advocates  for  ex- 
perience) arises  from  the  vagueness  of  the  language  in  which  political  facts 
are  necessarily  stated  by  the  most  faithful  and  correct  historians.  No  bet- 
ter instance  of  this  can  be  produced  than  the  terms,  Monarchy,  Aristocra- 
cy, and  Democracy,  commonly  employed  to  distinguish  different  forms  of 
Government  from  each  other.  These  words,  in  their  strict  philosophical 
acceptation,  obviously  denote  not  actual  but  ideal  constitutions,  existing 
only  in  the  imagination  of  the  political  therorist ;  while,  in  more  popular 
discourse,  they  are  used  to  discriminate,  according  to  their  prevailing  bias 
or  spirit,  the  various  mixed  establishments  exemplified  in  the  history  of  hu- 
man affairs.  Polybius,  accordingly,  with  his  usual  discernment, expresses  his 
doubts,  under  which  of  the  three  simple  forms  the  constitution  of  Rome,:at  the 
period  when  he  had  an  opportunity  of  studying  it,  ought  to  be  classed. 
"  When  we  contempla'e,"  he  observes,  "  the  power  of  the  Consuls,  it  seems 
"  to  be  a  monarchy  ;  when  we  attend  to  the  power  of  the  Senate,  it  seems 
<c  to  be  an  aristocracy  ;  when  we  attend  to  the  power  of  the  People  we  are 
"  ready  to  pronounce  it  a  democracy."* 

It  is  easy  to  see  how  much  this  scantiness  and  want  of  precision 
in  our  political  vocabulary,  must  contribute  to  mislead  the  judgments  of 
those  reasoners  who  do  not  analyze  very  accurately    the   notions   annexed 

*  This  observation  of  Polybius  has  been  very  unjustly  censured  by  Grotius.  "  Sed 
"  nrque  Polybii  hie  utor  auc'oritate,  qui  ad  mixtum  genus  reipublicse  refert  Romanam 
"  reni|iubliram,  qua5  illo  tempore,  si  non  actiones  ipsas,  sed  jus  agendi  respicimus, 
W  mere  fuit  popularis  :  Nam  et  senatus  auctoritas,quam  ad  optimalum  regimen  refert, 
"  et  consilium  quos  quasi  reges  fuisse  vull,  subdita  erat  populo.  Idem  de  aliorum  po- 
e'  Htica  scribenlium  sententiis  dictum  volo,  qui  magis  externam  speciem  et  quotidia- 
u  nam  adm'mistralionem,  quam  jus  ipsum  summi  imperii  spectare  congruens  ducunt 
"  snoins'itulo." — (-e  Jure  B!li  ac  Pacis,  Lib.  I.  Gap,  3)  !  n  reply  to  this  criticism,  it 
is  sufficient  to  remark,  that  Polybius  is  not  here  speaking  of  the  theory  of  the  Roman 
constitution,  (about  which  there  could  be  no  diversity  of  opinion,)  but  of  what  common 
observers  are  so  apt  to  overlook, — the  actual  state  of  that  constitution,  modified  as  it 
was  by  time,  and  chance,  and  experience. — Amo^g  the  numerous  commentators  ore 
Grotius,  1  recollect  one  only  (Henry  de  Cocceii)  who  has  viewed  this  question  in  its 
"  proper  light.  "  Auctor  inter  eos,qui  circa  formas  imperii  falluntur  etiam  Polybiuni 
"  refert,  qui  rempublicam  Romanam  suis  temporibus  mixtam  fuisse  ait.  At  beneno- 
"  tandum,  Polybium  non  loqui  de  mixtura  status  sed  adminislraiionis :  forma  enim 
11  reipublicEe  erat  mere  popularis,  sed  administrate  divisa  fuit  inter  consules,  scnatum; 
"  et  populum." 


NOTES    AND    ILLUSTRATIONS.  403 

to  their  words ;  and  at  the  same  time,  what  a  purchase  they  afford  to 
the  sophistry  of  such  writers  as  are  disposed,  in  declamations  addressed  to 
the  multitude,  to  take  an  undue  advantage  of  the  ambiguities  of  language, 

Another  source  of  error  which  goes  far  to  invalidate  the  authority  of  va- 
rious political  maxims  supposed  to  be  founded  on  experience,  is  the  infinite 
multiplicity  of  the  seemingly  trifling  and  evanescent  causes  connected  With 
local  manners  and  habits,  which,  in  their  join'  result,  modify,  and  in  some 
cases  counteract  so  powerfully,  the  effects  of  written  laws  and  of  establish- 
ed forms.  Of  these  causes  no  verbal  description  can  convey  an  adequate 
idea  ;  nor  is  it  always  possible,  even  for  the  most  attentive  and  sagacious  ob- 
server, when  the  facts  are  before  his  eyes,  to  appreciate  all  their  force  : — 
So  difficult  is  it  to  seize  the  nicer  shades  which  distinguish  the  meaning  of 
corresponding  terms  in  different  languages  ;  and  to  enter,  at  years  of  matu- 
rity, into  those  delicate  and  complex  associations,  which,  in  the  mind  of  a 
well-educated  native,  are  identified  with  the  indigenous  feelings  of  national 
sympathy  and  taste. 

Of  the  truth  of  this  remark,  a  striking  illustration  presents  itself  in  the 
mutual  ignorance  of  the  French  and  English  nations  (separated  from  each 
other  by  a  very  narrow  channel,  and,  for  centuries  past,  enjoying  so  many 
opportunities  of  the  most  familiar  intercourse)  with  respect  to  the  real  im- 
port of  the  words  and  phrases  marking  the  analogous  gradations  of  rank  in 
the  two  countries.  The  words  gentilhomme  and  gentleman  are  both  deiwed 
from  the  same  etymological  root ;  yet  how  imperfect  a  translation  does  the 
one  afford  of  the  other  !  and  how  impossible  to  convey  by  a  definition  all 
that  is  implied  in  either  !  Among  French  writers  of  no  inconsiderable  name, 
we  meet  with  reasonings  which  plainly  shew,  that  they  considered  the  rela-» 
tive  rank  of  the  members  of  our  two  Houses  of  Parliament,  as  something 
similar  to  what  is  expressed  in  their  own  language  by  the  words  noble  and 
roturier  ;— while  others,  puzzled  with  the  inexplicable  phenomena  occasion- 
ally arising  from  the  boundless  field  of  ambition  opened  in  this  fortunate 
island  to  every  species  of  industry  and  of  enterprize,  have  been  led  to  eon- 
elude,  that  birth  has,  among  us,  no  other  value  than  what  it  derives  from 
the  privileges  secured  by  the  constitution  to  our  hereditary  legislators. 
Few  perhaps  but  the  natives  of  Great  Britain  are  fully  aware,  how  very 
remote  from  the  truth  are  both  these  suppositions. 

I  transcribe  the  following  passage  from  an  article  in  the  French  Encyclo- 
pidie ,-  written  by  an  author  of  some  distinction  both  for  talents  and  learn- 
ing ;  and  which,  it  is  not  impossible,  may  be  quoted  at  some  future  period- 
in  the  history  of  the  world,  as  an  authentic  document  with  respect  to  the 
state  of  English  society  in  the  eighteenth  century.  The  writer  had  certainly 
much  better  access  to  information  than  was  enjoyed  by  those  to-  whom  we 
are  indebted  for  our  experimental  knowledge  of  the  ancient  systems  of 
policy. 

"  En  Angleterre,  la  loi  des  successions  attribue  aux  aine's  dans  les  families 
"  nobles  les  biens  immeubles,  a  l'exclusion  des  cadets  qui  n'y  ont  aucune 
"  part.     Ces  cadets  sans  bien  cherchent  &  reparer  leurs  pertes  dans  I'e&r* 


404  NOTES  AND  ILLUSTRATIONS. 

"  cice  da  negoce,  et  c'est  pour  eux  un  moyen  presque  sur  de  s'enrichir, 
"Devenus  riches,  ils  quittent  la  profession,  ou  meme  sans  la  quitter,  leurs 
"  enfans  rentrent  dans  tous  les  droits  de  la  noblesse  de  leur  famille  ;  leurs 
"  aines  prennent  le  titre  de  milord  si  leur  naissance  et  la  possession  d'une 
" teire  pairie  le  leur  permettent. — II  faut  neanmoins  remarquer,  que  quel- 
"  que  fiere  que  soit  la  noblesse  Angloise,  lorsque  les  nobles  entrent  en  ap- 
"  prentissage,  qui  selon  les  reglemens  doit  etre  de  sept  ans  entiers,  jamais 
"  ils  ne  se  couvrent  devant  leurs  maitres,  leur  parlant  et  travaillant  tete 
"  nue,  quoique  souvent  le  maitre  soit  roturier  et  de  race  marchande,  et  que 
"les  apprentifs  soient  de  la  premiere  noblesse." — Encyclop.  Method.  Com- 
merce, Tom.  3-  Article  Noblesse. 

Note  (AA.)  page  340. 

"  Metaphysics  pars  secunda  est  finalium  causarum  inquisitio,  quam  no» 
**  ut  pi'aetermissam,  sed  ut  male  collocatam  notamus.  Solent  enim  inquiri 
"  inter  physica  non  inter  metaphysica.  Quanquam  si  ordinis  hoc  solum 
'.'  vitiuin  esset,  non  mihifuerit  tanti.  Ordo  enim  ad  lllustrationem  pertinet, 
"  neque  est  ex  substantia  scientiarum.  At  haec  ordinis  inversio  defectum 
"  insignem  peperit,  et  maximam  philosophise  induxit  calamitatem.  Tracta- 
"  tio  enim  causarum  finalium  in  physicis,  inquisitionem  causarum  physica- 
"  rum  expulit  et  dejecit,  efiecitque  ut  homines  in  istiusmodi  speciosis  et 
"  umbratilibus  causis  acquiescerent,  nee  inquisitionem  causarum  realium, 
f  et  vere  physicarum,  strenue  urgerent,  ingenti  scientiarum  detrimento. 
*'  Etemm  reperlo  hoc  factum  esse  non  solum  a  Platone,  qui  in  hoc  littore 
"  semper  anchoram  figit,  verum  etiam  ab  Aristotele,  Galeno,  et  aliis,  qui 
"  ssepissime  etiam  ad  ilia  vada  impingunt.  Elenim  qui  causas  adduxerit 
"  hujusmodi,  palpebras  cum  pilis pro  sepi  et  vctllo  esse,  ad  munimentum  oculo- 
fi  rum  .-  aut  corium  in  uuimaHbus  Jirmitudinem  esse  ad  propellendos  calores  et 
*'  frigora  :  Aut  ossa  pro  columnis  et  trabibus  a  nalura  induci,  qiribus  fabrica 
"  corporis  innitatur  :  Aut  folia  arborum  emitti,  quo  fructus  minus  patiantur  d 
"  sole  et  vsnto  :  Aut  nubes  in  sublimi fieri,  ut  terrain  imbribus  irrigent :  Aut 
"  terrain  densari  et  solidari,  ut  statio  et  mansio  sit  animalinm  :  et  alia  similia  : 
"  Is  in  metaphysicis  non  male  ista  allegarit  ;  in  physicis  autcm  ne  quaquam. 
"  Imo,  quod  ccepimus  dicere,  hujusmodi  sermonum  discursus  (instar  re- 
"  morarum,  uti  fingunt,  navibus  adhserentium)  scientiarum  quasi  velifica- 
*'  tionem  et  progressum  retardarimt,  ne  cursum  suum  tenerent,  et  ulterius 
*.'  progrederentur  :  et  jampridem  effecerunt,  ut  physicarum  causarum  in- 
"  quisitio  neglecta  deficeict,  ac  silentio  praeteriretur.  Quapropter  philoso- 
"  phia  naturalis  Demccriti,  et  aLorum,  qui  Deum  et  nientem  a  fabrica  rerum 
"  amoverunt ;  et  structuram  universi  infinitis  naturx  praclusionibus  et  ten- 
"  tamentis  (quas  uno  nomine  fatum  aut  fortunam  vocabant)  attribuerunt  ;  et 
"  rerum  particularium  causas,  materia  necessitate  sine  intermixtione  cau- 
"  sarum  finalium,  assignarunt ;  nobis  videtur,  quatenus  ad  causas  physicas, 
•'  multo  solidior  fujssej  etaltius  in  Naturam  penetrasse,  quam  ilia  Aristote- 


NOTES    AND    ILLUSTRATIONS.  405 

**  lis,  et  Platonis  :  Hanc  unicam  ob  causam,  quod  ill  L  in  causis  finalibus 
f  nunquam  operam  triverunt  ;  hi  autem  eas  perpetuo  inculcarunt.  Atque 
"  magis  in  hac  paite  accusandus  Aristotles  quam  Plato  :  quandoquidem 
*'  fontem  causarum  finalium,  Deum  scilicet,  omiserit,  et  naturam  pro  Deo 
"  substituerit,  causasque  ipsas  finales,  potius  ut  logicx  amator  quam  theolo- 
"  gise,  amplexus  sit.  Neque  haec  eo  dicimus,  quod  causae  illse  finales  verse 
"  non  sint,  et  inquisitione  admodum  dignse  in  speculationibus  metaphysicae, 
"  sedquia  dum  in  physicarum  causarum  possessiones  excurrunt  et  irruunt, 
"  misereeam  provinciam  depopulantur  et  vastant." — De  Augm.  Scient.  Lib. 
HI.  Cap.  4. 

Note  (BB.)  page  348. 

Among  the  earliest  opponents  of  Des  Cartes's  doctrine  concerning  Final 
Causes,  was  Gassendi  ;  a  circumstance  which  I  remark  with  peculiar  plea- 
sure, as  he  has  been  so  unjustly  represented  by  Cud  worth  and  others,  as  a 
partisan,  not  only  of  the  physical,  but  of  the  atheistical  opinions  of  the  Epi- 
curean school.  For  this  charge  I  do  not  see  that  they  had  the  slightest 
pretence  to  urge,  but  that,  in  common  with  Bacon,  he  justly  considered 
the  physical  theories  of  Epicurus  and  Democritus  as  more  analogous  to  the 
experimental  inquiries  of  the  moderns,  than  the  logical  subtilties  of  Aris. 
totle  and  of  the  schoolmen.  The  following  passage  is  transcribed  in  Gas- 
sendi's  own  words,  from  his  Objections  to  tile  Meditations  of  Des  Cartes 

"  Quod  autem  a  physica  considerations  rejicis  usum  causarum  finalium, 
"  alia,  fortassis  occasione  potuisses  recte  facere  :  at  de  Deo  cum  agitur  ve- 
*-'  rendum  profecto,  ne  prxcipuum  argumentum  rejieias,  quo  divina  sapien- 
"  tia,  providentia,  potentia,  atque  adeo  existentia,  lumine  naturae  stabilirl 
"  potest.  Quippe  ut  mundum  universum,  ut  coelum  et  alias  ejus  et  prx- 
"  cipuas  partes  prseteream,  undenam,  aut  quomodo  melius  argumentare 
"  valeas,  quam  ex  usu  partium  in  plantis,  in  animalibus,  in  hominibus,  in  te 
H  ipso  (aut  corpore  tuo)  qui  similitudinem  Dei  geris  ?  Videmus  profecto 
"  magnos  quosque  viros  ex  speculatione  anatomica  corporis  humani  non  as- 
"  surgere  modd  ad  Dei  notitiam,  sed  hymnum  quoque  ipsi  canere,  quod  om- 
*  nes  partes  ita  conformaverit,  collocaveritque  ad  usus,  ut  sit  omnino  propter 
"  solertiam  atque  providentiam  incomparabilem  commendandus.'' — Objec- 
tions Quintae  in  Meditationem  IV.  De  Vero  et  Falso. 

I  do  not  know  if  it  has  hitherto  been  remarked,  that  Gassendi  is  one  of 
the  first  modern  writers,  by  whom  the  following  maxim,  so  often  repeated 
by  later  physiologists,  was  distinctly  stated  :  "  Licet  ex  conformations  par- 
"  tium  corporis  humani,  conjectures  desumere  adfunctiones  mere  naturales.  It 
was  from  a  precipitate  application  of  this  maxim,  that  he  was  led  to  con- 
clude, that  man  was  originally  destined  to  feed  on  vegetables  alone  ;  a  pro- 
position which  gave  occasion  to  several  memoirs  by  Dr.  Wallis  and  Dr. 
Tyson,  in  the  Philosophical  Transactions  of  the  Royal  Society  of  London. 


406  NOTES    AND    ILLUSTRATIONS. 

Note  (CC  )   page  360. 

The  theories  of  Hume,  of  Paley,  and  of  Godwin,  how  differently  soever  they 
may  have  figured  in  the  imaginations  of  their  authors,  are  all  equally  1  able 
to  the  fundamental  objections  stated  in  the  test.  The  same  objections  are 
applicable  to  the  generous  and  captivating,  but  not  always  unexceptionable 
morality  inculcated  in  the  writings  of  Dr.  Hutcheson. — The  system,  indeed, 
of  this  last  philosopher,  may  be  justly  regarded  as  the  parent  stock  on  winch 
the  speculations  of  the  others  have  been  successively  grafted. 

Mr.  Hume  entered  on  his  Lnquiries  concerning  Morals,  at  a  period  when 
Dr.  Hutcheson's  literary  name  was  unrivalled  :n  Scotland.  The  abstract 
principles  on  which  his  doctrines  are  founded,  differ  widely  from  those  of 
his  predecessor,  and  are  unfolded  with  far  greater  ingenuity,  precision,  and 
elegance.  In  various  instances,  however,  he  treads  very  closely  in  Dr.  Hutch- 
eson's footsteps  ;  and  in  the  final  result  of  his  reasonings,  he  coincides  with 
him  exactly.  According  to  both  writers,  a  regard  to  general  expediency 
affords  the  only  universal  canon  for  the  regulation  of  our  conduct. 

It  is  a  curious  circumstance  in  the  History  of  Ethics,  that  the  same  prac- 
tical rule  of  life,  to  which  Dr.  Hutcheson  was  so  naturally  and  directly  led 
by  his  cardinal  virtue  of  disinterested  benevolence,  has  been  inferred  by  Dr. 
Pidey  from  a  theory  which  resolves  moral  obligation  entirely  into  pruden- 
tial calculations  of  individual  advantage.  For  the  very  circuitous,  and  (in 
my  opinion)  very  illogical  argument,  whereby  he  has  attempted  to  conneet 
his  conclusion  with  his  premises,  I  must  refer  to  his  work.* 

The  Political  Justice  of  Mr.  Godwin  is  but  a  new  name  for  the  principle 
of  general  expediency  or  utility.  "  The  term  justice"  he  observes,  "may 
"  be  assumed  as  a  general  appellation  for  all  moral  duty. — That  this  appel- 
"  lation,"  he  continues,  "  is  sufficiently  expressive  of  the  subject,  will  ap- 
"  pear,  if  we  consider  for  a  moment,  mercy,  gratitude,  temperance,  or  any 
".  of  those  duties  which,  in  looser  speaking,  are  contradistinguished  from 
"justice.  Why  should  I  pardon  this  criminal,  remunerate  this  favour,  ab- 
"  stain  from  this  indulgence  ?  If  it  partake  of  the  nature  cf  morality,  it 
"  must  be  either  right  or  wrong,  just  or  unjust.  It  must  tend  to  the  bene- 
"  fit  of  the  individual,  either  without  entrenching  upon,  or  with  actual  ad- 
"  vantage  to  the  mass  of  individuals.  Either  way,  it  benefits  the  whole  be- 
"  cause  individuals  are  parts  of  the  whole.  Therefore,  to  do  it  is  just,  and. 
"  to  forbear  it  is  unjust.  If  justice  have  any  meaning,  it  is  just  that  I  should 
"  contribute  every  thing  in  my  power  to  the  benefit  of  the  whole." — Polit. 
Justice,  Vol.  I.  pp.  80,  81. 

■   Principles  of  Moral  and  Political  Philosophy,  Book  ii.  Chap.  1, 2,  3,  4,  5,  6. 

The  theory  of  Dr.  Paley  has  been  very  ably  examined  by  Mr.  Gishorne,  in  a  trea- 
tise entitled  the  Principles  of  Moral  Philosophy  investiga:ed,  and  briefly  applied  tu 
the  Constitution  of  Civil  Society.  (London,  1790.)  The  objections  to  it  there  stated 
appear  tome  quite  unanswerable ;  and  they  possess  the  additional  merit  of  being 
urged  .viib.  all  the  deference  so  justly  due  to  Dr.  Puley's  character  and  talents, 


NOTES    AND    ILLUSTRATIONS.  40t 

It  is  manifest,  that,  in  the  foregoing  extract,  the  duty  of  justice  is  sup- 
posed to  coincide  exactly  as  a  rule  of  conduct  with  the  affection  of  benevo- 
lence i  whereas,  according  to  the  common  use  of  words,  justice  means  that 
particular  branch  of  virtue  which  leads  us  to  respect  the  rights  of  others  ; 
a  branch  of  virtue  remarkably  distinguished  from  all  others  by  this,  that 
the  observance  of  it  may  be  extorted  by  force ;  the  violation  of  it  exposing 
the  offender  to  resentment,  to  indignation,  and  to  punishment.  In  Mr.  God- 
win's language,  the  word  justice  must  either  be  understood  to  be  synonymous 
with  general  benevolence,  or — assuming  the  existence  of  such  an  affection — 
to  express  the  moral  fitness  of  yielding,  upon  all  occasions,  to  its  sugges- 
tions. "  It  is  just"  says  Mr.  Godwin,  "  that  I  should  contribute  everything  in 
¥  my  power  to  the  benefit  of  the  whole.— My  benefactor  ought  to  be  esteem- 
"  ed,  not  because  he  bestowed  a  benefit  upon  me,  but  because  he  bestowed  i 
"upon  a  human  being.  His  desert  will  be  in  exact  proportion  to  the  degree  in 
"  which  the  human  being  was  worthy  of  the  distinction  conferred.  Thus,  every 
'*  view  of  the  subject  brings  us  back  to  the  consideration  of  my  neighbour's  mo- 
"  ral  worth,  and  his  importance  to  the  general  weal,  as  the  only  standard  to  de- 
"  termine  the  treatment  to  which  he  is  entitled.  Gratitude,  therefore,  a  princi- 
**  pie  which  has  so  often  been  the  theme  of  the  moralist  and  the  poet,  is  no 
"  part  either  of'  justice  or  virtue."  (Ibid.  p.  84.)  The  words  just  and  justice 
can,  in  these  sentences,  mean  noihing  distinct  from  morally  ^  or  reasonable  ,- 
so  that  the  import  of  the  doctrine  amounts  merely  to  the  following  proposi- 
tion, That  it  is  reasonable  or  right,  that  the  private  benevolent  affections 
should,  upon  all  occasions,  yield  to  the  more  comprehensive ; — which  is  pre- 
cisely the  system  of  Hutcheson  disguised  under  a  different  and  much  more- 
exceptionable  phraseology. 

This  abuse  of*  words  is  not  without  its  effect  in  concealing  from  careless 
readers  the  fallaciousness  of  some  of  the  author's  subsequent  arguments ; 
for  although  the  idea  he  professes  to  convey  by  the  tei m  justice,  be  essen" 
tially  different  from  that  commonly  annexed  to  it,  yet  he  scruples  not  to 
avail  himself  for  his  own  purpose,  of  the  received  maxims  which  apply  to 
it  in  its  ordinary  acceptation.  In  discussing,  for  example,  the  validity  of 
promises,  he  reasons  thus  :  "  I  have  promised  to  do  something  just  and 
"  right. — This  certainly  I  ought  \o  perform.  Why  ■"  Not  because  I  promis- 
*'ed  it,  but  because  justice  prescribes  it.  I  have  promised  to  bestow  a  sum  of 
*' money  upon  some  good  and  rejspectaWe  purpose.  In  the  interval  between 
"  the  promise  and  my  fulfill  jig  it,  a  greater  and  nobler  purpose  offers  itself, 
"  which  calls  with  an  imperious  voice  for  my  co-operation.  Which  ought  I 
"  to  prefer  ?  That  whjch  besi  deserves  my  preference.  A  promise  can  make 
"no  alteration  in  the  case.  I  ougit  to  be  guided  by  the  intrinsic  merit  of 
"  the  objects,  and  not  by  any  external  and  foreign  consideration.  No  engage- 
"  ments  of  m.ne  can  chunge  then  Intrinsic1  claims.  If  every  shilling  of*  our 
"  property,  every  hour  of  our  fime,  and  every  faculty  of  our  mind,  have  al- 
ready rec?ived  the  r  dts'.natip'n  {"voni  .he  principles  oi*  immutable  justice, 
"promises  have  no  department  left  upon  winch  for  them  to  decide.     Justice, 


408  NOTES  AND  ILLUSTRATIONS. 

"  it  appears,  therefore,  ought  to  be  done,  whether  we  have  promised  it  or 
"  not."— Ibid.  p.  151. 

•  It  is  quite  evident,  that,  in  this  passage,  the  paramount  supremacy  indis- 
putably belonging  to  justice  in  its  usual  and  legitimate  sense,  is  ascribed  to 
it  when  employed  as  synonymous  with  benevolence  ;  and  of  consequence,  that 
the  tendency  of  the  new  system,  instead  of  extending  the  province  of  justice, 
properly  so  called,  is  to  set  its  authority  entirely  aside,  wherever  it  inter- 
feres with  views  of  utility.  In  this  respect,  it  exhibits  a  complete  contrast 
to  all  the  maxims  hitherto  recognized  among  moralists.  The  rules  of  jus- 
tice are  happily  compared  by  Mr.  Smith  to  the  strict  and  indispensable 
rules  of  grammar ;  those  of  benevolence  to  the  more  loose  and  general  de- 
scriptions of  what  constitutes  the  sublime  and  beautiful  in  writing  that  we 
meet  with  in  the  works  of  critics.  According  to  Mr.  Godwin,  the  reverse 
of  this  comparison  is  agreeable  to  truth  ;  while,  at  the  same  time,  by  a 
dexterous  change  in  the  meaning  of  terms,  he  assumes  the  appearance  of 
combating  for  the  very  cause  which  he  labours  to  betray. 

Of  the  latitude  with  which  the  word  justice  had  been  previously  used  by 
many  ethical  writers,  a  copious  and  choice  collection  of  instances  may  be 
found  in  the  learned  and  philosophical  notes  subjoined  by  Dr.  Parr  to  his 
Spital  Sermon.  (London,  1801.)  "  By  none  of  the  ancient  philosophers, 
"  however,"  as  he  has  well  observed,  "  is  justice  set  in  opposition  to  any 
"  other  social  duty  ;  nor  did  they  employ  the  colossal  weight  of  the  term  in 
"  crushing  the  other  moral  excellencies,  which  were  equally  considered  as 
"  pillars  in  the  temple  of  virtue."     pp.  28,  29,  30,  31.* 

Note  (DD.)  page  361. 

As  the  main  purpose  of  this  section  is  to  combat  the  logical  doctrine 
which  would  exclude  the  investigation  of  Final  Causes  from  natural  philo- 
sophy, I  huve  not  thought  it  necessary  to  take  notice  of  the  sceptical  ob- 
jections to  the  theological  inferences  commonly  deduced  from  it.  The 
consideration  of  these  properly  belongs  to  some  inquiries  which  I  destine 
for  the  subject  of  a  separate  Essay.  On  one  of  them  alone  I  shall  offer  at 
present  a  few  brief  remarks,  on  account  of  the  peculiar  stre3s  laid  upon  it 
in  Mr.  Hume's  Posthumous  Dialogues. 

"  When  two  species  of  objects,"  says  Philo,  "  have  always  been  observed 
"  to  be  conjoined  together,  I  can  infer,  by  custom,  the  existence  of  one 
"wherever  I  see  the  existence  of  the  other  :  and  this  I  call  an  argument 

*  Having  mentioned  the  name  of  this  eminent  person,  1  eagerly  embrace  the  op- 
portunity of  acknowledging  the  instruction  I  have  received,  not  only  from  his  various 
publications,  but  from  the  private  literary  communications  with  which  he  has  repeat- 
edly favoured  me.  From  one  of  these  (containing  animadversions  on  some  passages 
in  my  Essav  on  the  Sublime,)  I  entertain  hopes  of  being  permitted  to  ma!;e  a  few 
extracts  in  a  future  edition  ofthat  performance.  By  his  candid  and  liberal  strictures, 
1  have  felt  myself  highly  honoured ;  and  should  be  proud  to  record,  in  his  own  words, 
the  corrections  he  has  suggested  of  certain  critical  and  philological  judgments, 
%vhich,  it  is  highly  probable,  1  may  have  too  lightly  hazarded. 


NOTES    AND    ILLUSTRATIONS*  409 

M  from  experience.  But  how  this  argument  can  have  place,  where  the  ob* 
**  jects,  as  in  the  present  case,  are  single,  individual,  without  parallel,  or 
"  specific  resemblance,  may  be  difficult  to  explain.  And  will  any  man  tell 
"  me,  with  a  serious  countenance,  that  an  orderly  universe  must  arise  from 
(*  some  thought  and  art,  like  the  human,  because  we  have  experience  of  it  ? 
<k  To  ascertain  this  reasoning,  it  were  requisite  that  we  had  experience  of 
**  the  origin  of  worlds  ;  and  it  is  not  sufficient  surely,  that  we  have  seen 
"  ships  and  cities  arise  from  human  art  and  contrivance. — Can  you  pretend 
**  to  shew  any  similarity  between  the  fabric  of  a  house,  and  the  generation 
"  of  the  universe  ?  Have  you  ever  seen  Nature  in  any  such  situation  as  re- 
"  sembles  the  first  arrangement  of  the  elements  ?  Have  worlds  ever  been 
"  formed  under  your  eye  ;  and  have  you  had  leisure  to  observe  the  whole 
"  progress  of  the  phenomenon,  from  the  first  appearance  of  order  to  its  final 
"  consummation  ?  If  you  have,  then  cite  your  experience,  and  deliver  your 
"  theory.'* 

This  celebrated  argument  appears  to  me  to  be  little  more  than  an  ampli- 
fication of  that  which  Xenophon  puts  into  the  mouth  of  Aristodemus,  in  his 
conversation  with  Socrates,  concerning  the  existence  of  the  Deity.  "  I  be- 
u  hold,"  says  he,  "  none  of  those  governors  of  the  world  whom  you  speak 
"  of;  whereas  here,  I  see  artists  actually  employed  in  the  execution  of  their 
"  respective  works." — The  reply  of  Socrates,  too,  is  in  substance  the  same 
with  what  has  been  since  retorted  on  Philo,  by  some  of  Mr.  Hume's  oppo- 
nents. "  Neither,  yet,  Aristodemus,  seest  thou  thy  soul,  which,  however^ 
"  most  assuredly  governs  thy  body  ;  although  it  may  well  seem,  by  thy 
"  manner  of  talking,  that  it  is  chance  and  not  reason  which  governs  thee." 

Whatever  additional  plausibility  Philo  may  have  lent  to  the  argument  of 
Aristodemus,  is  derived  from  the  authority  of  that  much  abused  maxim  of 
the  inductive  logic,  that  "  all  our  knowledge  is  entirely  derived  from  ex- 
"  perience."  It  is  curious,  that  Socrates  should  have  touched  with  such 
precision  on  one  of  the  most  important  exceptions  with  which  this  maxim 
must  be  received.  Our  knowledge  of  our  own  existence  as  sentient  and 
intelligent  beings,  is  (as  I  formerly  endeavoured  to  shew)  not  an  inference 
from  experience,  but  a  fundamental  law  of  human  belief.  All  that  expe- 
rience can  teach  me  of  my  internal  frame,  amounts  to  a  knowledge  of  the 
various  mental  operations  whereof  I  am  conscious  ;  but  what  light  does 
experience  throw  on  the  origin  of  my  notions  of  personality  and  identity  i 
Is  it  from  having  observed  a  constant  conjunction  between  sensations  and 
sentient  beings  ;  thoughts  and  thinking  beings  ;  volitions  and  active  be- 
ings ;  that  I  infer  the  existence  of  that  individual  and  permanent  mind,  to 
which  all  the  phenomena  of  my  consciousness  belong  ?  Our  conviction  that 
other  men  are,  like  ourselves,  possessed  of  thought  and  reason  ;  together 
with  all  the  judgments  we  pronounce  on  their  intellectual  and  moral  cha- 
racters, cannot  (as  is  still  more  evident)  be  resolved  into  an  experimental 
perception  of  the  conjunction  of  different  objects  or  events.  They  are  in- 
ferences of  design  from  its  sensible  effects,  exactly  analogous  to  those" 

vol.  ii.  52 


410  NOTES    AND    ILLUSTRATIONS. 

which,  in  the  instance  of  the  universe,  Philo  would  reject  as  illusions  of  the 
fancy-* 

But  leaving  for  future  consideration  these  abstract  topics,  let  us,  for  a  mo- 
ment, attend  to  the  scope  and  amount  of  Philo's  reasoning. — To  those  who 
examine  it  with  attention,  it  must  appear  obvious,  that,  if  it  proves  any- 
thing, it  leads  to  this  general  conclusion,  That  it  would  be  perfectly  impos- 
sible for  the  Deity  if  he  did  exist,  to  exhibit  to  Man  any  satisfactory  evi- 
dence of  design  by  the  order  and  perfection  of  his  works.  That  every  thing 
we  see  is  consistent  with  the  supposition  of  its  being  produced  by  an  intelli- 
gent author,  Philo  himself  has  explicitly  acknowledged  in  these  remarkable 
words  :  "  Supposing  there  were  a  God,  who  did  not  discover  himself  imme- 
"  diately  to  our  senses  ;  would  it  be  possible  for  him  to  give  stronger  proofs 
"  of  his  existence,  than  what  appear  on  the  whole  face  of  nature  ?  What,  in- 
"  deed,  could  such  a  Divine  Being  do,  but  copy  the  present  economy  of 
K  things  ; — render  many  of  his  artifices  so  plain,  that  no  stupidity  could  mis- 
"take  them  ; — afford  glimpses  of  still  greater  artifices,  which  demonstrate 
"  his  piodigious  superiority  above  our  narrow  apprehensions  ; — and  conceal 
"  altogether  a  great  many  from  such  imperfect  creatures  ?" — The  sceptical 
reasonings  of  Philo,  therefore,  do  not,  like  those  of  the  ancient  Epicureans, 
hinge,  in  the  least,  on  alleged  disorders  and  imperfections  in  the  universe, 
but  entirely  on  the  impossibility,  in  a  case  to  which  experience  furnishes 
nothing  parallel  or  analogous,  of  rendering  intelligence  and  design  manifest 
to  our  faculties  by  their  sensible  effects. — In  thus  shifting  his  ground  from 
that  occupied  by  his  predecessors,  Philo  seems  to  me  to  have  abandoned  the 
only  post  from  which  it  was  of  much  importance  for  his  adversaries  to  dis- 
lodge him.  The  logical  subtilties,  formerly  quoted  about  experience  and 
belief,  (even  suppos  ng  them  to  remain  unanswered,)  are  but  little  calculated 
to  shake  the  authority  of  principles,  on  which  we  are  every  moment  forced 
to  judge  and  to  ac'c,  by  the  exigencies  of  life.  For  this  change  in  the  tactics 
of  modern  scept.es,  we  are  evidently,  in  a  great  measure,  if  not  wholly,  in- 
debted to  the  lustre  thrown  on  the  order  of  nature,  by  the  physical  re- 
searches of  the  two  last  centuries. 

*  This  last  consideration  is  ably  stale?'  by  Dr.  Reid.  (See  Essays  on  the  Intellec- 
tual Powers,  pp.  631,  632.  4to.  Ed.)  The  result  ol  his  argument  is,  that  "  according 
"  to  t'hilo's  reasoning  we  can  have  no  evidence  of  mind  or  design  in  any  of  oar  fel- 
a  low -men  " — At  a  considerably  earlier  period,  Buffier  had  fallen  into  the  same  train 
of  thinking.  Among  the  judgments  which  he  refers  to  common  sense,  he  assigns  the 
first  p'ace  to  the  two  follow  ing  "  1.  II  y  a  d'autres  etres,  et  d'autres  hommes  que  moi 
11  au  mende.  2  II  y  a  dans  eux  quelque  chose  qui  s'appelle  verite,  sagesse,  prudence" 
&c.  Sic.  (Cours  de  Sciences,  p.  566.  Paris,  1732.)  1  have  already  objected  to  the 
application  of  the  phrase  common  sense  to  snch  judgments  as  these  ;  but  this  defect,  in 
point  of  expression,  does  not  detract  from  the  sagacity  of  the  author  in  perceiving, 
that  in  the  conclusions  we  form  concerning  the  minds  and  characters  of  our  fellow 
creatures,  (as  well  as  in  the  inferences  drawn  concerning  the  invisible  things  of  God 
from  tlie  tilings  u-hich  are  made,)  there  is  a  perception  of  the  understanding  implied, 
for  which  neither  reasoning  nor  experience  is  sufficient  to  account. 


\A 


NOTES    AND    ILLUSTRATIONS.  411 

Another  concession  extorted  from  Philoby  the  discoveries  of  modern  sci- 
ence is  still  more  important.  I  need  not  point  out  its  coincidence  with  some 
remarks  in  the  first  part  o*"  this  section,  on  the  unconscious  deference  often 
paid  to  final  causes  by  those  inquirers  who  reject  them  in  theory ; — a  coin- 
cidence which  had  totally  escaped  my  recollection  when  these  remarks  wer» 
written.  1  quote  it  here,  chiefly  as  a  pleasing1  and  encouraging  confirmation 
of  the  memorable  prediction  with  which  Newton  concludes  his  Optical 
Queries  ;  that,  "  if  Natural  Philosophy,  in  all  its  parts,  by  pursuing  the  in- 
"  ductive  method,  shall  at  length  be  perfected,  the  bounds  of  Moral  Philo- 
fl  sophy  will  be  enlarged  also." 

"  A  purpose,  an  intention,  a  design,"  says  Philo,  "  strikes  every  where  the 
"  most  careless,  the  most  stupid  thinker;  and  no  man  can  be  so  hardened  in  ab- 
'*  surd  systems  as  at  all  times  to  reject  it.  That  Nature  does  nothing-  in  vain,  is 
"  a  maxim,  established  in  all  the  schools,  merely  from  the  contemplation  of  the 
"  works  of  Nature,  without  any  religious  purpose  ;  and  from  a  firm  conviction 
ec  of  its  truth,  an  anatomist,  who  had  observed  a  new  organ  or  canal,  would 
*'  never  be  satisfied  till  he  had  also  discovered  its  use  and  intention.  One 
"  great  foundation  of  the  Copeknican  system  is  the  maxim,  That  Nature 
"  acts  by  the  simplest  methods,  and  chooses  the  most  proper  means  to  any  end ; 
"  and  astronomers  often,  without  thinking  of  it,  lay  this  strong  foundation  of 
"  piety  and  religion.  The  same  thing  is  observable  in  other  parts  of  philo- 
i(  sophy  :  And  thus  all  the  sciences  lead  us  almost  insensibly  to  acknowledge 
lt  a  first  intelligent  author  ;  and  their  authority  is  often  so  much  the  greater, 
r'*  as  they  do  not  directly  profess  that  intention." 


*  P.  75. 


Since  this  sheet  was  cast  off,  I  have  been  informed  from  the  best  authori- 
ty, that  the  conversation  here  alluded  to,  which  I  had  understood  to  have 
taken  place  between  Lord  Chief  Justice  Mansfield,  and  the  late  Sir  Basil 
Keith,  really  passed  between  his  Lordship  and  another  very  distinguished 
officer,  the  late  gallant  and  accomplished  Sir  Archibald  Campbell.  I  have 
not,  however,  thought  it  worth  while,  in  consequence  of  a  mistake  which 
does  not  affect  the  substance  of  the  anecdote,  to  cancel  the  leaf; — more  es- 
pecially, as  there  is  at  least  a  possibility  that  the  same  advice  may  have 
been  given  on  more  than  one  occasion. 


\ 


APPENDIX. 


Article  I.    (See  page  121 .) 

J_  HE  following  article  relates  entirely  to  the  question, — "  How  far  it  is  true,  that 
W  all  mathematical  evidence  is  resolvable  into  identical  propositions?"  The  discus? 
gion  maj ,  in  one  point  of  view,  be  regarded  as  chiefly  verbal ;  but  that  it  is  not,  on 
that  account;  of  *o  'rifling  importance  as  might  at  first  be  imagined,  appears  from 
the  humiliating  inference  to  which  ii  has  be^n  supposed  to  lead  concerning  the  narrow 
jimita  of  human  knowledge.  "  Put  the  question,"  says  Diderot,  "  to  any  candid 
"  mathematician,  and  he  will  acknowledge,  that  all  mathematical  propositions  are 
il  merely  identical ;  and  that  the  numberless  volumes  written  (for  example)  on  the 
"  circle,  only  repeat  over  in  a  hundred  thousand  forms,  that  it  is  a  figure  in  which 
"  all  the  straight  lines  drawn  Irom  the  centre  to  i he  circumference  are  equal.  The 
f*  whole  amount  of  our  knowledge,  therefore,  is  next  to  nothing." — That  Diderot  has, 
in  this  very  paradoxical  conclusion,  staged  his  own  real  opinion,  will  not  be  easily 
believed  by  those  who  reflect  on  his  extensive  acquaintance  with  mathematical  and 
physical  science  ;  but  1  have  little  doubt,  that  he  has  expressed  the  amount  of  the 
doctrine  in  question,  agreeably  to  the  interpretation  put  on  it,  by  the  great  majority 
<*f  readers. 

As  the  view  of  this  subject  which  I  have  taken  in  the  text,  has  not  been  thought- 
satisfactory  by  my  friend  M.  Prevost,  I  have  thought  it  a  duty,  both  to  him  and  to 
myself,  to  annex  to  the  foregoing  pages,  in  his  own  words,  the  remarks  subjoined  to 
the  excellent  and  faithful  translation  with  which  he  has  honoured  this  part  of  my 
work,  in  the  Bibliotheque  Britanique.  Among  these  remarks,  there  is  scarcely  a 
proposition  to  which  I  do  not  give  my  complete  assent.  The  only  difference  between 
us  turns  on  the  propriety  of  the  language  in  which  some  of  them  are  expressed  ;  and 
on  this  point  it  is  not  surprising,  if  our  judgments  should  be  somewhat  biassed  bj'  the 
phraseology  to  which  we  have  been  accustomed  in  «ur  earlier  years.  The  few  sen- 
tences to  which  I  am  inclined  to  object,  I  have  distinguished  from  the  rest,  by  print- 
ing them  in  small  capitals. — Such  explanations  of  my  own  argument  as  appear  to  be 
necessary,  I  have  thrown  into  the  form  of  notes,  at  the  foot  of  the  page. 

In  the  course  of  M.  Prevost's  observations  on  the  point  in  question,  he  has  intro- 
duced various  original  and  happy  illustrations  of  the  important  distinction  between 
conditional  and  absolute  truths ; — a  subject  on  which  I  have  the  pleasure  to  find,  that 
all  our  views  coincide  exactly. 


"  A  la  fin  de  l'article  que  l'on'vient  de  lire,*  l'ingenieux  auteur  renvoie  a  ce  qu'il  a 
dit  au  commencement.  11  pense  3'  avoir  suflisamment  prouve  que  l'evidenee  pariicu- 
liere  qui  accompagne  le  raisonnement  mathematique  ne  peut  pas  se  resoudre  dans 
Ja  perception  de  fidentit§.  Recourons  done  a  cette  preuve.  Elle  se  trouve  consister 
toute  entiere  en  lefutation. 

*' 1.  L 'auteur  commence  par  remarquer,  que  quelques  personnes  fondent  I'opinion 
qu'il  rejette  sur  celle  qui  prend  les  axiomes  pour  premiers  principes.  Et  comme  il  a 
combattu  celle-ci,  il  en  conclut  que  sa  consequence  doit  etre  iausse.  Un  tel  argument 
a  en  effet  beaucoup  de  force  pour  ceux  qui  sont  partis  d'une  certaine  th€orie  sur  les 
axiomes  pour  en  conclure  l'assertion  contestee  ;  mais  il  n'en  a  point  pour  les  autres. 
Le  redacteurde  cet  article  se  range  parmi  ces  derniers.  Jl  a  dit  el  il  pense  encore, 
que  le  niuihenialicien  avance  de  supposition  en  supposition  ;  que  e'est  en  retournr.nt  sa 
penseesons  diyerses  formes,  qu'il  arrive  a  d'utiles  resultats;  que  c'est  la  recon- 

f  £hap.H,  Sect.  3.  Art.  II.  of  this  volume. 


414  APPENDIX. 

NOISSANCE  DE  QUELQUE  IDENTITE  QUI  AUTORISE  CHACUNE  DE  SES    CONCLUSIONS  \ 

et  toutefois  il  a  dit  et  il  persiste  &  croire,  que  les  axiomes  mathematiques  ne  ont  que 
tenir  la  place  ou  de  definitions  ou  de  theoremes ;  et  que  le^  definitions  sont  les  seuls 
principes  des  sciences  de  la  nature  de  la  geometric  Voici  ses  propres  expressions.* 
iC  J'observe  que  de  bonnes  definitions  initialed  sont  les  seuls  principes  rigoureusement 

"  suffisans  dans  les  sciences  de  raisonnement  pur.... C'est  dans  les  definitions  que 

"  sont  veVitablement  contenues  les  hypotheses  dont  ces  sciences  partent On 

"  pourroit  coneevoir,  [toujour?  dans  ces  metr.es  sciences,]  que  les  principes  fussent 
"  si  neltement  pos§s,  que  1'on  n'v  trouvat  autre  chose  que  de  bonnes  definitions  De 
"  ces  definitions  retourneps    i  e^ulieroient  toutes  les  propositions  sub^equentes.     Les 

*'  DIVERSES  PROPRIETES  DU  CERCLE  QUE  SONT-ELLES  AUTRE  CHOSE,  QUE  DIVER' 
"  SES    FACES  DE  LA    PROPOSITION  QUI  DEFINIT  CETTE  COURBE  ? — C'est  done    I'im- 

"  perfection  (peutetre  inevitable)  de  nos  conceptions,  qui  a  engage  a  faire  entrer 
*  les  axiomes  pour  quelque  chose  dans  les  principes  des  sciences  de  raisonnemenl  pur. 
4l  Et  ils  y  font  un  double  office.  Les  uns  rernplaeent  des  definitions.  Les  autres 
"  remplacent  des  propositions  susceptible*  d  eire  demontrees." 

"  [1  est  manifeste  que  celui  qui  a  tenu  de  tout  temps  ce  langage  n'a  pas  fonde"  son 
opinion,  vraie  ou  fausse,  relativemeni  a  l'evidence  mathematique,  sur  une  opinion 
fausse  relativement  aux  axiomes  ;  ou  du  moins,  qu'Stant  si  parfaitement  d'accord 
avec  Mr.  Dugald  Stewart  en  ce  qui  concerne  les  premiers  principes  des  matheoiati- 
ques,  ce  n'est  point  de  la  que  derive  Tapparente  discordance  de  ses  expressions  et  de 
celles  de  son  ami,  sur  ce  q  li  concerne  !e  principe  de  l'evidence  mathematique  dans 
la  deduction  demonstrative.  Des  lors  il  est  evident  que  ce  premier  argument  de 
1'auteur  reste  pour  lui  comme  nul. 

"  II.  Passons  au  second.  Celui-ci  est  encore  purement  negatif  et  personnel.  I! 
s'adresse  a  ceux  qui  derivent,  d'un  principe  propre  a  la  geometrie,  1'assertion  que 
J' auleur  combat.  De  ceque  I'egalitS  en  ieometrie  se  demontre  par  la  congruence^ 
ces  philosophes  se  pressenl  de  conclure,  que,  dans  toutes  les  ma'h§  natiques,  les 
verites  reposenl  sur  l'identite.  Ceux  done  qui  n'ont  jamais  songg  a  donner  un  tel 
appui  a.  l'asserlioa  contesiee  ne  peuvent  absolument  pas  se  rendre  a  I'attaque  dirigee 
contre  cet  appui.  II  est  probable  qu'un  tres-grand  nombre  de  partisans  du  principe 
de  l'identite,  considere  comme  base  de  la  demonstration,  se  trouvent  (comme  le 
redacteur  peut  ici  le  dire  de  lui-meme)  tout  a  fail  etrangers  a  la  maniere  de  raisonner 
que  l'auleur  refute :  et  n'ont  point  forme  leur  opinion  relativement  a  l'evidence  ma- 
thematique d'apres  la  congruence  (rCdle  ou  potentidle)  de  deux  espaces.  C'est  ce 
que  le  redacteur  affirme  ici,  quant  a  lui,  de  la  maniere  la  plus  po»i'ive  ;  et  de  la  re- 
sulte  que  l'argument  personnel,!  dirke  centre  ceux  qui  ont  eie  menes  d'une  de  ces 
opinions  a  l'autre,  ne  i'alteint  point. 

'•'  II  est  un  peu  plus  difficile  de  prouver  cette  affirmation,  que  quand  il  etoit  question 
des  axiomes,  parce  que  ceux'-ci  ne  peuvent  pas  manquer  de  s'offrir  aux  recherches  du 
logician,  au  lieu  qu'il  n'est  pas  appele  a  prSvoir  1'application  inconsideree  du  principe 
de  superposition  it  toute  espece  de  demonstration.  Si  cependant  il  fait  voir  que  son 
opinion  sur  la  demonstration  derive  de  principes  universels  et  tout  differens  de  celui 
qu'on  a  en  vue,  il  aura  fait,  je  pense,  tout  ce  qu'il  est  possible  d'attendre  de  lui. 

"  Qu'il  soit  maintenant  permis  au  rSdacteur  de  quitter  la  tierce  personne,  et  pour 
eviter  quelques  longueurs  et  quelques  expressions  indirectes,  d'etablir  nettement  son 
opinion  et  la  marche  qu'il  a  tenue  en  l'exposant. 

u  Des  les  premieres  pages  de  ma  logique,  je  pars  de  la  distinction  a  faire  entre  les 
deux  genres  de  verite  ;  la  conditionnelle  et  Pabsoluz.    Puis  j'ajoute: 

"  Le  MOVES  UNIQUE,  PAR  LEQUEL  NOUS  CONNOISSONS  SI  UNE  PROPOSITION  CON- 
a  P1TIONNELLE  EST  VRAIE,   OU  LE  CARACTERE  D'UNE  TELLE  VERITE,  EST  L'IDEK' 

*  Essais  de  Philos.  Tom.  II,  p.  39,  a  Geneve  chez  Pasch'W.d>  ISO*. 
f  Ad  homincm. 


APPENDIX*  415 

*t  TITE  BIEN  ETABLIE  ENTRE  LE  PRINCIPE  ET  LA  CONSEQUENCE.  CETTE  IDEN- 
«  TITE  N'EST  PAS  COMPLETE  SANS  DOUTE  ;  MAIS  ELLE  EST  TELLE  A  Q.UELO.UE 
**  EGARD,  QUE  LA  CONSEQUENCE  DOIT  ETRE  TOUTE  ENTIERE  COMPRISE  DANS  LE 
"  PRINCIPE."* 

"  Traitant  ensuite  des  sciences  selon  leur  genre,  j'appelle  sciences  de  raisonnement 
pur  celles  qui  ne  s'occupent  que  de  la  veYile  conditionnelle.  Je  cherche,  d'une  ma- 
niere  generate  et  abstraite,  les  caraciere=  de  ces  sciences.  J'en  fais  ensuite  Impli- 
cation aux  mathematiques  dans  les  deux  branches  qu'eiles  comprennent ;  et  c'est  par 
cette  vote,  que  je  me  trouve  avoir  determine-  la  nature  de  la  demonstration.  J'ai 
soin  du  reste  de  faire  remarquer  que  la  nature  du  raisonnement  pur,  ou  proprement 
dit,  ne  depend  nulleinent  du  sujet,  et  qu'il  n'est  propre  aux  mathematiques  qu'en  ce 
sens  que  ces  derniei  es  s'ocupent  de  raisonnement  d'une  maniere  exclusive  et  n'y 
melent  point  des  propositions  de  verile  absolue,  comme  font  les  sciences  de  fait  et 
d' experience.  En  voila  assez, je  crois,  pour  faire  voir  que  ce  n'est  pas  temerairement 
que  j'affirme  n'avoir  en  aucune  faQon  conc,u  la  nature  de  la  demonstration  d'apres  le 
point  de  vue  borne  de  la  superposition.  Je  ne  puis  done,  quant  a  moi,  donner  mon 
assenliment  a  un  argument  qui  n'attaque  que  ceux  dont  I'opinion  a  cette  base. 

"III.  On  est  ton  jours  long  quand  on  refute  une  refutation.  J'aurois  done  tort  de 
m'etendre  au-de!a  de  ce  qui  est  strictement  necessaire  pour  etablir  nettement  l'etat 
de  la  question.  Je  ne  disctiierai  pas  des  opinions  qui  me  sont  etrangeres,  telles  que 
celles  de  Leibnitz,  de  1'auteur  d'une  Dissertation  latine  imprimee  a.  Berlin  en  1764, 
de  Barrow,  Condillac,  Destutt-Tracy.  II  me  suffit  d'avoir  repondu,  pour  moi  et 
pour  ceux  qui  pensent  comme  moi,  aux  deux  seuls  argumens  de  l'auleur,  contre  I'opi- 
nion que  j'ai  des  long-temps  adoptee. 

"  J'ajouterai  cependant  un  mot  au  sujet  d'une  remarque,  que  1'auteur  introduit  en 
disant,  qu'elle  est  applicable  a  tnutes  les  tentatives  que  Von  afaites  pour  etablir  I'opi- 
nion dontil  s'agit.  "  Accordant,  dit-il,  que  toutes  les  propositions  mathematiques 
"  puissent  §tre  representees  par  la  formule  a  =  a.  il  ne  s'ensuivroit  nullement  que 
"  chaque  pas  du  raisonnement,  qui  conduit  a  ces  conclusions,  soit  une  proposition  de 
"  meme  nature."  Je  pi  ie  1'auteur  de  cette  objection  de  vouloir  bein  refiechir  un 
instant  sur  le  sens  du  mot  pas  rainene  a  son  expression  propre  et  non  figuree.  Cer- 
tainement  un  pas  du  raisonnement  n'est  autre  chose  qu'une  proposition.  Si  done  on 
accorde  que  toute  proposition  est  representee  par  a  =  «,  il  faudra  bien  que  tout  pa§ 
soit  de  meme  nature. t 

*  Essais  de  Phil.  Tom.  II.  p.  2.  "  Le  lecteur  equitable  voudra  bien  se  rappeler 
que  1'ouvrage,  dont  ce  passage  est  tire,  n'est  que  I'esquisse  d'un  cours  fort  etendu, 
dans  lequel  se  trouvent  developpes,  j  ar  des  exemples  et  de  toute  maniere,  les  simples 
6none6s  du  texte.  A  peine  est-il  necessaire  de  dire  ici  en  explication  ce  que  j'entends 
par  I'identite  compiete  ou  non  complete  entre  le  principe  et  sa  consequence.  Si  je 
conclus,  par  example,  du  genre  a  I'espece,  il  y  a  identiie  incomplete;  comme 
lorsqu'ayant  prouve  une  verte  de  tout  polygone.  je  l'aflirme  du  triangle  en  puiticu- 
lier.  II  y  a  identiie  compiete  dans  une  equation.  Et  on  entend  bien  que  I  identiie  ■ 
dont  il  s'agit  est  celle  de  la  quantite,  (du  nimbie  des  unites,)  et  non  dc  toute  autre. 
Ces  deux  exemples  me  sembient  mffire  pour  pievenir  toute  equivoque  " 

t  That  the  word  pas  or  step  is  a  figurative  expression,  when  applied  to  a  process  of 
reasoning,  cannot  be  disputed  ;  and  the  same  remark  may  he  extended  to  the  word 
proposition,  and  to  almost  every  other  term  employed  in  discussions  connecied  with 
the  Human  Mind.  It  may  be  doubted,  however,  whether  it  can  be  correctly  assert- 
ed, that  a  step  of  reasoning  differs  in  no  respect  from  a  proposition.  In  our  language, 
at  least,  the  word  step  properly  denotes,  not  a  proposition,  but  the  transition  to  a  new- 
proposition  from  others  all  eudy  knov'  n.  Thus,  when  1  say,  "  the  area  ol  a  triangle. 
"  having  the  circumference  of  a  circle  for  its  base,  and  the  radius  lor  its  altitude,  is 
u  greater  than  the  area  of  any  polygon  inscribed  in  tlie  circle,"  I  enunciate  -a  propo- 
sition. W  hen  1. say,  t  at  "  the  area  of  the  same  triangle  is  less  than  that  of  any 
"  circumscribed  polygon,"  1  enunciate  another  propositi&ttt  But  when  I  infer  from 
these  two  propositions,  that  the  areas  of  the  triangle  and  circle  are  equal,  1  obtain 
possession  of  a  new  truth  distinct  from  either  ;  nor  is  it  easy  to  imagine  a  more  sig- 
nificant metaphor  for  expressing  this  acquisition,  than  to  say,  that  I  have  advanced 
©r  gained  a  step  in  the  study  of  geometry. 


> 


416  APPENDIX. 

"  Quant  a  la  letlre  chiffVee,  certainement  elle  differe  de  la  nonchiffree  quant  aufc 
signes  ecrils ;  comme  aussi  les  plus  exageres  partisans  du  principe  de  l'identiie  nd 
nieront  pas  que  l'expression  deux  plus  deux  ne  soit  differSnte  de  1'expression  quaire. 
Dans  l'un  et  l'autre  cas  le  signe  differe,  le  sens  que  Ton  a  en  vue  est  le  meme. 

"  IV.  Les  observations  precedentes  ont  pour  but  de  prouver  que,  dans  les  procSdes 
de  raisonnement,  (precedes  que  les  mathematiques  offrent  degages  de  tout  melange*) 
on  deduit  les  consequences  en  s'appuyant  constamment  su'r  le  piuncipe  d'identite. 
Je  do»  dire  un  mot  maintenant  de  la  raison  pour  laquelle  je  crois  necessaire  d'etablir 
solidement  ce  principe  et  de  la  mettre  au-dessus  de  tout  attaque.  Cette  raison  est> 
qu'a  1'instant  oii  on  le  perd  de  vue,  on  court  risque  de  confondre  deux  genres  de  veri- 
tes,  que  nous  savons  tous  qu'il  faut  distinguer.  Ce  qu'il  importe  de  prevenir,  c'est  le 
passage  inaper^u  du  relatif  a.  1'absolu  ;  c'est  une  conclusion  vicieuse,  diduite  regu- 
lierement  d'une  hypothese,  et  tSmerairement  appliquee  a  ce  qui  e*t  independant  de 
cette  hypothese.  Ce  sophisme  qui  paroit  grossier,  a  neanmoins  ete  commis  plus 
d'une  fois  et  le  sera,  dans  quelques  occasons  deceptrices,  par  ceux  qui  n'auront  paS 
pleinement  analyst  le  travail  du  raisonnement. 

"  Tout  se  r§duit,  sans  doute,  en  fait  de  raisonnement,  a.  reconnoitre  que  la  conse- 
quence est  bien  deduite  du  principe.  Mais  quel  est  le  caraciere  auquel  on  reconnoitra 
que  cette  deduction  a  ete  bien  faite  ?  C'est  ce  que  ne  disent  pas  ceux  qui  rejettent  le 
caraciere  de  l'identiie.  Et  j'avone  que  je  ne  conqoispas  quel  auire  on  pourroit  tenter 
d'y  substituer.  Celui-la  est  simple  et  clair.*  On  peut,  a.  chaque  proposition, 
s'arreter  pour  voir  si  elle  n'est  que  le  developpement  d'une  precedente  ;  et  si,  par 
inadvertance  on  sort  du  genre,  en  melant  des  fails  aux  hypotheses,  on  est  ramene 
force  men  t  a.  celles^ci. 

"  Si  Jean  Bernoulli  et  Leibnitz  avoient  reconnu  leurs  hypotheses  aussi  nettement 
qu'Euler  les  reconnut  plus  tard,  ils  n'auroient  pas  ete  divises  d'opinion  sur  la  nature 
des  logarithmes  des  nombres  negatifs  et  imaginaires.  Si  Huyghens  n'avoit  vu,  dan^ 
le  travail  du  matheniaiicien,  que  le  retournement  de  ses  propres  hypotheses,  il  ne  se 
seroit  pas  servi  peut  etre  de  l'expression  que  rapporte  Leibnitz.  Ce  dernier  lui  ayant 
montre,  qu'une  quantite  meiee  d'imaginaires  pouvoit  etre  convertie  en  quantite 
reelle,  "  Huyghens,  dit  Leibnitz,  trouva  cela  si  admirable,  qu'il  me  repondit  qu'il 
"ya  la-dedans  quelque  chose  qui  nous  est  incomprehensible."! 

"  Je  connois  un  professeur  de  logique,  qui  a  coutume,  dans  ses  cours,  d'embarras' 
ser  a  dessein  ses  Sieves  par  des  questions  relatives  aux  rapports  des  quantites  nega- 
tives et  positives.  Si  un  paradoxe  les  arrete,  ils  se  tiennent  pour  avertis,  qu'il  ne 
peut  y  avoir  dans  les  consequences,  que  ce  qui  est  implicitement  conlenu  dans  le 
principe  ;  et  ils  se  donnent  le  soin  de  bien  affermir  celuici,  je  veux  dire,  de  le  reduire 
a  des  termes  parfaitement  clairs ;  apres  qnoi,  il  ne  leur  en  coute  point  de  lever  les 
difficultes.  Mais  si  Ton  n'est  pas  bien  preoccupe  de  cette  verite  londamentale,  on 
ne  saura  a  quoi  irnputer  l'anomalie,  ou  l'apparente  contradiction,  des  consequences. 

"  Personne  n'admire  plus  sincerement  que  je  ne  fais  le  genie  de  Jaq.  Bernoulli, 
qu'il  a  si  heureusement  applique  a  la  theorie  des  probabilites  ;  et  je  ne  fais  certaine- 
ment  aucune  injure  a.  sa  memoire,  en  le  produisant  comme  un  exemple  de  la  facilite 
avec  laquelle  le  mathematieien,  seduit  par  ses  belles  decouvertes,  oublie  un  instant 
quel  est  le  genre  de  verite  qui  lui  est  propre.  J'ai  en  vue  la  derniere  reflection  de 
son  Art  de  conjecturer.  D'une  formule  (tres-belle  sans  doute  et  tres-ingenieuse)  par 
laquelle  ce  pro  fond  penseur  a  apprecie  la  probability  d'approcher  du  rapport  des 
causes  en  multipliant  les  effets  ;  tout-a-coup  il  conclut  a  la  regularity  des  lois  que 
gouvernent  runivers.l, 

*  Would  it  not  be  still  simpler  and  clearer  to  caution  mathematicians  against  ever 
losing  sight  of  the  distinction  between  absolute  and  hypothetical  truths  ? 

t  Leibnitz.  Opera,  Tom.  III.  p.  372.    Letlre  a  Varignon. 
_  t  Uncle  tandem  hoc  sirigulare  sequi  videtur,  quod  si  eventuum  omnium  observa- 
tipries  per  totam  seteinitatem  contitiuarentur,  (probabilitate  ultimo  in  perfectam  certi-. 


APPENDIX.  417 

"  On  ne  me  reprochera  pas  d'avoir  tire  mes  exemples  dee  ecrits  de  quelques  rai« 
sonneurs  m§diocres  ;  et  l'on  voudra  bien  croire,  que  si  j'avois  voulu  puiser  a  de  telles 
sources,  j'aurois  eu  beaucoup  de  facilite  a  multiplier  mes  citations. 

f*  Je  pense  done  enfin,  qu'il  faut  que  celui  qui  travaille  dans  les  sciences  de  raison- 
nement  pur  soit  bien  averti,  qu'il  ne  fait  autre  chose  que  retourner  ses  hypotheses,  et 
que  e'est  11  le  seul  moyen  de  prevenir  des  erreurs  assez  dangereuses.  L'opinion  que 
je'soutiens  n'est  done  point  simplement  une  affaire  de  speculation,  dont  il  me  seroit 
aise  de  faire  le  sacrifice  ;  e'est  une  regie  pratique  qui  doit  servir  de  base  a  la  partie 
de  la  logique  qui  s'occape  de  cette  espece  de  verite. 

"  V.  Je  dirai  maintenant  pourquoi,  attache  comme  je  le  suis,  au  principe 
de  l'identite,  je  crois  neanmoins  pouvoir  espei  er  de  ne  differer  qu'en  apparence 
de  I'excellent  philosophe  qui  rejette  ce  principe  C'est  parce  que  nous  pensons  l'ua 
et  Pautre  que  les  definitions  sont  les  vrais  principes  des  math^matiques,  et  que  tout 
le  reste  en  derive.  C'est  15.  sans  dome  I'objet  principal.  Et  je  m'assure,  que  quand 
ce  philosophe  viendra  a.  discuter  (avec  plus  de  detail  que  son  sujet  ne  l'appeloit  a  le 
faire)  le  vrai  car  eterede  la  bonne  deduction,  il  finira  par  admeltre,  sinon  les  memes 
expressions,  du  moins  au  fond  le  meme  principe  que  j'emploie. 

"  Je  vois  en  effet,  et  pjy1'  son  ouvrage  et  par  sa  correspondanee,  que  ce  sont  les 
expressions  sur-toui  qu'ilcensure;  et  quant  a  ce  point  la,  je  serai  tres-dispose  &  y 
apporter  les  changemens  qu'il'voudra  bien  lui-meme  me  sugg€rer,  pourvu  toutefois 
qu'elles  rendent  correctement  ma  pensee. 

"  Ainsi  apres  lui  avoir  expose,  dans  une  letlre,  mes  id§es  au  sujet  du  principe 
d'identite,  j'ajoutois  :  "  Tout  cela  revient  a  dire,  que  la  consequence  est  contenue 
"  toute  entiere  dans  le  principe.  Ne  pourroit-on  pas  donner  a  toutes  les  propositions 
"  mathemariques  celte  tournure  :  Dire  telle  chose,  c'est  dire  telle  autre  chose?"  Mr. 
Dugald  Stewart  me  tepoiid  la-dessus  :  "  Je  suis  parfaitement  d'accord  avec  vous, 
"  quant  a.  Fesprit  et  a.  la  substance  de  votre  remarque.  Celui  qui  admet  la  definition 
"  ou  Yhijpothe.se  ne  peut  pas  nier  ses  diverses  consequences  logiques,  pourvu  qu'il 
"  soit  en  Stat  de  comprendre  chaque  pas  de  la  marche  par  laquelle  le  principe  et  les 
"  consequences  sont  lies  ensemble.  Je  ne  suis  pas  sur  toutefois  que, -pour  le  gros  des 
"  lecteurs,  vous  ne  presentiez  pas  cette  proposition  d'une  manie~re  tr»p  concise  et 
"  tiop  figuiee,  quand  vous  dites  que  la  consequence  est  contenue  clans  le  principe,  ou 
"  qu'affinner  I'un  c'est  affirmer  Pautre.  Tout  au  moins  je  pense  qu'il  y  a  lieu  de 
"  craindre  que  ces  expressions  ne  suggerent  de  fausses  idees  a  ceux  qui  ne  prendront 
"  pas  garde  au  sens  precis  que  vous  tlonnez  aux  mots  que  vous  employez."  Je  suis 
done  tout  pret  a.  remplacer  le  mot  contenue  par  un  equivalent.  Mais  ce  mot  me 
seinble  pris  ici  dans  un  sens  familier  aux  iogiciens  ;  car  c'est  precisement  ainsi  que 
l'on  dit  communement  que  l'espece  est  comprise  dans  le  genre.* 

tudinem  abennle,)  omnia  in  mundo  cerlis  rationibus  et  constant!  vicissitudinis  lege 
eontingere  deprehendeientur  ;  adeo  ut,  etiam  in  maxime  casualibus  atque  fortuitis, 
quandam  quasi  necessitatem,  et,  ut  sic  dicain,  (atalitatem  agnoscere  teneamur; 
qiiam  nescio  annon  Plato  intendere  voluerit,  suo  de  universali  rerum  apocatastasi 
dogmate,  etc.  Ait.  conj.  p.  4,  fine. 

*  "  Si  Ton  pent  dire  que  la  notion  de  triangle  est  comprise  dans  celle  de  polygone, 
on  pourra  dire  de  eertaines  propositions  sur  les  triangles  qu'elles  sont  comprises  dans 
leurs  analogues  sur  les  polygones.  Si  done  on  a  prouve,  par  exemple,  que  dans  tout 
polygoue,  les  angles  exterieurs  sont  egaux  a  qualre  droits,  on  pourra  de  ce  principe 
tirer  la  consequence  pour  les  triangles.  Et  cette  consequence  semble  pouvoir  etre 
dite  contenue  elans  son  principe.'1 

Willi  this  remark  t  perfectly  agree;  for  he  who  knows  the  general  theorem  is  in 
actual  possession  of  all  its  particular  cases  ;  insomuch  that,  after  this  theorem  has 
been  once  brought  to  light,  no  other  peison  can  afterwards  lay  claim  to  any  one  of 
the  cases  as  an  original  discovery.  After  it  had  been  demonstrated,  for  instance, 
that  in  every  rectilineal  figure,  the  exterior  angles  are  equal  to  four  right  angles,  no 
geometer  could  well  think  of  announcing,  as  a  new  proposition,  that  the  same  theo- 
rem holds  with  respect  to  every  triangle.  The  particular  cases,  therefore,  may  all 
VOL.  it.  53 


US  APPENDIX* 

"  Un  autre  rnot,  que  relgve  Mr.  Dugald  Stewart,  est  eelui  de  proposition  identique.  * 
II  me  fait  remarquer,  que  plusieurs  bons  logiciens  ont  appelS  de  ce  nom  les  proposi- 
tions qui  ne  font  que  :epeter  le  mSrne  mot  auxdeux  termes,  (A  est  A,)  et  qu'ils  de- 
signed ces  propositions  comme  inutiles  el  nugatoires.  Je  renoncerai  sans  discussion, 
sur  l'antririte  de  ces  logiciens,  a 1'expression  que  j'ai  adoptge,  quoique  je  puisse  oppa- 
ser  «utorite  a.  autorite.  Mais  je  desire  conserver  un  mot  qui  exprime,  de  maniere  ou 
d'autre,  ma  pensee.  Comme  dit  Campbell, t  cette  phrase  "  quatre  est  quatre," 
n'offre  qu'une  proposition  inutile  et  veritablement  nugatoire.  Mais  dire  "  deux  fois 
"  deux  font  quatre,"  c'est  presenter  la  meme  idee  sous  deux  faces  ;  et  un  tel  travail 
est,  comme  on  sail,  fort  utile.  Je  m'etois  accoutume  a  appeler  tautologiques  les  pre- 
mieres, etidentiques  les  secondes.  Je  suis  tout  pret  a  changer  cette  habitude,  pourvu 
que  l'on  me  fburnisse  un  mot  a  substituer.{ 

u  Enfin  Mr.  Dugald  Stewart  joins  a.  ces  critiques  une  remarque,  qui  fait  voir  qu'un 
des  motifs,  pour  lesquels  il  s'est  £leve  contre  le  principe  d'identite,  est  la  crainte  qu'il 
n'entraine  dans  quelques  consequences  fausses  ou  meme  dangereuses.  Voici  comme 
il  s'exprime  sur  la  fin  de  la  lettre,  dont  je  viens  d'extraire  les  observations  preceden- 
ces: "  A  toutes  ces  propositions,  comme  vous  les  entendez,  je  souscris  sans  difficulte. 
"  Mais  n'est-il  pas  a  craindre  qu'elles  ne  fassent  naitre  dans  l'esprit  de  quelques  lec- 
"  teurs  des  idees  difforentes  de  celles  que  vous  y  atlachez  ?  Et  n'ont-elles  pas  une 
"  tendance  a  dcnncr  un  air  paradoxal  a.  une  doctrine,  qui,  lors-qu'elle  est  proposee 
"  d'une  maniere  un  peu  pleine,  ne  donne  aucune  prise  au  doute  ou  a.  l'h§sitation  ? 
il  Quelle  etrange  consequence  a  ete  tiree  de  l'usage  de  ce  mot  identity,  par  un  philo- 
"  sophe,  tel  que  Diderot!  Interrogez,  dit-il,  des  mathematiciens  de  bonne  foi,  et  Us 
u  vous  avoueront  que  lews  propositions  sont  toutes  identiques  ;  et  que  tant  de  volumes 
il  sur  le  cercle,  par  exemple,  se  reduisent  a  nous  repeler  en  cent  mille  fa<?ons  differen- 

be  said,  with  perfect  propriety,  to  he  contained  in  the  general  theorem.  But  how 
widely  does  this  differ  from  the  meaning  annexed  to  the  same  word,  when  it  is  said, 
that  all  the  properties  of  the  circle,  whether  discovered  or  undiscovered,  are  contained 
in  Euclid's  definition  of  that  curve  ? 

*  Mr.  Dugald  Stewart  reproche  aussi  quelque  part  au  mot  d'identite  d'etre  em- 
prunte  des  scolastiques,  mais  ce  n'est  point  la.  une  (ache  a  mon  avis  ;  car  (comme 
disoit  Leibnitz  en  parodiant  un  mot  de  Virgile  ;)  il  y  a  de  For  dans  ce  fumier.  De 
plus  en  Anglais  on  pourroit  peu!-etre  se  passer  de  ce  mot,  en  Franciiis  on  ne  le  peut 
pas.    Nous  parlous  une  langue  timide,  qui  s'effraie  du  moindre  ncologisme." 

t  Voyez  Bib!.  Brit.  p.  32  de  ce  volume.— Litterut.  Vol.  LVIll  No.  3,  Mars  1815. 

|  The  distinction  marked  in  the  above  passage,  between  tautological  and  identical 
propositions  is  precise  and  important  ;  but  the  meaning  annexed  to  the  latter  epithet 
does  not  appear  to  me  agreeable  to  established  use ;  according  to  which,  identical 
propositions  are  exactly  of  that  description  to  which  the  name  of  tautological  is  here 
applied.  I  have  looked  into  every  b"Ok  of  logic  within  my  reach,  and  find  their 
language  on  this  subject  perfectly  uniform.  Locke  defines  identical  propositions  to 
be  those  in  which  a  term  is  affirmed  of  itself;  and  he  gives  as  instances,  "  a  sou!  is 
11  a  soul,"  "  a  spirit  is  a  spirit,"  "  a  law  is  a  law,"  '•  right  is  right;"  and  "  wrong  is 
"  wrong." — The  definition  of  identical  propositions  given  by  Crousaz  coincides  ex- 
actly with  that  of  Locke :  "  Quando  subjeeti  et  attributi  sedem  idem  oecupat  termi- 
"  nue,  eodem  sensu  prorsus  veniens  ;  proposilio  talis  dicitur  idenlica  ;  et  nugatoria 
"  est." — Condillac,  one  of  the  highest  authorities,  certainly,  among  French  logicians, 
expresses  himself  in  the  same  manner  "  Tout  le  systeme  des  connoissances  hu- 
"  maines  peut-etre  rendu  par  une  expression  plus  abie^ee  et  tout-a-fait  identique  : 
"  les  sensations  sont  des  sensations.  Si  nous  pouvious,  dans  toutes  les  sciences,  suivre 
"  egalement  la  generation  des  idees,  et  saisir  le  vrai  systeme  des  choses,  uous  verrions 
"  d'une  vente  naitre  toutes  les  autres,  el  nous  trouverions  l'expression  abregee  de 
"  tout  ce  que  nous  saurions,  dans  cette  proposition  identique  ;  le  meme  est  le 
"  meme."  Does  not  the  last  of  these  propositions,  as  well  as  the  first,  fall  under  the 
class  of  tautological  or  nugatory  propositions?  and,  if  this  be  the  case,  will  it  not 
follow,  that  the  assertion  which  gave  rise  to  this  discussion  requires  some  modifica- 
tion ? — "  C'est  en  repetant  sans  cesse,  le  meme  est  le  meme,  que  le  geometre  opere 
"  tous  ses  prodiges," 


APPENDIX.  419 

'.'  tes,  que  c'est  une  figure,  ou  toutes  les  lignes  tirees  du  centre  a  la  circonfere?ice  sont 

«  £gales.      NOUS  NE  SAVONS  DONC  PRESQCE    RIEN."* 

"  Cette  derniere  conclusion,  a  laquelle  arrive  Diderot,  est  d'autant  plus  Strange, 
comme  le  dit  celui  que  la  cite,  que  c'est  pr€(iseinent  parce  que  les  mathematiques 
travaillent  sur  la  veriie  conditionnelle,  qu'elles  sont  donees  d'tine  pleine  certitude, 
ainsi  que  j'ai  tache  de  la  faire  voir  ailleurs.t  et  que  c'est  par  consequent  a  ce  titre 
qu'elles  merilent  eminemment  le  nom  de  science.  Mais  de  ce  qu'un  philosophe,  tel 
que  Diderot,  s'esl  egare  dans  une  consequence  a  laquelle  sans  doule  il  aspiroit,  je  ne 
crois  pas  que  Ton  doive  conclure  a  la  necessite  de  change;-  un  langage  philo>ophique 
et  conlbrme  a  la  verite.  Si  ce  langage  a  une  appareuce  de  parado.ve,  ce  que  je  ne 
sens  pas,  il  Taut  lacher  de  la  reformer,  a  quoi  je  suis  bien  dispose  a  oooperer. 

"  Dans  tout  le  volume  que  j'extrais,  il  n'esl  plus  question  de  la  discussion  qui  vient 
de  nous  occuper.  Je  ne  crois  pas  en  consequence  avoir  occasion  d'y  revenir.  Ce 
n'est  pas  meme  sans  regret,  et  sans  une  sorte  de  repugnance,  que  je  l'ai  entreprise. 
Je  ne  la  tertninerai  pas  sans  rappeller  encore  une  Ibis  que  1'espece  d'opposition  qui 
rSgne  entre  no?  opinions  est  moins  reelle  qu'apparente,  et  que  Mr.  Dugald  Stewart 
a  juge  lui-memeque  c'eHoit  sur  les  mots  que  nous  differions,  plutot  que  sur  le  fond 

des  choses."  

Article  II.     (See  page  232.) 

For  the  contents  of  this  Article,  as  -well  as  of  the  former,  I  am  indebted  to  M. 
Prevost.  They  are  extracted  from  a  letter,  dated  Geneva,  9'.h  April  I8J5. — My 
readers  will  thus  be  put  in  possession  of  the  opinion  of  my  learned  friend  on  the  only 
two  questions  of  any  moment  which  we  have  had  occasion  to  discuss  in  the  course 
of  our  long  literary  correspondence.  The  difference  between  us,  in  both  instances, 
I  perfectly  agree  with  him  in  thinking,  is  more  apparent  than  real. 

"  Mais  il  y  a  une  autre  question  sur  laquelle  nous  diff erons,  ou  du  moins  nous 

ne  nous  expiimons  pas  de  meme.  C'est  ce  qu'eiablit  d'une  maniere  positive,  et  dans 
des  expressions  bien  honorables  pour  moi,  la  note  qui  se  trouve  au  bas  de  la  page 
311J  de  ce  meme  2d  volume  de  vos  Elejn.  of  the  Phil.  &c. — Ce  qu'il  y  a  de  sin°u- 
lier,  c'est  qu'encore  ici,  j'ai  lieu  de  croire  que  notre  dissenliment  est  moins  reel 
qu'apparent,  et  que  la  controverse  surce  point  n'est  pas  moins  verbaleque  sur  l'autre, 
peut-etre  plus,  ou  du  moins  plus  evidemment  telle.  La  chose  vaut  la  peine  d'etre 
eefctircie. — Et  d'abord,  vu  la  distance  qui  nous  separe,  oserois-je  vous  prier  de  relire 
ici  ce  que  je  dis  a  la  page  viii  et  ix  de  ma  preface  a.  la  traduction  de  vctre  premier 
volume.  Vous  y  verrez  que  je  n'etablis  aucune  difference  entre  nous  relaiivement  a 
la  nature  des  causes  physiques.^    En  citant  a  la  p.  311  ||  du  2d  vol.  les  deux  phrases 

*  Leltre  sur  les  aveugles.         t  Des  Signes,  p.  15  et  25  et  suiv. — Essais  de  Philos 
Tom.  II.  p.  12  et  13.  %  Page  232  of  this  edition. 

§  The  passage  here  referred  to  by  M.  Pi  evost  is  as  follows  : 

"  Je  n  entend  pas  toutefois  souseiire  implieitement  a  toutes  les  opinions  de  l'autenr. 
Je  nic  suis  present  clans  cette  traduction  de  rendre  fidelement  ses  pensees,  et  ie  n'ai 
pas  crn  devoir  toujours  lui  opposer  les  miennes,  dans  les  easrares  ou  je  ne  me  iron  void 
pas  d'accord  avec  lui.  J'en  donnerai  un  seul  exemple-  LWeur  envisage  comme 
contraire  aux  principes  d'une  saine  philosophic  la  recherche  de  la  cause  ou  du  me. 
canisme  rle  la  gravitation.  Ceux  qui  ont  connoissance  des  travaux  entiepris  et  exe- 
cutes par  G.  L.  Le  Sage  sur  celte  niatiere,  saveiit  qu'une  telle  recherche  est  com- 
patible avec  la  metbode  philosophique  la  plus  riguureuse,  Je  suis  pleinement  d'ac- 
cord avec  M.  Stewart,  quant  a  la  regie  generate  a  laquelle  cette  maxime  particuliere 
se  rapporle.  II  y  a  une  limite,  que  le  philosophe  doit  leconnnitie,  et  audelj  de  la- 
quelle il  ne  doit  pas  pousser  ses  recherches.  *  Mais  je  differe  sur  la  place  ou  code 
limile  doit  etre  posee  ;  en  convenant  toutefois,  que  la  recherche  du  mecahisme  de  la 
gravitation  a  6te  l'occasion  d'une  multitude  d'eireurs,  el  que  c'est  un  veritable  eiueil 
qui  doit  etre  soigneusement  evite  par  ceux  qui  debutent  dans  la  carriere  de*  scitnees 
philosophiques.  Quoique  cette  question  sort  ties  interessante  en  physique,  elle-1'est 
moins  en  nieta|  hxsique,  ou  plutot  en  logiquc  ;  puisque  dans  cette  derniSre  science  ce 
n'est  qu'nn  exemple  d'une  regie  qui  a  beaucoup  d 'applications.  Par  cette  raison,  je 
m'abstiendrai  d'entrer  ici  dans  la  discussion  de  ce  point  conteste." 

II  Page  232  of  this  edition. 


420  APPENDIX. 

aux  quelles  vous  reduisez  mes  opinions  a  ce  sujet,  il  vous  a  echappe  que  la  premiere 
de  ces  phrases  etoit  modifiee  par  celle  qui  la  suit  et  que  vous  avez  omise.  Cette  mo- 
dification est  tout-a-fait  essentielle.  "  Si  Ton  analyse  le  mot  force  ou  energie,  et 
"  qu'on  se  borne  aux  causes  naturelles  ;  on  verra  que  cela  signifie  que  1'effet  suit 
"  constamment  la  cause  par  quelque  loi  de  la  nature."  Dans  mes  cours  d'enseigne- 
ment,  j'insiste  beaucoup  sur  cette  definition,  a  laquelle  je  ne  crois  pas  que  (dans  vos 
idees  telles  que  je  les  connois)  vous  ayez  rien  a.  objecter  Elle  j>resenle  en  effet  le 
meme  caractere  des  causes  physiques  que  Hume  et  vous  ;  et  elle  repond  en  meme 
temps  a  une  difficulte  de  Reid,  tres-fondee  si  on  n'y  met  aucune  limite.  Est-il  besoin 
avec  vous  de  details  et  d'exemples  ?  Je  ne  le  pense  pas.  Cependant  la  crainte-  d'etre 
obscur  me  fera  ajouter  un  mot.  A  la  nouvelle  lune  de  Mars,  les  Mahometans  se 
tiennent  prels  a.  voir,  et  des  qu'ils  l'apercoivent  ils  jeltent  un  cri.  Ce  cri  est  bien 
un  signe,  mats  non  une  cause  de  l'apparition  que  j'aurai  devant  les  yeux  en  les  tour- 
nant  vers  le  ciel.  II  precede,  mais  ce  n'est  pas  en  vertu  d'une  loi.  Reciproquement, 
un  corps  electrique  etant  frotte  un  autre  corps  s'en  approche,  je  dis  indifferemment 
que  1'un  de  ces  corps  attire  l'autre,  ou  que  I'electricite  est  cause  de  ce  mouvement. 
C'est  que  ces  fails  se  suivent  en  vertu  des  lois  de  1'electricite.  Et  il  est  entendu  que 
Ton  remonte,  tant  que  Ton  peut,  de  cause  en  cause.  Ainsi  Ton  pourroit  demander  la 
cause  de  1'electricite;  comme  on  pourroit  demander  celle  de  la  fievre,  qui  elle-meme 
est  cause  du  delire,  &tc.  Sic.  Je  dis  done  que  nous  sommes  pleinement  d'accord  sur 
la  nature  des  causes  physiques,  a  moins  (ce  que  je  ne  prevois  pas)  que  vous  ne  me 
contestiez  la  distinction  que  j'etablis  entre  cause  et  signe. — Le  point  sur  lequel  nous 
ne  sommes  pas  d'accord  (et  ou  j'ai  contre  moi,  outre  vous,  plusieurs  nobles  autorites) 
est  une  question  de  physique  pure ;  savoir :  la  cause  de  la  gravitation  est-elle  au 
nombre  de  celles  dont  on  doit  s'occuper  ?  Persistons  a  cet  egard  chacun  dans  notre 
opinion.  11  est  pro'/ableque  ce  champ  de  discussion  ne  nous  engagera  pas  dans  une 
controverse  direcle,  et  je  m'en  feliciterai. — Je  passe  a  remarquer  la  difference  entre 
loi  el  cause.  Une  loi  est  un  rapport,  ou  mieux,  un  rapport  de  rapports,  une  propor- 
tion. C'esi  une  chose  theorique  ;  c'est  une  generalisation  ;  une  loi  ne  pent  agir.  II 
faut  done  un  agent ;  une  cause,  pour  realiser  un  changement.  Exemple.  "  Si  le 
11  pole  nord  d'un  aimant  est  approche  du  pole  sud  d'un  autre  aimant,  il  y  a  attrac- 
'■  tion."  C'est  une  loi.  Mais  ce  simple  enonce  ne  produit  rien.  Maintenant  j'ai 
sur  ma  table  deuxaimans,  j'oppose  leurs  poles  antagonistes  ;  la  cause  y  est ;  1'attrac- 
tion  (ou  approche)  suivra  d'apres  la  loi. — J'ai  risque  de  proposer  que  le  mot  agent 
fut  plus  particuHerement  consacie  aux  causes  impulsives,  parce-qu'elles  sont  celles 
qui  produisent  des  phenoinene^  tres  communs,  tres-bien  discutes,  et  universels.  Je 
n'ai  propose  cela  qu'avec  une  expression  de  doute  ;  et  je  n'ai  rii  n  a  dire  a.  ceux  qui 
s'y  refusent. — Pour  mieux  montrer  que  la  distinction  de  loi  et  cause  est  necessaire  en 
physique,  j'userai  d'un  exemple.  Un  homme,  venu  de  je  ne  sais  ou,  voit  un  cheval 
qui  traine  un  chariot  ;  mais  il  n'apercoit  point  les  trails.  A  chaque  pas  que  fait  le 
cheval,  il  voit  le  chariot  avancer.*  II  en  conclut  que  le  cheval  est  cause  du  mouve- 
ment du  chariot.  11  penelre  plus  avant  et  trouve  les  traits  ;  il  reconnoit  que  ce 
mouvement  se  rapporte  a  Pimpulsion.  Tout  cela  suppose  qu'il  connoit  les  lois  de 
celles-ci.  Le  cheval  est  une  cause,  le  trait  est  mp,  cause  plus  reculee.  C'est  celle-ci 
que  j'appellerois  un  agent.  Mais  pour  cette  dermere  denomination  je  ne  dois  pas 
trop  y  tenir. — Quant  a  la  fiction  de  Boscovich,  purement  hypolhetique;  j'avoue  que 
je  ne  vois  pas  qu'el!e  soit  d'un  grand  poids  en  faveur  de  ceux  qui  inculpent  la 
recherche  de  la  cause  de  la  gravitation.  J'aurois  sur  ce  sujet  plus  a  dire  ;  mais  com- 
me c'est  purement  un  point  de  physique,  il  me  semble  que  je  puis  ici  m'en  abstenir." 

*  II  est  entendu  que  ce  fait  se  repete  souvent  d'une  maniere  uniforme  sur  plusieurs 
chariots  pareils  et  iierativement  sur  chacun. 

THE  END. 


•"it  i   th-'AkM. 


